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ABSTRACT 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis identifies and defines the new African sovereignty. It establishes a modern 
sovereignty in Africa hatched from the changing nature of sovereignty in which countries come 
together at various levels or grades of partial surrender of national sovereignty in order to work 
closer together for their mutual advantage and benefit. To this end, the narrative zooms in on 
the central issues within the realms of money matters whereby a new model of monetary 
sovereignty and monetary solutions is designed in an attempt to ease the recurring tensions and 
challenges of modern national sovereignty in the continent of Africa. As such, this discussion 
will offer a historical journey through the constitution of sovereignty, to the birth of the nation 
state and international public law. It develops the theory of the changing nature of sovereignty 
within the modern state and opens new lines of inquiry for Africa. In this regard, it draws from 
juxtaposing and mixing elements of regional and global financial integration as well as retaining 
national financial sovereignty features to form this new design which I dub continental 
sovereignty. 
 
At its core, the thesis will deal with the legal aspects that stem from the co-mingling of legal 
systems of nation states and communities at the regional and global levels within the context of 
financial integration. The argument is that the rule of law remains sacrosanct in monetary 
management. Effective financial integration is the result of properly structured and managed 
legal frameworks with robust laws and institutions whether at a national, regional or global level. 
However, the thesis reveals that in order to avoid undermining the progress of Africa’s financial 
integration project, any solution for Africa must be immersed within a broader global solution 
where development issues are addressed and resolved and Africa can form a more central part 
in all relevant international discussion fora. 
 
The work will expound these issues by applying them within a regional and global context, with 
the state of affairs in Africa forming the nucleus. This application consequently presents the six 
key themes of the thesis which will be considered therein. They are: a.) regional advantage: 
which exploits the possibilities of deeper and further financial integration between smaller 
communal arrangements; b.) regional risk and exposure: the extent to which this deeper form of 
iii 
 
financial integration can spiral out of control if effected too quickly and too ambitiously; c.) global 
advantage: which considers the merits of global financial integration and the influence exerted 
by financial laws on the global financial architecture; d.) global risk and exposure: which 
considers the challenges of global financial integration especially within the background of the 
Global Financial Crisis 2007-2008; e.) African challenge: which considers the extent to which 
this analysis impacts the African economic and financial integration agenda; and f.) 
development challenge: which examines the extent to which global development issues impact 
the African solution (continental sovereignty) and the need for any solution for the continent to 
be roped into a broader global solution within which Africa can form an important part. 
 
Even though the thesis requests an optimistic undertone on the progress made so far, it 
unearths the African problem of multiple national sovereignty and multiple overlapping regional 
sovereignty constituted as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ dilemma. As such, the unique contribution to 
knowledge on financial integration in Africa can be echoed in these words: Africa‘s financial 
integration agenda has had little success in authenticating a systematic and dependable legal 
framework for monetary management. Efforts made have been incomplete, substandard, and 
not carefully followed through particularly reflected in the impuissant nature of the judicial 
enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the thesis argues that, any meaningful answer to the problems 
dogging the continent is inter alia deeply entrenched within a new form of cooperative monetary 
sovereignty. In other words, the thesis does not prescribe the creation of new laws; rather it 
advocates the effective enforcement of existing laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS...…………………………………………………………………………...... iv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... ixx 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .........................................................................................................xii 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION .................................................................................................. xiiii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 African Sovereignty or Continental Sovereignty– A monetary model of deeper 
cooperation and alliance .............................................................................................. 2 
1.2.1 Conceptualizing ‘African sovereignty’ and relational issues of law ........................ 8 
1.3 Sovereignty in Europe: A Historical Timeline ................................................... 13 
1.3.1 The Renaissance, Reformation, Age of Enlightenment and Revolution ...............18 
1.3.2 The Changing Nature of Sovereignty within the Modern State .............................23 
1.4 Research Problem ........................................................................................... 26 
1.5 Methodology..................................................................................................... 32 
1.6 Structure of Thesis ........................................................................................... 33 
CHAPTER 2: AFRICA- TOWARDS MONETARY INTEGRATION ...........................................37 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 37 
2.2 The Spaghetti Bowl .......................................................................................... 40 
2.2.1 Figure A: The Spaghetti Bowl of African RECs ....................................................41 
2.2.2 The Evolution of Economic Integration in Africa ...................................................54 
2.2.2.1  Merits of Financial Integration in Africa……………………………………..56 
v 
 
2.2.2.2             Table 1: Regional Financial Integration: A Generic Roadmap…………..59 
2.2.3 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) ...........................61 
2.2.3.2  Accelerating Economic Integration in Africa…………………………...…..64 
2.3 The Status and Implementation of Regional Law in REC Member States ....... 66 
2.3.1 The Credibility of Regional Enforcement Systems ...............................................71 
2.3.2 Recommendations ...............................................................................................76 
2.4  The Progress of RECs in Africa ...................................................................... 80 
2.4.1 The institutional structure of monetary union agendas in Africa ...........................80 
2.4.2 Continental Sovereignty: The case for deeper and further integration in Africa ....84 
2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 88 
CHAPTER 3: REGIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND 
AFRICA ....................................................................................................................................91 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 91 
3.2 Regional Financial Integration: Features and Relevance ................................. 93 
3.2.1       RFI: Pros’ and Cons ............................................................................................96 
3.3 The EU Experience .......................................................................................... 99 
3.3.1 Treaty Law ......................................................................................................... 101 
3.3.2 Completion of the Single Market (Treaty Law post-1980) ................................... 105 
3.3.3 Development of the EU Single Market legal structure ........................................ 112 
3.4 EU Banking and Finance Law ........................................................................ 117 
3.4.1 Mutual Recognition Integration Approach .......................................................... 121 
3.4.2 Post-Maastricht: The Way Forward for Programme Consolidation ..................... 124 
3.4.3 Africa and the EU model .................................................................................... 129 
3.5 The EU and the EMU ..................................................................................... 135 
3.5.1 EMU: A Chequered Framework? ....................................................................... 136 
vi 
 
3.6 EU Crisis-Response ....................................................................................... 141 
3.6.1 Role of the ECB, Governments and National Central Banks .............................. 145 
3.6.2 Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Case of Greece....................................................... 147 
3.6.2.1  Legality of the Bail-Out Package…………………………………………..150 
3.6.3 Regional Risk and Exposure: Lessons for Africa ................................................ 154 
3.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 156 
CHAPTER 4: CHANGING SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN GLOBAL MONETARY MANAGEMENT
 ............................................................................................................................................... 160 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 160 
4.2 The Bretton Woods System ........................................................................... 161 
4.2.1 Bretton Woods System: Objectives for Global Financial Integration ................... 162 
4.2.2 Bretton Woods System: Outcome ...................................................................... 165 
4.3 Bretton Woods System: “Nixon Shock” and Collapse .................................... 168 
4.4 Bretton Woods System: the Aftermath ........................................................... 170 
4.5 Global Advantage: Significance for Africa ...................................................... 172 
4.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 175 
CHAPTER 5: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CRISIS RESPONSE: A TALE FOR AFRICA
 ............................................................................................................................................... 178 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 178 
5.1.1 GFC: An Overview ............................................................................................. 180 
5.2 GFC Timeline ................................................................................................. 182 
5.2.1       Collapse of Lehman Brothers ............................................................................ 184 
5.2.2  Post Lehman ..................................................................................................... 187 
5.3 Triggers and Corrections ................................................................................ 191 
5.4 Global Crisis Response .................................................................................. 197 
vii 
 
5.4.1 Global Financial Framework after Bretton Woods and Global Financial Integration
 …………………………………………………………………………………………...199 
5.4.2 Problems with large complex global financial institutions ................................... 203 
5.4.3 Lender of Last Resort ........................................................................................ 206 
5.4.4       Financial Stability Board (FSB) .......................................................................... 207 
5.4.5 Contagion and Systemic risk .............................................................................. 209 
5.4.6       Crisis and Response Reflections ....................................................................... 212 
5.5 Impact of the GFC on the African continent ................................................... 214 
5.5.1 Going Forward – Crisis Response and African Sovereignty ............................... 217 
5.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 218 
CHAPTER 6: AFRICA, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND GLOBALISATION ............................... 221 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 221 
6.2 Development amidst Globalization ................................................................. 222 
6.2.1 New Global Development Agenda ..................................................................... 224 
6.3 Significance for Africa .................................................................................... 232 
6.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 235 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 236 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 236 
7.2 Thesis Threads- An Overview ........................................................................ 236 
7.2.1      Sovereignty..........................................................................................................236 
7.2.2 African Sovereignty or Continental Sovereignty ................................................. 238 
7.2.3 Regional Integration ........................................................................................... 239 
7.2.4 Globalization ...................................................................................................... 242 
7.2.5 Global Development .......................................................................................... 245 
7.3 Summing Up and Thesis Close ...................................................................... 246 
viii 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 249 
LIST OF CASES ...................................................................................................... 249 
BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS ............................................................................ 250 
ARTICLES ............................................................................................................... 257 
ACADEMIC COMMENTS ........................................................................................ 262 
ONLINE RESOURCES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS ........................................... 262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ADB: African Development Bank  
AEC: African Economic Community  
AJICL: African Journal of International Comparative Law 
AIG: American International Group 
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union  
AU: African Union  
AUC: African Union Commission 
BCCI: Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
BCEA: Banque Centrale de Etas de L’Afrique de L’Ouest 
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
BRVM: Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières  
CEEC: Committee for European Economic Cooperation   
CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
CENSAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States  
CERDS: Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CILSS: Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel 
CISNA: Committee of Insurance, Securities and Non-Banking Financial Authorities 
CMA: Common Monetary Area 
COBAC: Commission Bancaire de L’Afrique Centrale  
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
COSSE: Committee of SADC Stock Exchanges 
COSUMAF: Commission de Surveillance du Marche Financier de L’Afrique Centrale 
CREMPMF: Conseil Régional de l’Epargne Publique et de Marchés Financiers 
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo 
DSX: Douala Stock Exchange 
EAC: East African Community  
EBA: European Banking Authority 
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC: European Community  
x 
 
ECB: European Central Bank 
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States  
ECJ: European Court of Justice 
ICJ: International Court of Justice  
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States  
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community  
EDC: European Defence Community 
EEA: European Economic Area 
EEC: European Economic Community 
EFTS: Electronic Funds Transfer Systems 
EIOPA: European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
EPU: European Payments Union 
ESA: European Supervisory Authorities 
ESC: European Securities Committee 
ESFS: European System of Financial Supervision 
ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority  
ESRB: European Systemic Risk Board 
ESRC: European Securities Regulators Committee  
EU: European Union 
EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community 
FAFT: Financial Action Task Force  
FCA: Financial Conduct Authority 
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FSA: Financial Services Authority 
FSAP: Financial Sector Assessment Programs 
FSB: Financial Stability Board 
FSF: Financial Stability Forum 
FTA: Free Trade Area  
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GFC: Global Financial Crisis 
GTB: Guaranty Trust Bank plc  
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards 
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development  
IGADD: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development  
xi 
 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IOC: Indian Ocean Commission 
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions 
ITO: International Trade Organisation 
LCGFI: Large Complex Global Financial Institution 
LPA: Lagos Plan of Action 
LTCM: Long Term Capital Management 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
MFN: Most-Favoured-Nation  
MINT: Mexico, India, Nigeria, Turkey 
MIP: Minimum Integration Program 
NIEO: New International Economic Order 
OAU: Organization of African Unity  
OECD: Organization for Economic  Cooperation  and Development 
OHADA: Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
PTA: Preferential Trade Agreement 
REC: Regional Economic Community  
RFI: Regional Financial Integration 
ROSC: Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
RTGS: Real Time Gross Settlement  
SACU: Southern African Customs Union 
SADC: Southern African Development Community  
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals 
SEC: Securities Exchange Commission 
SICAV : Societe d'Investissement A Capital Variable 
TARP: Troubled Assets Relief Programme 
TEU: Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty 
TFEU: Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
UNECA: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union 
WAMU: Washington Mutual 
WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
 
xii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I begin by thanking God whose over-arching presence every step of the way ensured the 
successful conception to completion of this thesis.  
 
I will never be able to convey the depth of gratitude I feel towards my parents Professor 
Ephraim Ngwafor and Mrs Gladys Ngwafor to whom I dedicate this work. You have been 
incredible mentors and confidants throughout my academic pursuits. To my sisters Jessica and 
Sharon and brother Randolph, I say thank you for your relentless support. You all made this 
journey worthwhile.  
 
This thesis would not have been what it is without the critical and constructive comments of my 
supervisors Professors George A. Walker and Iain MacNeil. I thank you infinitely for your clarity, 
patience and belief in me. Working with you shaped my interest in this area of law and solidified 
my commitment to this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 
____________________________________________________ 
 
I declare that except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this thesis is 
the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of 
Glasgow or any other institution. 
 
Signature: 
 
Edwin Ndeh Ngwafor 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
____________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Regardless of the academic strata one belongs to, the definition of sovereignty will always 
invoke connotations pertaining to supreme power or authority over a territory.1 In the political 
and legal sphere, sovereignty is defined as ‘the supreme and independent control by states of 
their internal affairs, subject only to the recognized limitations imposed by international law’.2 In 
fact, Max Huber notably stated in his award in the Island of Palmas Case that: ‘Sovereignty in 
the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the 
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State’.3 
 
Thus, the genius of sovereignty defines the nation state, national identity and the notion of 
independence which have no doubt shaped many initiatives through which states exercise their 
functions all over the world. It is on the strength of this ingenuity that an analysis on the 
changing nature of sovereignty within the African context to reflect the modern continent and 
modern public international law will be made. The thesis seeks to advance the argument that 
Africa’s lasting problems discussed mainly in Chapter Two can be thwarted by surrendering 
parts of national sovereignty to form meaningful alliances and co-operation between countries. 
This creates the novel notion dubbed African Sovereignty or Continental Sovereignty.  
 
On this backdrop, the historical evolution of national sovereignty will be revisited. This journey 
will travel from its establishment through its changing nature over the years. After all, history is 
more than the trail left by the past; it influences the present and can shape the future.  
 
                                               
1
 This is no different with regards to the concept of monetary sovereignty which represents the employment of 
sovereign powers within the confines of money matters ( See 1.2 below as the research problem delves more into 
this) 
2
 See, for example Martin E A and Law J (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (6
th
 edition OUP, Oxford 2006). 
3
 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v USA) (1928), 2 UNRIAA 829; Also see Lowe V: ‘Sovereignty and 
International Economic Law’ in Shan W, Simons P, and Singh D (eds); Redefining Sovereignty in International 
Economic Law , Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008, p.77; for an analysis of the themes outlined by Huber which discuss 
the significance of sovereignty and define independence 
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1.2 African Sovereignty or Continental Sovereignty– A monetary 
model of deeper cooperation and alliance 
There is no doubt that the European Union (EU) integration regime has inspired the African 
continent to replicate this success. Unfortunately, the African Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) have so far failed to translate the adoption of this agenda to meaningful economic 
integration within them. In fact, achieving the most basic forms of economic integration has 
been challenging. In the thick of these challenges therefore, it is immature to think that given the 
status quo on the ground in Africa, adopting a new financial regulatory framework modeled from 
the EU example in the short and medium term would be successful. The ensuing subsections 
summarized from Iwa Salami’s comments offer a more sensible approach to bolster financial 
integration among the RECs and ensure a robust regulatory mechanism.4 These will be 
expanded further in subsequent Chapters Two and Three. The thesis will build on these by 
arguing that any continental solution requires the super-imposition of these proposals on a 
larger framework of alliance between African RECs in terms of monetary cooperation in order to 
facilitate broader global participation to enable the effective running of financial markets as the 
overarching solution to the many residual challenges Africa faces. This is the solution I dub 
African Sovereignty or Continental Sovereignty. 
 
a.)  Embracing the concepts of Supra-nationality and Supremacy of Regional law 
Generally, African RECs are known to ignore the concept of supra-nationality with neither being 
able to show a strong supranational framework yet. This is unfortunate because achieving the 
African Union/ African Economic Community (AU/AEC) objectives without the RECs and their 
Member States embracing this concept will be an exercise in futility. African countries have the 
reputation of having little regard for REC provisions and usually implement them very slowly at 
their own time or ignore them altogether. As a consequence of the lack of according Treaty 
provisions and secondary instruments supreme status nationally, REC policies are not 
implemented at the national level. Roped in this challenge also is the weakness of the regional 
enforcement mechanisms as they are unable to ensure compliance of these REC provisions 
nationally. Unless this concept of supra-nationality is embraced unconditionally, it will be flawed 
to attempt any type of integration using the EU institutional architecture. 
 
                                               
4
 Salami I; Financial Regulation in Africa, An Assessment of Financial Integration Arrangements in African Emerging 
and Frontier Markets; Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham Surrey 2012.  
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b.)  Strengthen Regional Financial Integration (RFI) communities 
The RECs are based mainly on an economic integration agenda for the Member States with 
objectives ranging from achieving a Free Trade Area (FTA), customs union, common market to 
the more ambitious arrangements of an economic and monetary union. Obvious failure to 
implement REC provisions domestically has hindered the achievement of these REC objectives. 
It is hard to envisage the creation of a common regional financial framework with a strong 
economic and monetary agenda when basic regional integration goals such as an FTA have 
been difficult to achieve. It makes sense for Member States to first consider trying to accomplish 
the most fundamental of these integration objectives, then strengthen and maintain them before 
striving to achieve deeper and more ambitious objectives such as financial integration. For 
instance, it is important to liberalize capital transactions between Member States then 
subsequently opening up their markets to the rest of the world eventually in order to be fully 
integrated into the global financial markets. It is imperative however that a robust regulatory 
regime be in place as without this, there would be cataclysmic consequences. 
 
c.)  Reforming payment systems  
In accordance with the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the public policy 
objectives of safety and efficiency in systemically important payment systems have resulted in 
10 Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems and four outlined 
responsibilities for central banks.5Here, Member States’ compliance with Principal I is most 
relevant in relation to this thesis as it states that ‘the system should have a well-founded legal 
basis under all relevant jurisdictions.’ In explaining this Principle, the committee stressed that 
the system should have an environment which is legally robust and effectively guarantees the 
protection of all participants through adequate enforcement of contract, payment, securities, 
banking, debtor/creditor relationships and insolvency laws.6 Also relevant are Principles IV and 
V which state that: ‘the system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of value, 
preferably during the day and at a minimum at the end of the day’ and ‘a system in which 
multilateral netting takes place should, at a minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely 
completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the participant with the 
                                               
5
 See ‘Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems: Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems’ (Bank for International Settlements, January 2001) p.3. Available on http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss34e.pdf 
(accessed 25 September 2014) 
6
 Ibid p.6 
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largest single settlement obligation’ respectively.7These constitute the basic minimum expected 
of all Member States. 
 
Although most African countries have a satisfactory payment system in cheque-clearing 
systems, there still remains a substantial amount of work to be done in this area as many of 
these systems have still not been modernized. For instance, just a few countries have 
introduced real time gross settlement (RTGS) systems and many still do not have electronic 
funds transfer systems (EFTS). Granted, cheque-clearing systems remain the most widely used 
medium in Africa and while for the most part they function effectively, sometimes settlement is 
awfully slow.8All African states must strive to establish a RTGS and promote the essential legal 
and judicial overhaul necessary to help enforce basic contract and bankruptcy laws which are 
fundamental to the operation of an efficient domestic payment system. Implementing the REC 
provisions is also vital and without embracing the supremacy of regional laws in Member States, 
implementing the harmonization provisions for the operation of the payment system would be 
inconceivable. 
 
d.)  Indigenous needs should inform regional standards for African RECs 
The need for regional standards centering on the environment and culture and relevant to the 
disparate stages of development in financial systems in Africa has never been more pressing. 
Given this disparity, a pragmatic approach would see the adoption of regional standards and 
institutions for the different groups with similar stages of development. Another option would be 
to establish some sort of accession criteria which will only integrate those countries within the 
REC which have achieved a certain standard of financial development and gradually increase 
the numbers upon achievement of this level by the other Member States. A move towards a 
‘one-size-fits all’ approach as required by international standards would only achieve negligible 
success if any at all. 
 
For instance, in terms of capital market regulation within Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), harmonization of the capital market could still occur through cooperation by 
the stock exchanges in the REC that are at the same level of financial development in spite of 
the absence of a formal regional framework for capital markets regulation. Three such stock 
exchanges exist in ECOWAS; they are: The Nigerian Stock Exchange (in Lagos), the Ghanaian 
                                               
7
Salami (n.4), p.170 
8
 In the DRC for example, it could take up to 30 days.  
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Stock Exchange (in Accra) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s (WAEMU) 
Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) (in Abidjan). Here, a regional regulatory 
regime could seek to harmonize accounting standards by universally upgrading the domestic 
rules in the Member States to international standards or establishing a regional standard 
inspired by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Alternatively, adopting as 
inspiration the financial regulatory mechanism of a success story within the African context such 
as the South African model of a single regional regulatory and supervisory authority is a good 
idea. 
 
e.)  National supervisory authorities co-ordination 
In the case of the EU, embracing supra-nationality has made this process much easier. 
Submission to EU regulatory institutions by Member States is common place and the hub-and- 
spoke nature of the new EU regulatory regime has solidified the familiarity between National 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) as the former operate as branches of the 
latter. It is therefore reasonable to speculate that the national financial supervisors are working 
smoothly within the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). Surely, this framework 
will not operate smoothly without the consistent co-operation of the national supervisory 
authorities.  
 
African RECs and their Member States must succumb to supra-nationality otherwise the 
relationship between national supervisors will be non-existent. It is imperative to submit to a 
regional financial regulator particularly in an industry as such where disparity between national 
practices is alarming, worsened by the differing stages of development of the African states’ 
financial systems which would further complicate the job of any regional financial regulatory 
authority.  
 
f.) Strong national financial regulatory and supervisory regimes 
The importance of this point cannot be over-emphasized. The powers to enforce regulation by 
the national regulators and supervisors need to be strengthened. There is the dire need for the 
improvement of many aspects of financial regulation within African states such as strengthening 
accounting and disclosure standards for financial firms and strengthening corporate governance 
provisions. Importantly, the independence of the financial supervisors must be ensured as this 
remains a deep-seated problem, especially in the banking sectors. As earlier mentioned it will 
be badly erroneous to superimpose a strong regional financial regulatory and supervisory 
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authority upon weak and unreliable national financial regulatory and supervisory authorities. If 
the regional regulatory framework is deemed strong enough generally, then, a fortiori, the 
national regulatory frameworks must be strong too. 
 
g.)  The development of a sound ‘regulatory strategy’ 
Closely linked to the point above is the necessity to prioritize the needs for regulation and 
supervision over time in a design that Quintyn and Taylor call a regulatory strategy.9They use 
Alfred Chandler’s argument that ‘structure follows strategy’ to justify the need for a strategy to 
ease the design of an appropriate supervisory structure relevant to an individual country’s 
current and future needs.10 They urge that this strategy should factor in capacity constraints and 
the central banks intricate role in the supervisory process. Therefore issues like the employment 
of trained and skilled staff and the need for institutional structures of regulation to be adapted to 
the changing nature of the financial industry are critical. Nevertheless responding to the 
capacity-constraint problem for example, if a particular sector is small, undeveloped, and 
showing little sign of growth (such as the capital markets sector in most states in Africa), it is 
sensible to use the scarce resources to first regulate other sectors that are more important for 
entire financial system stability. Over-all, this regulatory strategy should be built upon two 
decisions namely: the regulatory scope and the regulatory intensity.11 The former refers to the 
point in time during which the development of a particular sector attains a level where it needs 
to be regulated and thereby brought into the supervision net. The latter on the other hand refers 
to that point once a sector has been identified as needing regulation and supervision, would 
require determination as to the type of regulatory and supervisory framework to be imposed. It is 
advisable for institutional structures of regulation to be designed in connection with a state’s 
regulatory strategy.12  
 
h.)  Legal and judicial regimes must be strengthened  
Drawing from above is the need to reform the legal and judicial systems in African states in 
order to enable financial laws operate without interruption. The time-consuming and usually 
inept manner in which basic laws such as contract, property rights, and bankruptcy laws are 
                                               
9
 Quintyn M and Taylor M W; Building Supervisory Structures in Sub-Saharan Africa – An Analytical Framework; IMF 
Working Paper; Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 2007 
10
 Ibid  
11
 Ibid p.28 
12
 ibid 
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enforced have done very little to foster financial sector development. These need to be 
improved in order to guarantee investor protection because foreign portfolio investors typically 
steer clear from investing in countries that pose significant amounts of risks to their investment. 
It is well known that part of their risk assessment considers the extent of unreliability in the legal 
systems of states where they consider investing. 
 
i.) Encourage economic growth 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the IMF reports Africa as the second fastest growing 
economic region in the world after Asia with strong economic growth rates averaging 
approximately 6 percent per annum since the early 2000’s. In fact, McKinsey’s examination of 
these growth trends reports greater access to international capital. This capital if managed 
efficiently will go a long way to advance the development of the financial sector in the continent. 
This is particularly true as recent studies show a correlation between economic growth and 
financial sector development.13 Fostering economic growth in Member States will enable the 
advancement of the financial integration agenda within RECs especially considering the 
disparity in economic development amongst the African economies.  
 
Reflections 
Existing African community laws have established a unique legal system with their own law 
making institutions including mainly a Conference of Heads of State or Government, a Council 
of Ministers, and a Court of Justice. Currently as will be dissected in the next chapter, there are 
multiple regional blocs in Africa many of which have overlapping memberships; and as a result 
of this high rates of overlap, it is likely that some Member States with several memberships will 
eventually exit one or more of the RECs. The ensuing subsection identifies the case for a tidy 
and orderly creation of a model for economic and financial integration within Africa by virtue of 
the concept of African sovereignty which will be consistent with the Member States 
preparedness and acceptance of it. 
 
The idea of effectiveness measures the degree to which the RECs are, and will be, able to 
attain their objectives laid out in their various treaties. From this, it makes sense to point that 
                                               
13
 In their study of the relationship between stock markets, banks and economic growth, Levine and Zervos found that 
the magnitude of banking and stock market development are closely linked with current and future rates of economic 
growth most especially in developing countries.(See Levine R and Zervos S; Stock Markets, Banks and Economic 
Growth;(1998) 88 American Economic Review 536. 
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there could be differing degrees of achievement on these criteria; what is needed therefore is a 
process which views these criteria as ingredients along a continuum instead of a phase that is 
reached instantly. In this scenario, the more successful a community is, the more it would 
demonstrate elements of the criteria. This success can thus be rewarded with admission into a 
more advanced REC which enjoys superior and deeper levels of integration. 
 
1.2.1 Conceptualizing ‘African sovereignty’ and relational issues of law 
It is difficult to draw references to what the sources of law of the community will or should be 
throwing into doubt the relationship which exists with national laws. Certainly, the Treaty and 
protocols make up the essential sources of community law. Also, decisions of the Conference of 
Heads of State and regulations of the Council of Ministers are considered sources of law. 
Further, the judgments of the Community Courts should represent another source of community 
law. The general principles of law recognized by member states, including general principles of 
international law, could also be important sources of African community law.  
 
The Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ)14 solves, in part, this omission 
on sources of law as Article 31 of the statute lists various sources of law the court ‘shall have 
regard to’, but it is not clear on how the sources relate to each other, for instance in instances of 
conflict.15 Ultimately, the ACJ will have to act to resolve internal conflict of laws problems within 
the community legal system.  
 
In reality, there are several conditions for domestic legal systems to develop an appropriate 
relationship with the community legal system. These include inter alia: the need for an 
independent judiciary; respect for the rule of law; well developed judicial decisions, 
constitutional and international laws; and the political will to legislate. These conditions, which 
succeeded in Europe, are still absent in many African states. Nevertheless some progress can 
be seen for example with South Africa‘s judiciary which is reputed for its independence and 
quality of its judgments. Also, as recently as 2008, Ghana has democratically changed 
                                               
14
 See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 01 July 2008 [Protocol on the 
African Court of Justice], and the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights [Statute of the African 
Court of Justice], which is annexed to the Protocol, (2009) 17 African Journal of International and Comparative Law. 
15
 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: see online: 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-file-protocol_statute_african_court_justice_and_human_rights.pdf 
; p. 19 
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government five times since 1992. Other good examples of democratic, peaceful and stable 
countries are Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania. 
 
The existence of community law as a legal system has legal and socio-economic benefits. For 
instance, national governments’ interference with the external community is reduced due to the 
independence of the community’s legal system. Furthermore, it helps to stabilize the level of 
economic integration by reducing risk and uncertainty which is usually associated with economic 
transactions intra-community. This is so because varied categories of economic activity within 
the community can be subject to the community legal framework which is independent of 
domestic legal systems. More so, from a social perspective, a sense of unity within the 
community could be fostered as community citizens all live under one legal system. 
 
It is worth mentioning that, the integrity of the legal system at the community level and its status 
at the national level must be well defined and respected. Without a coordinated relationship 
between the community and national legal systems, the usefulness and success of the former 
will be undermined. These will be made easy by the surrender of state sovereignty to the 
community institutions. As one writer has noted:  
 
“The depth of legislative coordination required to achieve these economic goals [the goals of a 
common market, including that of free movement of people, capital, and services] would appear 
to require the member states of a common market to cede large portions of sovereignty to an 
institutional structure capable of not only implementing such integration but also policing 
whether member states follow through with their obligations. Without a strong institutional 
structure, a common market could only be created by countries capable of achieving a political 
consensus on the content and implementation of each common commercial policy.”16 
 
States generally have their own legal systems and enact their own laws which directly bind their 
citizens. Therefore, they hardly ever surrender this sovereign power however it is only through a 
surrender of this sovereignty at the community level and the acknowledgment of that surrender 
at the national level that such an initiative can exist. 
 
                                               
16
 Taylor C; Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening Integration: 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR? (1996-1997) 17 Nw. J. Int‘l L. & Bus 850 p.867 
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A demonstration of the surrender of state sovereignty is to permit the direct application and 
supremacy of laws established by community institutions. Decisions made should become part 
of the member state‘s legal system and have binding effect within it. Sovereignty may be 
surrendered partially or wholly. States could co-exist in a mere political association without the 
need to surrender sovereignty however this is not possible in the case of an economic 
community. For example, it is not possible to have a common market or economic union in 
which member states have not ceded sovereignty to some extent and also created a all -
encompassing legal system. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that in Federations like 
Canada, Nigeria and the USA the laws made by the federal government are usually directly 
applicable in the constituent states. 
 
The general silence in community law on the issue of member states‘ sovereignty should be 
differentiated from the ECOWAS Treaty which explicitly acknowledges in its preamble that ‘the 
integration of the Member States into a viable regional Community may demand the partial and 
gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective 
political will.’17 Nevertheless, this does not imply that the ECOWAS Treaty is more clear-cut on 
the issue of sovereignty and therefore implying that ECOWAS law is better positioned within a 
member state than any other community law which the state is a member. ECOWAS law is 
hardly raised in national courts and its presence within member states is trivial.18 Successful 
integration necessarily eats into member states’ sovereignty, and in that sense a gradual 
surrender of sovereignty, even if not expressly provided in a treaty is inevitable.  
 
As will be seen in the next chapter, some African States have already recognized the need to 
partially surrender sovereignty in order to advance economic development through regionally 
organized policies. For example, the EAC Treaty accords sovereignty to EAC institutions and 
organizations and promotes community laws above domestic national laws.19  
                                               
17
 Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993, (1996) 8 Afr. J. Int‘l & 
Comp. L. 187-227 [ECOWAS Treaty], preamble 
18
 Searches of law databases and reports in Ghana and Nigeria did not yield any important cases in which ECOWAS 
law has been applied in national courts. Nonetheless, there is a chance that it is being applied in administrative and 
executive cases. With regards to Sierra Leone and Liberia however, I wondered that due to conflicts which have 
hindered regional integration in the sub-region,  it is unlikely that given the political instability experienced over the 
past decades, any such cases would have gone to the national courts. 
19
 Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community, 30 November 1999, 2144 U. N. T. S. I-37437, Art 8(4) 
[EAC Treaty] 
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Also, the Treaty establishing the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa 
(OHADA Treaty)20 provides another example of the readiness of African governments to 
partially surrender sovereignty in order to promote economic development. OHADA member 
States under this treaty have partially given up national sovereignty to create a single regional 
regime of Uniform Acts which has harmonized their business laws. These Uniform Acts are 
directly applicable and overriding in the member states, in spite of any conflict which may arise 
with other domestic laws.21  
 
Reflections 
It is evident from the above that a notable problem in African financial integration is what 
Oppong describes as relational issues of law in economic integration which are diverse in 
form.22 He portrays these varied forms to include: “the relations between the laws of a 
community (community law), its institutions and those of its member states; mechanisms for 
normative exchange or communication between a community and its member states and 
member states inter se; jurisdictional conflicts between a community and its member states; the 
allocation of competences between a community and its member states; individuals’ access to 
community institutions; and the recognition and enforcement of member state and community 
normative acts.”23 Oppong further explains that community law involves treaty provisions, 
protocols, regulations and judicial decisions and the objectives, principles and undertakings of 
member states as laid out in the community treaties are of legal consequence. Although these 
can be discussed from multiple perspectives, focus in this thesis will rest on the legal and 
institutional structures and the interactions between different legal and judicial systems in 
reference to regional systems vis-a-vis national systems, and the implementation and 
enforcement of laws.  
 
It is true that both national and community efforts to limit the cross-border movement of goods, 
services, people and capital are typically informed by socio-economic and political 
considerations; however I firmly assert that it is only through the medium of laws that controls 
                                               
20
 Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, 1997, online: Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa http://www.ohada.com/traite.php (accessed 01 March 2014) 
21
 Ibid Art 10 
22
 Oppong R F;  Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011 p.8 
23
 Ibid  
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are realized and these issues become more relevant as states move through the various stages 
of integration. Whilst an FTA may endure without cogently managed relations between the 
community and national legal systems, a customs union, common market, economic and 
monetary union cannot function efficiently without considering these relational issues.24 This is 
because as economic integration advances through the different stages, the interactions 
between legal systems deepen.  
 
In spite of this complication, there is the presupposition that a high degree of legal integration 
and expectation of it and subsequently the existence of a high degree of legal integration is 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of economic integration in Africa. In 
fact from a legal perspective an effective community should demonstrate: “the free flow of 
goods, services, person, capital and property, including judgments within the community 
consistent with the stage of economic integration it has reached; the existence and development 
of a significant body of community laws including judicial decisions to regulate the integration 
process; integration of community law into the laws of member states; the existence of a 
carefully structured legal framework for addressing and managing the multiple relationships (for 
example, community–state, interstate, inter-community, inter-institutional) created by economic 
integration; the existence of institutions adequately designed, mandated and resourced to 
ensure the application of community law; the existence of well-outlined procedures for 
monitoring and addressing breaches of community law; adherence to community law in member 
states; and the existence and development of constituencies with interest in the community and 
their full integration into the activities and operations of the community at both national and 
community levels.”25  
 
Considering Africa’s under-development and economic marginalization, its governments should 
appreciate the need to set aside their national and personal interests to build a common 
framework through the Africa-wide integration project. The damage caused by World War II and 
the general threat of Communism, drove Europe to integrate. Similarly, the dire economic 
conditions in Africa should propel the leaders to work together. They should unite and grant 
supranational decision-making powers to the community to enable the pursuit of a common 
economic agenda. The obvious advantages of economic integration which are being enjoyed by 
other regions of the world should persuade African leaders to approach the economic 
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 The proposals in para.1.2 above provide a comprehensive approach to tackling these issues. 
25
 Oppong p.10-11 
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integration initiative with enthusiasm even though success will not come without problems. 
Nevertheless, with the necessary legal and institutional structures, political will and conducive 
socio-economic climate, it can be achieved.  
 
1.3 Sovereignty in Europe: A Historical Timeline  
It must be said that it is indeed a tall order avoiding uncertainties of emphasis when 
summarising the aspects of a very large and multifaceted subject. It is therefore impossible to 
squeeze the subject into any single academic discourse such as law, philosophy, history or 
political science as none of these disciplines capture the various stages of its evolution in 
entirety. Nevertheless, the study conducted on this matter of sovereignty draws from referenced 
interdisciplinary authority to make any relevant assertions or declarations.  All references to 
sovereignty refer to state sovereignty unless otherwise specified. 
It was Sir Francis Hinsley who stated that ‘men do not wield or submit to sovereignty. They 
wield and submit to authority or power.’26  In classical history, the ancient empires of Egypt and 
Greece for example showcased the sort of far-reaching and somewhat superficial absolute 
authority of their rulers which tremendously widened the gap between these rulers and their 
communities. They were categorized with the gods and the law; Alexander the Great for 
instance, the son of Zeus, ruler of Egypt, Macedon, Asia and Greece, was considered a real 
god on earth. This era was can be deemed to be void of sovereignty as this notion as we see it 
can only arise when rule is more comprehensive and restricted (implying that it governs a 
society (the former) and is anchored to a society (the latter)).27  
 
                                               
26
 Hinsley F H: Sovereignty; Alden Press, Oxford, 1966, p. 1- The term sovereignty depicts final and absolute 
authority in a political community illustrating the function of the concept (Hinsley p.1). Hinsley differentiates between 
the political society and political systems explaining that the latter are by no means the only institutions in the 
community which regulate social behaviour. Hinsley warns on the need to be weary of what he called the ‘semantic 
problem’ implying that terms and expressions of one era can sometimes be only given quasi definitions when 
translated into other languages. He provides examples from Aristotle’s use of the words such as ‘the state’, ‘the law’ 
and the word ‘empire’ by Charles V of Spain or Kant’s ‘federalism’ which would mean something different (Hinsley 
p.22-23). Admittedly, caution is necessary in defining sovereignty as words such as power, rule, empire, country, 
king, and government are synonymous to its use although less technical as the idea of sovereignty. 
27
 Hinsley p.27-32- Hinsley argued that because these rulers made little or no progress in developing the stage of 
sovereignty which involves the state forms extending their power within the community and reintegrating with it, they 
had failed to create the environment for the development of this notion of sovereignty (p.32) 
14 
 
It was in the third century during the era of the Hellenistic monarchs that the first steps were 
taken to bridge the gap between the rulers and their communities as the rulers began to 
recognize fixed territories.28 Even though further reintegration continued with the emergence of 
the Roman Empire following conquest, the emperor remained above the law29 and it was here 
that the emperor’s will became a source of law. The Roman jurist Ulpian articulated ‘princeps 
legibus solutes est’- and ‘quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem’30 
 
Following this era, the word ‘sovereign’ in the medieval period meant God - whose commands 
were recognized by Christians as necessitating strict obedience. In this connection, the Pope 
who was God’s representative here on earth led the Latin Christendom and his authority could 
not be rejected. Also, given that Catholic orthodoxy was based on the doctrines and teachings 
of the Christian religion, there was no room for anyone who questioned its legitimacy.  During 
the medieval era of Latin Christendom, the church and state were inextricably connected and it 
was almost impossible to have any political discourse without mentioning religion because 
religion sanctified all authority - temporal and spiritual. Whilst the king was in part a religious 
authority, the Pope was also in part a political authority.  
 
Putting this into perspective, the political theorist Dante declared “therefore it is evident that the 
authority of the temporal Monarch descends upon him from the fountain of universal authority 
(God), without any intervening medium.”31 Dante nevertheless expanded on the difference 
between religious authority (represented by the pope) and secular authority (represented by the 
emperor)- the latter being the temporal Monarch because his power was the effect of nature 
although also derived from God whereas that of the Pope was not the effect of nature but the 
direct and personal revelation from God.32  
 
                                               
28
 Hinsley provides a vivid historic account of these events. (Hinsley 1966 p.32-44); Also for a summarised timeline of 
events illustrating the development of sovereignty and how it is interconnected with the modern world (see Jackson 
2007) 
29
 referring to the codes, customs and constitution of the society- (Hinsley p.41) 
30
 Translated as ‘the sovereign is not bound by the laws’ and ‘what has pleased the prince has the force of law’ 
respectively- (Hinsley p.42). 
31
 Quoting from Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia; See Rolbiecki J: Dante’s Views on the Sovereignty of the State; The 
Catholic Historical Review; Vol. 9, No. 1 (April 1923); p.91-92 
32
 (Rolbiecki, p. 92) 
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At this time, the notions of state, nation-state, and sovereign people, national and international 
borders were absent and only came at a later time. Medieval Christians considered themselves 
as collectively belonging to one unified Christian-world regardless of how practically disjointed 
and loose this unity was.33  
 
The objective of achieving this unified Christian-world led to the Commonwealth of Christians in 
Europe known as Res Publica Christiana.34 This has been described as ‘dualist’ and constituting 
a theological-political empire were the Pope had overarching and centralized authority whilst the 
emperor had authority in the regna to defend the faith against all threats both internal and 
external and protect clergy and churches.35  
 
In post medieval times, sovereignty has portrayed a distinctive and novel composition of law, 
religion and politics which differentiates the modern world from previous eras.  In my opinion no 
                                               
33
 This unity never materialised historically. It is worth mentioning that two Christian Empires existed during the 
Middle Ages- in the West there was the Latin Christendom centred in Rome and in the East, the Greek Byzantine 
Empire centred in Constantinople (present day Istanbul). The Christian authorities in the latter rejected the Pope’s 
supremacy. In the mid-fifteenth century, its territories and populations were engulfed into the Muslim empire following 
their conquering and destruction by the Ottoman Turks. This event significantly hindered the emergence of sovereign 
states in the Ottoman parts of Europe until the 19th and early20th centuries. (See Jackson R: Sovereignty: The 
Evolution of an Idea; Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007 p.25; [For more discussion on the age of conversion between the 
4
th
 and 14
th
 centuries, and how the boundaries of Latin Christian civilisation were pushed see Jackson (Sovereignty); 
Fletcher R: The Conversion of Europe; Fontana, London, 1998; also see Bartlett R: The Making of Europe; Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, 1993]. The belief in this Christian unity although its realisation was sometimes hampered has 
been referred to as ‘deep-seated and die-hard’ (See Keen M: The History of Medieval Europe; Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1991, p.12) 
Medieval Europe consisted of various islands of local political authority (called regna with a regnum (king)) 
which spread across the west of the Roman Empire and these were setup randomly following the collapse of the 
Roman Empire and the settling of different migrants (notably the barbarian tribes) such as the Saxons, Franks, and 
Huns and so on. (Bury J: The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians: Norton, New York, 1967) 
34
 Jackson states that Res Publica Christiana was the means through which religious and secular authorities justified 
their authority- it was the theological-political way in which they thought of themselves and how they visualised the 
world. (Jackson (p.34)); Truth be said, it was the only uniform institution that existed in Medieval Europe and was 
central in all political thinking and activity during that era (See G Mattingly: Renaissance Diplomacy; Dover 
Publications, New York, 1988, p.16). Meanwhile, the conversion of rulers and the people living in the territories they 
ruled meant outposts of the Christian church were established. The regna and ecclesia a kind of ‘state’ and church 
formed the two components of a single theocracy which administered the expanding area of Europe for a millennium. 
35
 Jackson (p.27) 
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one has put more succinctly the necessity to understand the history of sovereignty than Harold 
Laski when he said:  
 
“Nothing is today more greatly needed than the clarity upon ancient notions. Sovereignty, 
liberty, authority, personality – these are the words of which we want alike the history and the 
definition; or rather, we want the history because its substance is in fact the definition.”36 
 
Laski states that it is indubitable that a state is an offspring of a unique set of historic events, 
and although man has always been a community -building specie, it was not until the sixteenth 
century that the features which characterize a modern state began to manifest. In fact, the 
foundations of medieval organization were fundamentally different as they focused on unity 
through a groups system which frequently exceeded geographical boundaries.37 
 
These groups system influenced by both the church and the emperor posed a problematic 
reconciliation task for the medieval thinker as separating the eternal from the temporal order 
was simply discouraging.38Changes were needed and the law had to be properly divided into 
Divine Law (or natural law) and Community Law.  
 
In a nut-shell, it is clear that the classical and medieval eras were characterized by a 
complicated, longwinded, but still crucial change which witnessed power of command (authority) 
move from the divinity of the emperor to the supremacy of the Pope and to a theological-political 
phase where authority was somewhat shared.  Now, it can be said that the move from medieval 
to modern involved the disbandment of res publica christiana and the conversion of the regna  
and ecclesia into what Machiavelli39 referred to as the stato40 and a national church 
respectively.41  
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 Laski H J: The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays; Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1921, p.314 
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 Ibid (p.1) – in legal language, a state can be defined as ‘a territory or territories over which there is a government 
claiming unlimited authority’ (see Zimmern A E: Nationality and Government, with other wartime essays; Chatto and 
Windus, London, 1918, p.56). Zimmern’s definition makes clear the indisputable fact that whatever the response of 
individuals, the claim to exercise unlimited authority is inherent to statehood. He also draws from Aristotle’s thinking 
to elaborate the State’s justification to claim this peculiar authority by explaining that experience shows that the state 
is mankind’s only safeguard against anarchy, and that anarchy involves the eclipse of freedom. (Zimmern p.56-57)  
38
 Laski (p.3) 
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 Machiavelli N: The Prince; ed. Bull G; Penguin books, 1961. In this controversial book, Machiavelli described what 
a prince needed to do to promote a thriving republic in conditions that granted him supreme authority within his 
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Some commentators have held that this world system of territorially mapped-out and organized 
sovereign states which humans happen to find themselves a part of over the past three to four 
centuries is a specific European innovation.42 Deemed a globally accepted system of 
government, it has been eventually replicated in every populated area on earth.43 Today, there 
                                                                                                                                                       
territory. Evidently, he was not to be bound by any authority be it natural or canon law that other members of 
Christendom were subject to. Instead, he would have to be willing and ready to be evil and to perform evil deeds, as it 
was sometimes necessary to advance the greater good in Machiavelli’s eyes and thought which ultimately was the 
strength and fortitude of the state. This obligation was the raison d’état and remained incontestable.  
The raison d’etre which included the morality and interest of the state was the main and only justification of statecraft 
(See Vincent J; Realpolitik, in Mayall J (ed), The Community of States ;George Allen & Unwin, London, 1982 p.73-85) 
40
 refers to the nation state and system of states within modern Europe which has emerged today 
41
 The rulers of early modern Europe came up with the idea to repudiate the all encompassing authority of the pope. 
Classical theories of sovereignty were fashioned to understand those expedient arrangements and practices in a 
comprehensive and systematic way. The mind-set used in escaping from papal authority was applied in the course of 
their rivalries and struggles which led to the formulation of international law. This will be expanded on in the 
subsequent subsection on the Reformation and Revolution. 
42
 See Strandsbjerg J: Territory, Globalization and International Relations; Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010; 
for a discussion on modern cartography and how it influences the modern political space in terms of the relationship 
between territory and globalization with impact on political identity. An explanation is given as to why state territory is 
crucial in discussions surrounding global politics. (Also see White G: Nation, State, And Territory: Origins, Evolutions 
and Relationships Volume 1; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Lanham, 2004) 
Although this territorially mapped-out design of sovereign states is considered a European innovation, it 
does not change the fact that other commentators have argued that central to the conception of International Law and 
Sovereignty is colonial confrontation between non-European and European societies. He states and I consider very 
logical that international law has always been brought to life by the ‘civilising mission’ because issues such as racial 
discrimination, cultural subordination and economic exploitation are intrinsically significant for the discipline. His 
approach draws on a history of sovereignty and international law which is different yet interesting as it considers the 
evolution from the 16
th
 century to the League of Nations and eventually to the present day ‘war on terror’.(See Anghie 
A: Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; CUP, 2004) .[Cf. G Lyons & M Mastanduno (ed.): 
Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention; John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1995] 
43
 See Jackson (p.144) and Bull H & Watson A: The Expansion of International Society; Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1984. Also see D’Entreves who said: “The importance of the doctrine of sovereignty can hardly be overrated. It is a 
formidable tool in the hands of lawyers and politicians, and a decisive factor in the making of modern Europe. 
(D’Entreves A P: Natural Law; Hutchinson, London, 1970, p.67) 
18 
 
are 193 sovereign states, each responsible for the territory under its jurisdiction, and the people 
who live there.44  
 
Although sovereignty has proved to be remarkably long-lasting, it is neither fixed nor 
unchanging. Instead it has evolved and been reformulated into different designs over the course 
of history to match the demands of specific historical periods.45 The next subsection explores 
the factors which accounted for the reformulation of sovereignty including the controversies and 
wars- both political and religious; the shift in scientific and political thinking during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries which led to the eventual fine-tuning of this concept to what it is 
today. 
 
1.3.1 The Renaissance, Reformation, Age of Enlightenment and Revolution 
In the sixteenth century, the medieval ecclesiastical-political order began to collapse following 
the Renaissance and Reformation which occurred almost concurrently.46  
 
i.) The Renaissance 
The renaissance which initially began in Italy, involved the emergence of independent Italian 
city-states which established a regional state system. This system was copied across Europe as 
other rulers took lessons from the Italians including the political art of statecraft.47 The 
subsequent reformation; also known as the Protestant Reformation involved the struggle by 
Protestants for religious freedoms and political authority against the status quo- Catholic 
orthodoxy.  
 
ii.) The Reformation  
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 The United Nations’ list of member states http://www.un.org/en/members/ (accessed 10 August 2014) - cf with The 
United States Department of State which recognizes 195 sovereign states, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm 
(accessed 10 August 2014). Earnestly, it is problematic to compile a definitive list with an exact number of all 
sovereign states as there are a number of countries whose sovereign status is disputed by others (such as Israel, 
China, Palestine) given that there is no binding definition for the criteria and requirements for statehood to be adhered 
to by all members of the community of nations. 
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 Philpott D: Revolutions in Sovereignty; Princeton University Press; Princeton, 2001 
46
 See Jackson R: Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape in Jackson R, 
James A, Clapham C et al; Sovereignty at the Millennium (ed. Jackson R); Blackwell, Massachusetts, 1999 p.15 
47
 See Machiavelli (supra n.39) on how political theorists began to influence novel ideas on statehood and statecraft.  
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The reformation has been said to be sparked by the publication of The Ninety-Five Theses by 
the German theologian Dr Martin Luther in 1517.48His theories challenged the doctrines of 
Catholicism and the res publica christiana which subsequently stirred the disentanglement of 
the state’s authority from that of the Pope’s. A good example was when King Henry VIII defied 
the Pope’s authority by separating from both his wife Catherine of Aragon and also from the res 
publica christiana in the same stroke. This defiance was advanced when the Act of Supremacy 
(1534) was passed which eradicated papal authority and lifted the King to Supreme Head of the 
Church of England.49  This time in history was plagued with wars which created an insatiable 
desire by monarchs to consolidate power in their hands within a stronger central authority at the 
expense of the ecclesia; and with this, the modern nation state began to emerge.50 
 
Meanwhile, the principle of sovereignty was first systematically expressed as a crucial basis for 
the exercise of state power by Jean Bodin in his writings – Les Six Livres de la Republique 
(1576) – a political treatise which carried out a study on the French monarchial state as a 
political entity which was free standing and self-absorbed. 
 
Bodin wrote what is considered a rejection of the political order in medieval times:  
 
“It is most expedient for the preservation of the state that the rights of sovereignty should never 
be granted out to a subject, still less to a foreigner, for to do so is to provide a stepping-stone 
where the grantee himself becomes the sovereign.”51 
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 Online at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/415676/Ninety-five-Theses (accessed 12 August 2014) 
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 See Davies N: Europe: A History; Pimlico, London, 1970, p.490 
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 The reformation led to a series of religious wars across Europe including the French wars of religion between the 
French Catholics and Huguenots (French Protestants) between 1562 and1598 and the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648) between Protestant and Catholic states involving almost all European countries. 
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 Bodin J: Six books of the Commonwealth; (Tooley M J trans.), Blackwell, Oxford; no confirmed date- (See Jackson 
n.46 p.16) 
It is believed that Bodin was likely influenced by Francois Grimaudet his less famous contemporary who in 
1560 gave an important speech in which he state publicly that ‘the welfare of the state demanded the subjection of 
the ecclesiastical to the civil power, in whose hands all the functions of society were legally invested.’ –See 
Grimaudet F; Remonstrances aux Etat’s d’Angers (1560) - initially delivered in French as a speech to the Provincial 
Assembly of Angers on 14 October 1560. (see Zimmermann C D: The concept of monetary sovereignty revisited; 
EJIL, 08/2013, Vol. 24, Issue 3; p.726-727) 
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Drawing on this rejection, most scholars hold that the event that eventually settled the bloody 
religious wars; serving as the most accurate historical reference to symbolize the transformation 
of the European political order from medieval to modern were a series of peace treaties signed 
in the seventeenth century precisely in 1648 called the Peace of Westphalia.52  
 
It was a vital turning point in the emergence of sovereignty as Westphalia ensured a platform 
where more authority was surrendered to the emerging European states by the res publica 
christiana. Christian unity as international justification was superseded by international diversity 
originating from a secular society of sovereign nation states. In fact as Jackson summarized, 
‘what had been a political-theological universitas became an international societas of sovereign 
states. That is what Westphalia stands for.’53 At long last sovereignty began to clarify the 
confusion around the issue of authority which existed during the medieval era. This juncture in 
history is considered the birth of Public International Law. 
 
Although major attempts to restore the order of a unified hierarchical authority continued in the 
latter parts of the seventeenth century as with the case of French King Louis XIV who fought for 
a universal monarch, and before the twentieth century with Napoleon’s attempt for continental 
hegemony, fierce resistance has always prevailed over such attempts.54  
 
iii.) The Age of Enlightenment  
This was the period of intellectual and scientific liberation in the years following Westphalia 
(between 1650 and 1775). The Oxford dictionary defines it as “A European intellectual 
movement of the late 17th and 18th centuries emphasizing reason and individualism rather than 
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 Cf. Hinsley’s view which considers the Concert of Europe in the 1820s as the historical manifestation of this 
transformation. See Hinsley F: ‘The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations between States’, in Stankiewicz W J, 
ed., In Defense of Sovereignty; OUP, New York, 1969, p.285  
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 (Jackson supra n.46 p.17)- It is worth mentioning that there was the intention to have a balance of power between 
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 Britain has always assumed the role of defending the balance of power by providing added military options 
especially in post-revolutionary Napoleonic France with the United States also playing similar roles in World War II 
against Nazi Germany. Evidently, both Britain and the US have assumed the role to defend the anti-hegemonic 
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tradition.”55  Its objective was to reform society using reason whilst advancing knowledge 
through scientific methods, and challenging ideas rooted in faith and tradition. It revolutionized 
human thinking by encouraging scientific thought, skepticism, and intellectual debate. These 
debates were argued on a platform of clearly defined principles where correct logic was used to 
arrive at conclusions through evidence and with the revision of these principles conducted in the 
event of convincing evidence put forward.56 Several monarchs used these ideas to govern their 
people and till this day, the ideas of this era continue to influence academia, culture, politics and 
governments of many countries all over the world. 
 
Part of this novel way of human thinking enabled the idea of sovereignty to achieve both legal 
and moral recognition in describing the meaning and power of a state; and the extent to which 
independent states, that enjoy sovereignty over a given territory can pursue their interests 
without destroying each other or the international system which they all form a part.57 Central to 
this system was the role of the citizen in shaping the outlook of sovereignty and the state. In fact 
Benjamin Franklin stated: 
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 Oxford Dictionary: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/enlightenment  (accessed 12 August 2014). 
It was heavily influenced by seventeenth-century philosophers such as Adam Smith, Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, 
John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Voltaire, Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, Montesquieu, Rousseau, David Hume, Denis 
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 The quest for a new legitimacy in governance was offered an answer by a new scientific philosophy. This new 
philosophy centred on the belief that all things were bound by universal laws and truths, including social behaviour 
and relationships, giving rise to the concept of natural law; which was the idea that human law was obtained from 
reason. Even though the Romans had previously developed natural law, it became extremely popular during the 
enlightenment era and was considered the highest form of law. (Greer T& Lewis G; A brief history of the Western 
World; Harcourt Brace College Publishers; New York, 1997; p.120 and p.448). In fact, enlightenment thinkers further 
developed other concepts such as natural rights which included life, liberty and property. Reason being chosen as the 
basis of law and rights, seemed unusual because such laws and rights were considered natural whereas reason was 
human and unnatural. However the scientific thinkers concluded that should humans act against nature’s physical 
laws like gravity, they will suffer consequences; in the same way should humans act against the natural law of 
reason, they will also suffer consequences. Natural laws ensure the protection of universal human rights endowed by 
nature. (White G E: Nation, State and Territory; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004 p.147) 
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Bodin’s definition of sovereignty was strengthened by Thomas Hobbes in his book Levitian: available online at: 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html  (accessed 12 August 2014) where his 
theory of absolute and indivisible sovereignty argues for a ‘social contract’ whereby a ruler's sovereignty is contracted 
out to him by the people he rules in return their guarantee of physical safety. Hobbes concludes that if and when the 
ruler fails in his duty, the people can reclaim their ability to protect themselves, including by forming a new contract 
with a new ruler. Also see Jean-Jacques Rousseau theory of popular sovereignty which moots that government is 
created and sustained by its people’s consent through elected representatives. 
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“In free governments, the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors and 
sovereigns”58 
 
Hence when people acquired this novel way of thinking which transformed social identity, 
political and intellectual attitude and energized the quest for a new legitimacy in governance, 
when their demands were not reflected in political action, they resorted to fierce protests which 
eventually resulted in the seventeenth and eighteenth century upheavals and historic 
revolutionary movements which changed the world for ever. 
 
iv.) The Age of Revolution  
The period following the age of enlightenment from 1775-1850 was characterized by 
momentous revolutionary movements across Europe and America.59 This period gave birth to 
constitutional states and republics; this blend of democracy, a constitution, and civil rights, gave 
a unique meaning to sovereignty which reflects in the definition of a nation state and national 
identity today, as opposed to absolutist monarchies. This period weakened the European 
imperialists most notably the British Empire who lost control of many colonies in the Western 
hemisphere of which they had under control for centuries.  
 
In fact their most notable defeat came during the American Revolution when the United States 
Declaration of Independence was adopted by Congress on the 4th July 1776 which confirmed 
that thirteen American colonies no longer considered themselves as part of the British Empire.  
 
Thomas Jefferson one of the American founding fathers and eventual third President was the 
principal author of the Declaration of Independence and oversaw one of the most memorable 
sentences in the English language with probably the most popular statement on human rights: 
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 Franklin B (ed. Ketchum R):The Political Thought of Benjamin Franklin; Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis 2003, 
p. 398. 
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 Examples will include the American Revolution (For historical analysis see Wood G: The Radicalism of the 
American Revolution; A.A Knopf, New York, 1992; also Merrill J: The Founding of a Nation: a History of the American 
Revolution 1763-1776; Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 2004); and the French Revolution (For historical analysis 
see Furet F: Interpreting the French Revolution; Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1978; also see Frey L & Frey M: The 
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which allowed independence from Spain and Portugal; and the Turks respectively. 
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“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness”60 
 
Evidently this period of warfare revolutionized the concept of sovereignty. It made meaningful 
the relevance of human institutions which rest at the core of every society and enabled an 
arrangement that recognizes the fundamental importance of these core human values which 
ought to be protected and upheld.61 For instance, in justifying the need for a constitutional 
separation of powers62, James Madison said: “In order to lay a due foundation for that separate 
and distinct exercise of the different powers of government…it is evident that each department 
should have a will of its own, and consequently should be so constituted that the members of 
each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the 
others…The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place.”63 
 
Following this age of revolution, the notion of sovereignty has continued to stay central in the 
world political system as it serves as custodian of those sacred values necessary for the service 
of humankind.  
 
1.3.2 The Changing Nature of Sovereignty within the Modern State  
Evidently human nature became the source of order in modern times and the reigning authority 
was humankind’s inner voice, conscience, passion and desire. Nobility was no longer 
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 This sentence has been said to contain ‘the most potent and consequential words in American history’ (See Ellis J: 
American Creation; A.A Knopf, New York, 2007, p.55-56) 
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 Jackson lists the most fundamental of these core values of sovereignty to include inter alia: ‘international order 
amongst states, membership and participation in the society of states, co-existence of political systems, legal equality 
of states, political freedom of states, and pluralism or diversity of ways of life of different groups of people around the 
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 This political doctrine found its origins in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (translated De L’Esprit des Loix); 
[Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M de Montesquieu (London: Evans T, 
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 Madison J; The Federalist, No. 51, reprinted in Hutchins, Great Books of the Western World, 43, p.162-5 
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synonymous to the reigning elites by birth but to those of heart and mind; those of genuine 
intellect and sensibility.64  
 
As the notion of sovereignty continues to evolve within this new international society of 
sovereign states, it is helpful to take stock of a summary of its historical characteristics. 
Generally, we have seen from the timeline that sovereignty has been regarded as absolute, 
exclusive, perpetual and indivisible. Absolute in the sense that sovereign power could legislate 
without consent and was neither restricted by a constitution, preceding laws or custom, and no 
areas of law or policy were beyond its control. Exclusive implying that within its jurisdiction, the 
decisions made by a sovereign power could not easily be contradicted by another authority. 
Perpetual in the sense that, sovereign power could not be temporarily delegated to a superior 
power and no one was to have the ability to enforce a time limit on the governing power 
demonstrating superiority over it. Indivisible in the sense that the sovereign remains the final 
authority and does not share power with any other; thereby eliminating any chance of dispute 
resolution between multiple sovereign powers.65  
 
These factors which have historically defined sovereignty over the passage of time now provide 
a clearer understanding of the complication that arises in achieving a balance between 
sovereignty retention while simultaneously surrendering parts of it in a cooperative arrangement 
for mutual advantage and the greater good.  
 
The capacities of sovereignty to be regenerated, reinvented and restated will now be considered 
in terms of a narrative on the continuity or change in conceptions of sovereignty in recent years. 
This represents the shift in the previous competing legal and political concepts of sovereignty to 
the presence of almost two-hundred sovereign states on the UN stage. The rise of global 
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 Pickett T: Invention nations: Justifications of the authority in the modern world; Greenwood Press, Westport, 1996, 
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industry and spread of law through supranational or transnational adjudicative and regulatory 
frameworks and networks66 will form central discussion points in this thesis. 
 
In this regard, these discussions will reveal the effect of sovereignty on the substance of 
international law. According to Christopher Greenwood, “for some, the concept of sovereignty 
(or, more accurately, concepts, for there is more than one) is a standard around which to rally—
‘the sovereignty of Parliament’, ‘the sovereign nation’, ‘loyalty to the sovereign’. For others it has 
become something outmoded, an obstacle to reform, whether in the form of democratization at 
home or greater international cooperation abroad. For the international judge, however, 
sovereignty is neither totem nor torment but an inescapable fact of life; part of the landscape 
within which judgments have to be made.”67 
 
From a legal perspective, sovereignty will normally refer to the constitutional allocation of power 
and authority within a State’s legal system; for instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) there is 
‘sovereignty of Parliament’ implying that parliament always has the final word in making law with 
no rival law-making authority acknowledged by the UK Constitution.  This must however be 
distinguished from other jurisdictions which have written constitutions that limit the powers of 
their law makers such as in the United States where power is separated by the US constitution 
between three separate branches of government to prevent abuse of power.68 
 
Christopher Greenwood has identified certain global developments in the last fifty years which 
have shaped the nature of power and authority between national and international borders.69 My 
emphasis lays on these because with over two hundred independent countries, it is difficult to 
see how a peaceful international world order could work without the proper coordination of these 
developments.70 
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 Firstly, international law tends to impose obligations on States regarding their behaviour within their own territories 
especially with regards to human rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European 
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What flows from these developments are the challenges the modern state faces and the 
eventual result as shall be seen is the formation of various arrangements of cooperative and 
complex sovereignty by these modern states in a bid to coordinate a peaceful international 
order.71  
 
The challenges which endure are indicative of the two key issues which summarize the 
research problem below. First is the issue of sovereignty and addressing the tensions arising 
from modern sovereignty; second, monetary sovereignty and the tensions and challenges of 
modern monetary sovereignty. From sovereignty and changing sovereignty, the concepts of 
global and regional integration are hatched and form the most part of the thesis. 
 
1.4 Research Problem 
I sought to bring to the fore these abovementioned developments because their relevance is 
important in establishing an agreement between nations to facilitate the building of strong 
institutions, and achieving favourable development goals as well. Concerning agreements 
between nations, as the world evidently grows smaller, it is easy to assume that human beings 
immediately recognize their similarities because we all seek the same things; happiness and 
fulfilment for self and family.  
 
Yet somehow, even with the spread of globalization at a dizzying pace and smoothing of 
modernity, people still remain apprehensive and hold on to those things they consider dear and 
intrinsic to their identities; things like their race, their tribe, their religion and how they conduct 
                                                                                                                                                       
Convention on Human Rights, the Convention against Torture and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
1989 have brought a significant revolution in international law. There is little doubt that following the horrors of 
genocide, torture and other abuses during the mid to latter parts of the last century, prohibition by international law is 
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their financial and monetary affairs. Over the centuries, this apprehension has led to conflict, 
total wars- and following World War II, people began to pause and reflect on the importance of 
coming together to harmonize mutual objectives and forge a unified global agenda for the 
benefit of all. What better sector precipitates the inclination towards the pursuit of happiness 
than the banking and finance sector which showcases the money markets; the need for free 
trade and the encouragement of a befitting environment for economic and financial activity? 
Indeed the appropriate management of this sector is in my opinion central to the resolution of 
many world problems today. 
 
Stemming from this and central to this thesis is the challenge which African states face in 
handling the proliferation of international financial institutions and regulations at the expense of 
state sovereignty. The infringement of global financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organisation (WTO) on state sovereignty 
for instance has given international lawyers food for thought because states the world over 
continue to deliberate on ceding control over economic and financial policies in order to achieve 
global financial efficiency. 
 
In this regard, particular attention will be paid to monetary sovereignty with stress on financial 
integration at the regional stage firstly and then subsequently at the global stage. My emphasis 
will be on the global and regional models of modern monetary sovereignty and monetary 
solutions in resolving the tensions and challenges of modern national monetary sovereignty. 
 
Traditionally, monetary sovereignty refers to states’ sovereign powers to create money through 
the issuance of currency, determining the appropriate amount of current and capital account 
convertibility, conducting monetary and exchange rate policies, and the organization of financial 
regulation and supervision. The tensions arising out of monetary sovereignty in the modern 
state center on the degree to which a given state, should preserve or lose its respective 
sovereign powers in the confines of money under the impact of various economic and legal 
constraints within a monetary union at a regional level, or within the international community as 
a whole. Perhaps importantly, what makes matters more complicated, is the fact that individual 
African states’ competences in monetary and financial matters is now increasingly redundant 
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because of the prevalence of factual constraints brought about by the growing integration of 
financial markets globally.72 
 
In no other continent has the subject of state independence following Huber’s definition above 
been more recent, relevant and stirred more complex emotional debate and controversy as the 
continent of Africa. After all, it was only in the mid- 1950’s that the process of de-colonization 
began in Africa following its loss of sovereignty to colonialism.  Today, there are fifty- five 
sovereign states in Africa which all benefit from unique national sovereignty and national 
identity.73   
 
I will identify continental sovereignty in Africa and the nature of continental integration 
specifically in money matters with a coherent legal structure shaped by evolving contemporary 
regional and global constraints that arise.74 The thesis will stress on the construction of a 
monetary model as pre-requisite to solving most of Africa’s problems.  
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At a time of increasing globalization and financial markets integration, the fostering of monetary and financial 
stability, are key values of contemporary monetary sovereignty.  
Zimmerman exposes the difference in approach between some central banks as they strive to maintain 
these values and also the differences from global financial institutions. For example in terms of monetary stability, 
some states adopt inflation ceilings while others set inflation targets as a preferred approach. This inflation target 
could be a ‘point inflation target’, referring to a specific percentage increase of consumer prices, as evidenced by the 
Bank of England’s inflation target of 2%, or the more common ‘target inflation range’ used in other countries like 
Canada and Sweden. (Zimmermann: The concept of monetary sovereignty revisited; p.13-15- Zimmermann draws 
this analysis from a study of central bank objectives conducted by a former general counsel of the IMF: Gianviti F; 
‘The Objectives of Central Banks’ in Giovanoli M and Devos D (eds): International Monetary and Financial Law: The 
Global Crisis, OUP, Oxford, 2010). For an elaborate definition and thorough discussion of monetary stability as a key 
central bank objective, see Lastra R M: Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability OUP, Oxford 2006, 
p.34–9.  
In terms of interest rates for instance, the Federal Reserve (USA) and the European Central Bank differed in 
their responses to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While the former reacted with a series of interest rate cuts 
directed at saving employment, the latter kept interest rates unchanged for much longer in a bid not to jeopardize 
domestic price stability. These issues will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapters two and three when addressing 
the difficulties which persist in harmonizing global economic and financial problems. Unfortunately, the example of 
central banks’ lack of harmonization regarding interest rates policies in pursuit of different monetary policy objectives 
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The difficulty in Africa which has ensued is that of multiple national sovereign with multiple 
overlapping regional communities. This problem labeled the spaghetti bowl is the starting point 
of the African problem. It is part of a broader problem in which a large number of sovereign 
countries (with sovereign autonomy) still suffer unique problems and are unable to use this 
quintessentially sovereign authority to solve the pertinent problems within their territories 
especially with regards to poverty, war and disease. More often than not, assistance and 
coordination is normally sought from outside the borders. This necessitates a new solution and 
in line with the African proverb ‘one hand cannot tie a broom’ it will be argued that what is 
needed to resolve this difficulty is a partial surrender and cooperation of sovereignty particular 
cooperative monetary sovereignty (financial cooperation). This cooperation will entail varied 
layers of regional and global financial integration arrangements which involve different forms of 
cooperative and complex sharing of monetary sovereignty for the mutual advantage of 
countries.75  
 
The new model of sovereignty which comprises a mixture of regional and global financial 
integration as well as retaining national financial sovereignty within the novel arrangement is 
what I characterize ‘continental sovereignty’ or the new ‘African sovereignty’. This defines the 
modern case of monetary sovereignty in Africa which explains the shift from conventional 
monetary sovereignty to the nature of a modern monetary sovereignty in Africa in which all 
countries come together and engage in various levels or grades of partial surrender of monetary 
                                                                                                                                                       
is replicated by the same issues which concern other economic problems across different countries especially 
concerning regulation and supervision.      
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In expansion, like sovereignty, the concept of monetary sovereignty has evolved significantly with the passage of 
time and will undoubtedly continue to change as economic and political circumstances shift. Having said this, it is of 
utmost importance to maintain the link between modern monetary sovereignty and domestic sovereignty as part of 
this novel cooperative monetary sovereignty. The conceptual continuity can be preserved by a framing element which 
some describe as the ‘principle of subsidiarity’. (See Zimmerman:  The concept of monetary sovereignty revisited; 
p.19-20). This refers to a state’s renunciation of its exercise of sovereign powers money and financial matters only to 
the extent necessary for the effective promotion of the core values of modern monetary sovereignty. As further 
elaborated by Besson: ‘[a]s a concept of power distribution the principle of subsidiarity implies a test of efficiency in 
power allocation. In each case, the sovereign authority will be that authority which can realize the objective in the 
most efficient way’ [Besson S: ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’ (2004) 8(15) European Integration online Papers; available 
online at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-015.pdf  (accessed 20 August 2014)]. This will ensure that the regulatory 
decisions that are normally part of the exercise of monetary sovereignty are not taken further away than required from 
those to whom those in power are ultimately responsible. (Zimmermann, p.20) 
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sovereignty so they can work closer together for their mutual advantage and benefit especially 
in tackling common problems such as poverty, war and disease.  
 
Against this background, in constructing this new model for the African continent, the thesis will 
seek to address the following six issues: 
 
A. Regional advantage: Reviewing the extent to which integration goes much further. In 
fact communal and national laws have provided benefits for the mutual resolution of regional 
economic and financial tensions. This subsequently provides the arguments for a regional 
financial mechanism to successfully approach and resolve these challenges in order to facilitate 
and foster economic and financial activity amongst member states and ensure the effectiveness 
of the regional financial integration agenda. 
 
B. Regional risk and exposure: Analysing the extent to which certain principles and policies 
adopted within and without some member states have jeopardised the application of regional 
laws, thereby hindering the integration agenda. The European Union case study provides 
relevant talking points for African regional systems to consider when forging ahead attempts at 
an integration agenda (rather than a mere copy-and-paste solution), especially with regards to 
the potential problems which arise when integrating too far and too quickly. 
 
C. Global advantage: Examining the extent to which the benefits of global financial 
integration have historically minimised the tensions of economic and financial problems and 
how, if at all existing international laws have successfully approached or resolved subsequent 
challenges which have ensued as economic and financial circumstances evolve over time. 
Thereby making a strong case for the need of countries to harmonize towards a global financial 
architecture.   
 
D. Global risk and exposure: Investigating the extent to which the challenges brought about 
by global financial integration have plagued its primary objectives and prompted legal systems 
globally to make far-ranging adjustments and decisions which have forever changed the 
perceptions of global financial integration. Here, the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2008 takes 
centre stage in the discussion. 
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E. African Challenge: Discussing the extent to which the African monetary integration 
agenda has faced its challenges. Bringing together key lessons from regional and global 
perspectives, the discussion addresses the effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of Africa‘s 
monetary integration process.  
 
F. Development Challenge: Examining the extent to which global development issues 
impact the African solution (continental sovereignty) and the need for any solution for the 
continent to be roped into a broader global solution within which Africa can form an important 
part. 
 
Although there has been some work done on the legal aspects of Africa’s integration agenda, it 
still appears scanty in comparison to the plethora of monographs, treatises and resources 
devoted to other continents particularly Europe.76 This thesis is a distinct attempt to fill a vacuum 
in the discourse on the efforts for a new African Sovereignty. A financial integration story which 
cuts across the continent in its entirety establishing the requirement for Continental Sovereignty 
as defined above. It provides a fresh perspective on the realistic nature of the objectives the 
African integration agenda has set for the continent. 
 
Undeniably, other communities outside Africa such as the EU have confronted challenges and 
tensions brought about by regional and/or global integration and have approached them through 
varied means. These experiences provide useful historical and comparative sources for this 
thesis. Nevertheless, this neither makes this work non-original or less relevant nor duplicative. 
Instead the expected academic contributions on Africa‘s integration agenda especially with 
reference to the novel idea of continental sovereignty are to: draw attention to the changing 
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the only African journal devoted entirely to economic integration, although focused mainly on Southern Africa 
arrangements). Recently, the African Integration Review published by the AU Commission was also added.  
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nature of monetary sovereignty within Africa; critically examining current attempts to forge 
ahead an African monetary integration agenda through regional integration arrangements (as 
part of a broader global integration framework) and their effectiveness; and investigate the 
extent to which the progress of Africa‘s monetary integration agenda may be stalled or boosted 
by attention to development issues. As such, my research aim is not to prescribe new financial 
laws, but rather to advance a discourse that exploits other relevant lines of inquiry and push 
boundaries in order to foster change and transformation. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
The thesis methodology entails a combination of detailed historical, descriptive and investigative 
considerations of the governing and legal institutions that shape and influence selected REC’s 
and regional financial systems in Africa as well as European and Global banking and financial 
systems. In other words, the thesis is heavily reliant on secondary and tertiary sources. The 
core global financial institutions focused on are the offspring of the Bretton Woods system of 
monetary management established in the mid-20th Century- they are the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); some attention is also paid to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
 
Furthermore, an explanatory, qualitative and comparative technique is used on the governing 
laws of the EU banking and finance programme, the regional financial arrangements in Africa, 
and the jurisprudence of national and regional courts to obtain a deeper understanding of their 
operation and efficiency. Here, reliance is focused on primary sources.  
 
Also, as the regional communities in Africa are analysed, it is seen that they do not vary 
considerably in their structures. In fact the problems the countries are bedevilled with appear 
strikingly similar which evidently implies a common solution is meaningful. Little wonder Mistry 
observed, ‘it appears as if the drafting of all these arrangements across Africa was done from 
the same template’.77 Truth is, they all share the common goal to create an all-encompassing 
economic and financial space for trade among member states through eliminating tariff and non-
tariff barriers. This has resulted in the birth of the AEC, which forms a pivotal part of the AU, as 
it attempts to merge all regional communities within the continent. Chapter Two will elaborate on 
its competence as the umbrella structure under whose canopy the other regional communities 
                                               
77
 Mistry P: Africa‘s Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration: (2000) 99 African Affairs 553 at p.564-565. 
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aim to achieve the African economic integration agenda. My choice of the African regional 
communities is pertinent because I aimed to geographically cover all parts of Africa from North 
to South, East to West.  
 
This global journey ultimately exposes the limitations on the scope of the thesis and in the same 
stroke the methodology as well. Firstly, at the global level, because of the voluminous amount of 
material on the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) with contributions ranging from economists, 
politicians, journalists, lawyers amongst others from all continents, the focus remains 
predominantly on the legal aspects within the confines of selected developed world countries 
such as the USA and UK in terms of an international response and Germany and France for 
regional responses. Secondly, due to the lack of a reliable system of law reporting in most 
African countries, there is occasional reliance on ‘unreported’ material obtained from the 
internet.78  
 
The thesis draws on academic commentary and offers most invaluable insights for African 
policymakers. However, the African experience is the centre of this thesis; and although many 
of the relevant principles discussed within the confines of the continent-wide integration agenda 
are drawn from their adoption in Europe, as Chapters Three will reveal, caution is needed when 
relying on insights from Europe. I say so because these chapters disclose unique differences 
between the European and African stories in terms of their historical circumstances, their socio-
economic-political contexts and the degree of their respective stages of development. Indeed, 
while the European model is far advanced, the African model is still undergoing formation. As a 
consequence, even though the European insights are helpful in dealing with community-state 
relationships, they are less helpful in terms of handling the distinctive African phenomena of 
fragmented autonomous regional arrangements operating simultaneously with the ultimate goal 
of eventual economic and financial integration. 
 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter Two paints the picture of the ambitious state of affairs towards the African financial 
integration agenda while assessing its readiness to embark on deeper and further integration. 
The chapter develops the argument that effective financial integration is the product of a 
correctly structured and managed legal framework harbouring the smooth synchronization of 
                                               
78
 For example, some ECOWAS judgements are available online at: http://www.ecowascourt.org/cases.html  
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relationships between states, communities, legal systems and institutions. A qualitative analysis 
will be devoted to the legal and institutional limitations which plague the future of financial 
integration in the continent. This concerns the effectiveness of community institutions with focus 
on the judicial institutions of the regional arrangements. Among the issues discussed are: the 
multiple overlapping regional communities labeled the ‘spaghetti bowl’ dilemma; and the 
jurisdictional co-operation between community and domestic courts. 
 
Although the chapter laments the incomplete story recounted of the different levels of Africa’s 
successes, it will however admit that the African agenda is still at the formation stage and its 
development is fundamentally contingent on the advanced development of the core constituent 
regional arrangement models already in existence such as the South African Development 
Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). In this connection and continuing on from Chapter One, the 
constitutive treaties and the jurisprudence of their respective laws and courts at the national and 
regional stages will inform the argument for the adoption of a mixed model of cooperation 
between member states for a new qualified monetary sovereignty to realize the effective running 
of financial markets as a solution to the African problem. This requires the surrender of more 
sovereignty in the areas of economic, fiscal and monetary policies to community institutions to 
achieve economic and financial coordination within RECs. These RECs form the building blocks 
for achieving continental sovereignty. This chapter provides a barometer for measuring the 
extent to which African national legal systems are integrated. This is necessary to aid the 
monetary integration process and financial transactions which take place within them. 
 
Chapter Three further considers the discussion on the relevance of transferring more 
sovereignty to community institutions by virtue of even deeper integrated financial markets 
between nations within specific regions. The precious balance between national sovereignty 
and the ever-growing need to relinquish parts of this national sovereignty ‘voluntarily’ will be 
considered especially in terms of the regional market and local control conflict. Brought to the 
fore will be an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of regional financial integration as 
the chapter zooms in on the EU Banking and Finance programme as case study. An 
examination will be conducted on the aspects that make this region considered to be the most 
advanced regional arrangement in the world. Here, particular attention is paid to issues such as 
its single or internal European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which form 
the core of the EU economic and financial architecture; the nature of its legal system, 
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supremacy of EU law, and the harmonization of national laws through the doctrine of mutual 
recognition.  
 
Drawing from this, a comparative analysis will be devoted to the legal and institutional limitations 
which plague the future of financial integration in the African continent with examples from the 
EU. This touches the effectiveness of African community institutions and the need to strengthen 
and empower these in order to achieve organic development in the short and medium term 
before embarking on any attempts to imitate EU institutions in the much longer term. 
 
It must be cautioned however that the manner in which the EU handled the GFC, coupled with 
the ravaging nature of the sovereign debt crisis it faced, confirms the imperfection and 
incompleteness of the European financial integration process both in terms of its content and 
geographical coverage. The Greece case study will be discussed and key insights will be 
derived from this experience which will inform the efforts made for Africa-wide integration. 
 
Chapter Four inserts the changing nature of sovereignty within a global context by drawing from 
the historical efforts of financial integration efforts at the global level. The chapter centers on the 
objectives, successes and failures of the Bretton Woods System which aimed at regulating and 
controlling international financial markets. This analysis confirms the source of inspiration for 
regional integration arrangements around the world. The chapter illustrates how states began 
committing to international financial institutions and regulations at the expense of state 
sovereignty. In using the examples of global financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organisation (WTO) the chapter promotes 
the argument that in order to achieve global financial efficiency, states need to cede control over 
parts of domestic economic and financial policies. Here it will be asserted that as regional 
integration and eventual continental sovereignty is necessary to assist Africa in meeting its 
indigenous challenges within the continent, it is also crucial for Africa to increase and 
consolidate its influence on the global stage by subscribing to global integration. 
 
Chapter Five addresses the likely risks and exposures of global integration by examining the 
complex nature of the global financial design. This will inform decision makers in Africa on the 
consequences of any ill-advised agendas for global influence. The chapter discusses in depth 
the impact of the recent Global Financial Crisis and the catastrophic ramifications it left behind 
especially in terms of the redefinition of what is commonly understood as systemic risk and 
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financial stability. The efforts made to respond to this crisis and restore a befitting global 
financial regulation structure to absorb the shock of this or any future crisis will be thoroughly 
evaluated. It argues that, free markets are of intricate value to society but without a watchful 
eye, could spin out of control especially considering the uncertainty of human intuition which 
presents its own challenges.  
 
From an African perspective, the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the African continent 
will also be investigated. It will be showed that the crisis effect suffered in the developed and 
emerging financial markets were quite different from those suffered in Africa. Whilst the 
developed financial systems were first hit by a systemic banking crisis, Africa sustained milder 
hits on economic growth and activity following the global recession. The argument is made for 
the strengthening of existing regulatory and supervisory institutions in Africa to ensure a robust 
financial system in the continent. The African sovereignty proposition will provide the necessary 
support and protection to the African financial system and improve preparedness for a future 
Global Financial Crisis while simultaneously enabling the African financial system to fit properly 
into the global financial framework. This will consequently provide a favourable ecosystem for 
the drivers of economic growth to flourish. The chapter nevertheless concludes by urging any 
solution in the continent to factor in development issues in order to mitigate the human impact of 
a crisis. 
 
Chapter Six reflects on the residual difficulties the continent faces and considers a solution 
embedded in the larger global community. In a nutshell, the Chapter advocates that African 
sovereignty must consider development law and globalization and ought to be superimposed on 
a larger framework of strategic and sustainable global programmes. In doing so, the chapter 
identifies efforts towards these sustainable global programmes which can assist Africa in 
circumventing its challenges within the diverse continent while remaining plugged into the bigger 
framework of global economic markets in general and global financial markets in particular. 
Issues of relevance will be poverty and debt reduction, governance and capacity building, 
energy use and climate control, peace and security. Also, the development of these 
programmes instigated by world leaders will be discussed although frustration is felt with 
regards to the repetitive nature of the recommendations and responses backed by little action.  
 
Chapter Seven closes the thesis by establishing the threads of thought and providing the 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2: AFRICA- TOWARDS MONETARY 
INTEGRATION 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Considering that the future economic growth in Africa will be propelled by its increasing ties 
to the global economy, sustainable mechanisms need to be continually introduced to help 
absorb the more complex, more integrated global environment today than did emerging 
markets of a quarter century ago. 1 
 
The core lessons to be learnt with reference to the African continent will form the nucleus of 
this thesis. Whether Africa will and/or can go as far as the European Integration agenda is a 
contentious matter this chapter will consider. 
 
It is true that African financial markets remain vulnerable to the domino-effects of a GFC, 
nonetheless, in so far as channeling capital from those who can supply it to those who need 
it remains a benefit of integrated financial markets and systems, the robustness of the entire 
international financial architecture is necessary and inextricably bound to enabling strong 
financial markets to flourish in the continent. Regional and domestic financial markets will in 
turn play central roles in mobilizing savings towards investment in households, businesses 
and government, in order to support sustained growth and development and manage 
investments for posterity.  
 
The continent’s rapid recovery following the GFC is a key indicator of the dawn of a new era 
on the continent. Net inflows from foreign direct and foreign portfolio investment have been 
on the rise and this trend has led Africa to be labeled a ‘second generation emerging market’ 
also known as ‘frontier markets’2 by foreign portfolio investors.  
                                               
1
 Then, institutional investors accessed emerging economies largely through equity markets and, in some cases, 
foreign currency debt issues. Today, these investments are only part of the picture. Investors are now immersed 
in a wide range of financial activities, including domestic bond and foreign exchange market instruments. Put 
simply, financial technology is now more complex than ever before. See Nellor D; The Rise of Africa’s Frontier 
Markets; Finance and Development, A quarterly magazine of the IMF; September 2008, Volume 45, Number 3 
2
 According to Standard & Poor's--which took over the emerging market financial indices from the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2000, “frontier markets” are countries with capital markets that are smaller and less 
liquid than those in the more advanced emerging markets. For more on this, see Nellor (n.1) available online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/nellor.htm (accessed 10 April 2014) 
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Given this turn of events and as the continent strives to attain its full potential, the topic of 
financial integration most especially at the regional levels remains crucial in facilitating the 
efforts to assist African financial markets acquire their full potential in order to enhance their 
attractiveness for investors. These efforts will no doubt have to include effective regional and 
domestic infrastructure to enable successful implementation otherwise African financial 
markets will stay small, unsophisticated and underdeveloped with the inability to attract 
considerable portfolio inflows as indicated by many African states. In this light, it will be 
argued that a combination of regional and domestic law reforms are needed to enable the 
economic integration agenda (one unable to achieve maximum results without the other).3 
 
As the integration exercise advances, it is sensible to pause and take stock of the reality on 
the continent. This chapter assesses the current stage of regional financial integration in 
Africa by evaluating the legal and institutional limitations which plague the future of financial 
integration and regulation in the continent. These limitations labelled the ‘Africa problem’ 
bring to the fore the intricate relevance that laws and institutions have in constructing 
regional financial integration agendas. This signifies that it will be flawed to engage solely in 
a socio-economic and/or political approach to the analysis of RFI without appreciating the 
legal aspects. The chapter further advances the argument that a monetary model formed 
with these laws and institutions at the center is a pre-condition to solving Africa’s residual 
challenges. 
 
For the purposes of this research, reference to Africa is frequent although the scope remains 
mainly Sub-Saharan Africa with periodic reference to North Africa should the need arise. The 
reason for this is twofold; firstly the region is frequently studied as a unit in most academic 
and policy settings, mainly as a result of the commonality in the region in terms of culture 
and racial heritage.  Secondly, the issues and shortcomings pertaining to development are 
relatively similar. 
 
The first part of this chapter will define what the Africa problem is. This definition places into 
context the ‘Spaghetti bowl’ dilemma by focusing on a discussion of the main Regional 
Economic Communities (REC) within Africa, their development, and how they work and 
operate.  
 
                                               
3
 Salami I; Financial Regulation in Africa, An Assessment of Financial Integration Arrangements in African 
Emerging and Frontier Markets; p.203 
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The second part will consider post-colonial progress of financial integration from the African 
perspective with particular attention on cross border access and regulation. The critique will 
introduce the African Union project and then delve deeper into the African problem and bring 
out reasons attributed for the project’s sluggish progress. Here the adequacy of the current 
treaties and enforcement mechanisms in place will be analyzed and recommendations put 
forth.  
 
This leads to the third part which will make the case for further and deeper integration which 
can go a long way to thwart the Africa problem and the constraints on national sovereignty, 
by solving many of the problems faced by investors on the ground.  Isolated success stories 
in managing and negotiating this Africa problem within the continent will be highlighted. This 
appreciation subsequently forms a basis for an emerging notion of sovereignty. The re-
conceptualization of sovereignty here will bring to light the new form of economic and 
monetary cooperation for Africa -African or continental sovereignty. This will involve a model 
of cooperation and alliance between member states aimed at the effective running of 
financial markets as a solution to the Africa problem. This part will assess the suitability of 
the current institutional structure for specific regional blocs. This will help to further explain 
the new form of continental sovereignty. 
 
The chapter concludes in part four which puts into perspective the realistic long term 
prospects of financial integration and regulation in Africa acknowledging the overwhelming 
amount of work which still needs to be done. It nevertheless urges for a complete as 
opposed to an incomplete story of Africa’s prospects to be told. Even though the thesis 
illustrates explicitly the prodigious nature of challenges the continent faces and the daunting 
task of reform,  the overall conclusion still requests an optimistic undertone of the glass 
being half full and not half empty with progress being made slowly but surely.  The old 
oxymoron festina lente has not been more fitting: make haste slowly. 
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Part One 
 
2.2 The Spaghetti Bowl  
The illustration below clearly captures a plethora of RECs which coexist in Africa. As 
memberships overlap, a ‘spaghetti bowl’ analogy is constituted. This multi-membership 
derived from the proliferation of RECs makes it administratively difficult to manage the 
integration process as their differing Rules of Origin, tariffs and customs procedures cause 
delays, confusion and increase the cost of trade. Therein lays the starting point of the Africa 
problem. As it will be seen, these RECs have struggled to fulfill the primary objectives of 
their arrangements. 
 
The effect of the spaghetti bowl has been described as follows: “The fashioning of the 
emerging ‘spaghetti bowl’ of regional trade agreements among African countries, while 
perhaps being done with good intentions, in practice is not having demonstrable salutary 
effects. Many Chinese and Indian investors—not to mention African and other foreign 
investors—find them at best, ineffective, or at worst, confusing, and not conducive to 
attracting international commerce.”4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4
 Broadman H: Africa’s Silk Road, China and India’s New Economic Frontier; The World Bank, Washington, USA, 
2007; p.18; available online at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/Africa_Silk_Road.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2014) 
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2.2.1 Figure A: The Spaghetti Bowl of African RECs5 
 
 
Note: AMU: Arab Maghreb Union6; CBI: Cross Border Initiative; CEMAC: Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa7; CILSS: Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought 
Control in the Sahel8; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa9; EAC: 
East African Cooperation10; ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States11; 
ECOWAS: Economic Community of Western African States12; IGAD: Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development13; IOC: Indian Ocean Commission14; SACU: Southern African 
Customs Union15; SADC: Southern African Development Community16; WAEMU: West 
African Economic and Monetary Union.17 
                                               
5
 Ibid; Figure 9; p.18 (source: the World Bank) 
6
 http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
7
 http://www.cemac.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
8
 http://www.cilss.bf/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
9
 http://www.comesa.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
10
 http://www.eac.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
11
 http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
12
 http://www.ecowas.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
13
 http://igad.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
14
 http://politics.ioconline.org/home.html (accessed 10 April 2014) 
15
 http://www.sacu.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
16
 http://www.sadc.int/ (accessed 10 April 2014) 
17
http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Home.aspx (accessed 10 April 2014) 
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Instantly, one can recognize how easily efforts to foster integration can be duplicated and 
how complex the exercise becomes when trying to work out what obligations states involved 
in the RECs have towards each other and third states. Here, the definition of the third state 
becomes somewhat messy and ambiguous for the purposes of operating a common external 
tariff by a member state to another state where it is also involved in a customs union 
arrangement. Salami provides a very neat example using the case of Kenya which belongs 
to a customs union arrangement with the EAC, SADC and COMESA. How would it then 
relate with Burundi for instance as a third state for the purpose of operating the customs 
union in COMESA when it is also in a customs union arrangement with Burundi under EAC? 
Again, Cameroon being a member of ECCAS which has the paramount aim of establishing a 
common market and subsequently a customs union is already a member of CEMAC which 
already has a customs union. How would it relate with Sao Tome and Principe its fellow 
custom union member under ECCAS as a third state when trying to implement the common 
external tariff as a member of CEMAC?18 
 
To untangle this complex web and solve the problem of duplicity of efforts, I am in accord 
with Salami’s recommendation for a Pan-African Regional Coordination Structure to be 
established with the objective to ensure that memberships to RECs are effectively 
coordinated to avoid jeopardizing the ultimate AU agenda.19This structure should be 
independent and free from any influences- political or otherwise to enable it function at its 
maximum capacity. 
 
2.2.1.1 The African RECs 
Drawing from the above, the existing integration arrangements in Africa are an attempt to 
facilitate the continent-wide integration project through a gradual process of coordination, 
harmonization and progressive integration of activities of existing and future RECs in Africa. 
It is worth mentioning that there are only eight RECs recognized by the African Union. They 
are: the ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, COMESA, ECCAS, AMU, CEN-SAD, and IGAD.20 These 
will now be evaluated below: 
 
 
 
                                               
18
 n 8; p.19 
19
 Ibid; p.20 
20
 Available online at: http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs (assessed 10 April 2014) 
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i.) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
The pursuit of economic integration in West Africa restarted in 1972 when it became 
apparent that the countries were being marginalized more and more on the international 
stage.21 The Nigerian and Togolese Heads of state authorized their government officials to 
design the framework for such an integration arrangement. It was this framework that 
eventually hatched the idea of the West African Clearing House (WACH) in 1975. The 
WACH was the first attempt to boost intra-regional trade between states in the West African 
region. Yet, it failed to achieve its goals mainly due to the non-recognition and application of 
its policies at domestic levels in Member States. This led to the creation of ECOWAS. 
ECOWAS was the first attempt to create a formal regional bloc, covering the entire West 
African region. The Treaty of ECOWAS was signed in Lagos on 28th May 1975 by Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  
 
Although the ECOWAS Treaty did not necessarily state one of its objectives as achieving a 
common market, its goals nonetheless formed parts of a common market. The 1993 revised 
treaty however stated that achieving a common market was one of the goals of ECOWAS.22 
Without much success in achieving trade liberalization, the Anglophone states of ECOWAS 
(Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) decided to embark on the creation of a 
monetary union, the second in the sub-region. This was initially scheduled for 2003 but has 
been postponed four times to now be achieved in 2020.23 The second monetary zone (the 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)) was created in 2000 and is made of five countries 
within the ECOWAS that plan to introduce a common currency called ‘the Eco’ by 2020. 
There is no doubt that this objective will be met with challenges as the free trade area which 
was scheduled to be achieved by 1985 was only attained thirty years later in 2010.  
 
In terms of the governance structure24, ECOWAS comprises three arms of governance, the 
Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The Chairman of the Authority of Heads of 
State and Government sits at the helm of the organization structure is. The Chairman is the 
current Head of State and Government appointed by other Heads of State and Government 
to oversee the affairs for a period of one year. The Minister in charge of ECOWAS affairs in 
                                               
21
 Okeke C; The Theory and Practice of International Law in Nigeria (Fourth Dimension Enugu Nigeria 1986) 172. 
22
 ECOWAS Treaty 1993 Art 3(d) 
23
ECOWAS Vision 2020; available online at: http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ECOWAS-
VISION-2020.pdf  (accessed 01 July 2014) 
24
 Available online at: http://ecoslate.github.io/about-ecowas/governance-structure/index.htm (accessed 01 July 
2014) 
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the country of the Chairman of the Authority automatically becomes the Chairman of Council 
of Ministers; similarly, that country presides over all other ECOWAS statutory meetings for 
the year (ministerial and senior level, such as the Technical Committees).  
 
At the top of the Executive arm of the Community is the President of ECOWAS Commission 
appointed by the Authority for a non-renewable period of four years. He is assisted by a Vice 
President and 13 Commissioners. 
 
The legislative arm of the Community is the Community Parliament headed by the Speaker 
of the Parliament. The administrative functions of the Parliament are directed by the 
Secretary General of the Parliament. Pending elections by direct universal suffrage in future, 
parliamentarians are seconded by national Parliaments to the Community Parliament for a 
period of four years. The judicial arm of the Community is the Community Court of Justice, 
headed by the President. They are all supported by the Supreme Courts of their respective 
Member States to fill the country positions. The Court ensures the interpretation and 
application of Community laws, protocols and conventions. The administrative functions of 
the Court are handled by the Court Registrar who is assisted by other professionals. 
 
ii.) The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SADC is made up of 15 Member States which are Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. They are at different stages of development but remain 
largely underdeveloped. SADC was created in 1980 as the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC). The objective at the time was to achieve integrated 
economic development and to strengthen economic and political independence against 
apartheid. It became apparent that the organization needed a stronger legal position to 
attain its aim of economic integration. This would require an agreement, charter or treaty to 
replace the SADCC Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
This led to the signing of a declaration by the Head of States and Governments and the 
Treaty of Windhoek in 1992 established SADC. Its objectives included: the achievement of 
economic development and growth; alleviation of poverty; and the enhancement of the 
standard of living of the Southern African people through regional integration.25 The 
objectives are to be achieved by developing policies directed at the progressive elimination 
of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services and of the 
                                               
25
 SADC Treaty Art 5(1)(a) 
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peoples in the region generally among Member States26- simply put, attaining a common 
market. Nevertheless, intra-regional trade is still sluggish due to structural problems caused 
by non-tariff barriers. Commitment to fully liberalize intra-regional trade is the pre-requisite to 
achieve the deeper integration plans to eventual monetary union. 
 
Regarding the governance structure and decision-making procedures27, the organization has 
eight principal institutions and organs charged to execute its mandate. They are: The 
Summit of Heads of State or Government; Summit Troika of the Organ; Tribunal; Council of 
Ministers; Sectoral and Ministerial Committees; Standing Committee of Senior Officials, 
Secretariat; National Committees; and Parliamentary Forum. 
 
The SADC Summit is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of functions of 
the community, ultimately making it the policy-making institution of SADC. It is made up of all 
SADC Heads of States or Government and is managed on a Troika system that comprises 
of the current SADC Summit Chairperson, the incoming Chairperson (the Deputy 
Chairperson at the time), and the immediate previous Chairperson. The Troika System vests 
authority in this group to take quick decisions on behalf of SADC that are ordinarily taken at 
policy meetings scheduled at regular intervals, as well as providing policy direction to SADC 
Institutions in between regular SADC Summits. This system has been effective since it was 
established by the Summit at its annual meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, in August 1999. 
Other member States may be co-opted into the Troika as and when necessary. The Troika 
system operates at the level of the Summit, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 
the Council of Ministers and the Standing Committee of Senior Officials. The Summit usually 
meets once a year around August/September in a member State at which a new 
Chairperson and Deputy are elected.  
 
The SADC Tribunal ensures adherence to, and proper interpretation of the provisions of, 
the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and adjudicates upon disputes referred to it. It 
was established by the Protocol on the Tribunal, which was signed in 
Windhoek, Namibia during the 2000 Ordinary Summit, and was officially established on 18 
August, 2005 in Gaborone, Botswana. The inauguration of the tribunal and the swearing in 
of members took place on 18 November, 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia where it is based. It 
consists of appointed judges from Member States. 
 
                                               
26
 SADC Treaty Art 5(2)(d) 
27
 Available online at: http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/ (accessed 01 July 2014) 
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After several judgments ruling against the Zimbabwean government, the Tribunal was de 
facto suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit. On 17 August 2012 in Maputo, Mozambique, 
the SADC Summit addressed the issue of the suspended SADC Tribunal. The SADC 
Summit resolved that a new Tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be 
confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between 
Member States. 
 
The Council of Ministers oversees the functioning and development of SADC and ensures 
that policies are properly implemented. The Council consists of Ministers from each Member 
State, usually from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Planning, or Finance. It meets 
twice a year in January or February and immediately prior to the Summit in August or 
September. 
 
The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC, responsible for strategic 
planning, co-ordination and management of SADC programmes. It is also responsible for the 
implementation of decisions of SADC policy and institutions such as the Summit, 
the Troikas and Council of Ministers. It is headed by an Executive Secretary and has its 
headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. 
 
iii.) The East African Economic Community (EAC) 
The EAC is made up of six Member States. They are: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Over the last century, these states have been involved in one 
form of economic cooperation or the other. For example, Kenya and Uganda were once 
involved in a customs union as far back as 1917.28 There was also an East African 
Community between 1967 and 1977 and an East African Cooperation between 1993 and 
2000. Following the collapse of the previous East African Community in 1977 due to political 
reasons, the Member States negotiated a Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets 
and Liabilities in 1984. It stated that Member States were to consider areas for future 
cooperation and to make concrete arrangements for such cooperation. 
 
Subsequent meetings of the Heads of State of the original three states (Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda) led to the signing of the Agreement for the establishment of the Permanent 
Tripartite Commission for the East African Co-operation on 30 November 1993. This was 
later upgraded to a treaty when the need to strengthen regional cooperation arose. The 
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Treaty for the creation of the EAC was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered into force 
on 7 July 2000.29 
 
The objectives of the EAC are to develop policies and programmes, aimed at deepening 
political, economic, social and cultural cooperation among Member States with the aim of 
strengthening and regulating the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, 
political, and other relations of the Member States in order to achieve speedy development 
and sustained expansion of economic activities among all Member States.30 Following these 
goals, it aims to achieve a customs union, common market, monetary union and ultimately a 
political federation amongst other things.  
 
The EAC is making good progress with the achievement of its goals, both a customs union 
(2005) and a common market (2010) have been established and the Monetary Union 
Protocol (signed 30 November 2013) has been implemented within set timeframes.31  
 
With regards to the governing structure32, the main Organs of the EAC are the Summit, the 
Council of Ministers, the Coordinating Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the East African 
Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat. 
 
The Summit comprising of Heads of Government of Partner States gives strategic direction 
towards the realization of the goal and objectives of the Community. The Council of Ministers 
(or simply, the Council) is the central decision-making and governing Organ of the EAC. Its 
membership constitutes Ministers or Cabinet Secretaries from the Member States with 
responsibility for regional co-operation. Every year, the Council meets twice, one meeting of 
which is held immediately preceding a meeting of the Summit. The Council meetings assist 
in maintaining a link between the political decisions taken at the Summits and the day-to-day 
functioning of the Community. Regulations, directives and decisions taken or given by the 
Council are binding to the Member States and to all other Organs and Institutions of the 
Community other than the Summit, the Court and the Assembly. The Council, each year, 
elects a Chairperson by rotation to serve a one-year term to the office of Chairperson of the 
Council of Ministers. 
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The East African Court of Justice (or simply, the Court) is the principal judicial Organ of the 
Community and ensures adherence to the law in the interpretation and application of 
compliance with the EAC Treaty. It was established under Article 9 of the EAC Treaty for the 
Establishment of the East African Community. Its temporary seat is Arusha, Tanzania until 
the Summit determines its permanent seat. The Court established its Sub-registries in the 
Member States, which are located in the premises of the National Courts. The Court is 
currently composed of ten judges, appointed by the Summit from among sitting judges of 
any Member State court of judicature or from jurists of recognised competence, and the 
Registrar who is appointed by the Council of Ministers. The Court has two divisions: an 
Appellate division and a First Instance division.33 
 
The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is the Legislative Organ of the Community 
and has a cardinal function to further EAC objectives, through its Legislative, Representative 
and Oversight mandate. It was established under Article 9 of the EAC Treaty. The Assembly 
has a membership comprising of 45 elected Members (nine from each Member State), and 7 
ex-officio Members consisting of the Minister or Cabinet Secretary responsible for EAC 
Affairs from each Partner State, the Secretary-General and the Counsel to the Community 
totalling 52 Members. 
 
The Secretariat is the executive Organ of the Community. As the guardian of the Treaty, it 
ensures that regulations and directives adopted by the Council are properly implemented. In 
service of the Community, the Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General, 4 Deputy 
Secretaries-General, the Counsel to the Community and hundreds of EAC staff members 
who carry out the day-to-day work of the EAC as mandated by the Council. The Secretary-
General is the principal executive and accounting officer of the Community, the head of the 
Secretariat and the Secretary of the Summit; he/she is appointed by the Summit for a fixed 
five-year, non-renewable term. The Deputy Secretaries-General are appointed by the 
Summit on recommendations of the Council and on a rotational basis. They deputise the 
Secretary-General and each serves a three-year term, renewable once. The Counsel to the 
Community is the principal legal adviser to the Community. 
 
iv.) The Economic Community of Eastern and central African States (COMESA) 
In 1965, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) organised a meeting 
of the newly independent states of Eastern and southern Africa in 1965 to consider 
proposals for establishing regional economic integration arrangements among them. The 
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meeting proposed the creation of an Economic Community of Eastern and Central African 
states which would benefit from a larger market size and promote social and economic 
cooperation among the Member States. A treaty for the creation of a preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA) among the Member States was concluded in December 1981 and came 
into force on 30 September 1982. The treaty outlined plans to transform the PTA into a 
common market within 10 years. This led to the treaty establishing the COMESA signed on 5 
November 1993, and it came into force on 8 December 1994.34  
 
COMESA comprises 19 countries which include: Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Its main objective is to create a fully 
integrated and unified region which has free movement of goods, services, capital and 
persons among Member States: the idea is to establish a regional economic community.35 
COMESA achieved a FTA, among nine Member States including Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 2000 which was the 
deadline for the achievement of an FTA among all member States. Rwanda and Burundi 
joined the FTA in 2004 and the Comoros and Libya joined in 2006. The customs union was 
due to be achieved in 2004 launched later in June 2009. The delay was as a result of 
Member States’ failure to implement the free movement of goods policies. In spite of this, 
COMESA agreed in 2008 to expand the FTA to include two other RECs including the EAC 
and SADC.36 
 
In terms of decision-making power37, the COMESA Authority, composes of Heads of States 
or Government and is COMESA’s supreme policy-making organ. The Authority is headed by 
a Chairman elected for an agreed period. The Authority is tasked with the general policy 
direction and controlling the overall performance of the executive functions of COMESA. It 
meets once a year at Summits which are held in different member States. Whilst the hosting 
country assumes the chairmanship of the Authority for the year, an Extraordinary Summit 
can be held at the request of any member of the Authority; so long as one-third of the 
members of the Authority support such a request. The Authority meetings are held in closed 
sessions and usually decisions are taken by consensus. The session leaders have to issue a 
communiqué, recording any decisions made. These directives and decisions taken by the 
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Authority are binding on all member States and the other organs to which they are 
addressed. 
 
The COMESA Court of Justice decisions have precedence over any decisions of national 
courts. The Court of Justice may receive cases not only from member States, but also from 
natural and legal persons, against the Council to determine the legality of any act towards 
the directive's, regulation or decision made. The Persons are also permitted under the 
Treaty to sue a member State in the COMESA Court; the legality under the Treaty of any 
act, directive regulation, or decision of such member State. 
 
v.) The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
The Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) known as the Customs 
and Economic Union of Central Africa was established by the Brazzaville Treaty in 1996 to 
create a customs union between its members. The Member States included: Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. In 1981 the UDEAC 
leaders agreed to form a wider economic community of Central African states which gave 
rise to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). This was established 
on the 18 October 1983 by the UDEAC members and Burundi, Rwanda, former DRC, Sao 
Tome and Principe. Angola became a member in 1999. The ultimate aim of ECCAS is to 
achieve a customs union.38 
 
ECCAS was functional in the mid 80’s but became subdued for several years due to 
financial difficulties (non-payment of membership fees) and conflicts in the region and focus 
was diverted to achieving peace and security within the region. The war in the DRC was 
particularly divisive, as Rwanda and Angola fought on opposing sides. In fact in February 
1999, Member States established the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa 
(COPAX) with the aim of promoting, maintaining and consolidating peace and security in 
Central Africa. It entered into force in January 2004.39 Achieving peace in this region has 
been difficult because conflicts persist notably recently in the Central African Republic. 
 
The governance structure40 comprises the Conference of Heads of State and Government; 
Council of Ministers; Secretariat General (one secretary-general elected for four years and 
three assistant secretaries-general); Court of Justice; and Consultative Commission.  
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The Conference of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ and is made of 
the Heads of State of Member States. The Conference defines the political and socio-
economic harmonisation agenda for the organisation. It seats once a year and the 
presidency rotates annually by alphabetic order of the Member States. The Council of 
Ministers constitutes Ministers or Cabinet Secretaries from the Member States with 
responsibility for economic development. Every year, the Council meets twice and the 
meetings assist in maintaining consistency between the political decisions taken at the 
Conference and the day-to-day functioning of the Community. The Council also proposes 
recommendations for the Conference to consider. 
 
While the Secretariat is the executive organ to ensure the promotion of the organisations’ 
objectives, the Court of Justice is still not operational. 
 
vi.) The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
The AMU comprises of five Member States which are: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. It is a sub-regional bloc of countries in North Africa. Algeria, Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia came together through the first conference of Maghreb Economic Ministers in Tunis 
in 1964 to establish the Conseil Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM). It was set up to 
coordinate and harmonize the development plans of the four countries, and to coordinate 
intra-regional trade between them and relations with the EU. As these plans failed to 
materialize, in June 1988 the states set up the Maghreb High Commission and other 
specialized commissions. This eventually gave rise to the establishment of the AMU signed 
in Marrakech on 17 February 1989 by all Member States. The primary objectives of the AMU 
Treaty included working ‘…towards the progressive realization of the free movement of 
persons, services, goods and capital’.41 Again, although the treaty does not specifically state 
that a common market is part of its goals, the above all form parts of a common market. 
Similarly like the case of ECCAS, conflicts42 in the area have hindered progress on the 
union's joint goals and practically made it currently inactive. Furthermore, the overall 
instability following the Arab Spring crisis which sprung in 2010 cannot be overemphasized. 
Nevertheless, attempts have been made to revive it especially as growing efforts for peace 
and security in the region have ignited a fresh need for cooperation. 
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vii.) The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
There are twenty-eight Member states of CEN-SAD. These are: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and 
Tunisia. The Treaty establishing CEN-SAD was signed in Tripoli on 4 February 1998. It 
became a REC in July 2000 and it is the biggest REC in Africa by virtue of number of 
countries, population and surface area. Following the inactivity of AMU, CEN-SAD has 
become the main player in the North African region. 
 
The goals of CEN-SAD include establishing an economic union, which would involve 
establishing a common market with the free movement of persons, capital, goods and 
services.43 The progress of CEN-SAD like the case of AMU has been hindered by political 
conflicts in Member States. The focus to achieve economic benefits from the REC has been 
delayed by the pursuit for solutions to the political conflicts in Darfur and Somalia.44  
 
More pressing is the complication brought about by the spaghetti bowl dilemma. Achieving a 
customs union for all twenty-eight Member States will be problematic considering that they 
all are actively involved in other RECs with intersecting customs union goals.  
 
With regards to the governing structure45, at the helm of the organisation is the Conference 
of leaders and Heads of State. They meet once a year. The Executive Council prepares the 
programmes and action plans and ensures the implementation of the decisions arrived at the 
Conference of Heads of State. The Secretariat ensures the day-today running of the 
organisation and the functioning of the different institutions in the organisation. 
 
viii.) The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was first established 
to advance a platform to redress recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters 
between 1974 and 1984 which had caused widespread famine and economic hardship in 
the Eastern African region.46 There were six countries in the horn of Africa which included 
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Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda that came together to launch the 
IGADD. 
 
Eritrea joined the IGADD upon its independence in 1993 and in March 1996, the IGADD 
changed into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The objectives were 
broadened to include: harmonizing policies with regards to trade and customs; promoting the 
free movement of goods, services and people within the region; creating an enabling 
environment for foreign, cross border and domestic trade and investment. The IGAD’s aim 
also included promoting and realizing the objectives of the COMESA and EAC since the bulk 
of its members belong to these communities.47 
 
In terms of the organization structure of IGAD48, the organisation is comprised of four 
hierarchical POLICY organs: first, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which is 
the supreme policy making organ of the Authority. It determines the objectives, guidelines 
and programmes for IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is elected from among the 
member states in rotation; second, the Council of Ministers which is composed of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Focal Minister designated by each member state. 
The Council formulates policy, approves the work programme and annual budget of the 
Secretariat during its biannual sessions; third, the Committee of Ambassadors which is 
comprised of IGAD member states' Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the 
country of IGAD Headquarters. It convenes as often as the need arises to advise and guide 
the Executive Secretary; fourth is the Secretariat which is headed by an Executive Secretary 
appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years 
renewable once. The Secretariat assists member states in formulating regional projects in 
the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonisation of development policies, 
mobilises resources to implement regional projects and programmes approved by the 
Council and reinforces national infrastructures necessary for implementing regional projects 
and policies. 
 
Again like the cases of AMU and CEN-SAD, persistent political conflicts in the area have 
dented efforts for economic cooperation and diverted focus to achieving peace and security. 
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Having considered the above, the chapter will now reexamine the development of the 
differing types of financial integration systems within Africa from the post-colonial period till 
present, taking into account the motivations for RFI.  
 
2.2.2 The Evolution of Economic Integration in Africa 
On the back of the African problem laid out above, it is sensible to reflect on the 
development of the concept of regional economic integration in Africa to better understand 
why the project has morphed into this multifarious web.  
 
Economic integration arrangements institute the removal of domestic trade barriers typically 
between countries within the same geographic region. These integration arrangements are 
usually free trade areas or customs unions. As evidenced previously, these regional 
arrangements have not been without criticisms. Firstly, possible trade diversion could occur 
as trade could be diverted from a cheaper source in a non-Free Trade Area country to a 
more expensive source in a Free Trade Area member who still enjoys a price advantage 
because of tariff protection. On another side of the same argument, there is the possible 
reduction in the terms of trade of Member States where FTA leads to trade diversion from a 
low-cost third country to a higher cost intra-FTA source. For instance countries like South 
Africa and Nigeria enjoy competitive advantage by virtue of the fact that there is typically an 
influx of investors and human resources because they provide more conducive business 
environments by virtue of the size of their economies. This could be further complicated by 
perceived or real gains and losses among the members that may lead to disputes and a 
sense of loss of national sovereignty.49 Furthermore, the fiscal stability of member states 
could be affected in the short run as regional economic integration can lead to reduction in 
government revenue mainly because a huge part of government revenue in Africa is 
generated from trade tariffs and taxes. Small wonder the 1990’s witnessed countries that 
made the swiftest advances toward trade liberalization suffer significant reductions in 
revenue from trade taxes.50  
 
In spite all this, Salami draws from empirical evidence and suggests that trade liberalization 
through regional agreements nonetheless enhances development but advices that any 
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adverse fiscal consequences should be diluted by proper sequencing and the introduction of 
adequate policies in Member States. These preconditions for sound regional economic 
integration must be present domestically such as strong commitment in implementing the 
agreed arrangements and fair mechanisms to arbitrate disputes51; ensuring a sound 
macroeconomic environment, stringent measures to ensure the coordination of the revenue 
and spending aspects of the budget including raising domestic indirect and direct taxes, 
strengthening tax administration and collection and improving the effectiveness of public 
spending. 52 
 
From a broader perspective, the underpinning pillars for regional integration 
in Africa originate in the continent’s geography, geology and demography. This development 
can be described as follows: 
 
i) Geography: With its vast land area nearly 30 million square kilometers, in fact its 
sheer land area dwarfs that of the combined major economies of the world, including that of 
the USA, Western Europe, Japan, China, India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, which average 27.8 million square kilometers. The sheer geographical scale of the 
continent is only matched by its economic prospects. Most of the discussion on regional 
integration has focused on the free movement of goods and services. There are 
nevertheless 17 landlocked countries with no access to sea. The possibility of integrating all 
these countries into one common market is a very attractive economic prospect. 
 
ii) Geology: Africa is endowed with mineral and natural resources with near-global 
monopolies of platinum, chromium and diamond; a high proportion of the world’s gold, cobalt 
and manganese; and extensive reserves of bauxite, coal, uranium, copper and nickel. It is 
also home to timber deposits and has an enormous agricultural potential.  
 
iii) Demography: In addition to its abundant supply of land, the continent is blessed with 
abundant labour supply that is not only youthful, but growing. With a population of slightly 
over one billion people in the 54 countries, it accounts for about 14.8 percent of the World's 
human population. Comparatively, Africa’s population is larger than the combined population 
of the USA, Japan, Western Europe and the GCC countries. In economic theory, land and 
labour are considered as two major factors for the production process. As such with a 
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combined endowment of labour and land, everything being equal it is justified for the 
continent to attain sustainable growth.  
 
Given the similarities of the problems faced continentally, regional integration is seen as a 
rational response to the difficulties like the smallness of many national markets, landlocked 
countries, high unemployment rates despite the population size and unevenly distributed 
resources which have in most curses served as a curse rather than a gift.53  
 
Consequently, there has been much support from African governments for regional 
integration. Indeed since independence they have embraced regional integration as an 
important component of their development strategies. The different types of integration 
agreements which states have used to foster their development agenda will now be 
explained below. 
 
2.2.2.1  Merits of Financial Integration in Africa 
Financial integration is deeply rooted within the constructs of the simplest forms of trade 
integration methods. These can be distinguished as preferential trade agreements, free 
trade agreements and custom unions from which it has been argued other higher forms of 
economic integration agreements have cropped up including a common market and a 
monetary union, which require more commitment from Member States. Basically, RFI 
harmonizes the financial policies of Member States within a particular regional bloc. In 
essence, it begins with the liberalization of capital accounts and can subsequently deepen 
with banking and capital markets integration (normally harmonizing the banking and capital 
market laws) with the objective of establishing a single market in the financial services 
sector. The rationales for this include54:  
 
i) Pooling scarce savings together: the continent has suffered high levels of poverty 
exacerbated by weak banking regimes with poor laws and regulation. This has resulted in 
inefficient credit systems; coupled with the underdevelopment of capital markets, extremely 
limited sources of savings and investment exist. Cross-border banking and financial activity 
would help pool resources from all member states in the arrangement. These resources 
could then be used to fund credible domestic and regional projects.  
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ii) Developing the national financial systems and national financial regulation 
mechanisms: drawing from the previous point, cross border banking and financial activity will 
no doubt bolster the advancement of national systems because the Member States that 
render more advanced banking and finance services and functioning capital markets can 
easily transfer the skills to other Member States that lack these advanced services. Also the 
risk of contagion will propel the Member States with more efficient financial regulatory 
authorities to take a lead in ensuring top-notch regulation and supervision to avoid systemic 
risk spreading across the region.  This will ensure financial stability.  
 
iii) Harmonizing regional laws: in the same connection, a harmonized regional system 
for regulation and supervision would enable all Member States adhere to stipulated regional 
standards.  
 
iv) Encourages competition and innovation in the banking and finance sector: opening 
regional markets would likely result in increased competition and consequently innovation 
which would encourage a better lending and credit system. This system would thereby 
promote cheaper and more competitive services across the region.  
 
v) Risk diversification: closely linked to the above point, an efficient credit system 
provides an array of investment opportunities. Investors will be able to have multiple options 
of combining investment portfolios and as such the ability to diversify risk. This is 
advantageous as it promotes investment and resources can be channeled to other projects.  
 
Balassa defines a preferential trade agreement (PTA) and free trade areas (FTA) as the 
former being an agreement to reduce customs duties (mainly tariffs) on trade among 
members relative to those on trade with non-members and the latter referring to an area 
where tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are abolished, 
but each country retains its own tariffs against non-members. Further, while a customs union 
is where tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are 
abolished and the participating countries share a common external tariff against non-
members, a common market is a higher form of integration where trade restrictions as well 
as restrictions of factor movements are abolished.55 This definition is elaborated further by 
Tsoukalis as an economic area within which there is free movement of goods, services, 
persons and capital.56 A monetary union has been defined as the high degree of 
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coordination of monetary, macroeconomic and budget policies.57 Reinforcing the argument 
for supra-nationalism, an economic and monetary union can be differentiated from total 
economic integration in that the latter is ‘the unification of monetary and fiscal policies 
requiring the setting up of a supra-national authority whose decision are binding on for 
member states.’58   
 
It is worth noting that an African Development Bank (ADB) report set forth a 5 stage criteria 
for attaining financial integration within RECs.59These stages are illustrated in Table 1 below. 
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2.2.2.2 Table 1: Regional Financial Integration: A Generic Roadmap 
 
Stage of RFI Domestic measures Regional measures 
Preconditions Macroeconomic stability 
Bank soundness 
 
Stage I: Preparatory  
 
Member countries begin to take 
steps to modernize their 
financial systems by 
implementing parts of 
international financial standards 
and initiating exchange of 
information among themselves 
Improve national payments 
systems (RTGS) to reduce 
payment delays and transfer 
costs  
 
Strengthen bank supervision 
and regulatory framework 
(‘partial’ compliance with BCPs)  
 
Improve accounting standards 
(IFRS)  
 
Improve core elements of legal 
system (land and corporate 
registries, property rights, 
contract enforcement) 
Agreement to establish FTA  
 
Regional secretariat to advance 
and implement regional agenda  
 
Exchange of information and 
regular meetings between 
monetary and financial 
authorities  
 
Regional committees to 
delineate areas and modalities 
of the integration process  
 
Bilateral and regional 
agreements to offer technical 
assistance to ‘less developed’ 
members to upgrade their 
financial systems 
Stage II: Harmonization  
 
Member countries to modernize 
their financial system. Steps 
should be taken to harmonize 
and link regional financial 
policies, institutions, and rules 
and regulations 
Expand payments systems to 
include electronic fund 
transfers, security deposit 
systems, and payment switches 
 
Devise cost-effective systems 
for small transfers  
 
Further strengthen bank 
supervision and regulation by 
‘large’ compliance with BCPs, 
IAIS, & IAS  
 
Remove intraregional exchange 
controls  
 
Liberalize foreign capital inflows  
 
Strengthen stock exchange (if it 
exists) rules and regulations, 
and implement supervision 
((IOSCO) principles  
 
Substantially complete the 
modernization of the financial 
systems, making them market-
based;  
 
Central bank autonomy and 
reinforced supervisory authority  
 
Remove barriers to entry of 
regional and foreign banks to 
Fully effective FTA  
 
Agreement on relevant 
convergence criteria (voluntary 
compliance)  
 
Establishment of (advisory) 
surveillance and monitoring 
mechanism  
 
Regular meetings between 
country regulators and 
supervisors  
 
Harmonization of policies 
regarding inward capital flows  
 
Liking national payments 
systems (REPSS< TARGET)  
 
Establish private financial sector 
consultative bodies (association 
of bankers, accountants, stock 
exchanges, etc.)  
 
Establish regional physical 
infrastructure development 
bodies 
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improve competition  
 
Develop national credit 
information systems. 
 
Stage III: Cooperation  
 
Members make substantial 
cooperative moves towards 
harmonizing and linking their 
financial sector policies.  
 
They also strengthen and make 
more operative the regional 
surveillance and monitoring 
mechanism 
Gradually liberalize exchange 
controls vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world  
 
Implement regionally agreed 
comprehensive convergence 
criteria  
 
Coordination of monetary and 
exchange rate policies 
Agreement to establish customs 
union  
 
Regional FDI regime 
 
Establishment of 
comprehensive convergence 
criteria (mandatory) and its 
monitoring with MDBs/IFIs 
support  
 
Full harmonization of regulatory, 
supervisory, and accounting 
standards  
 
Single bank licensing, cross-
border participation of 
regulators and supervisors in 
bank supervision  
 
Development of a centralized 
credit information system 
 
Development of region-wide 
securities market infrastructure 
and regulations 
Stage IV: Integration  
 
Members move to unify their 
institutions, rules and 
regulations, as well as financial 
products. 
Adapt/modify domestic 
legislative and regulatory 
requirements and institutional 
set-up to conform to the 
requirements of this stage of 
RFI. 
Fully effective customs union 
 
Unified stock exchange 
 
Adoption of broad legal system 
(e.g. OHADA treaty by WAEMU 
countries) 
 
Partial pooling of reserves 
 
Regional bond market 
Stage V: Unification  
 
In this stage members yield 
sovereignty in monetary policy 
to a regional authority 
Exchange local currency for a 
regional currency  
 
Reserves in common currency 
Regional central bank  
 
Regional common currency 
 
 
The ADB report touted financial integration as a process ending with monetary union and not 
just one leading up to it. The roadmap outlined above involves a number of detailed 
measures to be implemented at various stages of the integration process. 
 
The need to integrate African economies has been widely endorsed however the nature and 
scope of this integration remain contested. This breakdown fuels the argument which 
underpins this chapter as to whether there is now the need for a new mixed African model of 
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integration; suggesting that countries be grouped in accordance to their current integration 
commitments. This will be such that as part of the enlargement process, those at the basic 
levels within preferential and free trade areas will be gathered in the same arrangement. 
Following successful implementation and accomplishment of certain criteria they then 
ascend to the customs union block, thereafter into a common market and subsequently the 
monetary union arrangement with a political union the last phase. This undoubtedly lends 
credence to the truth that an effective framework for overall regional financial integration can 
only be derived upon the success of simpler forms of economic integration such as free 
trade areas and customs unions. This will now be put into context in the ensuing paragraphs 
as the African Union project is unfolded. 
 
Part Two 
 
2.2.3 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) 
The post-independence period of the 1960’s brought about protectionist economic policies 
adopted by the newly independent states across the continent as opposed to any form of 
state cooperation beyond the colonially imposed boundaries. This was due to the 
melancholy which prevailed following the exploitative nature of colonialism they had suffered 
and that any form of state cooperation could bear similar effects. This approach was very 
unpopular with respect to the international markets and states became increasingly 
overlooked thereby ushering in regional economic integration as a more thoughtful system 
moving forward. 
 
Consequently, the OAU was the first attempt hatched in 1964 as an all-encompassing 
framework for an African-wide integration system. Its objective was to promote economic 
development through economic cooperation among the economies of the African states.60To 
achieve this, it sought coordination and harmonization in the context of economic and 
political cooperation.61 It is worth noting that eventually other sub-regional groupings were 
formed typically among countries that shared the same colonial history on one hand and 
among countries within the same geographical region on the other. There are fourteen sub-
regional economic groupings which have existed concomitantly with the OAU although as 
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abovementioned only eight have been recognized by the AU.62 A unique fact prevalent is 
that majority of the African states are members of more than one regional or sub-regional 
bloc. As it will be seen, the various regional blocs and indeed the individual countries that 
comprise their membership were and still are at differing stages of development and 
implementation of their regional arrangements. This continues to pose significant difficulty for 
the smooth functioning of an African-wide integration system. 
 
2.2.3.1  The AU and AEC Treaty  
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) which became the driving 
force of regional integration and the OAU in its entirety struggled to meet the aforementioned 
objectives and as a result the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was adopted in 1980 by the OAU. 
The LPA led the way for the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). The 
AEC Treaty63 came into force in May 1994 and following its ratification, the OAU operated on 
the basis of the OAU Charter and the AEC Treaty. The LPA aimed to create separate but 
confluent and overarching integration regimes in three blocs via three sub-regions which 
were West Africa, Eastern and South Africa and Central Africa.  
 
Further, Article 6(2) of the AEC Treaty affirms the main purpose of the AEC is to realize an 
African Central Bank and single currency by 2028 in six different stages. Placing this into 
perspective, this continental integration process is an ambitious plan that seeks to do in 
thirty-four years what Europe accomplished in forty-one years. Other aims of the AEC as 
outlined in Article 4(1) provide that the AEC is to promote social and cultural development 
including African economic integration with the view of realizing economic development. 
 
Firstly, within the first five years, Stage I will aim at strengthening existing RECs and where 
necessary will create new ones. 
 
Secondly, within eight years, Stage II will focus on the stabilization of tariff and other barriers 
to regional trade and the strengthening of sectoral integration, particularly in the field of 
trade, agriculture, finance, transport and communication, industry and energy, as well as 
coordination and harmonization of the activities of the RECs. 
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Thirdly, within ten years, Stage III will seek to establish an FTA and a Customs Union at the 
level of each REC.  
 
Fourthly, in two years, Stage IV will subsequently coordinate and harmonize tariff and non-
tariff systems among RECs, with a view to establishing a Continental Customs Union.  
 
Fifthly, within four years, Stage V will establish an African Common Market and the adoption 
of common policies.  
 
Finally in the last five years Stage VI will integrate all sectors, establish an African Central 
Bank and a single African currency, set up of an African Economic and Monetary Union 
including creating and electing the first Pan-African Parliament. The justifications for the 
need of a monetary union intersect with those for an RFI arrangement. These include:  
 
a) the furtherance of price stability by controlling inflation where the mandate of the union 
establishes price stability as a pivot of monetary policy;  
 
b) also, curbing inflation and stabilizing exchange rates stimulates economic activity thereby 
promoting growth and facilitating foreign investment as a result of the macroeconomic 
stability;  
 
c) again, currency convertibility will enable smooth unrestricted trade within and without the 
region. This solves pertinent problems caused by transaction costs and delays from using 
foreign currencies like the dollar and euro in intra-regional trade given that business 
transactions are normally carried out in foreign currency;  
 
d) further, closer cooperation and trade will enhance the region’s influence in the global 
economy. 
 
The establishment of an African-wide monetary union with a Central Bank is overly 
ambitious by every measure considering that a monetary union typifies the deepest form of 
RFI. The legitimacy of the ambition to accomplish this project within the prescribed deadline 
can be questioned however as African states have so far found it difficult to realize the more 
basic forms of integration. 
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Remarkably, a transformation occurred in 2001 with the advent of the new Constitutive Act-- 
the OAU was now changed to the African Union (AU).64 
 
The AU was formed in order to accelerate the process of economic and political integration 
across the continent concurrently with the achievement of the already existing economic 
development goals of the OAU. Suffice to say therefore that the AU was set up to pursue the 
aims of both the OAU Charter and the AEC Treaty. This will ultimately unify the OAU and the 
AEC into one institution. Generally, the AU objectives are more wide-ranging than those of 
the OAU however Article 33 (2) of the AU Act states: 
 
“The provisions of this Act shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or 
contrary provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community”. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the majority of the RECs abovementioned aim to create a 
customs union and a common market through the elimination of obstacles to enable the free 
movement of goods and services, labour and capital. Needless to say that none of them can 
showcase an efficient common market; not even COMESA, which is known as a common 
market. The same situation exists with the other African RECs like SADC, WAEMU and 
CEMAC that have a monetary union.65 
 
2.2.3.2  Accelerating Economic Integration in Africa 
After the AEC Treaty, the integration process has remained slow despite many good 
attempts to accelerate the process of economic integration in the continent. Firstly The Sirte 
Declaration of 1999 tried to shorten the AEC Treaty time-frames and then the Accra 
Declaration of 2007 called for a Union government of Africa to speed up political and 
economic integration. In 2009 the Minimum Integration Program (MIP) was established as 
agreed by Member States, the RECs and the African Union Commission (AUC) to enhance 
the cooperation amongst RECs as a continental framework to achieve economic integration 
in the continent. MIP is of capital importance as it promotes the idea that allows RECs 
progress at differing rates in an organized manner while simultaneously carrying out the 
activities laid out in MIP. This builds consensus around the activities and projects to be 
executed to accelerate the regional and continental integration process. Also MIP infuses 
greater visibility into the implementation of both the regional and continental agenda and 
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clarifies the relationships, restoring synergy between stakeholders in terms of policy 
coordination and harmonization.66 
 
One of the areas of priority which was to be achieved by the RECs in the first phase of MIP 
included free movement of people, goods, services and capital by progressive elimination of 
tariff barriers in all the RECs; elimination of non-tariff barriers in the RECs; signing of 
partnership agreements between RECs; facilitation of customs procedures and creation of 
customs unions in each REC with a common external tariff; total free movement of people in 
the regions and partial free movements between the regions; free movement of goods in the 
regions; progressive free movement of services and capital in the regions; establishing a 
regional and continental framework to attract visitors.67 
 
The MIP did admit that although the RECs function in specific environments with projects 
and programmes suited to their circumstances, it is vital for their actions to be coherent with 
their role as the building blocks of the AEC. The coordination and harmonization of these 
activities around jointly negotiated priority programmes will accelerate the continent’s 
integration. Therefore, actualizing the MIP will depend on the resolve of each stakeholder to 
play their role and to give solid expression to its share of the programme.68 
 
Unfortunately, most RECs are still far behind establishing a customs union by 2017 as per 
the time frame of the AEC Treaty and the main bottlenecks hindering MIP are identical to 
those existent before it was created. These are non-implementation of regional policies and 
provisions at national levels; absence of supranational coordination and leadership at the AU 
level; conflict of interest issues that arise from the countries’ multi-membership of REC’s.69  
 
Suffice to say however that behind every dark cloud hides a silver lining as evidence of 
cooperation amongst RECs has been recorded following the COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite 
Summit on the 20 October 2008. This marked a significant high-point as for the first time in 
AU history, key building blocks of the AEC met to plan how to deepen cooperation between 
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themselves within the AEC Treaty framework.70 The second Tripartite Summit dated 12 June 
2011 provided evidence which solidified the commitment by these three RECs and their 
member states to foster integration.71 They indicated strong willpower to see an integrated 
Africa by adopting a road map for establishing the Tripartite FTA and adopting negotiating 
principles, processes and institutional frameworks. It can only be hoped that these efforts will 
come to fruition.  
 
Clearly, there is little doubt as to the many advantages that regional economic integration 
can bring to Africa. Nevertheless, the outlined plan for continent-wide-integration appears to 
be far more advanced and ambitious than the Member State’s readiness for it. Any revisions, 
modifications or additions should be therefore be practicable. 
 
More so, this thesis concedes that the characteristic weaknesses in the legal structures 
across most RECs serve as the main hindrance to achieving their goals at the regional level 
and also attaining the overall AU objectives. As Africa’s role in the global sphere increases, 
these legal impediments become more apparent and there is the urgent need now more 
than ever for them to be addressed.  
 
2.3 The Status and Implementation of Regional Law in REC 
Member States 
Generally, most RECs would usually have primary law which typically constitutes treaty 
provisions establishing the REC and also secondary law which is composed of all other legal 
instruments adopted by the institutions of the organization. 
 
Most REC treaties fall short in providing for the status and applicability of REC secondary 
law or legal instruments in Member States even though most REC treaties have a general 
provision for adherence to their treaty obligation. For instance in the case of ECOWAS, the 
status of the 1975 Treaty was stated in Article 3: 
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‘The Member States shall make every effort to plan and direct their policies with a view to 
creating favourable conditions for the achievement of the aims of the Community; in 
particular, each Member State shall take all steps to secure the enactment of such 
legislation as is necessary to give effect to this Treaty.’  
 
With respect to the secondary instruments, two main types of legal instruments originated 
from two institutions of the community. Firstly were the ‘Decisions’ and ‘Directions’ of the 
Authority of Heads of State and secondly were the ‘Decisions’ and ‘Directions’ of the Council 
of Ministers. The Authority of Heads of State is the highest institution of the community and 
their ‘Decisions’ and ‘Directions’ were binding on all institutions of the community.72 The 
‘Decisions’ and ‘Directions’ of the Council of Ministers, on the other hand, were binding on all 
subordinate institutions of the community.73 No mention of the effect of these legal provisions 
on Member States is made and in fact, the failure to specify the binding effect was a 
significant weakness of the 1975 Treaty even though the revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty 
sought to solve this problem. The 1993 Treaty clearly stipulates that the ‘Decisions’ of the 
authority shall be binding on the Member States and the institutions of the community.74 
However, it did not specify particularly the legal effect of ‘Decisions’ in Member States.  
 
It is worth pointing out the similarity that exists between the other RECs in Africa with 
regards to the status of both the primary and secondary law. In SADC for example, the treaty 
provides, imprecisely, for the effect of SADC treaty provisions as Article 6(1) states:  
 
‘Member states undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the 
objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardize the 
sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty.’ 
 
Furthermore, Article 6(4)–(5) stipulates that: 
 
‘Member states shall take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application of this 
Treaty. Member States shall take all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of 
national law.’  
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There is neither mention of secondary law nor any provision to address the application of 
such law at the national level. 
 
Another interesting position is that of the revised EAC Treaty 2007. Article 8(4) states:  
 
‘Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar national ones 
on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty.’  
 
This does not consider or acknowledge the fact that there might be national provisions that 
are entirely different from the treaty and it fails to state which would prevail. This is the same 
scenario with Article 8(5), which stipulates: 
 
‘In pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article, the Partner States undertake to 
make the necessary legal instruments to confer precedence of Community organs, 
institutions and laws over similar national ones.’ 
 
This is problematic because it could now be interpreted that since the national provisions are 
dissimilar and totally contradictory to the regional framework, there would be no need to 
ensure their compliance with the EAC Treaty. This interpretation is likely given that there 
clearly would be no need to pass the ‘necessary legal instruments to confer precedence of 
Community organs, institutions and laws’ since the national law in question is different to the 
treaty provision. 
 
Also, Article 16 whose title is ‘Effects of Regulations, Directives, Decisions and 
Recommendations of the Council’ states: 
 
‘Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, the regulations, directives and decisions of the 
Council taken or given in pursuance of the provisions of this Treaty shall be binding on the 
Partner States, on all organs and institutions of the Community other than the Summit, the 
Court and the Assembly within their jurisdictions, and on those to whom they may under this 
Treaty be addressed.’  
 
This article somehow mentions secondary law of the treaty but does not define their status. 
These provisions are quite peculiar because other than the treaty, this is the first mention of 
regulations, directives and decisions of the council. Ideally, these instruments which should 
have different binding effects ought to be defined. Unfortunately their status has not been 
defined as opposed to the provisions of the EC Treaty, which it sought to emulate. 
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The case of ECCAS is also remarkable. Article 5(2) spells out the status that should be 
accorded the treaty nationally. It states: 
 
‘Each Member State shall take all steps under its constitutional procedures to secure the 
enactment and publication of such legislation as is necessary to give effect to this Treaty.’  
 
Also, Article 11(1)–(3) states that: 
 
“The Conference shall act by decisions and directives. Decisions shall be binding on the 
Member States and institutions of the Community, except for the Court of Justice. They shall 
become enforceable automatically in Member States Thirty (30) days after the date of their 
publication in the official journal of the Community. Directives shall be binding on the 
institutions concerned, except for the Court of Justice. They shall come into force upon 
notification and shall be published in the official journal of the Community.” 
 
While Article 15(1)–(3) stipulates that: 
 
‘The Council shall act by regulations. Regulations shall be binding on the Member States 
and institutions concerned, except for the Court of Justice. They shall be enforceable 
automatically in Member States thirty (30) days after the date of their publication in the 
official journal of the Community. They shall become effective for the institutions concerned 
immediately upon notification.’ 
 
These articles outline decisions, directives and regulations as the secondary instruments of 
ECCAS and have sought to make provision for their effect at the national level. They go on 
to indicate that Decisions and Regulations take effect in Member States 30 days after the 
date following publication in the official community journal. Be that as it may, it does not 
factor in the possibility that the legal systems within Member states could be dissimilar and 
as such could have implications on the effect of international law domestically.  
 
Thus far, it would seem the REC Treaty provisions of the COMESA Treaty are the most 
detailed. Articles 2 and 10 differentiate between the status of the treaty provisions on one 
hand and secondary legislation of the council in Member States on the other. Article 2 
states: 
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‘Each Member State shall take steps to secure the enactment of and the continuation of 
such legislation to give effect to this Treaty and in particular . . . to confer upon the 
regulations of the Council the force of law and the necessary legal effect within its territory.’  
 
Article 10(1)–(5) defines the status of COMESA secondary legislation within Member 
States––something which the other REC treaties conspicuously neglect. It states: 
 
“The Council may, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue 
directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions. A regulation shall be 
binding on all the Member States in its entirety. A directive shall be binding upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed as to the result to be achieved but not as to the 
means of achieving it. A decision shall be binding upon those to whom it is addressed. A 
recommendation and an opinion shall have no binding force.” 
 
However there remain several impediments to the realization of the customs union and 
common market objectives in spite of these detailed provisions, on the status of the 
COMESA treaty and secondary legislation in Member States. For instance non-tariff barriers 
affect the free movement of goods thereby hindering trade among Member States.75 
Nevertheless, the efficacy of regional enforcement structures in addition to the supreme 
status of the treaty and its legal instruments being accorded in Member States would 
ultimately determine the application of these provisions. In short, the general vagueness of 
most of the REC Treaty provisions confirm that those who drafted the treaties as well as the 
ratifying states made little or no preparation for compliance within Member States. Little 
wonder hardly any of these RECs have fully achieved their objectives. 
 
RECs such as ECOWAS and EAC which make provision for legal instruments to have 
binding effect in Member States but omit to specify how they would be implemented leave 
the execution of these laws in the hands of national parliaments. Again, the failure of most 
Member States to accord supreme status to REC provisions over national law allow these 
REC legal instruments to be ignored in most Member States. It remains true that the REC 
treaties ought to have articulated clearly the status of REC legal instruments to avert 
confusion. That notwithstanding, even in cases such as COMESA where the treaty clearly 
stipulates the status, because Member States fail to accord a supreme status to REC 
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provisions at the national level, the articulation of the status of these legal instruments in the 
REC Treaty is therefore expendable. History shows that regardless of the types of legal 
systems which African states operate, they typically do not have a reputation of complying 
with regional treaties and legal instruments. This is a reputation that has to change for things 
to move in a forward direction especially knowing now that the articulation of the status of 
REC treaties and the legal instruments must go hand-in-hand with specifications on how 
they would be implemented in Member States. 
 
2.3.1 The Credibility of Regional Enforcement Systems 
In Africa, the REC treaties have normally made provisions for the creation of community 
Courts of Justice and tribunals, but the reality is that the provisions have fallen short of 
granting these regional enforcement mechanisms the authority to hear cases referred to 
them by national courts. For example, the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty provided for the 
establishment of a tribunal to resolve disputes between Member States and to ensure the 
legal and just interpretation of the treaty.76 In the event of an unsuccessful resolution of 
disputes between Member States, the tribunal’s decisions would be final.77 The treaty did not 
provide for initial referral of disputes to the tribunal and this omission clearly resulted in the 
failure of the tribunal to foster community law and enable its possible supreme status. No 
wonder upon revision of the treaty in 1993, the tribunal had fallen short of establishing a 
body of jurisprudence.  
 
Unlike the 1975 Treaty, the revised 1993 treaty accentuated the legal aspects of ECOWAS 
with the most notable change being the provisions for the establishment of a ‘Community 
Court of Justice.’78 In addition to the abovementioned functions of the tribunal, Article 15(4) 
further made provisions for the court’s judgments to be binding on Member States, 
institutions of ECOWAS, individuals and corporate bodies. A protocol in defining its 
competence stipulated that it could hear disputes between Member States; and between 
Member States and community institutions on the interpretation and application of the 
treaty.79  
 
In spite of this, due to the lack of a platform to enable the development of the supreme status 
of the ECOWAS Treaty, the revised treaty has been unable to guarantee the implementation 
of ECOWAS provisions in and by Member States. Still no provision for the referral of cases 
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by national courts to the community court was made for the interpretation of treaty 
provisions. Consequently, the community court could not exert the kind of influence to 
ensure the establishment of supremacy of African Community law. The case that vividly 
exposes this shortcoming is Olajide Afolabi v Federal Republic of Nigeria80, where the 
plaintiff sought redress from the ECOWAS Court against Nigeria for closing the Benin 
border. This act had resulted in his business suffering a loss. Clearly this was a violation of 
the free movement provisions under the treaty however Nigeria argued that the ECOWAS 
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The ECOWAS court folded under this 
argument and dismissed the case.81  
 
In this case, the Applicant contended that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the substantive 
case on the grounds of the peculiar nature of the suit wherein the Applicant instituted 
proceedings against his State. Every provision of the Community law must be placed in its 
context and applied or interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole 
and in the light of all those considerations. The Court stated that the answer to the question 
submitted must be that the first paragraph of Article 9(3) of the Protocol which states that: “a 
Member State may, on behalf of its nationals, institute proceedings against another Member 
State or Institution of the Community, relating to the interpretation, application, of the 
provisions of the Treaty, after attempts to settle the dispute amicably have failed”; is to be 
applied as meaning that this Court is competent to hear disputes instituted by a Member 
State on behalf of its nationals against another Member State or institution of the Community 
and not otherwise, as was the case. By the examination of the said Protocol, the Court held 
that the Applicant cannot bring proceedings other than as provided in Article 9(3) of the 
Protocol. This view proved the point that the Applicant in this case could not bring the 
proceedings against his Country or Member State which by law is saddled with the 
responsibility of instituting proceedings on his behalf. The Court stated that the issue before 
it was that of competence to adjudicate on the proceedings instituted by the Applicant 
against the Respondent and not on locus standi per se, which the Applicant contended.82 
 
This position was similarly taken in Frank Ukor v Richard Lalaye83. Here an action was 
brought against Benin by one of its citizens for the seizure of his truckload of goods. He 
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argued that this was in violation of the free movement provisions of the ECOWAS treaty. As 
in the previous case, Benin also argued that the court had no jurisdiction and the court 
yielded and dismissed the case.84  
 
Here, the issue of jurisdiction of the Court considered Article 88 which provides as follows:  
 
“1. Where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of an action or 
where the action is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may by reasoned order, after hearing 
the parties and without taking further step in the proceedings gives a decision.  
2. The Court may at any time of its own motion consider whether there exist any absolute 
bar to proceeding with a case or declare, after hearing the parties, that the action has 
become devoid of purpose and that there is no need to adjudicate on it; it shall give its 
decision in accordance with Article 87(4) and (5) of these Rules.” 
 
Concerning the question of lack of jurisdiction, the Court considered the jurisprudence on 
jurisdiction which are deplete in the decisions of the Court, nationally and internationally as 
to when they may be said to lack it. On that basis, the cardinal principle of law on jurisdiction 
which never changes is that jurisdiction or lack of it is fundamental to the proceedings. It is 
trite law that jurisdiction means simply the power of a Court to entertain an action. On this 
note, this Court declined to act outside its mandate as specified in Protocol A/P1/7/9.85 
 
As expected, the ECOWAS Court of Justice is therefore unable to also play a central role in 
developing the common market goals of ECOWAS. 
 
This situation is similar among the enforcement mechanisms in other African RECs. Despite 
the fact that most of the treaties make provisions for the establishment of a court or a 
tribunal to ensure the interpretation of the treaty and dispute resolution between Member 
States arising from the treaty, it was only the COMESA, EAC and WAEMU treaties that 
allowed for national courts to refer cases to the regional enforcement body. 
 
Others such as SADC, ECCAS and AMU like the ECOWAS Treaty had ‘skeletal’ outlines. In 
the SADC Treaty for instance, Article 16(1) states: 
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 For the case summary see: http://dev.ihrda.org/doc/ecw.ccj.jud.01.05/view/ )accessed 01 July 2014) 
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 Protocol A/P.l/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice: available online at: 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/protocol.pdf  (accessed 01 July 2014) 
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‘The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the 
provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as 
may be referred to it.’  
 
Article 16(4) provides that: ‘The Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the 
Summit or the Council may refer to it,’ while Article 16(5) states: ‘The decisions of the 
Tribunal shall be final and binding.’  
 
Further, Article 32 stipulates that: ‘Any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of 
this Treaty, which cannot be settled amicably, shall be referred to the Tribunal.’  
 
This is markedly similar to ECOWAS and even though the treaty goes on to provide for 
decisions of the tribunal to be final and binding and that disputes that cannot be resolved 
amicably shall be referred to the tribunal; it neither explicitly makes reference to Member 
States nor require Member State courts to refer cases for clarification to the tribunal. 
Evidently, the SADC tribunal could not develop community law nor foster the realization of 
common market goals. 
 
The COMESA Treaty which has already been touted as the most comprehensive treaty of all 
the African REC treaties considered provides for an appropriate enforcement 
mechanism86alas, due to existing hindrances to the free movement of goods such as non-
tariff barriers, trade is still obstructed between Member States. Yet Member States fail to 
seek judicial intervention in dealings between themselves. As a result, the supremacy of 
community law has not been realized within COMESA nor has the community court been 
influential in facilitating the fulfillment of common market goals despite all its exhaustive 
provisions.  
 
In ECCAS’s case, the treaty provision is sketchy regarding enforcement mechanism. Article 
16(2) makes provision for the establishment of a Court of Justice that ‘. . . shall ensure that 
the law is observed in the interpretation and application of this Treaty and shall decide 
disputes submitted to it under this Treaty.’ Article 16(3)(b) states that: ‘The Court shall 
decide on actions brought by a Member State or the Conference on the grounds of lack of 
competence, misuse of powers or infringement of an essential procedural requirement of this 
                                               
86
 Article 19 outlines that the COMESA Court of Justice shall ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation 
and application of this treaty. Article 30(1)–(2) on national courts and preliminary rulings states that the highest 
court in the Member States should refer cases for preliminary rulings to the community court where the matter 
relates to the interpretation of the treaty.  
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Treaty,’ while Article 16(3)(c) stipulates that the Court shall ‘. . . give preliminary rulings on: 
the interpretation of this Treaty; the validity of the decisions, directives and regulations 
formulated by Community institutions.’ Article 17 also states that ‘The decisions of the Court 
of Justice shall be binding on Member States and institutions of the Community.’ 
 
Interestingly, regardless of the meagerness of the ECCAS Treaty, it somehow provides 
power for the community court to grant preliminary rulings––which have been central to the 
development of the supreme status of regional law. It unfortunately does not specify under 
what circumstances cases will be brought to the court and by whom. It remains unclear 
whether as with the EC and COMESA Treaties, it is the highest courts of the Member States 
or whether it is simply the institutions of ECCAS. 
 
The subsequent necessity would be the impact of this provision on the achievement of the 
common market objective. Sadly, the ECCAS Court has no records of facilitating the 
realization of ECCAS goals because the achievement of peace and security within the 
region became a priority due to the prevalence of regional conflicts.87 In this light, a provision 
on the court’s power to grant preliminary rulings was made redundant as without peace and 
stability within and without Member States, the common market agenda was dead-on-arrival 
anyway. This peace and stability initiative has been recently tested following the coup d’état 
in March 2013 which ousted the President of the Central African Republic-a member state of 
ECCAS.  
 
The AMU Treaty and the enforcement mechanism provision are quite scanty. Article 13 
which designs the enforcement mechanism in the form of a judicial authority comprised of 
two judges from each Member State, appointed for a period of six years. Their judgments 
shall be enforceable and final with regards to their rulings on disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the treaty and agreements concluded within the union. 
There is no provision for preliminary rulings and the development of supremacy of regional 
law given that the judicial authority as the case with ECCAS, sought to achieve security and 
stability first due to the conflicts within the region, which for many years inhibited any 
attempts of establishing a common market.88  
                                               
87
 African Union, Regional Economic Communities: History and Background of Economic Community of Central 
African States, available online at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/eccas.htm (accessed 20 September 
2014) 
88
 The effect of the ‘Arab Spring” which began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout the Arab 
World cannot be over-emphasized as a revolutionary wave of protests consumed the status quo. Suffice to say 
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2.3.2 Recommendations  
The examples above show that despite the efforts made by the African RECs to adopt a 
coherent regional integration model in both their treaty texts and long term common market 
objectives, they have fallen short more often than not. This triggers the necessity for vital 
reforms at both the domestic and regional levels to salvage the situation. Some proposals for 
reform will now be discussed below: 
 
a.) Clarity of definition of REC Legal Instruments in Member States 
But for the COMESA and WAEMU treaties, the other REC treaties considered above have 
shown that the draftsmen failed to neither provide clarity on the definition of the instruments 
that constitute secondary law nor provide explicitly for their effects in member states. 
Reforming the treaties by bridging these gaps will maximize the weight accorded these 
secondary law instruments in the national courts as well as before the regional enforcement 
mechanism.  
 
b.)  The concept of Supra-nationalism 
The lack of subscription to the concept of supra-nationalism in Africa has dented the regional 
integration project. The African experience is characterized by weakness in leadership at the 
regional levels and ineptitude of the regional institutions to carry out their duties worsened by 
Member states blatant disregard of their obligations under the REC Treaties. This issue can 
only be resolved by strengthening RECs in Member States by expressly embedding regional 
laws in domestic laws. This will no doubt bolster the supranational framework. 
 
c.) REC goals 
A significant number of African RECs have obscure aims especially in relation to articulating 
their common market objectives. Omitting to mention integral parts of a common market or 
indeed stating that the project seeks to achieve a common market without specifying its 
component parts makes assessing the REC’s progress problematic and questions its 
integrity. The objectives of the RECs must be clearly articulated and defined to eliminate any 
ambiguity. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
the impact on peace and stability in this region would drastically affect any integration project. Additionally the 
prevalence of distractions like Boko Haram only delay any progress made in terms of peace and stability. 
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d.) Regional Enforcement Framework 
Noticeably thus far, the foremost limitation of the legal systems of the African REC treaties is 
the weakness of their regional enforcement mechanisms which exude little or no authority. In 
spite of the fact that the duty to ensure that REC treaties are executed by Member States 
rests with them, the status quo confirms they lack the power to ensure compliance on the 
ground. Fair to say even with the EAC, COMESA and WAEMU Treaties which allow this 
provision, the regional enforcement institutions have been too defunct to make any 
remarkable difference. 
 
Again, the REC enforcement institutions have not developed concepts such as direct 
applicability and effect which render the influence of the treaties in Member States and to 
community citizens abstract. All these don’t help in the institutions’ reputation in fostering the 
goals of RECs and the overall common market goals. 
 
In order to reform the treaty provisions, it makes sense to ensure a common policy towards 
regional enforcement mechanisms requiring all RECs to have standard Courts of Justice or 
tribunals as the accepted enforcement mechanisms. The powers accorded the institutions to 
ensure compliance must be real and the repercussions for failure to comply properly spelled 
out. This will include adopting a common policy towards according all REC enforcement 
institutions the power of preliminary ruling so national courts can refer cases to be heard. 
Where regional courts appear to develop jurisprudence such as in ECOWAS and SADC, 
even though the bulk of cases heard are human rights cases, it will be ideal to encourage 
these institutions to take the lead and play a more active role in enforcing common market 
provisions thereby improving the chances for the achievement of common market goals. 
 
e.) Efficient Legal and Judicial Systems in Member States 
It is important to empower independent national legal and judicial systems. They should be 
seen to comprehensively enforce basic laws such as contract laws and property rights in a 
timely and fair manner. This is critical because the national legal systems are the media 
through which regional treaty provisions and policies will be applied and should they not 
operate up-to-snuff, it will jeopardize the overall implementation of Treaties by Member 
States. 
 
For instance it is sensible to advance the argument that the existence of robust legal and 
institutional infrastructure in Member States should precede accession into a regional 
integration arrangement considering the fact that the legal and judicial systems in most 
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African countries have been plagued by a long history of poor enforcement of basic contract 
laws and property rights.89  
 
f.)  Law of African Integration 
In addition to reforming domestic legal systems, the need to recognize African Integration 
Law within the core curriculum of legal education remains paramount. Unfortunately as this 
has not been recognized as a distinct area of law, the legal professionals such as lawyers 
and judges who will represent in and preside over these cases respectively could flounder as 
a result of incompetence. This is likely because the lawyers and judges will emerge from 
these communities where there have been no efforts made to enhance their expertise in this 
area of law. It is imperative that African Integration law going forward be developed and 
incorporated into the syllabus for formal legal training for future legal professionals. 
Essentially, to ensure professionals are kept abreast with international developments in this 
area, well-resourced information on integration law needs to be made available in libraries 
and learning centers. This information must be updated regularly and made accessible by 
appropriate communication technology.90 
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 Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulation: Explore Economies, available online at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings  (accessed 25 September 2014). A World Bank survey conducted on 183 
countries to assess the ease of doing business in these countries, ranked Sub-Saharan African countries as the 
lowest and the most difficult places to do business. Part of the parameters used for the study included the 
effectiveness of the judiciary in enforcing contracts and protecting investors. 
90
 Concurrently, the fundamental differences which exist between the legal systems of African countries within a 
given REC need to be addressed urgently as this has an impact on the overall legal framework of the REC and 
eventually the AU project as well. Placing this in context, Sub-Saharan Africa is largely made up of English –
speaking (Anglophones), French-speaking (Francophones) and Portuguese- speaking (Lusophones), while the 
Northern parts of Africa are predominantly Arab- speaking (Arabophones). This differences stem directly from 
their colonial history as the Francophone countries function firmly on the Roman concepts of the French system 
(Code Civil), whilst the Anglophones have backgrounds in the common law system operating on case law. These 
differences make it problematic to achieve a harmonized legal system in a regional context because of the split in 
similarities along the lines of colonial heritage. The impact of this is much more pronounced within large RECs 
that have memberships involving people from different colonial backgrounds like ECOWAS and those that cut 
across a few sub-regions in Africa such as COMESA. For example, within the ECOWAS the English speaking 
countries like Nigeria, Gambia and Ghana will have similar legal systems that follow English law whilst the 
French-speaking countries like Cote D’Ivoire, Togo and Senegal within the same REC follow the French legal 
system. In fact in Cameroon, because of their colonial ties to both the French and British, both legal traditions co-
exist in a bi-jural arrangement within the state. On a positive note however, this has not been known to inhibit 
regional integration as is evidenced by the EU which comprises different peoples of different legal heritage. This 
confirms that it is possible to achieve economic integration without full harmonization of legal systems. Also, 
England and Scotland have managed to co-exist whilst operating different legal systems and whilst procedural 
issues here have been overcome, within the African integration context experience points to the fact that these 
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g.)  Supremacy of REC Law 
No matter how effective the national and regional legal and judicial systems are, coupled 
with well-trained law professionals, all this will be immaterial if there is no domestic law 
which accords regional law a supreme status. Member States should acknowledge the 
supreme status of community law through national provisions in the form of constitutions, or 
Acts of their legislature which explicitly award regional laws supremacy over domestic laws. 
Sadly, this is absent in African states where state constitutions have often been suspended 
following military coups which frequently interrupt state governance. In fact even where 
stable civilian government exists, national courts still fail to recognize regional law as 
supreme as no explicit supreme status is accorded African integration law. This 
consequently affects the overall achievement of REC goals as it would be complex to 
implement regional policies into Member States thus jeopardizing the entire regional 
integration project.91 
 
Reflections 
The types of regional financial structures operating in the African financial markets will be 
examined in the following part and consideration will be made as to the suitability of these 
kinds of structures. It will be seen that the main reason why African countries face 
challenges in applying international standards is because these standards do not typically 
factor in the peculiarities of African financial systems which for decades have been shaped 
largely by historical, political and economic factors among other things. These can hardly 
now be compelled into a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to regulation which international 
standards promote.  
 
Should these internationally acceptable regional standards be adopted, the question about 
what these standards should be and how they will be established would still arise. As 
previously discussed, the AU and AEC aim to achieve monetary integration for the entire 
continent by 2028 by firstly achieving financial harmonization among the regional blocks, and 
then across the whole continent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
issues are more difficult to resolve than even the substantive issues. Nevertheless, the OHADA Treaty discussed 
earlier is a success story in progress especially with regards to direct applicability in member states. 
91
 It is important to stress the need for the recognition of the supremacy of regional law by all the arms of 
government (legislative, executive and judiciary) including all levels of government in Member States to ensure 
consistency. Recognition by the legislative arm would ensure that no laws conflicting with REC laws are enacted.  
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In spite of all the shortcomings which plague the African integration project, these have still 
not prevented the RECs from pursing the adoption of a modern financial regulatory 
mechanism- at least on paper.  
 
Part Three 
 
2.4  The Progress of RECs in Africa 
It is evident that the main weakness of economic integration in Africa is the failure of 
Member States to implement REC policies domestically. Firstly, most member states belong 
to more than one REC with overlapping policies and secondly, the judicial enforcement 
regimes are weak. 
 
Nevertheless, the efforts made by the COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite arrangement provide 
a breath of fresh air as there is evidence of progress with respect to the Tripartite Free Trade 
Area (Tripartite FTA) and the Tripartite FTA institutional framework. The summit which took 
place on 20 October 2008 was a landmark event because it was the first time since the 
formation of the AU that key regional blocs of the AEC agreed to commence plans on 
deepening cooperation between themselves. The focus in my opinion should dwell more on 
ensuring the goals at the level of the individual RECs be fulfilled and the obstacles overcome 
in order to realize a truly integrated COMESA-SADC-EAC to serve as an example and 
model for the continent at large. As Salami points out, the focus of any plan such as the 
Minimum Integration Program (MIP) should not be to accelerate the process of economic 
integration, but to develop approaches that strengthen the efficacy of the RECs. For 
example she argues that the plan for an African Integration Fund to assist lesser developed 
economies within RECs is misplaced. In this case, the proposal encourages the focus on 
first getting Members States to appreciate the benefits of economic integration to the 
development process in Africa by raising awareness especially in the private sector. 
Secondly and more importantly, the AU should strive to persuade Member States’ domestic 
implementation of regional policies. Once these foundations are rock-solid, then plans like 
the Fund can become relevant.92  
 
2.4.1 The institutional structure of monetary union agendas in Africa 
Further instances of progress can be seen in respect of the various monetary union agendas 
albeit at differing rates. Knowing that the emphasis of this thesis is regional financial 
integration and considering that the deepest form of financial integration is monetary 
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integration, the thesis will now examine the regional financial regulatory structures among 
the African RECs with a monetary union agenda. These are: WAEMU, CEMAC and SADC.  
 
i.) WAEMU 
The WAEMU which consists of the francophone countries in ECOWAS provides the best 
example of a monetary union agenda in Africa. The banking regulatory framework here is 
provided for by the West African Monetary Union ((WAMU) Treaty formally WAEMU Treaty), 
the BCEAO (Banque Centrale de Etas de L’Afrique de L’Ouest) Statute and the WAMU 
Banking Commission Convention. The treaty made provisions for a common banking code 
for the WAMU countries93promulgating into the WAMU Banking Law. Following this banking 
regulation, the Central Bank (BCEAO) and the Banking Commission jointly share the 
banking supervisory functions94 whilst the ministers of finance of the various Member States 
maintain the residual functions.95 
 
Regarding a regional mechanism for capital markets regulation, all existing financial markets 
within WAEMU have been merged into a single market and operate under a single regulator.  
The regional capital market is based in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The adoption of an official 
regional regulator and stock exchange type capital market integration is advantageous 
because it enables Member States use only one single rulebook for listing, trading, clearing 
and settlement. The single market for both bond and stock trading BRVM (Bourse Regionale 
des Valeurs Mobilieres) and the fund management SICAV (Societe d'Investissement A 
Capital Variable) are supervised by a regional securities commission   
 
                                               
93
 Article 22 WAMU Treaty 
94
 The following articles stipulate the banking supervision functions of the BCEAO Statute: Art 23 grants 
assistance to WAMU banks, Art 24 requests information such as those regarding the financial affairs of banks; 
Art 25 requests banks to report any cases of payment problems; Art 27 ensures that harmonized banking laws 
are applied by domestic banks; and Art 28 proposes the need to constitute reserve requirements deposits with 
itself, including observing ratios within various components of their resources and monitoring ceilings for the 
amount of some of their uses of resources. Similarly, the banking supervisory functions of the WAMU Banking 
Commission can be found in the WAMU Banking Commission Convention and its annex. Art 1(1) outlines that 
the function of the WAMU Banking Commission is oversight of the organization and supervision of banks and 
financial institutions; Art 1(2) states that the Banking Commission would be governed by the terms of the Annex 
to the Treaty; Art 12 is on the approval of banks and financial institution; Arts 13–21 are on supervision of banks 
and financial institution; Art 22 is on administrative measures; Art 23 is on disciplinary measures; Arts 13, 14 and 
21 are on joint supervisory functions with the BCEAO. (See Salami I; Financial Regulation in African frontier 
markets: can the EU approach work?; Law and Financial Markets Review Vol.5, Num 5, September 2011, p. 380) 
95
 For example Art 31 and Art 12 of the WAMU Banking Convention and the WAMU Banking Law respectively 
require authorisation from Member States ministries of finance for the licensing and closure of banks. 
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The BRVM is the only wholly integrated regional capital market in Africa serving eight states 
in one region. In fact, it is the only model of a single market consisting of eight countries in 
one region operating in the world. This rarity coupled with the fact that there exists a 
common regulatory mechanism for all market players has led many to acknowledge the 
advanced nature of financial integration in WAEMU. 
 
However the growth and development of the capital market in the region remains lethargic. 
For instance only 38 companies as at 2010 were listed on the exchange compared to 360 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Its total market capitalization was $7.1bn 
as opposed to $1,012bn for the JSE.96 Factors already mentioned such as poor legal 
systems to ensure basic contract laws, secured transaction laws, insolvency laws and 
property rights coupled with general political instability do little to guarantee protection for 
institutional investors thereby alienating them from the region. In combination with other 
socio-economic problems, these legal issues need to be tackled head-on predominantly at 
the national levels to increase participation by investors on the regional stock exchange. 
 
ii.) CEMAC 
Other than the WAEMU, another regional arrangement with a monetary union worth 
discussing is the CEMAC zone. There are similarities with WAEMU in that the banking laws 
here have also been harmonized. Following the establishment of the regional banking 
commission, La Commission Bancaire de L’Afrique Centrale (COBAC) in 1990, a 
Convention was signed in 1992 establishing the harmonization of banking laws across 
CEMAC. Other than the responsibility for the harmonization of regulations and supervision of 
the regional banking system, COBAC also ensures compliance by credit institutions 
including issuing sanctions for any offences. 
 
Also, capital markets integration within CEMAC adopts the framework of a single regulator 
for the regional stock exchange. The Central African Stock Exchange BVMAC (Bourse des 
Valeurs Mobilieres d’Afrique Centrale), was established in 2003 and is situated in Libreville, 
Gabon. The Central African Financial Market Monitoring Commission COSUMAF 
(Commission de Surveillance du Marche Financier de L’Afrique Centrale) was created as the 
regional regulator of the capital market. Despite that, the creation of another stock exchange 
in Douala, Cameroon (Douala Stock Exchange (DSX)) at the same time has blighted the 
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 World Development Indicators 2012, available online at 
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(accessed 01 September 2014) 
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creation of the BVMAC. This coexistence poses a problem as it results in duplicity in the 
regulation and supervision of both exchanges. Besides, the region accounts for very few 
large companies and investors at the moment and there is a very low record of trading on 
DSX (with only 3 listed companies and a market capitalization of approximately 
$200million97) and hardly any on BVMAC. There is no question as to the underdeveloped 
nature of the capital markets in the region.  
 
The reasons which account for this inactivity in the stock exchanges can be attributed firstly 
to the poor comprehension of the financial markets in the region, and most especially poor 
comprehension of the stock exchanges. Nationals do not understand how these will help 
them and affect their livelihoods directly. Secondly, many business operators still remain 
skeptical about enlisting their companies because control of these stock exchanges still 
remains predominantly with the state. People just do not trust the state in monitoring their 
shares. As a result, certain measures need to be put in place to address this situation. 
Firstly, there is need for the state to run public sensitization campaigns and educate the 
public about the importance and benefits of the stock exchange. Radio and television 
programs, town hall meetings and the introduction of courses on the Stock Exchange in the 
national curriculum will go a long way to enable the populace develop an understanding of 
this institution and the transactions and activities therein. The Nigerian Stock Exchange is 
excelling partly because of sensitization and public awareness. Furthermore, the state needs 
to partner with the private sector to manage the affairs of the Stock Exchange. This will 
reduce the fears haboured by the population about investing in the Stock Exchange.  
 
iii.) SADC 
Within SADC, there exists a Common Monetary Area (CMA) which is a monetary area 
comprising of three states (South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland) and each Member State is 
given the responsibility of controlling its own financial institutions.98 Unlike the WAEMU and 
CEMAC experiences, there is no harmonized banking regulatory system within the CMA and 
as such the central banks of each CMA country have a unique department within them 
responsible for bank supervision. 
 
With regards to capital markets regulation in SADC, the Committee of SADC Stock 
Exchanges (COSSE) which was set-up in January 2011 is the main institution pushing 
through capital markets harmonization in the region. The draft SADC Finance and 
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 Available online at: http://www.douala-stock-exchange.com/indiceref_us.php (accessed 01 September 2014) 
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Investment Protocol, which was signed to foster the aims of the SADC Treaty, provides the 
realms under which COSSE operates.99 The primary objective of COSSE is to ensure the 
advancement and harmonization of capital markets in the SADC region. Other objectives 
include: to improve the operational, regulatory and technical requirement underpinnings and 
capabilities of SADC exchanges; to make the securities markets of SADC exchanges more 
attractive to both regional and international investors; to increase market liquidity and 
enhance trading in various securities and financial instruments; to promote the development 
of efficient, fair and transparent securities markets within the SADC region; and to 
encourage the development of a harmonized securities market environment within the SADC 
region.100 
 
In spite of these objectives, the overall pace of progress remains sluggish because most of 
the other SADC Member States have small capital markets and are still trying to catch up 
with the advanced nature of the South African capital market regime. South Africa is the hub 
of the region and COSSE’s vision to accomplish an integrated real-time network of the 
region’s national exchanges in tandem with South Africa’s by 2006 was never achieved. To 
date, there still is no regional capital markets regulatory mechanism in operation within 
SADC. 
 
2.4.2 Continental Sovereignty: The case for deeper and further integration in 
Africa 
In spite of the challenges discussed above, the thesis now advances the argument that the 
problems (abovementioned) faced by investors in the various RECs can be thwarted by 
deeper and further integration. A case is made to show that the complexities caused by the 
spaghetti bowl and inadequate legal institutions are being negotiated and managed 
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Art 21 stipulates that Member States have to work towards harmonizing macroeconomic policies in specific 
areas of co-operation including investment and finance. 
100
 Available online at: http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/finance/capital-markets/ (accessed 25 
September 2014) - Since 2007 COSSE has worked to harmonize the listing standards for SADC Member States 
with stock exchanges which meet the JSE listing standards. This is good practice as slowly but surely it 
encourages others to meet these standards thereby enabling them ascend into the more advanced arrangement. 
It is worth noting that presently, COSSE oversees securities exchanges in South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It also works closely 
with the Committee of Insurance, Securities and Non-Banking Financial Authorities (CISNA), which forms part of 
SADC’s Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate. Also, in 2012, COSSE also launched a new 
website available at: http://www.cossesadc.org/ (accessed 25 September 2014) to improve visibility and access 
to data about Southern African stock exchanges. This is part of the Committee’s focus on using technology to 
improve linkages between capital markets in the region. 
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successfully in some of the regions. This success story is hatched from the alliance between 
African RECs in terms of monetary cooperation to realize the effective running of financial 
markets as a solution to the African problem. This reveals the new concept of African 
sovereignty or continental sovereignty. 
 
Following the instability and lack of confidence that engulfed the global financial markets 
since 2007, Africa emerged as an alternative for investors and policymakers alike as they 
continued to seek other investment opportunities and risk diversification options away from 
developed markets. This was smoothly facilitated by the revelation that Africa had muscled 
its way into a regional player following strong economic growth rates reported by the IMF 
averaging approximately 6 percent annually since the early 2000’s making it the second 
fastest growing economic region in the world after Asia.101 The quickening of Africa’s 
economic pulse has thereby infused the continent with a new commercial vibrancy. In fact 
McKinsey examined this acceleration in Africa’s growth trends and reported that the 
continent is gaining greater access to international capital as total foreign capital flows rose 
from $15 billion in 2000 to a peak of $87 billion in 2007.102 The McKinsey report illustrates 
that the rate of return on foreign investment in Africa is higher than in any other developing 
region.  Information of this sort confirms that growth trends in Africa are not synchronized 
with those in developed markets thereby creating an attractive platform for investors seeking 
high returns on investments elsewhere.  
 
Furthermore, as future economic growth in Africa is propelled by its increasing ties to the 
global economy, sustainable mechanisms need to be continually introduced to help absorb 
the more complex, more integrated global environment today than did emerging markets of a 
quarter century ago. Then, institutional investors accessed emerging economies largely 
through equity markets and, in some cases, foreign currency debt issues. Today, these 
investments are only part of the picture. Investors are now immersed in a wide range of 
financial activities, including domestic bond and foreign exchange market instruments. Put 
simply, financial technology is now more complex than ever before. 103 
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It is worth remembering that Africa is a very fragmented continent with poor countries many 
of which are landlocked. However when these countries are grouped together, the 
arrangement becomes very interesting. For example, a country like Togo (in ECOWAS) is a 
small country with a GDP of approximately $7billion and a population of approximately 6.8 
million people, in the grand scheme of things, this is not particularly attractive for investors. 
However when grouped with the likes of Nigeria and Ghana, it becomes a very interesting 
proposition with access to over 300 million people in the ECOWAS region alone.104 It was 
this proposition that attracted investors to set up Ecobank Transnational (Ecobank) in 
Lomé, Togo in 1985 at a time when the banking industry in West Africa was dominated by 
foreign and state-owned banks. Today, Ecobank is a leading pan-African banking 
conglomerate with banking operations in 36 countries and its activities have facilitated 
economic, financial integration across the African continent.105 
 
More so, in the case of stock exchanges for example, the increase of these throughout the 
continent in the last couple of decades have also contributed to the growth trend and 
boosted Africa’s international clout. The number of stock exchanges rose from a dozen in 
the early 1990s to over twenty-three today, including two regional stock exchanges. About 
two-thirds of African countries are now served by a local or regional stock exchange in a 
continent that was once devoid of stock exchanges. Between 2007 and 2009, $10billion of 
equity capital was raised on local African stock exchanges. Prior to the global financial crisis, 
African countries began to play an active role in the international financial markets and were 
able raise capital there. In January 2007, a Nigerian commercial bank, Guaranty Trust Bank 
plc (“GTB”), was able to raise $350million through a five year euro-bond issue and demand 
for this was high. This was the first time any Nigerian institution, private or public, had 
approached the international capital markets since the early1990s. In July 2007, GTB listed 
global depositary receipts on the London Stock Exchange in its first global offering. The 
offering raised $750m and was the first offering by a Nigerian bank. In September 2007, 
Ghana was the first African country to raise $750m in its first sovereign bond issue. The 
bond, which is for a term of 10 years with a coupon rate of 8.5% per annum, was the first in 
sub-Saharan Africa and at the time of closure was more than four times oversubscribed. In 
October 2008, Seychelles raised a $230million three-year bond; and in December 2007, 
                                               
104
 The same is true for the EAC which is a community of five states with a combined population of almost 
150million people, here again, they might not have much of an impact singly, but as a group, they exert 
significant clout. 
105
 Available online at: http://www.ecobank.com/group/aboutus.aspx (accessed 01 July 2014) 
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Gabon successfully raised $1billion through a 10-year euro-bond issue on the international 
market. 
 
In terms of a specific legal mechanism for regulating relations between different Member 
States within different RECs in the continent, there is a glimmer of hope with the 
Organisation pour l’Harmonization en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) which is a 
treaty harmonizing business laws for 16 sub-Saharan African countries. The OHADA Treaty 
created in 1993 in Mauritius set up a system of business laws and implementing institutions. 
There has been significant development in the harmonization of commercial laws, unifying 
eight subjects of business law precisely (which include general commercial law, secured 
transactions law, enforcement and debt collection, accounting and auditing, insolvency law, 
arbitration and transportation by road). However, there remain challenges in ensuring that 
each of these statutes is directly applicable in each member country.  
 
Reflections 
It is the example of Ecobank that provides the grounds for argument that a regional 
approach to integration in Africa should be encouraged as a sensible option in order to 
bolster the development of the banking and financial sector in Africa.  
 
The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA example applies a combination of solid laws, 
enforcement mechanisms and institutions while retaining some parts of national sovereignty 
in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and policies domestically. It is these RECs 
that form the building blocks for the new continental sovereignty. 
 
With this in mind, the structural characteristics of African economies are quite unique to the 
continent, and even though monetary integration can help promote financial stability, the 
pace and structure of monetary integration within Africa must be tailor-made to suit its 
environment.  
 
In my humble opinion, emphasis on the rule of law as the center of a robust RFI 
arrangement does not in any shape or form downplay the importance of the other socio-
economic and political elements necessary for a rigid RFI arrangement.  
 
My polemic however subscribes to Pescatore’s observation instead, as he affirms that: ‘The 
process of integration can have no real consistency and, above all, no real stability or lasting 
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force unless we succeed in giving it a sufficiently solid institutional and legal framework.’106 
Consequently, this chapter revealed the issues surrounding the legal obstacles to trans-
boundary (cross-border) economic and financial activity. 
 
Part Four 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
From all indication, the two areas in need of thorough attention with respect to African 
Regional Integration are firstly the drafting of treaties and secondly the regional enforcement 
mechanisms. The chapter exposes the fact that many of the REC Treaties are ambiguous 
and have been poorly drafted. This poses problems for the entire African integration agenda 
because a weak foundation of the REC Treaty frameworks will undoubtedly result in a weak 
outcome for the overall integration project. Little wonder the progress of economic 
integration in Africa is extremely lethargic. There is need for reformation of the treaties to 
ensure articulate provisions and definitions for strengthening the supra-nationality of the 
RECs which would of course include strengthening the powers of the regional enforcement 
institutions. Whatever the case, these must be matched with considerable action and 
implementation on the ground. 
 
Nonetheless, the RECs remain building blocks of the AU/AEC and as such stay central to 
this process because the success of the RECs would no doubt reflect in the overall success 
of the AU/AEC project. This plan is still lagging behind schedule and given the current state 
of affairs it is inconceivable for a Single Currency to be achieved by 2028. The deep legal 
and institutional challenges which the RECs face have resulted in their failure to accomplish 
their own sub-regional integration objectives within the set timetable. 
 
All the same, there exists a changing narrative of investing rather than aiding in Africa, in 
spite of the political, cultural, religious and economic issues still impact on this narrative. The 
conventional cynicism exuded by many observers reflects the hardboiled stereotype; 
concretized over decades, fueled by the negative images of Africa which have for so long 
dominated the news headlines- famine, poverty, disease, conflict and corruption inform the 
basic understanding of the status quo in the African continent. This default position 
sometimes glossed by well-meaning sympathy is a stereotype which I concede transcends a 
world cup and encompasses every aspect of life and economic activity. As a result, for 
                                               
106
 Pescatore P: The law of integration: Emergence of a new phenomenon in international relations, based on the 
experience of the European Communities; Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1974, p.2 
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decades the continent had been snubbed from the global fora and exerted very limited 
influence in international debates. 
 
It therefore comes as no surprise that this single story of Africa- the story of catastrophe- 
was no different with regards to Africa’s role in the international financial markets which is of 
particular relevance here. Africa’s role was for many years marginalized for numerous 
reasons which include: corruption and poor governance, political instability, weak domestic 
economies, failure to adhere to international financial standards including poor financial 
reporting and bad accounting practices, politically-controlled and weak regulatory regimes. 
These were worsened by feeble legal systems with poor laws, institutions and impuissant 
enforcement mechanisms even for basic laws such as contract laws, insolvency and 
bankruptcy laws and property rights. These shortcomings have for decades formed a single 
story for the African continent. 
 
This chapter in part advocates my contention that there is indeed a less-told story unfolding 
in Africa; a story of reform and economic growth, clampdown on corruption, business 
opportunity and job creation. In her book Reforming The Unreformable, globally renowned 
economist Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala who typifies a new generation of enlightened reformers bent 
on changing the course of the African continent describes vividly her experience as part of 
the team in Nigeria which implemented a far-reaching set of economic and political changes. 
She recounts the story of how a dedicated team of reformers with shrewd political will set out 
to revamp a series of broken institutions. In the process, Nigeria’s economy was given a 
face-lift in ways that helped create a robust platform for more sustained long-term growth.107 
 
It now makes sense why enthusiasts like the celebrated Nigerian writer Chimamanda 
Adichie warned on the danger of the single story when she said: “The single story creates 
stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are 
incomplete. They make one story become the only story.”108 Political will which is also 
needed to stop the barriers of integration is unfortunately not translating fast enough to 
improvements on the economic side of things.  
 
There is no doubt as to the huge advantages that regional economic integration brings to 
Africa. Nonetheless, it seems the outlined plan under the AEC Treaty is far more 
                                               
107
 Okonjo-Iweala N: Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria, MIT Press, 2012 
108
 TED Talks Lecture: The Danger of a Single Story; Oxford, England; July 2009; available online at 
http://africa.harvard.edu/chimamanda-adichie-the-danger-of-a-single-story/ (accessed 11 April 2014) 
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sophisticated that the Member States and indeed the AU’s readiness for it. Given the legal 
and institutional bottlenecks that engulf the main RECs in the continent, the agenda should 
be watered-down and made more realistic. Any realistic ambition for the economic 
integration agenda should factor in revisions, additions and modifications following a 
thorough study of the real obstacles of integration to enable the development of sustained 
solutions. As Africa’s role in the global sphere increases, this cannot be over-emphasized. 
The prevalence of trade obstacles which are no longer fashionable such as corruption, post-
colonial affiliations and stifled political commitment continue to bring about a strain on the 
realization of the integration agenda. Others like geographical and infrastructural setbacks, 
military tensions and so on only make matters worse. These development issues will be 
addressed in the succeeding chapter in line with the African agenda.  
 
This chapter goes on to stress that any solution for continental sovereignty must be 
measured, and consistent with inclusive and legitimate policies, and a strong civil society. 
This requires new thinking and very difficult choices as the challenges grow more 
pronounced with a changing world. Continental sovereignty remains Africa’s best hope as a 
solution for its wider problems abovementioned. 
 
The argument for an indigenous solution relevant to the needs of the African continent is 
made in the next chapter. Here the European model of regional integration is scrutinized in 
order to shape the thoughts of achieving organic African sovereignty by virtue of 
strengthening and empowering existing institutions in the continent. 
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CHAPTER 3: REGIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, THE 
EUROPEAN MODEL AND AFRICA 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into four parts. Part one opens with a discussion on the relevance of 
regional financial integration (RFI) and whether its benefits to a state individually outweigh those 
of the region as a whole. This is a particularly topical issue with no outright and clear-cut 
answer. Nevertheless, I will attempt to use the EU experience to ascertain whether it should 
serve as a model for other regions especially African RECs in terms of how it has handled the 
pros and cons as a result of the financial integration process within this region. This will 
showcase the extent to which individual countries are willing to stay integrated not just during 
the good times, but also during crisis for instance during the GFC. After all, history shows that 
some countries tend to develop protectionist measures in order to solve domestic problems 
during financial crisis. 
 
The second part focuses on the example of the EU because it has established the most 
advanced regional trading system in the world. In fact, many of the other regional systems 
around the world are modeled on it including the African models which were discussed in the 
preceding chapter. To fully understand this idea of a single market, the development of the EU 
will be reviewed. From a purely historical viewpoint, European integration is a much broader 
notion, thus the EU is merely a step towards the achievement of full and complete European 
integration. It will be seen that this European integration process remains incomplete, both in 
terms of its content and geographical coverage and thus can be viewed as a kind of midway 
amalgam of an international organization and a federation, still subject to further fruition.  
 
Drawing from this, it will be noted that in the early period following the establishment of the EEC 
in 1958, banking and financial matters were treated as part of the larger trade objectives. Some 
progress was possible in the development of early central bank co-operation within the 
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Community although a large degree of close contact already existed between the parties 
involved at the international level.1  
 
The third part will therefore apply this unique legal structure of EU law within the realms of the 
banking and finance sector. This will involve an understanding of the Single European Market 
and an understanding of the doctrine of mutual recognition in line with the ingenuity behind the 
construction of a single or internal market, given that regional arrangements are believed to 
normally trigger a breach of the WTO agreements which prohibit member countries from 
discriminating between their trading partners. This is so because, the principle of most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment insists on member countries treating each other equally and 
trading without discrimination: if one member is granted a special favour (such as lower customs 
duty rates for one of your products) then the same must be done for all other WTO members.2  
 
Admittedly, it comes as no surprise that the African integration project is highly influenced by the 
European model. At this point, an assessment of the extent to which the African integration 
project has been inspired by the EU is essential. The thesis draws from the experience of the 
EU to determine the adequacy of the RECs in Africa. The EU model is no stranger to the 
continent owing to the fact that most RECs have sought to introduce the EU framework for trade 
integration, single market and single currency. The thesis argues that the African continent must 
first strive to develop the existing community institutions organically by strengthening and 
empowering them in the short and medium term before making any attempts to replicate the 
advanced EU institutions. 
 
Part four will delve into the intricacies of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which form 
the core of the EU economic architecture. In this light, a dissection of the relationship between 
the EU and the EMU in relation to the GFC will also be made bringing to the fore the European 
                                               
1
Walker G.A.: European Banking Law: Policy and Programme Construction; BIICL, London, 2007; p.234-287. Walker 
offers a comprehensive and exhaustive discourse on the evolution and state of affairs of the banking and finance 
programme in the EU- much of this will be reflected and summarized in this chapter.
 
2
There are over sixty regional arrangements in the world which provide for either bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements between countries. These have to be notified to the IMF because when establishing a regional trading 
system, preference is automatically given to member countries at the expense of the other members. This is true 
because the arrangements in place will allow member countries to trade easily amongst each other while making 
trade difficult with those outside the system; this is obviously contrary to the WTO rules as the MFN treatment 
principle is undermined. 
93 
 
 
 
sovereign debt crisis. The significance of the Greek debt crisis is important here because it was 
triggered by Greece’s irreversible surrender of sovereignty to the EU, the sort of which is 
required to sustain an African-wide sovereignty. This investigation is overly important for the 
African project as it provides insights to learn from. These insights reveal the suitability of 
eventual full European integration which could either inspire or discourage the African 
integration project enthusiasts.  
 
Part One 
 
3.2 Regional Financial Integration: Features and Relevance 
In accordance to an IMF working paper, RFI refers to a process, market driven and/or 
institutionalized, that broadens and deepens links between financial markets within a region.3 
The authors assert that at the very least, this process of RFI would normally involve eliminating 
barriers to cross-border investments and differential treatment of foreign investors. Also, 
financial links can be further broadened and deepened by taking the form of harmonizing 
national policies, laws and institutions. Moreover, as time goes by, cohesion of regional 
frameworks, operational structures and information systems, and convergence of prices and risk 
assessments mean the national financial markets within the region effectively function as one.4 
 
Since the late 1980s, the geography of the financial world has changed dramatically. In many 
regions across the world, major strides have been taken towards the implementation of the plan 
for a single market in goods and services, so far as the financial sector is concerned. The aim is 
conspicuously to create a legislative and administrative open space in which an enterprise 
incorporated in any Member State may compete throughout that region on equal terms with all 
the other companies in different states within the region.5  
                                               
3
Wakeman-Linn J & Wagh S: Regional Financial Integration: Its potential contribution to financial sector growth and 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa; African Finance for the 21
st
 Century, High- Level Seminar organized by the IMF 
Institute in collaboration with the Joint Africa Institute, Tunis, Tunisia, March 4-5 2008; Session IV: Beyond Banking: 
Regional Financial Integration; available online at  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2008/afrfin/pdf/wakemanlinn.pdf p.2 (accessed 04 January 2014)
 
4
 Ibid. Taking this concept further, a group of countries may set up a regional bond or stock market, distinct from and 
potentially coexisting with national markets, with the specific intent of pooling resources, risks and returns. 
 
5
This involves not only the ability of companies to conduct their business operations but also equal opportunity for 
companies to raise capital and finance within the regional financial markets. More concretely, the process of RFI 
would mean dismantling barriers to the cross-border flow of capital and financial services, such as capital controls 
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It is worth noting that a key factor underlying this process has been the increased globalization 
of investments coupled with the desire to seek higher rates of return and the opportunity to 
diversify risk on an international scale. Simultaneously, many countries have in turn encouraged 
inflows of capital by dismantling restrictions, deregulating domestic financial markets, and 
improving their economic environment and prospects through reforms which are principally 
market-oriented.6 
 
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that cross-border integration can carry on either globally 
or regionally. In other words, a country can integrate with the world as a whole or with the region 
where it is located. The former tends to take the form of increased financial links with major 
financial centres such as London and New York because network externalities give these 
centres an advantage in the provision of financial services. For the same reason, regional 
integration likewise is facilitated by regional centres for instance in the case of Hong Kong 
[Special Administrative Region (SAR)] and Singapore.7 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
and withholding taxes. This consequently opens a state’s financial markets and institutions to foreign players as well 
as permitting local market participants to invest abroad.  For example, companies whose securities are listed in one 
Member State must have the ability to sell those securities in other States, without the need to comply afresh with a 
different set of regulations and on-going obligations in every State. This normally would mean harmonising national 
standards and laws, through either the mutual recognition of standards or the adoption of commonly agreed minimum 
(legal) standards. [See Bamford C: Transparency and the end of doing good by stealth; Financial Crisis Management 
and Bank Resolution: Edited by Labrosse J, Olivares-Caminal R, Singh D; Informa, London 2009. Ch.5 p. 83] 
6
This was very common with many developing and transition economies especially in East Asia, Latin America, and 
Eastern Europe who removed restrictions on international financial transactions, at the same time that they were 
relaxing regulations on the operation of domestic financial markets and moving away from regimes of financial 
repression. Policies aimed at increasing the openness of domestic financial markets to foreign investors have 
included the removal of controls on capital outflows and the liberalization of restrictions on foreign direct investment. 
[See Agenor P R: Benefits and costs of International Financial Integration: Theory and Facts; The World Economy, 
Volume 26 Issue 8, August 2003, p.1089-1118.]
 
7
Garcia-Herrero A & Wooldridge P: Global and regional financial integration: progress in emerging markets; BIS 
Quarterly Review, September 2007, p.57- 70. In any case, whether integration proceeds globally or at the regional 
level, the impact of potential benefits varies to some extent. For example, Garcia-Herrero and Wooldridge suggest 
that business cycles are less correlated among distant economies, and so risk-sharing might be best facilitated 
through global integration. They also stipulate however that geographical proximity is an important determinant of 
trade and financial flows, and hence economic growth might be given a greater boost by regional integration (Garcia-
Herrero & Wooldridge, p.58).  
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The three main forces which usually determine the broadening and deepening of cross-border 
financial links and thus considered the key drivers of financial integration have been identified 
as: first, the changes in the behaviour of local and foreign market participants, for example, over 
the past two decades, advances in communications and computing technology and the 
consequent increase in the availability of information have contributed to a weakening of 
investors’ home bias. At the same time, an increasing number of firms have opted to raise 
capital in international markets, including through the cross-listing of shares on major stock 
exchanges abroad.8 Secondly, the unilateral action by national authorities in the 1980’s as they 
liberalized their financial systems and implemented other market-oriented reforms and thirdly; 
multilateral action by a group of countries especially in recent times (presumably inspired from 
the Bretton Woods summit) has promoted the development of a range of well-functioning 
systems in the international community. Subsequently, many countries have taken steps to 
harmonize national standards with these international ones.9 
 
In general terms, financial integration has two principal economic benefits; namely economic 
growth and risk-sharing. By encouraging the allocation of capital to its most productive use and 
promoting the development of the financial system, integration would enhance growth 
prospects. Secondly, by allowing cross-border financing and investment, it facilitates portfolio 
diversification and, therefore the sharing of risks across states. According to Garcia-Herrero and 
Wooldridge, “such risk-sharing allows income to be insured against country-specific shocks and 
thus consumption to be smoothed over time.” (Garcia-Herrero & Wooldridge, p.59) The question 
now which follows is; how much of these benefits can countries enjoy over time? The answer is 
it depends inter alia on the extent of the relationship between regional and global integration. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8
 (Garcia-Herrero & Wooldridge n.8) 
9
These actions have also been encouraged by formal trade and investment agreements. Such agreements often give 
a greater impetus to regional than to global partly because of the difficulties of reaching agreements among a large 
number of countries. The EU as will be discussed later is the best known example of a collective effort to achieve an 
integrated regional market. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that these multilateral actions can usually promote 
integration, but they are not necessarily sufficient for its advancement as certain agreements may not be 
accompanied by the broadening and deepening of financial links among market participants within the region. 
(Garcia-Herrero & Wooldridge pp.59-60)
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3.2.1 RFI: Pros’ and Cons 
The benefits and costs of RFI can be viewed either from the perspective of individual investors 
(such as the opportunity to diversify international risk; abovementioned) or from the perspective 
of the countries initiating the process of integration. This discussion will focus exclusively on the 
second point of view. To start, in a generalized answer, RFI can help small financial markets 
take advantage of the “systemic scale economies” that accrue to larger systems. 
 
Also, regional financial markets can expand the scale of opportunities for financial 
intermediation. Pooling national savings can facilitate the financing of large investment projects, 
where funding for such projects might be scarce or unavailable at the national level. 
 
Again, larger markets can make it more cost effective to improve aspects of the financial 
infrastructure, such as payment systems, regulatory and supervisory regimes, all of which have 
high initial fixed costs. 
 
In addition to this, regionalization can introduce efficiencies in financial markets, given that by 
raising the number and diversifying the types of financial institutions that operate in a particular 
local market, competition is fostered thereby lowering the prices of financial products and 
services. 
 
Furthermore, small financial systems are more likely to be incomplete; in the sense that, they 
are typically skewed in terms of the available institutions (for example banks rather than non-
banks) and instruments (debt instead of equity). This is not made any easier by the usual 
absence of information markets due to the lack of high cost credit rating services. 
 
As seen, regional financial markets are better able to cope with risk because they allow for 
greater diversification of assets and markets for individual investors. This encourages individual 
financial systems to tap into a collective pool of reserves in the event of a shock or speculative 
attack. 
 
More so, regional reporting requirements can propel greater accountability and transparency on 
the part of national monetary authorities. Regional institutions can also become familiar with 
central banks and pressures from the national fiscal authorities. 
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Finally, regional integration can lead to a harmonization of business practices, laws and 
institutions, thus benefitting from those prevailing in the most developed member state.10 This is 
of central relevance with regards to the partial surrender of sovereignty in terms of financial law-
making which will be the core of deliberation in Chapter five with regards to the establishment of 
Continental Sovereignty for Africa. 
 
These can be summarized around four main considerations which explain the analytical 
arguments in favour of financial openness. They are: (i) international risk-sharing, (ii) the 
positive impact of capital flows on domestic investment and growth, (iii) much-improved 
macroeconomic discipline and; (iv)an increased efficiency including greater stability of the 
domestic financial system which is associated with the entry of foreign investors. 
 
On the other hand, the experiences of recent times have led many policy-makers and 
academics to acknowledge that the functioning of RFI could also have potential costs. Most 
perceptible is the likelihood of cross-border spill-overs of financial distress and contagion risks;11 
these are brought to bear in the latter part of this chapter following the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis. 
 
Where financial systems are small and underdeveloped, a few large financial institutions with 
complex balance sheet linkages and exposures across markets, beyond the monitoring ability of 
the local monetary authorities, may make it difficult for the regulatory and supervisory authorities 
to do their job effectively, with associated risks.12 These disadvantages could be summarized 
                                               
10
 Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (n.3) 
11
Hamid F; Financial integration: “Key concepts, benefits and risks”, in Integrating Europe’s Financial markets, editors 
Decressin J, Faruqee H and Fonteyne W; (IMF, Washington DC, 2007)
 
12
Besides, there are limits to the benefits that can accrue from RFI as this depends on the commonalities and 
differences of member state profiles. When the members of a regional sub-grouping have very similar structures and 
challenges, regionalization may pool rather than solve national problems. For instance, where all member financial 
systems are characterized by excess liquidity and high interest rate spreads, which might indicate a region-wide lack 
of viable investment projects and long-standing structural problems. It has been argued that RFI without national 
efforts to address the core problems will not be effective here. Some authors illustrate how the benefits from 
harmonising practices and laws might also be limited in a regional grouping with similar low initial conditions. And 
even after some form of RFI, several small country groupings may still not reach the threshold needed to benefit from 
economies of scale. Therefore a combination of regional and multilateral liberalization may be what works best for 
low-income countries such as those in Africa.  
In addition, while advanced members can serve as effective benchmarks for other members, a regional 
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under the following: (i) the high degree of concentration of capital flows and the lack of access 
to financing for relatively smaller countries, (ii) capital flows domestic misallocation, (iii) 
weakening of macroeconomic stability, (iv) short term flows pro-cyclicality (v) instability of capital 
flows, contagion and herding (vi) risk of penetration by foreign banks.13 
 
Drawing from this, global and regional financial arrangements will usually demonstrate some 
pros and cons depending on factors such as their trade objectives, membership coverage and 
supporting institutional framework notably the governing laws. Regional models as will be seen 
can create considerably deeper levels of integration in terms of the scope of trade inter-
dependence even though this develops the tendency of over-protection, exclusion and distortion 
sometimes. Nonetheless, it should be possible to monitor these tendencies through the existing 
global trade and finance framework in place. 
 
It is nevertheless irrefutable that the financial crisis reminded that, although financial integration 
improves the access to financial markets and the opportunities for risk diversification, it may 
also increase the scope for financial contagion across countries. It is therefore paramount that 
the financial stability arrangements keep pace with the degree of financial integration.  
 
At this juncture, it makes sense to examine the RFI experience in the EU which is characterized 
by a high degree of financial integration within the Eurozone; and highlight those aspects which 
have made it a role model for other regions across the world to follow suit. It is also imperative 
to review how the EU handled the recent GFC; as it were, despite having arguably the most 
advanced regionally integrated financial system, it still failed to stop both the crisis from 
occurring as well as spreading across the region. Examples will be drawn from this study to 
measure the degree to which individual member states are willing to stay integrated especially 
during times of crisis because practice has sometimes shown that some countries tend to ‘go 
                                                                                                                                                       
grouping with asymmetric partners raises the risk that financial resources will flow primarily towards the member 
country with the most viable investment options, inhibiting the development of credit markets in smaller countries-
even though the smaller markets may still benefit from improved payments and regulatory regimes, and possibly from 
improved financial services for people who save. Conversely, financial institutions which may have sought increased 
market share by expanding to un-served customers and areas may instead seek to compete for the business of 
already-served customers in the regional markets now open to them; hence leaving certain areas under-serviced. 
(See Wakeman-Linn and Wagh p.4) 
13
 Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (n.3) offer a comprehensive analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of RFI from 
an economic perspective. 
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solo’ in protecting their own domestic interests during times of global (and in particular regional) 
crisis.  
 
Part Two 
 
As will be seen, the main problem is that there exists a single global market place, with control 
however being done at the national and domestic level through national laws and national 
regulators. We are faced with a global market and local control conflict. Having identified this 
problem, the question now beckons, what happens if this global market versus local control 
problem is transferred unto a regional basis with a resulting regional market and local control 
conflict? To answer this question the European Banking and Finance programme will be 
considered. Integral to this consideration, this part will deal with the following three issues: 1.) 
The differentiation of the various layers of European financial integration in terms of integration 
within the EU and the development of European Law; and the specific forms of integration within 
the European Monetary Union; 2.) The risk of a sovereign debt crisis such as the Greek 
scenario and the challenges it presents to regional financial integration; 3.) Distinguishing 
between the EU responses and those taken by European governments.   
 
3.3 The EU Experience 
Seating at the core of a thriving regional integration system between countries is a clever 
arrangement typically referred to as a single or internal market model. Thus, over the years 
there have been copious opinions reflecting a broad spectrum of views resulting from debates 
regarding its sustainability and the means through which its full economic and associated 
benefits can be achieved. In recent times, the most appropriate solution to resolve the 
abovementioned conflict has been via the doctrine of mutual recognition. Whether this solution 
remains appropriate going forward remains to be seen. 
 
The larger European integration initiative has, in particular, included the development of an 
increasingly substantial single market in banking and financial services which constitutes both 
an essential support area within the EU as well as an important independent commercial sector 
in its own right. To properly understand the genesis of the EU, a reflection upon the long 
process of economic and political integration is required, as it details a process which is deeply 
rooted in the military, political and economic history of Western Europe and, in particular the 
product of choices made in Europe and elsewhere at the end of World War II. Historically, the 
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EU can be considered in terms of the Treaties which have been set out over the course of the 
last fifty years even though being a legal scholar, this may sound prejudiced.14  
 
Therefore, rather than considering Europe as a single initiative, it can be regarded as a number 
of intersecting communities, agreements and other arrangements under international law. 
These Treaties have eventually set out the EU's constitutional basis by establishing the various 
EU institutions concurrently with their remit, authority, procedures and objectives (policies and 
agenda). The EU can only act within the capabilities awarded to it through these treaties. In 
addition, amendments to the treaties require agreement and ratification of every single 
signatory. 
 
This has resulted in the construction of by far the most developed regional trading system in the 
world within which exist a combination of complex, interconnected cross-border markets and 
relations, in all industrial, commercial, banking and financial industries. Simultaneously, 
considerable progress has also been achievable in other socio-political areas as well as in 
areas dealing with justice and home affairs. 
 
It is difficult to establish when the idea of a single Europe was conceived as the attractiveness of 
an open European marketplace based on trade and commerce, dates from the restoration of 
trading and commercial ties from the 11th and 12th centuries onwards. In fact, digging deeper 
into historical archives, it dates back to the period of Europe governed by the Roman Empire 
when efforts towards the safeguarding of a unified Europe continued in various designs 
including the concept of 'Christendom' as established by the Roman Catholic Church, and the 
'Christian Commonwealth of Europe' under Henry IV of France as seen in chapter one which 
recounted the development of sovereignty. Fast forward to 1946; then British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill offered what at the time must have appeared to be an astonishing and even 
fanciful proposal for the revival and transformation of the Continent.15 
                                               
14
 Mulhearn C. & Vane H. R.: The Euro: Its Origins, Development and Prospects; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham, 2008. (for an economic analysis of the EU’s development)
 
15
 See Winston Churchill speech calling for a United States of Europe, delivered at the University of Zurich, 19 
September 1946; available on The Council of Europe website: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/archives/selection/churchill/ZurichSpeech_en.asp  (accessed 15 January 2014). He 
argued that the way forward was: “To recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with 
a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. 
In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth 
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The prescience of his remarks indicated the potentiality of how large European nations will 
combine with the smaller nations for the collective good. This issue of integration did not 
normally extend to the monetary, banking and financial domain at the early stages. Instead, 
monetary relations in post war Europe were heavily conditioned by the general economic 
imperatives for reconstruction and by the specific influences of three institutions: the Bretton 
Woods system, the Marshall Plan, and the European Payments Union.16 
 
3.3.1 Treaty Law 
Given that relations across Europe were badly damaged after the war17 the Europeans 
challenged themselves to formulate a new set of relationships between each other by securing 
limited functional economic initiatives. Here, common core interests will be identified and 
                                                                                                                                                       
living.” He carried on by identifying the essential constituents of new Europe by stating that: “The first step in the 
recreation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany....There can be no revival of 
Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany”. He added: “The structure of the United 
States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will 
count as much as large ones and gain their honour by a contribution to the common cause.” 
16
 The following review on the treaties is obtained from Professor Walker’s academic comments (n.2). The Bretton 
Woods system which established the World Bank, IMF and WTO as seen in Chapter two boosted these international 
initiatives in order to enhance post-war reconstruction. In spite of this, it was recognized that currency stability alone 
would not be enough to facilitate the physical and economic recovery of the war-torn countries in Europe. Hence, the 
United States agreed a four year aid package worth $13 billion to underwrite European reconstruction. This initiative 
was officially the European Recovery Programme and became known as the Marshall Plan, named after then US 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall who proposed the urgent need to help the European recovery in his address 
at Harvard University in June 1947. In order to coordinate the distribution of this money, the European recipients 
established the Committee for European Economic  Cooperation  (CEEC),  the  forerunner  of  today‘s  Organization  
for  Economic  Cooperation  and Development (OECD). The European Payments Union (EPU) which allowed 
economies to trade deficit positions with other members effectively enabled the transfer of liabilities to itself as these 
liabilities obviously had to be settled. The EPU facilitated currency convertibility and stimulated intra-European trade; 
this was a notable achievement at a difficult time and although it was dissolved in 1959 after a steady improvement in 
economic conditions, it allowed the introduction of the general convertibility of Europe‘s currencies. It fact it has been 
considered the first instance of European monetary cooperation in the post war period. 
 
17
A world war which amongst other things was arguably caused predominantly by disagreements regarding economic 
assets notably money, most especially regarding the Ruhr district (the strategically located and buoyant centre of 
Germany‘s coal, iron and steel production); little wonder it was on the basis of the agreements reached over this coal 
and steel that many point to the birth of European Integration and the EU. 
 
102 
 
 
 
worked on from which expansion and modifications could follow in subsequent years as the 
confidence and health of relations between the countries involved improves over time.18  
 
Naturally as coal and steel were the most important resources at the time in Europe, the main 
factors and products of production of coal and steel and then all the factors which co-constitute 
production such as goods, workers and capital needed to be handled first. This endeavour 
towards functional integration led to the: 
 
a.) The Treaty of Paris, 1951 
This Treaty was signed in 1951 and provided for the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). The Treaty of Paris was signed by France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, who are often referred to as the original six founders of 
European integration. 
 
More so, it is worth noting that the ECSC is credited for recognizing the need for authority and 
legislation by thus providing the platform for the supra-national institutions that would later 
govern. They are: the Council of Ministers (made up of representatives from each of the then six 
Member States), the High Authority or executive arm (to operate as an independent executive to 
take decisions and procure funds, fix maximum and minimum prices for coal and steel and 
enforce the original competition provisions set out in the Treaty), an Assembly (a representative 
body consisting of delegates appointed by the parliaments of the Member States) and a Court of 
Justice (to rule on the interpretation of the Treaty, review the acts of the new institutions set up 
and consider competition actions; and dispute resolution).19 
                                               
18
This was a particularly clever way forward especially as the hugely grandiose and ambitious plan to create a 
European Defence Community (EDC) in order to harness military potential between member countries had failed. It 
was a matter of going back to basics and starting to build on these relations from the bottom-up, rather than taking up 
these grand proposals when relationships were still at a very fragile and sensitive state 
19
 Designed by Jean Monnet and implemented by Robert Schuman. The former was a French civil servant while the 
latter was the then French foreign minister. The signal event which announced the start of the process of European 
integration is known as the Schuman Declaration. This declaration presented Monnet‘s plan as an invitation from the 
French government to West Germany to participate in the ECSC. It provided for the placing of French and German 
coal and steel production under a single 'High Authority' (an executive branch). The declaration opened by taking up 
Churchill‘s theme of the need for a rapprochement to overcome opposition between France and Germany. 
Nevertheless, the words of the declaration made it clear that Schuman was proposing much more than the shackling 
of the means of war. They went on to acknowledge the need for the pooling of state sovereignty. There was however 
a limitation since all these countries in the EEC were members of the Bretton Woods system, it meant that their 
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b.) The Treaty of Rome, 1957  
Even though there was recorded success of the new functionalism adopted in the area of coal 
and steel, the process of European integration continued to face difficulties and in May 1955, 
the Benelux group (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) submitted a memorandum to the 
governments of France, Germany and Italy which proposed using the ECSC model to develop 
the transport and atomic energy infrastructures of Europe. At the same time, the memorandum 
made a case for an economic community defined by a common European internal market. The 
scale of investment suggested that a shared approach to the development was the right one. 
The six countries met at Messina, Italy and agreed that their collective interests would best be 
served. Thus, the ‘Spaak committee‘ (which consisted of the foreign ministers of the six member 
countries including Paul-Henri Spaak, then Belgian foreign minister whom the committee was 
named after) came up with a report which identified key factors; namely: the development of 
common institutions, the gradual fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market 
and harmonization of social policies. All these were intended to pave the way for higher levels of 
economic integration. 
 
The result came in 1957 when two Treaties were signed by the Six in Rome; called the Treaties 
of Rome. One created the European Atomic Energy Community, known as the EURATOM 
Treaty, and the other created the European Economic Community (EEC) often referred to as 
the Treaty of Rome.20 The latter has proven to be the undoubted driver of European integration 
since 1957. 
                                                                                                                                                       
currencies will be fixed against one another, and against all other currencies inside the system. They would therefore 
enjoy both intra-market openness and mutual exchange rate stability. Unfortunately however, by the late 1960s, the 
Bretton Woods system was beginning to show signs of considerable strain which posed a dilemma for them. Should 
the Bretton Woods system fail, they would still courtesy of the Treaty of Rome, have an integrated market but the 
currencies that underpinned it would no longer be fixed against one another. The clear danger was that currency 
instability for the six could threaten the very considerable collective economic progress they had made in the 1950‘s. 
For example, the growing integration of the French and German economies would be unlikely to proceed smoothly in 
the presence of severe and unpredictable oscillations between the franc and mark. 
20
 While its purpose was ‘to lay the foundations of an even closer union among the peoples of Europe’ although this 
would be pursued by the extended economic functionalism provided for with the establishment of the Common 
Market, the purpose of EURATOM was to create a specialist market for atomic energy and provide for its managed 
distribution across Europe as well as develop energy policies and sell surpluses to non-European countries. In 
addition EURATOM Treaty is considered the parallel treaty and obvious extension of the ESCS as some including the 
French considered atomic energy was future of the world. 
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c.) The Merger Treaty, 1967 
The treaty was signed in Brussels on 8 April 1965 and came into force on 1 July 1967. It 
assimilated the executive bodies of the three separate communities of the ECSC, EURATOM 
and EEC into a single institutional structure. It set out that the Commission and the Council of 
the EEC should replace the Commission and Council of EURATOM and the High Authority and 
Council of the ECSC. Although each Community remained legally independent, they 
nevertheless shared common institutions (prior to this treaty, they already shared a 
Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice and were known together as the European 
Communities). Considering the fact that these could always be extended and developed, the 
combination of this single European Council, European Commission, European Court of Justice, 
and European Parliament has been mooted by many as the beginning of the modern European. 
 
Meanwhile, the growth and progression of the EEC to fit in this much larger international arena 
was thwarted as a result of its failure to attain its goal of achieving a Common Market at the end 
of its ‘transitional period’ due to disagreements and problems within the community in 
conjunction with larger international problems. While all counties were anxious to achieve the 
benefits from a full and effective common market, many were often reluctant to make the 
necessary compromises to achieve that result. Following the recessions of the 1970’s and 
protectionist pressures brought about by some of these governments the delays were further 
                                                                                                                                                       
It included a number of general principles which specified the 'task' and the 'principal activities' of the new 
EEC. The main activities included elimination of customs duties, quantitative restrictions and other measures having 
equivalent effect in the area of goods. A number of common policies were also adopted including the four free 
movements (goods, person (establishment and workers), services and capital) as well as a common agricultural 
policy (CAP), a common fisheries policy and a common transport policy. Measures were also included to ensure the 
prohibition of any anti-competitive practices (competition policy) and a harmonization or approximation policy for 
national laws to allow the common market to function. 
It makes sense to mention the fact that the Treaty of Rome provided for the establishment of the Common 
Market within a 'transitional period' of twelve years from date of signing (thus the end of this ‘transitional period’ had 
to be the 1
st
 January 1970) to be achieved in three four year periods (corresponding with Commission appointment 
terms). Despite some early success, early progress was limited due to the underlying difficulties in harmonizing the 
separate laws. 
Furthermore, the French president Charles de Gaulle also objected to the qualified majority voting with 
France withdrawing from participation in the Council which subsequently led to the Luxembourg Accords of January 
1966 (aimed at resolving differences within the EEC), which allowed member countries to veto major issues. 
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prolonged. All this, was unfortunately coupled with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 
early 1970’s which disrupted international trade and most of all the international financial 
markets. This was a massive setback for the EEC as it attempted to interact with the other 
countries across the world in this complex global financial market. In fact, the problems were 
aggravated by the early 1980‘s Developing World debt crisis. This raised concerns over 
competition in the International setting especially from North America and the Far East. 
 
While all this could be corrected by the creation of a fully integrated single European market, it 
was difficult to see how this would be achieved despite the continuing initiatives adopted by the 
commission particularly in the banking area. 
 
3.3.2 Completion of the Single Market (Treaty Law post-1980) 
Meanwhile, a new Commission was appointed and Jacques Lucien Delors (former French 
Finance Minister) was appointed President in January 1985. Delors era injected a new and 
fresh momentum to the process of European integration. To neutralize the pressures during the 
early 1980s, a number of ideas were adopted most significantly, that of mutual recognition 
based on the decision of Cassis de Dijon21(Cassis) in 1979 which subsequently developed into 
a new integration policy in place of the earlier full harmonization approach set up under the 
Treaty of Rome.22 It was decided that it was better to focus on a more limited programme of 
legislative measures to complete the effective operation of the internal economic market within 
Europe rather than to proceed with the earlier full harmonization programme which had been 
subsequently extended to include such matters as regional policy, research and development 
and environmental policies. 
                                               
21
 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Case120/78) [1979] ECR 649. See also the 
Commission‘s Communication on its interpretation of the decision a year later in 1980 (OJ No C256, 3.10.80, p 2). 
This followed an earlier communication which had been sent to the Parliament, the Council and the Member States 
(see COM (1980) 30 DEF, 24.1.800. It is important to note that it was in this Communication that the words ‘mutual 
recognition’ were first used as the ECJ never used them in Cassis (contrary to popular knowledge). 
22
The various Heads of State and Governments of the Community had been unanimously steadfast and reiterated 
their commitment towards a European single market in European Council meetings in Copenhagen 1982, 
Fontainebleau and Dublin 1984. With the acceptance of the essential equivalence of the objectives of national 
legislation, mutual recognition could be an effective strategy for bringing about a common trading market. Following 
the rulings of the Court of Justice, the European Parliament has stressed the principle that goods lawfully 
manufactured and marketed in one Member State must be allowed free entry into other Member States. Immediate 
and full recognition must be the rule where harmonization of supporting regulations and standards is not considered 
essential
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In this connection, the then Vice-President Lord Francis Cockfield prepared the Commission 
White Paper published in June 1985 on Completing the Internal Market which set out the 
objectives of the Single Market. This was based on the necessity to remove all obstacles to free 
trade (of which he identified 300 of them) and to adopt a programme of new directives which 
would guarantee the efficient operation of the single market based on the policy of mutual 
recognition.23 
In addition to proposing that a complete programme be set within a specific timetable, Lord 
Cockfield also wished to create a new philosophical framework and a new approach distinct 
from the traditional emphasis on goods, services, people and capital. Hence, rather than 
focusing on free movement as such, it was decided that the removal of obstacles or barriers to 
trade be stressed irrespective of the particular area of activity involved. Furthermore, the 
treatment of goods and services had to be done on the same terms in a bid to correct the 
stagnation which had arisen in the services area.  
 
It must nevertheless be pointed out that while the Commission accepted that pure mutual 
recognition could remove barriers to trade, it acknowledged that it would be inadequate for the 
purpose of constructing an expanding and competitive European market. The Commission also 
noted that a harmonization policy on its own would be over-regulatory, and as such take a 
significant amount of time to implement. This inflexibility would potentially constrain innovation. 
The new approach to be adopted would accordingly proceed on the basis of the mutual 
recognition of non-essential standards with legislative harmonization through directives under 
Article 100 being restricted to core health and safety requirements that would be obligatory in all 
Member States. The separate 'mutual acceptance' of national standards would also be 
promoted through the agreed notification and standstill procedure set up under Directive 
83/189/EEC in connection with non-standardized areas pending further European 
harmonization. 
 
                                               
23
 With this new emphasis on the preparation of general directives which would create working frameworks and 
minimal essential regulations the Commission translated into the larger single market area the earlier policy which 
had adopted with its New Approach in the banking area. In so doing the Commission was concerned not to make any 
early mistakes which had arisen with regards to attempting to follow a full harmonization programme. 
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In its earlier 1980 communication, the Commission had referred to the Court‘s statement in 
Cassis (Para.14) with regard to lawful production and first placement. It subsequently developed 
this into an independent free standing principle. To the extent that the first separate reference to 
mutual recognition was in the White Paper, it has to be regarded as only constituting an 
executive or administrative construct under European law. This would then be given some 
further judicial support subsequently by the Court although the Court would continue only to 
consider specific Treaty provisions and not attempt to convert this into any more general 
doctrine. While the supposed juridical base would remain Cassis, care has to be taken in light of 
the weakness of the original judgment in these terms. 
 
Lord Cockfield was particularly concerned to ensure that this New Approach was applied to 
services and goods on an equal basis and in the White Paper, the Commission noted that it was 
particularly regrettable that progress on the freedom to provide services across internal frontiers 
had been much slower than that achieved in relation to the free movement of goods. As a 
factual matter, the Commission viewed it necessary to establish a common market in services 
as one of the prerequisites for the return to economic prosperity with trade and services being 
as important as trade in goods. As a result, the Commission considered early action was 
required in order to open up the market in traditional albeit evolving service areas like banking, 
insurance and transport as well as new areas like information technology and audio-visual 
services. As for the liberalization of the financial services, this would represent a major step 
towards financial integration within the community and to the widening of the Internal Market. 
 
The White Paper noted that the accent was increasingly been placed on the free circulation of 
financial products which had been made easier by developments in technology. More so, the 
Commission noted that the approach adopted in the Cassis judgment could be applied in the 
financial areas. It stated that there ought to be the possibility of facilitating the exchange of such 
financial products using a minimal co-ordination of rules as the basis for the mutual recognition 
by the Member States of the action taken by each to safeguard the interests of the public 
(relevant in discussions dealing with the concept of minimum harmonization). 
 
Concomitantly, the minimum amount of harmonization to be effected especially in connection 
with the supervision of on-going activities is to be effected on a home country control basis 
under which the primary task of supervision is attributed to the competent authorities of the 
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Member State of origin.24 Although acknowledging the work which had already been carried out 
in the banking, insurance, securities and collective investment areas, Lord Cockfield and his 
team were constantly motivated by curiosity and as such a number of further measures were 
proposed.25 
 
d.) The Single European Act, 1986 (SEA)  
All the relevant constitutional amendments were effected under SEA. It provided for the 
amendment of the Treaty of Rome to include a definition of the ‘internal market’ set out in Article 
8a (18).26 The earlier condition for unanimity was replaced by majority voting in a number of 
cases and in this light, a new co-operation procedure was introduced to make the European 
Parliament more closely involved in the elective process.27 This paved way for the setting up of 
a Court of First Instance within the European Court of Justice.28 
                                               
24
 Para 103; all necessary information must be communicated to the home country while host authorities are to have 
a complimentary role without fully being deprived of power. While there would have to be a minimum harmonization 
of relevant surveillance standards in this regard, this would not be allowed to delay further necessary and overdue 
decisions. Goods lawfully manufactures and marketed in one Member State must be allowed free entry into all other 
Member States following the rulings of the Court of Justice and further confirmed by the European Parliament. 
Where the harmonization of regulations and standards was not considered to be essential from either a 
health and safety or an industrial point of view the immediate and full recognition of differing quality standards, food 
composition and similar requirements must be the rule. There is no obligation on the buyer of goods to prove the 
equivalence of a product produced according to the rules of the exporting State. A major initiative was also to be 
launched to secure the mutual recognition of tests and certification procedures within the Community to avoid 
wasteful duplication; Para. 78. Where harmonization of regulations was still required in certain areas, enterprises 
could only be required to meet a single set of rules to enjoy free circulation throughout the Community; Para. 79. 
25
 It is worth mentioning that the UK joined the EEC finally on 1 January 1973 after two previous attempts had failed. 
Other Treaties of Accession followed suit in 1981, 1986, 1995. It is worth mentioning that Lord Cockfield was a British 
Conservative politician who was expected to adhere to the euro-scepticism of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
but however became a crucial driving force in orchestrating the ground work for the creation of the European Single 
Market in 1992. 
26
 Please see Mulhearn (n.14) for the principal economic argument for the creation of a European single market 
which lay in the potential benefits for businesses and households 
 
27
 Article 100 provides for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States as directly affecting the establishment of the common market. Article (94) then provided the basis for 
the adoption of harmonisation measures in any area relevant to the operation of the common market where no other 
express provision was set out in the Treaty. The scope of the common market was defined in Article 3 to include 
attainment of the four freedoms (goods, persons (workers and establishment), services and capital) as well as the 
promotion of common policies in agriculture, transport and social services and the protection of competition. Article 
235 separately provided for the adoption of measures whenever necessary to achieve a Community objective where 
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e.) The Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty (TEU), 1993 
The EU was consequently launched under the Maastricht Treaty. It was agreed in December 
1991 and signed by heads of state or government on 7 February 1992 in the Dutch city of 
Maastricht. The EU was based on three pillars consisting of the original European Community 
(including the ECSC the EEC and the EURATOM), in addition to a new Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and, a Justice and Home Affairs Policy. 
 
The distinction between the varied levels of integration within EU law is based on the Treaty 
structure of the EU. While the EEC constituted one of the 'three pillars' of the EU and concerns 
the social and economic foundations of the single market. The second and the third pillars were 
created by the Maastricht Treaty and involve Common Security and Defence Policy and Internal 
Security. Decision-making under the second and third pillars is not subject to majority voting at 
present. The Maastricht Treaty created the Justice and Home Affairs pillar as the third pillar. 
Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the areas of illegal immigration, visas, 
asylum, and judicial co-operation to the EEC (the first pillar). Now Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters is the third pillar. Justice and Home Affairs now refers both to the 
fields that have been transferred to the EC and the third pillar.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
no express legislative power is contained in the Treaty. 
Almost 200 directives had been adopted by the mid-1980s in such areas as motor vehicles (over 60 
measures alone), foodstuffs, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, dangerous products, consumer electrical goods, 
mechanical products and weighing equipment.
 
28
 For criticism of the Single Act on the basis that it qualified the scope of the original Treaty provisions by focusing 
only on the completion of the ‘internal market,’ see Pescatore P: Some Critical Remarks on the ‘Single European Act’; 
24 CMLR 9 (1987), 11. Pescatore argues that the effect of this was to substitute the one-sided notion of an internal 
market based on arbitrary selection of Treaty objectives for the well balanced and complex concept of the Common 
Market. Pescatore also criticised the decision not to give the definition of the internal market set out in Article 8a 
direct effect. The Luxembourg Conference (which negotiated the Single Act) adopted a separate ―Declaration on 
Article 8a which confirmed that the setting the date of 31 December 1992 did not create an automatic legal effect. 
This was despite the Commission recommendation that Article 8a should have direct effect. While some 
commentators assert that the internal market represents a new substantive legal concept and that proceedings may 
be commenced against the Council under Article 175 if it fails to act (See for example Ehlermann C D; 'The Internal 
Market Following the Single European Act' (1987) 24 Common Market Law Review, Issue 3, p.361–409); others have 
argued that the Declaration was only an interpretative communication with no legal effect. [Toth A G; On Law and 
Policy in the European Court of Justice, Y.E.L. 1987, p. 411-413.] 
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Furthermore, TEU which included certain new constitutional principles and paved the way for 
greater political integration, also set out a procedure and timetable for creating an Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) (subject to third stage opt-outs for the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Denmark) and provided for the implementation of the 1989 European Social Charter under a 
Social Protocol (subject to UK exception).29 
 
f.) The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999 
This is commonly known as the Amsterdam Treaty, and was signed on 2 October 1997, coming 
into force on 1 May 1999; it made considerable changes to the TEU. Earlier Treaty amendments 
were consolidated under the Amsterdam Treaty and it intended greater importance on 
citizenship and the rights of individuals. This was an attempt to achieve more democracy via 
increased powers for the European Parliament including the promotion of equality between 
men, protection and improvement of the environment, a high degree of competitiveness and 
sustainable economic development; a Community area of freedom, security and justice, the 
beginnings of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the modification of institutions 
in the build-up to enlargement. The Treaty also provided for central and eastern European 
expansion and further work on European citizenship.30 
                                               
29
 Other changes included: (i) the establishment of a Committee of Regions, (ii) the Court of Auditors became a 
Community institution, (iii) increased powers for the European Parliament under a new co-decision procedure, (iv) 
greater co-operation in the areas of culture, education, vocational training and youth, (v) increased co-ordination on 
healthcare programmes and levels of health protection, (vi) new initiatives in the area of consumer protection, (vii) the 
development of trans-European networks, (viii) co-ordination of research and development activities, (ix) further work 
in the area of social and economic cohesion, (x) further environmental initiatives, (xi) confirmation of the Community's 
commitment to integration with the world economy, (xii) full free movement of capital and (xiii) new rules on 
international transport. 
 
30
 All earlier Treaty amendments are incorporated under a new renumbering. Decisions are to be taken as 'openly as 
possible' and as closely as possible to the citizen with the Council of European Union being able to suspend treaty 
rights where there has been a persistent and serious breach of human rights. More so, Justice and Home Affairs is 
incorporated within the Treaty and extended to include Policy and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). 
The Treaty is also amended to include the gradual abolition of border checks under the Schengen Agreement in 
1985. 
 
The veto rights provided under the Luxembourg Accords are brought within the Treaty as new powers are 
conferred in the area of non-discrimination and a new title on employment included with a separate advisory 
Employment Committee being set up. 
 
Further provisions are amended or included with regard to public health, consumer protection, co-decision, regional 
consultation and fraud. Groups of Member States are also allowed to co-operate in specific areas without the 
necessary involvement of all others under a new flexibility principal. 
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The Amsterdam Treaty did not however settle all institutional questions once and for all. Work is 
still in progress on reforming the institutions to make them capable of operating effectively and 
democratically in a much enlarged EU. The most pressing issues here are the composition of 
the Commission, the weighting of Member States' votes, and qualified majority voting. These 
questions were addressed in subsequent Treaties. 
 
g.) The Treaty of Nice, 2003 
The treaty was signed by European leaders on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 
February 2003. It is generally concerned with amending the composition of the institutions, 
voting procedures, enlargement and promoting enhanced co-operation. It reformed the 
institutional structure of the EU to withstand eastward expansion, a task which was originally 
intended to have been done by the Amsterdam Treaty, but failed to be addressed at the time. 
 
Qualified majority voting rights (QMVs) were re-rated resulting in more power being given to the 
larger countries (including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK). 
 
h.) The Treaty of Lisbon 2009 
Initially known as the Reform Treaty, it was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 
2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the TEU and the Treaty of Rome. 
In this process, the latter was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Critics of the Treaty of Lisbon, such as former Danish Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) Jens-Peter Bonde argued that it would centralize the EU, and weaken 
democracy by moving power away from national electorates.31 
 
Typically, the Treaty attempts to deal with expansion and reforming the institutions but has 
encountered difficulty in doing for the simple reason that once countries have acquired powers 
over the years, they are reluctant to give it up. This is particularly relevant to the new (eastern 
European) countries coming into the EU who have limited or no voting rights. This raises issues 
of disproportion as some countries (the bigger countries) ultimately benefit from enlargement 
much more at the expense of the smaller countries. 
 
 
                                               
31
 See Bonde J P; From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty; Forlaget Notat; Allingåbro, 2008 p.41 
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3.3.3 Development of the EU Single Market legal structure 
The legal development of the European internal market can be summarized into the following 
five categories which are considered below. This categorization is what lies at the heart of the 
distinctiveness of EU law as compared to any other model of regional integration in the world. In 
fact, the proposals put forward in chapters one and two to solve the African problem including 
the spaghetti bowl dilemma and relational issues, were derived from these categories. 
 
a.) Supremacy of EU Law: 
This is sometimes referred to as primacy of European law.  It is the principle by which the laws 
of EU member states that conflict with laws of the EU must be ignored by domestic courts so 
that the EU law can take effect. This was established in the important ECJ case Costa v 
ENEL32where the court ruled that EU law would not be effective if Mr Costa could not challenge 
national law on the basis of its alleged incompatibility with EU law: ―It follows from all these 
observations that the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of 
the community itself being called into question. As a matter of fact, some countries have written 
the precedence of Community law into their constitutions. For example, Article 29 of the 
Constitution of Ireland states that: “No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, 
acts done or measures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of 
membership of the European Union or of the Communities...”33 
 
b.) Direct Effect: 
The concept direct effect emerged in the ECJ case Van Gend en Loos34 which decided that a 
citizen was able to enforce a right granted by EC legislation against the government. This 
applied to all individuals across Europe. It was completely revolutionary and again concretizes 
the EU‘s matchlessness as compared to any other attempts at single market programmes 
anywhere else in the world. It was the first time the principle of direct effect had been 
established and ever since, it has been subsequently loosened in its application to treaty 
                                               
32
 Case 6/64, Falminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593 
 
33
 Available online at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/en/constitution/index.html#part7 (accessed 12 January 2014) 
34
NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration 
[1963] ECR 1, EURLex case 26/62. Direct applicability means that EU law becomes part of the national law without 
intervention of Parliament.  
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articles. Thereby, the ECJ expanded the principle, holding that it is capable of applying to 
virtually all of the possible forms of EU legislation most especially regulations35and in certain 
circumstances directives.36 
 
c.) Mutual Recognition: 
This was the outcome of the Cassis de Dijon case in 1979. The case concerned the sale by an 
importer of Crème de cassis, a blackcurrant flavoured liqueur, produced in France. The German 
government had a law restricting the minimum amount of alcohol which should exist in certain 
products being sold as a liqueur. The importer was prohibited by the German authorities from 
importing Cassis de Dijon into Germany on the grounds that its alcoholic strength was too low. 
German law prevented the sale of any drink with alcohol content between less than 25%. 
Therefore the importer was told that the product could not be sold as they intended to sell it. The 
importer argued that this represented a quantitative restriction on trade, which would be in 
breach of Article 28 of the Treaty of Rome. As such, the ECJ held that the German legislation 
represented a measure having equivalent effect of restricting trade, and that the law was in 
breach of Article 28 of the Treaty. It added that there are no valid reasons why a product that is 
lawfully marketed in one member state should not be introduced in another member state.37 
This created a double test of (i) lawful production and (ii) first placement in one member state to 
enjoy free movement across the community. 
 
It is worth mentioning that, Cassis was a narrower judgement of an earlier case in 1974 called 
                                               
35
Article 288 TFEU (former Art 249 TEC) explicitly provides that regulations "Shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States" the ECJ has confirmed that they are therefore in principle directly effective 
stating that "Owing to the their very nature and their place in the system of sources of Community law, regulations 
operate to confer rights on individuals which the national courts have a duty to protect"- Case C-253/00 Munoz [2002] 
ECR I-7289 para.27 
36
 Unlike Treaty provisions and regulations, directives cannot have horizontal effect (against another private individual 
or company), as this is adjudged contrary to the principles of equality [see Marshall v Southampton and South West 
Hampshire AHA (1986) ECJ-Case 152/84) [1986] ECR 723]. As such, Directives are currently only vertically directly 
effective (i.e. against the state, a concept interpreted broadly by the ECJ, including state schools and other 
―emanations of the state). 
 
37
 To soften this wide opening of the gates for intra-Community trading, the court went on to provide four exceptions 
normally referred to as mandatory requirements which might be accepted as necessary for restricting trading: ―..The 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions, and the 
defence of the consumer‖- this replaced the much broader reasonableness test set out in Dassonville 1974 (infra 
n.44) (mandatory requirements was the wishy-washy translation of the French phrase “Exigences Impératives” 
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Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville38 simply referred to as Dassonville. This is 
so because, in Cassis, the ECJ sought to limit the range of the Dassonville decision by reducing 
the gamut of restrictions.39 In Dassonville the ECJ had held that the Belgian legislation which 
required the certificate of authenticity from a trader importing Scotch whisky (having purchased 
this whisky in France where no such requirements existed) represented a measure having 
equivalent effect of restricting trade, and was in breach of Article 28 of the Treaty. In other 
words, the restriction meant that it was perfectly possible for a French seller of Scotch whisky to 
sell the whisky, whilst a short distance away in Belgium, a trader selling the same whisky would 
be subject to restrictions thus, effectively creating a restriction on their ability to compete with 
the French trader. The court stated: “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to 
be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.” 
 
Thus, contrary to popular belief following the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ in Dassonville 
established that discriminatory and non-discriminatory rules of member states that hinder trade 
shall be illegal. Thereby developing an effects test which provided that discrimination must not 
be the only precondition for a restriction to be illegal but anything else which restricted trade. 
This strong pro-trade bias against the domestic regulations of the member states proved to be 
very broad and as such was narrowed in Cassis.40 The ECJ did not nevertheless forget to 
                                               
38
EURlex (Case 8/74) [1974] ECR 837. This was the leading case regarding the free movement of goods and 
competition as it provided the Court with its first important opportunity to consider the meaning of free movement of 
goods provisions. 
 
39
 Horspool M & Humphreys M: European Union Law (5th edition), OUP, Oxford 2008, p.316–317.  
40
 Silhouetted against the transformation of its decision making (harmonization) mechanism, the development of the 
ECJ jurisprudence, with respect to the interface of free markets and state regulation, has oscillated as it pursues an 
appropriate balance between deeper integration and domestic regulatory autonomy. The ex. Article 30 of the Treaty 
of Rome amounts to a combination of GATT Article III: 4 (National Treatment) and XI: 1 (Prohibitive of Quantitative 
Restrictions and Measure Equivalent to Quantitative Restrictions). It states: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and 
all measure having an equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between 
Member States ”.
 
Before the 70‘s, there was a spectrum of views on the interpretation of the Article, ranging from narrow 
(‘protection test’) to a wider (an ‘obstacle’ test). Meanwhile, the view adopted by the Commission was that 
indistinctively applicable measure would fall within the prohibition of ex Article 30 only if they were ‘disproportionate’. 
(infra n. 41; Cho. p.71-72). These disparaging views were concomitant with the failure of the general programmes to 
be adopted in 1970 due to overwhelming disagreements between member states. (This was solved by direct effect) 
(The differing views were clarified somewhat post Cassis de Dijon.) 
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provide an outlet for escape from an overly draconian application of the rule as long as the 
questioned measure was found to be “reasonable” and “indistinctively applicable” to all 
community nationals. This outlet was available even for purposes that lay beyond the breadth of 
the exhaustive list of ex Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome such as the prevention of unfair 
practices.41 
 
In strictly banking and financial law terms, it is worth noting that one of the main obstacles to 
cross-border trade in the banking and financial industry was regulation. Historically, national 
regulations have always tended to restrict trade. Regulations in place are normally restrictive on 
banks and financial institutions coming from abroad to operate within your country; this is an 
obstacle to cross-border trade and in order to create a single market place, this obstacle must 
be removed. On the one hand, there are problems which arise if they are removed and on the 
other hand, obvious problems if they aren‘t. For example if German banks are told they cannot 
come into the UK to operate unless they are willing to comply with all the national laws and 
regulations, they will find it very difficult to come in because it could end up being a very 
expensive and time consuming process (retraining staff, building up capital to set up offices and 
branches and so on). If however, these obstacles are removed and they are told to come in 
freely, exempt from restrictions and regulations and all the laws there is a danger Britain could 
be undermining the stability of its local financial market place (and potentially the whole regional 
trading system which has been established) because it cannot be known whether they are 
regulated or not in Germany. 
 
This was a major problem which requires compromise; hence within Europe the solution put 
forward was mutual recognition. 
                                               
41
Cho S.: Free markets and social regulation: a reform agenda of the global trading system; Kluwer Law International, 
London, 2003, p.71-75.Subsequently Cassis elaborated on this prototype of the ‘rule of reason’ by tempering further 
the interpretive rigours of Dassonville (hence the mandatory requirements). This was a significant hermeneutical 
innovation for overcoming the pro-trade bias embedded in Dassonville. 
 
 In spite of the Cassis judgment which granted considerable regulatory leeway to member states, the 
shadow of Dassonville remained an overwhelming presence for a very long time. In particular, even indistinctively or 
equally applicable measures still needed to be ‘justified’ by the proportionality test in order to escape the reach of ex 
Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome. This vestigial rigour which continuously interfered with the domestic regulatory 
autonomy often contradicting local socio-political sensibility turned out to be more severe and burdensome as 
integrative market forces embrace member states at an ever increasing rate. Angst over diminishing regulatory 
sovereignty was also reflected and fuelled by the ethos of ‘subsidiarity’ which influenced the Social Charter 
Movement (1989) (Cho, page 73).
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d.) State Liability: 
The principle of State Liability for compliance with EU law emerged from the case Andrea 
Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic42. This concerned a compensation scheme which 
Italian workers were entitled to under an EU directive. Since state liability is enforced through 
national courts, the ECJ stipulated that national procedures should determine how state liability 
is enforced. The procedures for claiming damages from the state before national courts must 
comply with the principles of equivalence (to those procedures available for similar claims for 
damages) and effectiveness (to secure that EU law is respected). So long as it respects these 
two principles, the Member State can prescribe its own procedures for claims. Here the ECJ 
acted in a formative rather than purely responsive or interpretative manner in developing a 
number of core doctrines or principles of European law. This more interventionist and 
aggressive policy was, in particular, considered necessary during the late-1960s and early-
1970s with the delays and relative successes possible in other areas of European 
harmonization and integration.43 
 
e.) New Legal Order: 
From a holistic point of view, the progress of EU Law has been largely shaped by the ECJ. In 
the landmark case of Van Gend en Loos in 1963, the ECJ ruled that the EC, through the will of 
Member States expressed in the Treaty of Rome, ―constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights albeit 
within limited fields. It established that provisions of the Treaty of Rome were capable of 
creating legal rights which could be enforced by both natural and legal persons before the 
courts of the Community's member states.44 This is the principle of direct effect above 
explained. Van Gend en Loos is acknowledged as being one of the most important, if not the 
most important, decision in the EU‘s development.45 The application of this rule was unlike 
                                               
42
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR I-5357  
43
 A number of general principles have also been recognised as forming part of European Community law. These 
general principles may be derived from the underlying Treaties themselves as well as from principles of national laws 
within the Member States or other international Treaties or international laws. The main general principles of 
Community law recognised by the Court over time have included the following: human rights, equality, proportionality, 
legal certainty, due process, good faith, fairness and force majeure. 
 
44
 Kent, Penelope; Law of the European Union; 4
th
 Edition, Pearson, Harlow, 2008; Van Gend en Loos was the first 
case in which the ECJ considered direct effect.
 
45
 Craig P and De Búrca G; EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials; 5
th
 Edition; OUP, Oxford, 2011; Ch. 7
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anything ever seen in any regional integration system and was indeed the first of its kind.46 The 
evolution of this structure demonstrates the undoubted uniqueness of the EU as compared to 
any other regional integration system in the world. It will be interesting to note the success and 
shortcomings of the application of this European structure of integration within the confines of 
banking and finance activities. An appreciation will be made in the wake of the GFC on how the 
EU handled the crisis at the regional level with lingering factors initiated at the national level.  
 
Part Three 
 
3.4 EU Banking and Finance Law 
Drawing from the historical content above, it is noticeable that in the early period following the 
establishment of the EEC, banking and financial matters were treated as part of the larger trade 
objectives. Some progress was possible in the development of early central bank co-operation 
within the Community although a large degree of close contact already existed between the 
parties involved at the international level mainly through the work of the G10 in Basle.47 The 
objective of these efforts was to begin to create more effective co-ordination of the activities of 
the central bankers within Europe especially with regard to monetary policy although it was 
unclear at that time to what extent this could be carried forward and be effective in practice.48 
                                               
46
 Van Gend en Loos is authority for the proposition that articles of the EC treaty are directly effective (as distinct from 
directly applicable) in their application against the state. The case illustrates the creative jurisprudence of the ECJ as 
the concept of direct effect is not mentioned in the treaty. The court held that such a doctrine was necessary in order 
to ensure the compliance of Member States with their obligations under the Treaty of Rome. Additionally, it typifies a 
procedure of enforcement of EU law at the national level - direct effect does not require the Commission to bring an 
action against the state. This is significant, because it provides a more effective, distributed enforcement mechanism. 
 
47
 Walker G.A.: European Banking Law: Policy and Programme Construction; BIICL, London, 2007, p.234-287 
 
48
 In this early period the only action which was taken in the banking and credit area was the creation of early 
systems of central bank co-operation. This began with Council Decision 64/300 on co-operation between the central 
banks of the Member States. The basic objective was to set up a committee of central bank governors to achieve 
closer co-ordination of monetary policies between the Member States by ensuring that consultation was secured 
before major decisions were taken. The Committee is made up of each of the governors of the central banks of the 
Member States or by a member of a directing body of the institution. The Committee is required to hold consultations 
on the general principles and broad lines of policy of the central banks and to exchange information at regular 
intervals about the most important measures falling within the competence of central banks and to examine those 
measures. The Committee is also required to review the monetary trends inside and outside the EC. Although the 
importance of the Committee decline with the development of the European Monetary System is has subsequently 
been given greater responsibility in connection with the implementation of stage one of Economic and Monetary 
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With reference to the law of free of movement (goods, people, capital, services and 
establishment), those particularly relevant to the banking and finance sector specifically are the 
free movement of capital,49 services and establishment. In fact, the banking and investment 
services measures which have been adopted by the Council of Ministers were based on the 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome dealing with the free movement of capital, freedom of 
establishment and free provision of services.50 It is nevertheless worth noting that as the 
objective was to remove discrimination against incoming firms whereas the relevant Directive 
was accordingly based on the principle of national treatment, as such, the Directive was 
superseded by the decisions in van Binsbergen51 and Reyners52 in which the European Court 
held that the underlying Treaty provisions were of direct effect from the end of the transitional 
period. These were landmark in the development of free movement of establishment and 
services. 
 
The directives to be adopted under the General Programmes were either intended to give effect 
directly to the underlying rights of establishment or free provision of services or to establish 
common provisions that would allow these rights to be exercised in practice.53 The construction 
                                                                                                                                                       
Union in the Community. A further Directive was adopted on March 22, 1971 to strengthen central bank co-operation 
within the framework of co-ordination of national monetary and credit policies having regard to the general economic 
policy guidelines laid down by the Council. (See Walker; European Banking Law: Policy and Programme 
Construction) 
49
 (Ibid Walker) - Although no specific measures with regards to banking or investment services were adopted during 
this initial period the First and Second Council Directives implementing Article 67 of the Treaty in respect of the free 
movement of capital were proposed. Although these Directives provided for the progressive abolition of all restrictions 
on the movement of capital between Member States, as provided for in Article 67(1), very limited progress was made 
in the area for a long period due to the exercise by certain Member States of the safeguard clauses provided for in 
these Directives and the Treaty.  
50
 While the court attempted to develop its more general policy of free movement, the commission has been working 
on the construction of necessary secondary legislative programmes in each of the areas of activity (and sub-activity) 
set out in the original General Programmes adopted under the Treaty of Rome. [See General Programme for the 
abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on 
freedom to provide services (OJ No. 2, 15 January 1962, 36/62); See also, Commission Completing the Internal 
Market 1985] (Walker p.233)These General Programmes included specific references to banking and insurance.  
51
 Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid Case 
33/74 [1974] ECR 1299 
52
 Reyners v. Belgium State Case 2/74 [1974] ECR 631. 
 
53
 Although it had been originally understood that some form of prior harmonization or pre- compliance would only be 
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of a new banking and financial programme has since proceeded through the adoption of a 
number of particular legislative measures. The aim of these has generally been to give effect to 
the underlying rights of establishment and services provided under the Treaty of Rome and 
simultaneously construct appropriate supporting supervisory and regulatory systems across 
Europe. 
 
In this light, to assess the issue of programme completion in the banking and financial area and 
to consider the work being done by the commission, the basic structure of the banking and 
financial programme is reviewed and the recent integration efforts referred to. 
 
From the onset, it was difficult to agree common standards in all detailed technical areas, which 
frustrated many in the member states. In the banking area specifically, difficulty arose because 
it was initially unclear whether some degree of harmonisation was necessary before the rights of 
establishment and services granted under the Treaty of Rome could be exercised and if so 
whether it would subsequently be possible to agree all of the relevant terms within a single 
measure. As a result, work in this area was carried out through the establishment of an initial 
advisory group in 1966 and then a more formal Committee of Experts in 1968. The advice 
provided by the first working group, it was decided that some harmonisation would be required 
although the Commission had earlier produced a draft free movement directive which was 
adopted in 1973.54 A first draft of a fully consolidated directive was produced in July 197255 
                                                                                                                                                       
required in the insurance sector, it was subsequently realized that this would also be necessary for banks. 
Furthermore, the importance of securities markets as independent sectors would be recognized subsequently. The 
problem that arose however was that, no guidance was provided in the Treaty with regard to the content and 
structure of the harmonization or pre-compliance to be secured. It was simply assumed that the relevant 
requirements in each area would be harmonized. 
54
 Council Directive 73/183/EEC of 28 June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks and other financial institutions. 
 
  
  Following its further work, the Commission‘s separate Committee of Experts produced a first draft banking 
measure on a German-Dutch model in 1972. This was necessary in light of the generally underdeveloped nature of 
the French laws at that time and unnecessary institutional complexity within the Italian system. 
 
55
 An original group of national experts had been asked to advise the Commission on whether measures would have 
to be harmonized within the banking area between the then six original Member States and on the content of any 
harmonized provisions required. The initial Working Group met between 1966 and 1968 and the objective was to 
compare the existing national laws and consider whether any material differences existed and possible grounds of 
harmonization. The Working Group, in particular, examined licensing, solvency, liquidity, risk concentration and legal 
form issues. The expert group reported end of 1967 and beginning of 1968. 
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although its consideration could not proceed further with the accession of the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark in 1973 as a result of disagreements between the member states especially as a 
result of persistent resistance from France and Italy who wanted to protect their domestic 
policies. 
 
As a partial alternative to this full harmonization within the banking area, the Commission 
adopted a new framework approach.56 This involved identifying a number of core regulatory 
areas within the banking area and developing separate directives in respect to each. As a result 
of this change in approach, some of the main outline provisions set out in the original 
1972 draft were retained within the proposal in 1974 for the ‘First Banking Directive’ which 
would later be adopted in 1977.57 Other initial standards set out in the proposal for the First 
Banking Directive related to minimum own funds, the number and suitability of directors, control, 
conditions for withdrawal of license, reciprocity and information exchange. Also, the 
First Banking Directive anticipated passport rights, home country control and transitional 
minimum harmonization. 
 
One of the particular problems that had arisen by the early 1970s was that new financial ratios 
(especially with regard to capital adequacy) had to be developed with the changes that had 
taken place in banking market structure and practice. In light of the complexity of the issue and 
underdeveloped nature of each of the national systems at that time, it was decided to undertake 
                                                                                                                                                       
The Committee produced in July 1972 a 'Draft Directive for the co-ordination of the legal and administrative 
provisions for the taking up and exercise of the "independent operator" activities of credit institutions' (see 
XIV/508/72-D, Orig, D). The draft 1972 Directive contained a full set of measures for the full supervision and 
regulation of credit institutions. The draft consisted of 9 Parts and 41 articles. (See Walker p.237) 
56
 A more general directive to remove discrimination in regulatory banking practices was announced by Monsieur 
Françoise Treppaniers at a banking conference in London on 16 January 1974. The preliminary 'umbrella' directive 
would include basic provisions concerning conditions under which licenses were issued, minimum levels of liquidity, 
risk and solvency, competition, accounting disclosure requirements, winding-up, banking operations and third country 
arrangements. Monsieur Trappaniers was speaking on behalf of Monsieur Henri Simonet, Vice-President of the 
European Commission for Taxation, Financial Institutions and Company Law. The Commission had to reconsider its 
approach to the whole problem of harmonising banking rules in the communities and had attempted to separate from 
the generality of the subject various aspects which would be treated separately. See 'EEC wants rules on banking 
harmonised,' The Times (16.1.1974), p 16, column 3 
57
 See First Council Directive 77/780/EEC on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the take up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions of 12 December 1997 (OJ L 322 12.12.1997, p 
30)
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a data collection and examination exercise through the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) 
which was set up under the Directive.58 
 
The underlying policy was, nevertheless still essentially determined by harmonisation, and the 
only difference was that harmonisation would now be effected through multiple rather than a 
single directive. Consequently, the underlying integration policy implemented changed 
fundamentally with the integration process now re-launched with the adoption of a new 
approach based on the ‘mutual recognition’ of national laws and regulations. 
 
3.4.1 Mutual Recognition Integration Approach 
Mutual recognition defined by Walker is ―based on the identification of core aspects of control 
within which certain minimum common standards are established. In the banking and financial 
area, in particular, the additional principle of home country control also allows for supervisory 
allocation or division of key functions between the home and host territories. Mutual recognition 
also requires each set of national authorities to recognize the authority of the license provided 
by the home country. This includes both the validity of the home license and its operational 
effectiveness within the jurisdiction of the host territory.59 
 
                                               
58
 The BAC was distinct from the European Contact Group (Groupe de Contact) which had been set up in 1972 to 
facilitate operational contact and co-operation between national supervisory authorities in the banking area. The BAC 
was accordingly instructed to monitor financial ratios and attempt to develop common standards acceptable in all 
national territories under the Directive. 
59
Walker; European Banking Law; p.240- Walker points out that ―the difference between mutual recognition and full 
harmonisation is that it is not based on the establishment of a full set of common standards but only a minimum level 
of protection within selected agreed areas. In the financial area, pre-compliance is also not sufficient as with full 
harmonisation. Rather continuing compliance is secured through the operation of the supervisory allocation secured 
under home country control. Continuing rather than prior compliance is then effected. 
 
The two integration approaches are accordingly different in terms of standards and compliance. Both, 
however, provide for regulatory withdrawal principally through exemption from the application of the host regulatory 
requirements and, in particular, the local core prohibition on the (unauthorized) conduct of the particular financial 
activity concerned. The host requirements are accordingly relaxed in each case and the validity and scope of the 
license (and authorization) provided by the home country recognized in the local territory. Full and framework 
harmonisation also operate on a mutual recognition basis to a certain extent. The difference is that the recognition 
now operates on the basis of reciprocal compliance with agreed minimum standards in certain pre-defined areas 
rather than with compliance with a full of range of pre-set common standards. In the banking and financial area, this 
also operates on continuing rather than simple initial market entry basis.  (Walker p.240-241) 
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In applying this new mutual recognition based integration approach in the banking and financial 
area, the most important measure created in order to provide a full range of access rights was 
the Second Banking Directive.60 
 
These measures were supported by the Own Funds Directive and the Solvency Ratio Directive 
which created a basic system of credit risk capital cover61 and an earlier Large Exposures 
Directive which introduced formal concentration limits for the first time.62 The main measures in 
the banking area were then drawn together and restated in a Consolidated Banking Directive in 
May 2000.63 
 
The general effect of these measures was to give effect to the underlying Treaty rights of 
establishment and cross-border provision of services64 and operated within a new general 
regulatory framework defined in terms of mutual recognition, minimum harmonisation and home 
country control. The underlying objective is then to provide for both full market access and 
proper market control concurrently. The supporting control system is then generally based on a 
number of separate regulatory and supervisory provisions. The regulatory requirements are 
generally concerned with initial authorisation65 and continuing compliance.66These regulatory 
                                               
60
 Council Directive 89/299/EEC on the own funds of credit institutions of 17 April 1989 (OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p 16) as 
amended by Directive 91/633/EEC of 3 December 1991 (OJ L 339 , 11.12.1991, p 33) and Directive 92/16/EEC of 16 
March 1992 (OJ L 75, 21.3.1992, p 48); and Council Directive 89/647/EEC on a solvency ratio for credit institutions of 
18 December 1989 (OJ L 386, 30.12.1989, p 14) as amended by Directive 91/31/EEC (OJ L 17, 23.1.1991, p 20). 
 
The purpose of the Own Funds Directive was to establish certain common standards for the calculation of 
the own funds (capital) of credit institutions that would be available to ensure the continuity of credit institutions and to 
protect savings. Whereas, the Solvency Ratio Directive provides for the calculation of a total risk-adjusted asset 
figure of a bank (including off-balance sheet items) and imposes the 8% minimum requirement. 
 
61
 Council Directive 89/299/EEC on the own funds of credit institutions of 17 April 1989 (OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p 16) as 
amended by Directive 91/633/EEC of 3 December 1991 (OJ L 339 , 11.12.1991, p 33) and Directive 92/16/EEC of 16 
March 1992 (OJ L 75, 21.3.1992, p 48); and Council Directive 89/647/EEC on a solvency ratio for credit institutions of 
18 December 1989 (OJ L 386, 30.12.1989, p 14) as amended by Directive 91/31/EEC (OJ L 17, 23.1.1991, p 20). 
 
62
Concentration limits for credit institutions were introduced under Council directive 92/121/EEC on the monitoring 
and control of large exposures of credit institutions of 21 December 1992 (OJ L 29, 5.2.1993, p 1) following an earlier 
Commission Recommendation 87/62/EEC (OJ L 33, 4.2.1987, p 10). 
 
63
 See Directive 2000/12/EC May 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
[CBD]. 
 
64
 See CBD, Article 18 (formerly SBD, Article 18(1)). 
65
The initial market entry or authorization is generally based on a minimum capital requirement (Article 5(1)), 
management and shareholder suitability (Articles 6(1) and 7(2)) and basic internal controls (Articles 8 and 17). 
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obligations are then supplemented by a number of further basic supervisory provisions which 
are principally concerned with the monitoring and oversight of credit institutions to ensure, in 
particular, that they comply with basic regulatory obligations imposed.67 Market exit (as opposed 
to entry) is partly dealt with through the Deposit Protection Directive68 (liability resolution) and 
the Winding-Up Directive69 (asset realization). These essential regulatory and supervisory 
measures are then supplemented by further specific transactional requirements such as with 
regard to bank charges and guarantees, consumer protection and payment and settlement.70 
 
Further to these measures, directives have also been adopted in the securities and investment 
services area. The Investment Services Directive created an equivalent set of rights for 
investment firms as credit institutions in 1993.71 This was supported by the Capital Adequacy 
Directive which set out the minimum capital requirements to be applied to banks and investment 
firms in respect of securities related market (or position) risk as well as foreign exchange, some 
operational and commodity risk.72 
 
It is imperative to understand that any meaningful progress in the banking area was only 
possible once full free movement of capital had been secured across Europe during the late 
1980s and early 1990s.73 It is worth pointing out that the in Casati74 the ECJ recognised from 
                                                                                                                                                       
66
Continuing regulatory compliance is based on capital adequacy (the Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directive 
(CBD, Articles 34-47) and large exposures (Articles 48-50) , suitability of controllers (Articles 7 and 16), restrictions on 
commercial holdings (Article 51), administrative and internal controls (Article 17) and separate requirements on bank 
and branch disclosure. Compliance is secured through various supervisory procedures imposed. 
 
67
The supervisory framework set up is generally based on consolidated supervision (Articles 52-56), consultation and 
co-operation between authorities (Article 28), information exchange (Article 30), inspections and verifications (Article 
29) and disciplinary measures (Article 32). 
 
68
 Directive 94/19 of 30 May 1994 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ 1994, L135/5). This followed an earlier 
Commission Recommendation 87/63 concerning the introduction of deposit guarantee schemes in the Community of 
22 December 1986 (O J L33/87). 
69
 See Directive on the Winding-up and Liquidation of Banks 2001/24/EC adopted 4 April 2001. See also Directive on 
the Reorganization and Winding-up of Insurance Undertakings 2001/17/EC adopted 19 March 2001. 
 
70
 See, Section 4.V 
71
 Council Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field of 10 May 1993 (OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p 
27). 
72
 Council Directive 93/6/EEC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions of 15 March 1993 
(OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p 1) 
73
 Although capital Directives date from 1961 and 1963, Member States had relied on standstill provisions until further 
measures were adopted in 1986 and 1988. See generally, Age F. P. Bakker, The Liberalisation of Capital Movements 
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the onset that free movement of capital is ‘one of the fundamental freedoms of the 
Community.’75 Nonetheless, it established that unlike the other freedoms, the Treaty provisions 
concerning it were not directly effective and could therefore not be relied upon in the domestic 
courts. 
 
A number of crucial measures have been adopted accordingly in each major financial sector 
(including capital). With these provisions, an attempt has been made to reconcile the basic 
conflict that arises in attempting to provide full market access with proper market control in any 
regional trading system. Substantial progress has been achieved although a number of 
significant gaps and omissions remain. It is for this reason that the more recent consolidation 
and completion work of the Commission is of essential importance to the longer term 
development and ultimate success of this work. 
 
3.4.2 Post-Maastricht: The Way Forward for Programme Consolidation 
To ensure an effective banking and financial programme be constructed within Europe, an 
original Action Plan for the Single Market was firstly proposed at the Amsterdam European 
Council Summit in 1997 to make sure that all of the directives adopted under the 1985 White 
Paper had been properly implemented and worked effectively to the greatest advantage of 
European citizens and businesses.76 
 
The original Action Plan was followed by a framework document in the banking financial area in 
October 1998.77 This Framework for Action had been requested by the June 1998 Cardiff 
European Council and was to be presented at the following Vienna Council. Given that the 
Commission recognized the fact that plenty of work still had to be done, the Framework was 
generally based on the adoption of a number of measures in the area of regulation, wholesale 
and retail financial markets as well as improved supervisory co-operation and other financial co-
                                                                                                                                                       
in Europe-The Monetary Committee and Financial Integration 1954-1994 (1996). 
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 Case 203/80 [1981] ECR 2595 
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 Para.8 of judgement (ibid) 
76
 See Communication of the Commission to the European Council, Action Plan for the Single Market (CSE (97) 1 
final) of 4 June 1997 
 
77
 See Commission Communication, Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action COM (1998) 625 final of 28 
October 1998 
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ordination such as in taxation, competition policy and infrastructure.78 The Commission was 
then asked to prepare a programme timetable to achieve the objectives set.79 An 
implementation paper was subsequently produced in May 1999.80 A Financial Services Policy 
Group (FSPG) was also set up to assist the Commission identify relevant priorities. The group 
consists of personal representatives of the national Finance Ministries and although it was only 
                                               
78
 See Commission; ‘Financial Services Commission proposes Framework for Action’ (28 October 1998); available at 
available http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_maketen/en/finances/general/fsen.htm. (accessed 14 January 2014). 
Regarding the regulatory devices, it was accepted that the existing framework of measures established must be 
continually revised to reflect changing market conditions. While the framework of measures adopted was generally 
satisfactory, the legislative structure had to be revised to ensure that they were as speedy, flexible and streamlined 
as possible. Also, there was concern to improve existing rules through better implementation, enforcement and 
clearer and more uniform interpretation by proceeding with the production of interpretative communications to assist 
national authorities and market participants and present detailed suggestions for discussion on a better approach for 
further prudential financial services legislation.  
 
      Again, it was acknowledged that while the introduction of the Euro would assist in the development of a 
large and liquid European capital market, this would not, singlehandedly integrate capital markets.  That  said,  
regulatory,  administrative  and  tax  obstacles  have  caused  a  high  degree  of  market fragmentation in 
combination with other financial and corporate governance distortions a number of Member States were significantly 
under-developed. To solve, it was recommended that issuers should enjoy easy access to European wide capital 
markets on competitive terms. Investors should be free to invest their assets without encountering legal, 
administrative or information barriers. Investment service providers should also be able to operate throughout the EU 
without confronting overlapping sets of legal and administrative formalities. Hence, the main recommendations were 
accordingly access, investment and compliance driven. 
79
 Six main objectives were identified; they included: (a) equip the EU with a legislative apparatus to meet present 
and future challenges; (b) eliminate remaining capital market fragmentation to minimise the cost of capital raised on 
EU markets; (c) make the advantages of open markets available to both users and suppliers of financial services; (d) 
encourage the closer co-ordination of supervisory authorities; (e) promote the emergence of an integrated 
infrastructure at EU level; and (f) reduce barriers to the single market resulting from disparities in taxation. See 
Commission; ‘Financial Services Commission outlines Action Plan for single financial market’ (11 May 1998) 
available http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_maketen/en/finances/general/action.htm. (accessed 14 January 2014) 
80
 See Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 
232, 11 May 1999. 
      This identified a number of issues requiring urgent action to ensure the proper functioning of the European 
financial market (and the ‘benefits of the single currency’). The 5 main areas  recommended for reform were:  
(a) the EU should be endowed with a legislative apparatus capable of responding to new regulatory challenges; (b) 
any remaining capital market fragmentation should be eliminated to reduce the cost of capital raised on EU markets; 
(c) users and suppliers of financial services should be able to exploit freely the commercial opportunities offered by a 
single financial market at the same time as benefit from a high level of consumer protection; (d) closer co-ordination 
of supervisory authority should be encouraged; and (e) an integrated EU infrastructure should be developed to 
underpin retail and wholesale and financial transactions. See 1999 Communication, p 3. 
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set up to assist with the Action Plan preparatory work, the Commission has found them of 
considerable value and has recommended that some more formally constituent equivalent 
bodies be set up to operate on a continuing basis. 
 
A separate report was also prepared in the capital market area by a Committee of ‘Wise Men’ 
under Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy. The Committee produced an initial paper in November 
2000 and a final report in February 2001.81 The final report, in particular, recommended the 
establishment of two further committees in the securities area (a European Securities 
Committee (ESC) and a European Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC)) and the adoption 
of a four part (level) approach to European capital market reform.82  
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 See Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men, The Regulation of European Securities Markets (9 November 
2000); and Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men, The Regulation of European Securities Markets (15 February 
2001). 
 
82
 Despite the potential benefits available, a number of obstacles continued to plague the realization of a Single 
Market in the securities area. In addition to regulatory and implementation difficulties, differences in legal and taxation 
systems as well as other trade, political and cultural barriers worsened significant areas of legislative 'blockage' at the 
European level. The system was generally considered to be too slow and rigid involving too much ambiguity and 
erratic implementing rules. 
     In response to these difficulties, the Committee produced a series of general principles for securities 
regulation and recommended that a new four level approach be adopted for regulatory reform in the capital market 
area. Level one generally involved having framework principles produced at the European level within the existing 
legislative procedures available. Level two provided for more detailed implementing rules to be developed through 
two new specialist committees consisting of the ESC and ESRC. Level three promoted the enhanced co-operation in 
implementing relevant measures at the national level and level four guaranteed strengthened enforcement would also 
be secured through Commission action across Europe. As such, the general effect of these recommendations would 
be to improve both the legislative process at the European level as well as the common content and effective 
implementation of these measures at the domestic or national levels. The underlying objective is to ensure that the 
legislative process within Europe is made speedier, more flexible and responsive with the existing institutional 
obstacles identified being removed or, at least, reduced as far as possible. This would then have consequential 
regulatory benefits at the national level. 
      Walker points out that ―Although directed at the securities area, these proposals are also capable of more 
general application. Most of the main recommendations made were not concerned with or directed at securities 
markets specifically, it is surprising that equivalent institutional arrangements in the banking and insurance area were 
not considered or, at least, referred to expressly. The Committee presumably felt constrained by its original ECOFIN 
mandate and subsequent directions. One possible reason for the securities focus may also have been the perceived 
lack of progress achieved in that area as against the other main financial sectors and consequent potential benefits 
that may be realized. Even allowing for this, the final financial programme will only be of value if all necessary intra-
sector and cross or inter-sector progress is achieved. The Lamfalussy recommendations are accordingly of 
considerable value although only as one part of the larger integration efforts being undertaken.  (Walker p. 271) 
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In fact a number of Progress Reports were subsequently issued by the Commission on the 
measures proposed to give effect to the Action Plan.83 These considered the legislative 
progress of each of the measures recommended in the 1999 programme as well as further 
measures subsequently adopted. Related market developments and substantial progress were 
noted simultaneously with particular difficulties in the adoption of certain measures. 
 
There is little doubt that the new mutual recognition approach adopted by the Commission 
within Europe supported by the principles of minimum harmonisation and home country control, 
has allowed agreements to be reached on minimum regulatory requirements as well as 
supervisory provisions. As a result, an Internal Market in banking and financial services has 
been constructed on the basis of the mutual recognition of national authorization and licensing 
systems although only the most minimum regulatory and supervisory framework have been 
created in each financial sector. Considerable differences still remain in terms of substantive 
regulatory content and operational market supervision. 
 
Indeed, substantial economic benefits followed from the creation of a single market in banking 
and financial services; however Walker warns that the larger welfare gains that may arise must 
be protected from possible market and systemic collapse the sort experienced with the GFC. 
Moreover, whether the balance between immediate economic advantage and longer-term 
market and economic stability has been properly achieved remains to be seen. 
 
More generally, the Commission has been concerned with dealing with selective omissions 
(mainly through resource constraints) rather than with conducting any more specific or detailed 
process of substantive regulatory and supervisory revision.  
 
Walker continues by asserting that ‘the most important elements within the recent completion 
proposals are possibly regulatory content simplification, legislative procedural revision and 
improved supervisory co-operation.’84Improvements in these areas would be of significant value 
although possibly still insufficient in themselves to correct the deficiencies identified in terms of 
regulatory and supervisory content, mutual review and market support as well as possible 
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 See Commission, First Progress Report (29 November 1999); Commission, Second Progress Report (31 May 
2000); Commission, Third Progress Report (8 November 2000); Commission, Fourth Progress Report (1 June 2001); 
Commission, Fifth Progress Report (30 November 2001); and Commission, Sixth Progress Report (3 June 2002). 
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political interference and enforcement problems. These will also only be of limited effect if they 
are restricted to capital market programme reform. Rather than correct, this may only confirm 
existing cross-sector inconsistencies within Europe. The result may simply be to strengthen 
rather than resolve the sector disparities that already exist. 
 
While agreed political compromises that balance comparative or relative advantage and 
disadvantage of one Member State as against another may also be of value, this may be wholly 
inappropriate in such a complex and important area as financial market stability. It is essential 
that each measure is fully and carefully considered and an appropriate result produced in each 
case. Political ambition and self-interest must not be allowed to undermine or lessen inherent 
supervisory or regulatory quality, coherence and operability. 
 
Having said this, there is overwhelming evidence suggesting that extensive work has been 
undertaken in the banking and financial area. As a factual matter, a great deal of significant 
clarification has been achieved in addressing the difficulties which have arisen. I cannot agree 
more with Walker who holds that the main issue of concern now is proper programme 
completion (including existing programme revision) and implementation. He stipulates that it will 
involve ensuring that all residual gaps or deficiencies are corrected and that the programme 
agreed is then applied and operates in an effective and consistent manner within all Member 
States in practice. In addition, a necessary degree of commitment must then be made with 
adequate resources allocated at the European and national levels to ensure that this is 
achieved. In a nut-shell, ―the final objective must be the full and effective implementation of all 
necessary measures and the construction of an appropriate level of operational comparability 
and consistency in national regulatory and supervisory practice.85 Even if new formal 
institutional structures cannot be agreed and are considered to be unnecessary or 
inappropriate, closer co-operation and co-ordination of activity at all operational levels must 
nevertheless be ensured. To be effective ultimately, the European financial system may have to 
move from formal (but still only nominal and superficial) mutual recognition to a considerably 
more substantial mutual co-operation and co-ordination based system of relevant activity in all 
operational areas. 
 
Thus, I concur with Walker‘s concession that ―traditional mutual recognition may have to be 
replaced over time by increased mutual assistance and mutual reliance as authorities develop 
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common operational and administrative systems involving closer co-operation and co-ordination 
of all relevant activities. This is the idea upon which the notion of African sovereignty is based. 
 
3.4.3 Africa and the EU model  
An investigation on the extent to which the features of the EU regional arrangement have been 
embraced by the RECs in Africa will now be carried out. The example of the EC legal framework 
which is backed by the ECJ is used because firstly the AU and REC Treaties have all drawn 
inspiration from the European model and secondly stated previously stated, it is the most 
advanced regional arrangement in the world. Dealing mainly with institutional aspects, the thesis 
lays out two areas of comparison between the legal frameworks: the regional enforcement 
mechanisms within the treaties and the financial regulatory systems. 
 
i.) Regional Enforcement Systems 
The effective functioning of the EC depends largely on the role played by the ECJ. Article 220 of 
the EC Treaty expressly gives the ECJ the responsibility to ensure that the law is observed in 
the interpretation and application of the treaty. Therefore, in interpreting and enforcing these 
primary and secondary laws of the EC, the ECJ is a pivotal institution in the community.86  
 
The ECJ has the power to interpret treaty provisions at the request of national courts or 
tribunals.87 The referral of landmark cases such as Van Gend en Loos and Costa v Enel to the 
ECJ and the subsequent implementation of its interpretation nationally is testament to the 
existence of the supremacy of EU law.88The general framework of community law has been 
greatly influenced by its jurisprudence thereby contributing to the development of the common 
market which enabled the integration process.  
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 The three main functions of the ECJ include: i) Hearing actions against community institutions (Arts 230–233 EC 
Treaty); ii) Hearing actions against Member States (Arts 226–228, EC Treaty); iii) Providing preliminary rulings on the 
interpretations and validity of community at the request of national courts (Art 234, EC Treaty). 
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 Article 234 EC Treaty 
88
 In Van Gend en Loos, when the supremacy of EC law was questioned, the ECJ held that ‘the Community 
constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose benefit the States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields.’ The ECJ hereby signalled clear advocacy for the supremacy of EC law. 
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In cases such as Van Dyn89 and Rutili90 the court encouraged the integration process by ruling 
against barriers to free movement of people imposed by Member States. Similarly, in cases 
such as Reyners and Van Binsergen, the ECJ ruled against barriers to the free movement of 
services.  
 
Regarding the free movement of goods, the ECJ by playing a more vigorous role ruled in Cassis 
that a Member State’s measure was ‘equivalent to a quantitative restriction’ and as such, 
violated the provision for free movement of goods.91  This is in marked contrast to the situation 
in Africa as the REC treaties unlike the ECJ, have failed to grant regional enforcement 
mechanisms the authority to hear cases referred to them by national courts.92 
 
Additionally, in the case of ECOWAS, as there was no provision made for national courts to 
refer cases to the community court, the latter could not exert the kind of influence the ECJ had 
through the various referrals of landmark cases such as Van Gend en Loos and Costa v Enel by 
establishing the supremacy of EC law. The two cases that unearth this inadequacy are Olajide 
Afolabi and Frank Ukor93discussed in Chapter Two. This shortcoming prevents the ECOWAS 
Court of Justice from playing a fundamental role in the development of the ECOWAS common 
market goals. 
 
ii.) Financial regulatory systems 
Following the GFC, Europe retracted to the drawing board and began a system overhaul in 
respect of regional financial market regulation and supervision. The resulting regulatory 
framework is known as The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFC). This 
institutional architecture was primarily built upon the EU’s strong recognition of the concept of 
supra-nationality, a robust EU legislative system and the existence of efficient and reliable 
financial supervisory authorities within Member States. This is hardly the case with the African 
RECs which struggle to demonstrate these qualities. The ESFS which functions as an 
interconnected system of EU and national authorities working hand in hand consists of three 
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levels of authority: a) the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)94 which is the highest tier, b) 
the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA)95 which is the middle tier, and c) the National 
Supervisory Authorities which sit at the lowest tier.96 
 
All this plays out nicely because the concept of supra-nationality has been fully embraced by the 
EU and its Member States. Essentially, Member States delegate decision-making powers to EU 
institutions as a fundamental part of their EU membership. These institutions in turn are 
accorded the responsibility of providing oversight and/or direction to the member countries. 
Sadly, this feature is conspicuously absent in the African RECs. 
 
Furthermore, in a bid to set-up a single, harmonized European rulebook, the ESA has been 
accorded EU legislative authority to create legally binding technical standards. This rulebook 
applies to all domestic authorities and financial firms operating within the single market.97 In a 
nut-shell, the rulebook carries the same binding effect as EU regulations it is binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. For all intents and purposes, national 
financial supervisory authorities can directly influence rule-making at the European stage. 
Clearly, this is possible only because all EU Member countries acknowledge the supremacy of 
EU law. Conversely, due to the absence of the supremacy of regional law in African RECs, it is 
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 In accordance with EU Regulation 1092/2010 (2010) OJ L 331/1 (ESRB Regulation) Art 2, the role of the ESRB is 
to supervise the financial system in its entirety and to prevent widespread financial distress; Art 3 outlines its three 
main functions which include: to monitor and assess systemic risk; to provide early warnings when systemic risks 
loom; and to issue policy recommendations for corrective action and monitor their implementation. 
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 Ibid ESRB Regulation, Art 1(3); The ESA was established by transforming the former advisory ‘Level 3’ Lamfalussy 
Committees (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors and the Committee of European Securities Regulators) into Authorities. They determine 
universal technical standards for all EU financial firms and have the authority to intervene during a crisis. As things 
stand, the ESA authorities are: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). These ESAs work 
simultaneously with the national supervisory authorities and are therefore made up of national banking supervisors, 
national insurance supervisors and national securities supervisors.  
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The national banking supervisors, national insurance supervisors and national securities supervisors which form the 
lowest level in the EU mechanism have the responsibility of supervising the day-to-day activities of individual firms. 
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 Art 8(2) of the EU Regulations establishes the following: EU Regulation 1093/2010 [2010] OJ L331/12 (EBA 
Regulation), Art 8(2); EU Regulation 1094/2010 [2010] OJ L331/48 (EIOPA Regulation), Art 8(2); EU Regulation 
1095/2010 [2010] OJ L331/ 84 (ESMA Regulation), Art 8(2). These provisions grant the ESA the authority to form 
‘regulatory technical standards’ and ‘implement technical standards’. This again is different from the previous ‘level 
3’Lamfalussy Committees position where powers were limited only to the issuing of guidelines. 
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highly unlikely that a regional equivalent of financial supervisory authorities accorded with this 
level of authority can be created.  This regional authority will hardly have the authority to create 
laws, and should it manage to create the laws, will struggle to implement them because they will 
barely be recognized domestically. Previous discussions illustrate how African countries have 
acquired the reputation of ignoring regional provisions, talk less of implementing them.  
 
Also, although the power to declare emergencies rests with the EU Council in consultation with 
the ESRB and European Commission however relevant98, the ESA has unprecedented authority 
to intervene in emergencies and take remedial action for instance; banning certain products and 
restricting some financial activities.99Whilst the ESAs have the authority to mediate, arbitrate 
and enforce their decisions,100 they can also resolve disputes between domestic authorities, 
particularly in areas requiring co-operation or joint decision-making by supervisory authorities in 
two or more member countries.101 Further, these decisions could be appealed before a joint 
board of appeal for the ESAs- all three of them.102 This arrangement is impossible within African 
RECs because the disparity in the levels of expertise of the various financial authorities across 
the continent inhibits the creation of a single financial rulebook.103 This is worsened by the fact 
that as noted above, financial supervisory authorities in most African countries are impuissant 
when it comes to enforcing laws and decisions. As things stand, it is therefore inconceivable to 
visualize an African equivalent to the ESA with the ability to mediate, arbitrate and enforce its 
decisions and/or have the authority to resolve disputes between national authorities.  
 
Reflections 
It is worth noting that even though the EU financial regulation regime had thus far been 
successful as a result of Member States implementing financial harmonization directives, the 
application of these harmonized directives in Member States was sometimes inconsistent and 
subsequently destabilized the single market agenda. It is now believed that this challenge will 
be diminished considerably by the new regulatory framework because although financial 
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required for full implementation are lacking in most African countries. See Robert Bruce’s report for more on this: 
www.ifrs.org/News/Features/Africa+embraces+IFRSs.htm (accessed 24 September 2014) 
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supervision still rests with national authorities, the addition of a regional perspective under the 
new framework will enable the national authorities work hand-in-hand with the ESA to better 
carry out their functions. Conversely, there exists no harmonized banking law regime operating 
in the African RECs without a monetary union agenda and banking supervision is decentralized 
and carried out at the domestic level. In the African RECs with a monetary union agenda like 
CEMAC, although a common banking law is in place with centralized supervision carried out by 
Banking Commissions, what is now imperative is the strengthening of supervisory powers and 
the elimination of political and domestic interference.  This interference always interrupts the 
work and effectiveness of the Banking Commissions. 
 
With regards to a regional regulatory mechanism for capital market integration, apart from South 
Africa, most countries within the various African RECs are still at the virgin stages of 
development and other than the case of the BVRM in WAEMU, there is no regional capital 
markets regulatory regime among Africa’s RECs.104 
 
In summary, considering the differing historical and geopolitical trajectories of each case, the 
EU financial regulatory institutions are far sophisticated and advanced for the African system to 
adopt in the short and medium term. To this end, emphasis must be paid to strengthening the 
regulatory and supervisory powers of the existing institutions in Africa especially the community 
courts, central banks and national and community regulators. The elimination of political and 
domestic interference is imperative as well. These will enable the institutions in Africa to develop 
at an organic rate as they must show the ability to handle less sophisticated matters before 
moving on to the more advanced. The sort of organic growth recommended here, can be 
gleaned from the Ecobank example referred to in Chapter Two. The bank started in one of the 
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Following the World Bank’s world development indicators, the first group consists of South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, 
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developing states especially in Africa is economic growth (infra 3.6.9 below). Also the importance of sound legal 
infrastructure cannot be overemphasized. In Angola for instance the creation of a capital market scheduled for 
2011was postponed as many of the country’s companies do not meet the listing requirements. (Salami: African 
financial markets- going global or staying at home? p. 568) 
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smaller countries in Africa in 1985 but has morphed into a Pan-African financial giant.105 Its 
business model is focused on delivering commercial success while contributing to economic 
development and financial integration. It has developed and implemented a common 
sustainability framework that focuses on driving economic transformation, promoting socially-
responsible financing, attracting and retaining human capital, and protecting natural resources. 
Ecobank’s “One Bank” concept—with its uniform technology platform, universal branding, and 
common policies across branches—enables continued expansion into new markets while 
providing all customers with a consistent, high level of service.106 Clearly, the framework 
adopted should be more tailed to the indigenous needs in the African continent. 
 
Only subject to outstanding progress from the organic development of these institutions, can 
further attempts to co-opt models of the more advanced EU regulatory framework such as the 
ECJ, ECB and ESFS in the very long term be made. I stress however that this can only be 
achieved by adopting the concepts necessary for African sovereignty; supra-nationality, the 
supremacy of community law, the strength and effectiveness of the legislative and enforcement 
powers. 
 
There is no doubt that this discussion confirms the superior nature of the EU financial regulatory 
and supervisory arrangement, a success which blossoms as a result of the EU Member States’ 
embrace of the concepts of supra-nationality, the supremacy of EU law, the strength and 
effectiveness of the legislative and enforcement powers and the implementation of the financial 
harmonization directives by the Member States even though this occurred amidst challenges. 
These crucial factors are blatantly missing in the African regional financial integration project 
and need to be adopted sooner than later to keep alive any chance of a successful Africa-wide 
integration agenda. 
 
I nevertheless agree with commentators like Salami who caution however that, despite the 
robustness of this new framework, there still looms potential exposure to risks should national 
supervision authorities fail to agree on certain policies. This is possible because many technical 
rules are decided at Member State level, and there still are substantial variations between 
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Member States. Even so, Salami acknowledges that by ensuring a totally mutual exchange of 
information and views early on, the new authorities will significantly lessen any chances of 
disagreement.107 
 
Part Four 
 
3.5 The EU and the EMU 
Nowhere have efforts towards closer co-operation and co-ordination been tried and tested than 
in the European Union, particularly with the monetary union where an even deeper form of 
regional integration has been experienced. 
 
The EMU which brought about scepticism when first proposed in 1969 became a reality thirty 
years later in 1999. After decades of debate over whether a single currency was viable in 
Europe, scholars, commentators and enthusiasts are now cogitating on the more urgent 
question of whether this monetary union has made Europe better or worse. 
 
To begin, a curious question beckons; why did countries such as France, Germany and Italy 
invent an entirely new currency as a replacement for the franc, mark and lira? To properly 
understand the genesis of the EMU one must reflect upon the long process of European 
economic and political integration detailed above108 
 
Following the Delors Report in 1988 which considered how economic and monetary union in the 
Community could be best achieved and the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 which set out the 
timetable and criteria for member states to participate in the project, eleven countries were 
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     The issue of integration did not normally extend to the monetary domain at the early stages. There were 
some discussions of a single currency in the early 1950‘s by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom but this led to nothing. Instead, monetary relations in post war Europe were heavily conditioned by 
the general economic imperatives for reconstruction and by the specific influences of the Bretton Woods system 
(fixed exchange rate system designed to stabilize the values of the major Western countries against each other, the 
Marshall Plan (which was a US 4 year aid package to underwrite European reconstruction as it was recognized that 
currency stability alone would not be enough to facilitate the physical and economic recovery of the war-torn 
countries in Europe), and the European Payments Union (which allowed member state economies to trade deficit 
positions with other). 
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deemed to have met the Maastricht convergence criteria in May 1998. They were Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. They elected to proceed to the third and final stage of EMU and on the 1st of January 
1999, exchange rates between their national currencies were irrevocably fixed and the Euro 
was now official. Nevertheless, it existed only in virtual form up until 1 January 2002 when it 
then assumed physical form. National currencies continued to circulate up until the end of 
February 2002 when they were then taken out of circulation and the Euro became the sole 
currency for participating countries. Also, Greece which had failed initially to meet the Maastricht 
criteria adopted the Euro on the 1st of January 2002 while Denmark, Sweden and the UK still 
retain their national currencies as they have opt-out clauses.109 
 
3.5.1 EMU: A Chequered Framework? 
Ruthlessly ambitious it may be, but the conception of an economically unified Europe is an 
astonishing development. After all, France and Germany and other European nations went to 
war with each other three times in the 75-year period from 1870 to 1945 hence, European 
leaders became convinced that the only way to secure a lasting peace was to unite 
economically and politically. 
 
Today, the euro is second only to the US dollar in use and importance in international money 
and capital markets, which is indeed an impressive statistic for a currency which has been in 
circulation for just over a decade. The main economic rationale for a single European currency 
was to deepen economic integration among its members by reducing the costs of cross-border 
commerce, encouraging cross-border mergers, improving price transparency, increasing 
competition, and eliminating exchange rate risk. Before EMU, the focus was on the rates at 
which the pre-existing national currencies would be turned into Euros. After January 1, 1999, 
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the focus quickly changed to the value of the euro relative to other non-European currencies, 
especially the US dollar. 
 
A strong case can however be made that EMU has thus far proven to be no more than the sum 
of its parts. The euro is less widely used than the combination of European currencies— the 
German mark, French franc, Italian lira, Dutch guilder, and so on—that it replaced. Some 
countries have benefited from the euro, most visibly those with lower costs of issuing 
government debt, while others have suffered under policies designed for the EU as a whole 
rather than their own economic circumstances. Small wonder, entry into the Euro was a much 
bigger structural shock for peripheral member countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain than for core member countries like Germany and France. With Germany having the 
biggest economy in the Euro-zone, one cannot help to wonder whether the Euro making 
Germany more powerful. 
 
From a logical perspective, it seems to be the case because in a monetary union typically, 
changes in bilateral real exchange rates take place only through inflation differentials, since 
nominal exchange rates are fixed by definition. Countries across the euro area differ in many 
ways for example in their levels of per capita output, demography, industrial specialization, and 
structural policies related to factor and capital markets (Germany having a significant advantage 
in all these categories). As these imbalances  within  EMU—differences  in  growth,  inflation,  
competitiveness,  current  account  and budget balances—have, however, increased in the last 
ten years the differences suggest that countries across the euro area will vary in their trend 
rates of productivity growth and in the extent of their exposure to global shocks in particular 
industries. In other words, a country that imports more than it exports must also borrow to pay 
for those imports. Conversely, Germany's large trade surplus (net export position) means that it 
must also be a net exporter of capital, lending money to other countries to allow them to buy 
German goods.110 
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Drawing from the above, the fundamental issue is that European economic integration is built on 
a group of countries of which each wants to stay largely as it was before integration. Although 
monetary union is now a reality, many citizens in Europe are still grappling with the question of 
how truly unified they care to be—as exemplified by the French and Dutch votes that blocked 
ratification of the proposed EU constitution in 2005. In fact some commentators argue that 
European institutions like the European Central Bank (ECB) are more like additions to the 
original member country institutions, rather than new constructions that efficiently take on 
European economic policy making.111 
 
The ECB is subject to the same dilemma that exists for all European and in fact International 
institutions which is: a desire for more integration combined with reluctance to cede national 
political control. Europe‘s economy has been little affected by monetary union because the 
distribution of power among those in charge of EMU policy decision making, and the 
implementation of those decisions, remains too highly decentralized to take advantage of the 
possible gains.112 
 
It should come as no surprise therefore, that the performances of European economies have 
not changed dramatically with integration and that the global role of the euro is not much 
different than the combination of currencies that it has replaced. Anyway, the resistance of the 
euro had not been tested greatly as it had not been under severe political and financial stress 
such as that which tested its functioning in terms of the severe macroeconomic and financial 
shocks113 which occurred during the GFC and the sovereign debt crisis which resulted from it. 
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Historically, the concept of economic and monetary union was sold to Europeans as the means 
by which they could achieve political and economic stability. Considering what followed the GFC 
and the sovereign debt crisis, it is clear that there are a number of potential challenges to this 
vision of stability which Europe now faces. In fact some commentators have lamented that since 
the establishment of the EEC in the 1950‘s, attempts at monetary integration and ultimately 
monetary union have tended to assume importance only as a result of financial crisis and 
subsequently becoming a vague objective as soon as the crisis recedes.114 This sales pitch is 
one the African continent needs to consider carefully in order to mitigate the challenges which 
come with this form of deeper integration. 
 
Despite the fact that historically, the idea of an EMU generated a plethora of conflicts of interest, 
the first decade of EMU in Europe has been a rich success. EMU has brought significant 
benefits to its member countries: it has led to remarkable macroeconomic stability and 
accelerated trade and, in particular, financial integration in the euro area. Many contributors 
have suggested enthusiastically that thanks to the successful first decade of EMU, the euro 
area and its Member States are today in a much better shape to weather these truly testing 
times than ever before.115 They argue that the euro has protected EMU members during the 
crisis, and arguments that the crisis would lead to a breakup of the monetary union are neither 
new nor convincing. In fact, the crisis to them has made EMU even more, not less, attractive, 
and most EU countries that are not yet members of EMU are keen to join in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
They argue that following the financial turmoil in 2007, other than the prevention of exchange 
rate and interest rate turbulences among the euro-area Member States that used to be common 
during periods of financial stress in the past, the ECB has adopted an accommodative monetary 
policy stance and has skillfully managed liquidity. This has helped to ease conditions in the 
interbank market and to anchor inflation expectations throughout this period of uncertainty. 
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Finally, some commentators hold that the governance structure of EMU, while far from being 
perfect, has facilitated policy coordination across the euro area and the EU as a whole and the 
close interaction of all actors spurred a swift and bold policy response to the GFC.116 Other 
important policy lessons to be learned from the crisis include policy coordination among the 
EMU members need to be improved and structural reforms accelerated. Also, the framework for 
the supervision of financial markets should be strengthened, and external representation 
streamlined. With the necessary political will, the GFC should serve as a ‘wake-up call’ and 
catalyst for deeper and broader economic and financial coordination and surveillance in the 
euro area. 
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 Ibid- The commentators urge us to imagine for a moment how the crisis might have unfolded in the euro area 
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financial regulation on the one hand, and moves from national governments and regulators to enhance local 
supervision in order to protect their own taxpayers and budget deficits on the other. This is only one of the EU 
problems exposed by the crisis. 
      Furthermore, it exposed the vulnerability of Member States with significant macroeconomic imbalances, and 
underscored important shortcomings in the European regulatory and supervisory framework and in cross-border 
crisis resolution arrangements. A slightly cynical way of looking at it is that part of the reason why southern European 
nations like Spain and Greece suffered a great deal during the sovereign debt crisis is that the northern European 
nations were prepared to lend to them the cash in the first place. The construction boom in Spain, for example, wasn't 
financed out of nowhere: it was fuelled by enormous sums of cheap cash borrowed at very low rates. There were 
huge imbalances within the Euro-zone, hence big export surpluses in Germany were being channelled into housing 
and construction booms in the south. Most of the growth in those southern economies was built on debt which they 
could not get out of. 
 
An easy economic solution would be to devalue their currency, making exports cheaper and the 
economy eventually grows, but that is not an option as long as they remain in the euro. Without such growth, though, 
the tax base - vital for paying off any big public debts - will never increase.
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3.6 EU Crisis-Response 
At first, many commentators thought that mainland Europe was likely to be relatively immune 
from the worst impacts of the financial crisis – particularly after European governments decided 
not to take part in a joint bailout effort with the US in September 2008.117 This view was 
predicated on the belief that Europe‘s financial sector was sufficiently removed from the US and 
UK markets. In the first phase of the crisis, governments focused primarily on short- to medium-
term plans combined with ad hoc measures to address particularly urgent situations. These 
measures typically were undertaken by individual countries and the European Commission‘s 
activities, particularly in connection with its state aid review, have had an additional 
homogenizing effect.118 
 
The implementation of any European response typically begins with the problem of ‘state aid’ 
which is prohibited in the EU. As set forth in the Treaty of Rome, state aid is defined as ‘any aid 
granted by a Member State or through State resources . . . which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’119 
 
There are nonetheless a number of exceptions to the prohibition on state aid in Europe, which 
require prior notification to and approval by the European Commission. Of particular relevance 
is an exception where the aid is to ‘remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State.’120In a notable departure from the Commission‘s previous application of this exception, 
the Commission adopted a flexible approach to approving aid to financial institutions involved in 
the financial crisis. Thus, the Commission established a fast-track approval process for aid 
plans relating to financial institutions and has set forth guidelines to assist Member States in 
formulating plans that are likely to be approved.121 Member States committed to report to the 
                                               
117
 New York Times, The U.S. Financial Crisis Is Spreading to Europe, 30 September 2009 
118
 Martin D, Saba O and Alogna F G: European Responses to the Financial Crisis: available online at:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337586 (accessed 2 February 2014). Most of these structural measures of direct 
intervention fall under the state aid scrutiny of the Commission. 
119
 Treaty of Rome; Article 87 states: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the common market.’
 
120
 Art. 87, Sec. 3(b) 
121
European Commission, Communication, The recapitalization of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: 
142 
 
 
 
Commission every six months on plan implementation, with most of the plans being subject to 
re-notification. The Dutch guarantee plan was also approved, with recapitalization being 
approved on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the individually negotiated nature of that 
plan.122 
 
In addition to the approval of the foregoing general plans, the Commission has also approved a 
number of ad hoc state interventions in specific institutions, notably including aid to Fortis Bank 
and Fortis Bank Luxembourg, Dexia and Northern Rock.123 In response to the financial crisis, a 
number of jurisdictions worldwide have adopted a financial guarantee program, including 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
                                                                                                                                                       
limitations of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (5 December 
2008); European Commission, Communication, The Application of State aid rules to measures in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, 2008/C 270/02 (25 October, 2008 (adopted 13 
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     It is worth mentioning that on 8 October 2008 the UK Government (under former Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown and former Chancellor Alistair Darling) were the first to announce a major bank recapitalization plan, described 
by the Bank of England as ‘the largest UK government intervention in financial markets since the outbreak of the First 
World War.’ The plan which was followed in several key respects by a number of other EU governments, had three 
elements: recapitalisation of the banks; the Credit Guarantee Scheme, which guaranteed banks’ borrowing on the 
wholesale market (ultimately extended to £250bn); and an extension of the Special Liquidity Scheme to £200bn. In 
order to ensure confidence, and not single out any particular bank as requiring assistance, the Bank and the 
Government insisted that all the major UK banks join the scheme, even if they were not in particular need of capital. 
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States, where the bailout efforts have been largely at the level of the federal government. 
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Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The underlying rationales of these guarantee programs are the 
same throughout: to maintain bank liquidity. The guarantee programs are also the product of 
negotiations both with the Commission in the context of state aid, as discussed above, as well 
as with other Member States.124 For example, the announcement by the Irish government that it 
would guarantee all debts and deposits of the country‘s six largest banks for two years was 
widely criticized in the UK and other Member States as putting non-Irish banks at a competitive 
disadvantage.125 
 
In terms of new regulation, this has been moving at noticeable speed at the European level. 
Taking up the recommendations of the de Larosière report126, the European Commission 
adopted a proposal for a new group charged with supervising risks to financial stability, which 
was named the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC).127 Although the ESRC‘s 
recommendations would not be binding, compliance would be exerted through the influence of 
the Commission and the European central banks who would participate in the ESRC, the 
quality of the ESRC‘s work, and the possible publication of the ESRC‘s recommendations. 
 
Also, the Commission proposed that the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) be 
established, which would create a strengthened operational network among national 
supervisors. Although national regulators would continue to perform day-to-day supervision of 
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their home markets, the ESFS, working with the European Supervisory Authorities would 
perform a number of activities at an EU level.128 The European Supervisory Authorities would be 
involved in the development and application of high-level supervisory standards and 
interpretative guidelines, ensuring the consistent application of EU rules (such as, for example, 
settling disputes and policing compliance by national regulators with existing EU legislation), 
and ensuring cooperation among national regulators across member states. Colleges of 
supervisors which are being set up for major cross-border institutions would become the 
―lynchpins for the new system, helping to ensure communication between host and home 
authorities, as well as the development of a common European supervisory culture. 
 
Nevertheless, some commentators point out that even though the Commission acted on the 
measures notified by the Member States on a fast and adequate manner, issuing a generally 
appropriate guidance according to cost/benefit analysis, it nevertheless was merely in response 
to the first wave of the crisis. Therefore, bank guarantees and recapitalisation are not 
necessarily sufficient to re-launch economic activity although the appropriateness of 
recapitalisation is acknowledged (only to sound institutions implying institutions with no major 
solvability risk and therefore have the possibility to recover when normal market conditions 
prevail.)129 
 
All the same, these proposals for new institutions as the ESRC and ESFS at the EU level may 
be further harbingers of increased coordination within Europe. In this respect, the EU appears to 
be continuing to incrementally move toward a political and institutional integration which 
matches the existing monetary and economic integration, although noting that the result is by no 
means a foregone conclusion.130 
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3.6.1 Role of the ECB, Governments and National Central Banks 
All along, it had been less clear what role the ECB would play if a European bank were to suffer 
a major collapse, or if one country or region within Europe were to go into financial crisis. In fact, 
the Maastricht Treaty entrusted the ECB with the responsibility for monetary policy and did not 
give this institution supervisory powers or an explicit mandate for providing emergency liquidity 
support to individual banks. National authorities remained responsible for financial stability and 
as a result, in the euro area some bank regulatory functions are centralized, while others are 
allocated multiple, competing national regulators. In light of the potentially precarious economic 
and financial situation of some Member States, one could identify the lack of a lender of last 
resort as a significant source of weakness for the euro area.131 
 
The ECB has been criticized for being slow to lower its interest rates and embark on 
unconventional monetary policy.132The ECB did, however, launch an unprecedented policy of 
supplying unlimited short- and long-term liquidity at fixed rates to the market. The ECB has 
consistently argued that supplying liquidity is more suitable for the European economy than the 
approaches taken by central banks in Japan, the UK and US.133 Although the ECB has recently 
considered ―printing money to purchase assets,134 it has reiterated its belief that its large-scale 
short- and long-term liquidity facilities are more appropriate for the European financial model.135 
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      Recent developments in financial markets in Europe have made the ECB step in and guarantee support for some 
non member states. This is an unprecedented move. The ECB used, for some time, to provide technical assistance 
to central banks in countries neighbouring the euro-zone. Such dialogue reinforces cooperation between the EU and 
its neighbours, including countries which are supposed to adopt the euro. However, the ECB never acted as a 
potential lender of last resort for a non euro-zone country so far. 
        The ECB’s decision indicates how much the European financial landscape has changed since the creation 
of the monetary union. This is now characterized by a growing number and increasing strength of banking groups 
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Unlike the central banks of Japan, the UK and US, the ECB has been reluctant to pursue a 
policy of expanding its balance sheet to purchase government (and other) securities. 
 
In terms of central banks and national governments on another side, the crisis has caused a 
significant re-evaluation of financial regulation at all levels of governance: the global, regional 
(EU), and national. Little wonder Julia Black points out that for many observers it has also called 
into question the model of financial capitalism that financial institutions, governments, and 
regulators have created.136 More immediately however, it required a reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the markets and the state. Governments have been accustomed to 
hearing the dictum that they should move from ‘rowing to steering’137In fact, Black 
sensationalizes how the financial crisis saw governments move from steering, to throwing 
lifelines, bailing out, rowing, and ultimately re-building the boat. But most governments have 
made it clear that they are reluctant shipbuilders and rowers and would prefer to return to 
steering as soon as possible, though with a firmer grip on the tiller.138  
 
Clearly financial markets are global, and financial regulation has long been marked by the 
mismatch between global markets and national rules (in the UK for example, central to the 
management of the crisis was the role played by the Tripartite Authorities: the Treasury, the 
Bank, and the former Financial Services Authority (now Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA)).Thus despite calls for harmonized action, we have seen national governments take 
unilateral and sometimes protectionist action for example the French and UK governments’ tax 
                                                                                                                                                       
with significant cross-border activities. And, although in theory each subsidiary of a banking group is a legal entity 
subject to the legislation of the EU‘s member state in which it is established, in practice, a deteriorating position in 
one location could well lead to significant contagion effects. The GFC has brought about a quite paradoxical situation: 
it is not necessarily subsidiaries in non member states which cause the trouble in the main, but overall practices 
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headquartered in countries which do not necessarily belong to the euro-zone. Ironically, the ECB is forced to step in 
because of poor practices in its principal geographic area of concern. From this point of view, the ECB‘s financial 
support has been extended to for example, the National Bank of Hungary may be seen as a pre-emptive move 
attempting to maintain the existing financial stability in a wider euro-zone area. 
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on bonus pools.139 However, the crisis had to be managed within the context of EU regulatory 
regimes on banking regulation and state aid. Moreover, this was a global crisis, and the cross-
border character of banking services meant that this international dimension brought about an 
unprecedented impact for the crisis response at national level. No event exposed this truth more 
than the sovereign debt crisis which ensued within the eurozone following the GFC.  
 
The importance of the lessons learnt from the Greek debt crisis to the Africa integration project 
cannot be overemphasized considering that it was triggered by Greece’s irreversible transfer of 
sovereignty, the like of which is demanded from African states in order to uphold an African 
sovereignty.  
 
3.6.2 Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Case of Greece 
Some hold that an international financial crisis and a sovereign debt crisis mutually reinforce 
each other. A sovereign debt problem weakens many creditor banks further, both domestic and 
foreign banks, and the cost of bank bailouts compounds government deficits and debts. It has 
been said that international banking crises are almost invariably followed by sovereign debt 
crises140 and some feel no pity for countries like Greece and blame them for adopting 
irresponsible macroeconomic and particularly fiscal-budgetary policies for years which 
eventually led them to their eventual calamity. The case of Greece within the EMU should be 
distinguished from the other cases of national crisis response within the wider EU.141  
 
From a legal point of view, the emphasis here is regarding the unequivocal wordings of Article 
125 of the TFEU (ex Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty) which stipulates explicitly that neither 
the Community nor any Member State is liable for or can assume the commitments of any other 
                                               
139
 Black suggests that in one sense, the UK government was fortunate because it remains outside the Euro-zone, 
and that the largest banks that failed were not foreign-owned, otherwise the crisis could not so easily have been 
managed within national borders. (Black,p.34) 
140
 Rogoff  K and Reinhart C: This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 2009 
141
 The reform needed in the EU to reduce the likelihood of another financial crisis and also reinforce the internal 
market is to address the financial ‘trilemma’ [the term is derived from Pelmans J: ‘the role of the EU in the financial 
and economic crisis’ (in Dutch), Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, October 
2009, p. 32.)] consisting of a combination of three elements: a) financial integration; b) stability of the financial system 
and c) regulation and supervision of financial institutions which is still predominantly based on autonomous policies 
and decisions of the individual member states.  
148 
 
 
 
Member State. In this regard, the legality of any bailout under the EU Treaty is uncertain 
implying that the law would have to be bent should EU leaders decide to forge ahead with a 
rescue package for any country in crisis which of course would set a very worrying precedence. 
 
Some contributors argue that economic divergences within EMU, driven by uncontrolled public 
deficits and deteriorating competitiveness, could undermine the entire European Union project. 
In their view, the notorious discrepancy between high- and low-performing Member States 
ultimately creates a policy dilemma that leaves only three options.142 First, the low performers 
would have to engage in permanent austerity policies, including repeated cuts in wages and 
social standards. However, such an option would hardly be politically viable and ultimately 
undermine the support of the Single Market project altogether. Secondly and alternatively, 
Germany, being the wealthiest high performer, would have to sustain the low performers. 
However, such an approach would have detrimental moral hazard effects, and would neither 
accord with the Treaty. Thirdly, to regain competitiveness, euro-area Member States with 
structural competitiveness disadvantages should exit the euro area and devalue. Having said 
that the legal, economic and ideological consequences of this radical choice must be scrutinized 
exhaustively before such a decision is made. This debate unfortunately is far outside the 
confines of this paper. 
 
Considering the levels of concern which arose following the Greek government‘s deficit and 
debt levels, there is no doubt that the precarious nature of Greece‘s public finances is a test not 
only for the country‘s government/policymakers, but also for Europe‘s. Even though the case of 
Greece ushered in another phase of the GFC, some would say that tragedy was inevitable from 
the moment when Greece was admitted to the euro zone. Others would claim that woe was 
sure to befall such a disparate currency union sooner or later: if not Greece, then some other 
weak member of the club would have been the cause. 
 
Greece had to undergo a dramatic budgetary tightening as its fellow Europeans and the IMF 
organized a humiliating bail-out. Some even talked probably mistakenly, of the beginning of the 
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end of the euro area.143 Prior to joining the euro-zone, Greece had a long history of fiscal 
trouble, as it had spent half of the past two centuries in default.144 When it joined the euro in 
2001, its public debt was over 100% of GDP and many feared its chronic budgetary 
mismanagement might harm the currency. That notwithstanding, strong GDP growth served as 
a smoke-screen to cover the underlying weakness of the public finances.145 In 2009, Greece‘s 
budget deficit reached 12.7% of GDP with its national debt close to €300bn (around 120% of 
GDP), and worries over whether the government will act to cut it had already begun to cause 
the markets to watch nervously as Greece attempted to deal with its dire economic straits. 
These led to protracted debates as academicians, pundits and commentators argued whether 
the EMU will be able to surmount the first serious challenge it faced or was it a fair-weather 
construction with basic design flaws. These debates were fuelled further by the anxiety about 
contagion which consequently turned the focus on to Portugal, Spain and the Republic of 
Ireland amid fears that the Greek debt crisis could undermine other debt-laden states that use 
the single currency. 
 
The government announced austerity measures including public sector pay cuts in a bid to calm 
the situation down and regain some confidence. Despite these efforts, the financial markets  still  
kept  losing  faith  in  Greece‘s  ability to  service  its  debt  and  this  seriously underscored the 
triviality of the measures they had taken so far. To cut things short, Greece needed a huge bail-
out. 
 
Drawing from this, there are two pertaining questions of crushing concern which ignited 
debates. Firstly, how does this bail-out package and guaranties reconcile with the Maastricht 
Treaty which made neither bail-out provisions nor artificial devices available to address 
situations like this.146 Secondly, also of equal concern, to what extent will these guaranties 
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extend going forward and at what rates? Greece could be fortunate today, but what happens to 
others who find themselves in a similar situation in the future. 
 
Finally, although the crisis has enhanced moves to greater internationalization and 
harmonisation of regulation at the global level, there are corresponding centripetal tensions 
which pull regulation back to the national level. The crisis has made it clear that the state 
ultimately underwrites the financial system. In the end, it is national taxpayers that pay and 
national budget deficits which suffer. Yet in turn, it is to the markets that national governments 
have to turn to raise the money necessary to resolve the problems those same markets have 
caused. The state and the financial markets are inextricably intertwined, whether they want to 
be or not. I concur with Black who underscored the fact that ‘the markets may fear big 
government but governments are now beginning to fear big markets’. The turmoil illustrated that 
financial markets can pose a greater risk to the state and its taxpayers than the state can ever 
pose to the markets.147   
 
3.6.2.1  Legality of the Bail-Out Package 
Considering what was at stake, it came as no surprise how bitter, tense and argument-riddled 
the negotiations were between policymakers who sought to solve the Greek situation. For one, 
some of them most especially Germany were very reluctant to provide assistance148 (instead 
suggesting IMF involvement) while the French mooted a European solution, and secondly, the 
mix of politics and pride across the Union only exacerbated the problem.149 In particular the 
intertwined issues of Greek and French politics were obviously proving to be sensitive. It 
became ironic that an accord designed to unite France and Germany was now dividing them.  
 
The importance of the legal element should not be divorced from these debates and this part 
attempts to understand the legal position. This will depend crucially on how two ostensibly 
contradictory articles in the TFEU are interpreted: one article allows for member states to 
provide financial assistance to another member state in case of an emergency beyond that 
country‘s control (Article 122). The other article explicitly prohibits member states from taking on 
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the financial 'commitments' of a national government (that is to assist in closing a budget deficit) 
(Article 125). 
 
On one hand, Article 122 Sec. 2 states: 
 
“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused 
by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the 
Member State concerned.”150 
 
On the other hand, the 'no bailout' clause (Article 125) states: 
 
“The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, 
local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a 
specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or 
public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees 
for the joint execution of a specific project.”151 
 
In a written answer to former MEP Kathy Sinnott, the Council of Ministers suggested that the 'no 
bailout' clause is superior to the article allowing for financial assistance to member states.  
 
On how article 122 can be used, it said: “the Council recalls the terms of the Declaration on 
Article 100 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which is attached to the Nice 
Treaty. According to this declaration, 'decisions regarding financial assistance, such as are 
provided for in Article 100 and are compatible with the 'no bail-out' rule laid down in Article 
103...”152 
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The Council therefore refers to a "Declaration on Article 100"153 (that was attached to the Nice 
Treaty), which states that actions under article 100 must be "compatible with the 'no bail-out' 
rule" Given that the Council's written answer also revealed that the EU's member states have 
never set out exactly what "exceptional occurrences" beyond the control of a member state 
might constitute, it means that there‘s a legal ambiguity here thereby providing room for 
interpretation.  
 
This, in turn, means that Greece‘s economic difficulties could be defined as an occurrence 
beyond the country‘s control (if linked to the GFC), thereby triggering Article 122 even though 
this would constitute a significant legal stretch. Therefore the outcome of the bail-out was 
welcomed by those who argued that if the GFC was not defined as an 'exceptional occurrence', 
then it will be hard to see what type of event could ever fall into this category. 
 
It is clear that a bailout involved immense political and economic risks. Attempting to convince 
taxpayers in one country of the need for them to pay for the mistakes of a government in 
another country (which they obviously cannot vote out of office) is a particularly difficult 
undertaking. For many, it is fundamentally undemocratic and simply perverse to make taxpayers 
liable in this way. As a factual matter, many EU citizens would oppose using taxpayer funds to 
bail-out other countries in financial difficulties. This economic risk can be summed in what the 
FT‘s Martin Wolf has described as a ‘monstrous case of moral hazard for politicians.’154 
 
In turn, the receiving country is likely to be forced to give up much of its control over its own 
economy because strict economic conditions are inevitably attached to the loans. Indeed, 
Greece experienced unparalleled intervention from the European Commission in its economic 
policies with such intrusion not easily justified to voters (citizens) at home who are always ready 
to make their voices heard. 
 
Some observers considered the bail-out arrangement to be done in an ad hoc fashion clearly 
with the intention to deal with an emergency situation. As a result, they argued that the EU 
needed a scheme capable of dealing with the threat of sovereign default instead of muddling 
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through on the basis of ad hoc measures. Their primary reason for argument was that the IMF 
was called in to help, and the country concerned refused to comply with the conditions of a 
support programme, the problem would only be worsened because the debtor country, would 
retain its main negotiating asset, namely the threat of a disorderly default, which would create 
systemic financial instability in the EU and possibly at the global level.  
 
Having said this, on a regional basis, one of the biggest outcomes was that of humiliation.155 
Never had it been envisaged that a euro-zone country would need bailing out, yet because of 
Greece, the EU had to launch one of the biggest financial rescues ever attempted. Sceptics 
voiced out nevertheless that what the plan did was to buy time and to shelter Greece from the 
fierce winds of the markets. Whatever the case, what should have been a limited crisis resolved 
by fairly technical means turned into a crisis of the euro area, requiring a combination of 
political, economic and financial responses. 
 
It is important to understand that one important underlying setback here is the political and 
cultural vulnerability of European integration. The historical, geopolitical motivation for EU 
integration to secure peace among formerly war-torn countries gradually receded over time. It 
had made way for a more egocentric approach of many Europeans, who tend to focus on their 
own economic advantages far from EU integration. More so, due to the ever increasing scope of 
EU regulations, the image of Brussels has suffered over time. Small wonder, under these 
preconditions, the envisaged strict enforcement of fiscal austerity in Greece by the European 
Commission caused several conflicts which eventually undermined political and cultural 
cohesion among EMU countries.156  
  
On a strictly personal note I agreed with the bail-out package by joint EU-IMF funding to solve 
the immediate problem of contagion which otherwise would have escalated the domestic 
problem to a regional one and beyond. Nevertheless my reservations are contained in the fact 
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that I also believe strongly in the assertion that the best way to prevent failure is to prepare for it. 
Market support mechanisms must be in place going forward to minimize this type of risk. 
 
On another note, legal scholars could have mixed feelings in relation to the provisions of the 
Treaty Law. Thus far, it became evident that paragraph 2 Art 122 TFEU forms an 
underestimated legal basis whereas Art. 125 TFEU prohibits an assumption of the commitments 
of a Member State. The conflict between Art 125 and Art 122 TFEU cannot be solved by 
ignoring Art. 122. If the requirements of both articles are met, it is not about suppression but 
about harmonization. 
 
There is no doubt that these two contrary provisions reflect the differing points of view of the 
economically stronger and weaker Member States during the negotiations on the Maastricht 
Treaty. The former wanted to exclude any possible behaviour that would contradict stability, 
while the latter supported a mechanism that contained solidarity. The final version of the Treaty 
did not clearly decide for one or the other option but rather put them alongside each other; thus 
each group could claim to have prevailed. If one tries to harmonize both provisions, Art. 125 
TFEU cannot completely preclude financial assistance. Thus, a procedure equivalent to a bail-
out can, as an exception, be admissible. Nonetheless; such measures can only be taken into 
account as last resort if there are no other means available to prevent a severe crisis and only 
under accordingly strict conditions. 
 
3.6.3 Regional Risk and Exposure: Lessons for Africa 
Drawing from the experience which the EU specifically the EMU suffered as a result of the 
regional risk and exposure due to the Greek sovereign debt crisis, there are a number of issues 
which need to be considered in order to plan any efforts made to fully integrate the African 
continent. These can be summarized in terms of five key issues: a.) costs, b.) masked fiscal 
problems, c.) policy dilemma, d.) political posturing; and e.) the political and cultural vulnerability 
of integration. 
 
a.) Costs 
The Greek sovereign debt problem weakened many creditor banks both national and foreign 
with the cost of these bank bailouts increasing government deficits and debts. In Africa, not 
many countries can contain any further strain on their national deficits and debts. In Europe, 
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countries like Germany157 and France158 have the muscle to intervene and assist with bail-outs, 
the sheer size of their economies dwarfs those of the countries with the biggest GDPs in Africa - 
Nigeria159  and South Africa160. Also, there are many countries which due to long years of 
conflicts and unstable governments (mainly dictatorships) have adopted irresponsible 
macroeconomic, fiscal-budgetary policies for years. Other countries have suffered droughts and 
other natural disasters which have led them to displace economic priorities. This could pose 
concern for the other more economically stable countries in the region. 
 
b.) Masked fiscal problems 
Drawing from the above, many African countries currently enjoy strong GDP growth averaging 
6% in the continent. These figures could however serve as concealment of underlying fiscal 
problems largely due to weak public finances. For decades many African states have suffered 
from corruption and mismanagement of state funds by public officials. This has left incredible 
strain on state coffers including the need to increase national debt. There are concerns as to the 
effectiveness of the national policies and initiatives in different states taken to solve this problem 
of corruption and mismanagement and also to service their debts. 
 
c.) Policy dilemma 
There is no doubt that a disagreement will unfold between the high performing states from the 
low performers eventually creating a policy problem. This could pit the low performing countries 
that need to engage in austerity policies (thereby reducing social standards risking civil unrest) 
against the wealthier performers, who have to sustain these low performing states. This could 
lead to detrimental moral hazard effects which I wonder if Africa is prepared to handle. 
Consequently, these present a challenge in achieving economic coordination among states 
within RECs.  
 
d.) Political posturing 
It became evident during the Greek bail-out deliberations that Greece and France held positions 
on how to deal with the crisis based on political convenience and advantage. These positions 
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were opposing and eventually divisive even for states that started an arrangement from the 
same unifying position. This can cause strain on the achievement of subsequent policy 
objectives for the region as a whole. As seen in the previous chapter in the case of the African 
RECs such as the AMU for example, Africa has already been blighted by several political 
conflicts including wars between states within the same RECs. Their inability to solve previous 
differences, allowing these to drag over many years shows the void in their readiness to deal 
with challenging issues for the good of the entire community. In the case of Germany and 
France, a resolution was eventually concluded. The same cannot be confidently said about the 
African example as for instance with the AMU, initiatives have been inactive and suspended 
indefinitely due to lack of resolutions.161 More so, issues dealing with austerity measures further 
complicate matters. 
 
e.) Political and cultural vulnerability of integration  
Integration is generally motivated by historical and geopolitical reasons, over time however the 
approach taken by Member States tends to be selfish as they focus on the benefits enjoyed 
nationally as opposed to the attainment of the objectives outlined by the integration agenda. The 
Greek crisis revealed that although efforts towards deeper integration can be made, there still 
remain political and cultural tensions which pull the need for regulation back to the Member 
State at domestic level. African states need to show more commitment to comply with 
community laws and institutions despite this tendency because there are limits as to what a 
state can achieve on its own especially in terms of growing its financial system.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
It is important to reiterate the fact that the EU is still acknowledged as the most advanced 
regional integration model in the world even though it has illustrated imperfections in its dealing 
with the GFC and the sovereign debt crisis in particular. Nevertheless, there is an ancient 
Chinese saying which goes ‘a diamond with a flaw is still worth a lot more than a pebble without 
imperfection.’ What makes the EU unique is its prominence as a new legal order established by 
van Gen Loos in 1963, further concretized by the concept the supremacy of European Law, 
under Costa v Enel in 1964 and importantly the creation of legal rights which could be enforced 
by both natural and legal persons under the principle of direct effect established in van Gen 
Loos even though some claim it was a radical solution for compliance. 
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In order for a regional integration system to work successfully, a solid single market programme 
must exist within it. In the EU, particularly in the banking and financial services, the concept of 
mutual recognition supplemented by minimum harmonisation and home country control solved 
the compromise problem by striving to eliminate obstacles brought about by varied regulation 
policies across the EU. These obstacles created a regional access and domestic control conflict 
which is a subset of a much broader global access versus local control conflict. 
 
This single market transformed into legal obligations through the establishments of Treaties 
over half a century. Its completion is far from over and I agree that proper programme 
completion (including existing programme revision) and implementation must be a priority. In 
fact, this could be at the expense of the landmark concept of mutual recognition because going 
forward increased mutual assistance and mutual reliance as authorities is more pressing and 
relevant, including the development of common operational and administrative systems 
involving closer co-operation and co-ordination of all relevant activities. 
 
For the first time the design of the EMU was seriously tested and Greece‘s sovereign debt 
problem highlighted the scale of potential damage. It may be time to scorch the myth that one 
size fits all; as conventional thinking tells us. It seems to me that regional financial integration is 
overwhelmingly advantageous up until the point where there is a financial crisis. The problem 
lies with monetary and fiscal convergence between the EU member states and the EMU 
member states and then the EEA states with each other. More so, the fact that there are 
countries in the EU which are not part of the EMU such as the UK but nevertheless exert great 
influence in global monetary decisions, convergence and harmonisation poses huge challenges 
for the integration programme. As the euro does not encompass the whole of the EU, therefore 
whatever advantages it offers are, from an EU-wide perspective, at best only partial. 
 
Considering that it was due to these rising interrelationships between markets that contagion 
spread the financial crisis into the EU while at the same time cross-border flows and 
international integration of financial institutions and markets grew remarkably (while supervision 
mainly remained on a national level), joining the euro-zone could however be a catch 22 
decision for some countries especially after what happened to Greece. Some may not want to 
be part of the chaos while others may say we could as well get in, after all should anything 
happen, we will get bailed out. The bail-out was a damage limitation tool which to me was a 
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good thing. As a lawyer however, it is frustrating to deal with conflicting provisions which deal 
with the same thing. Either there is a bail-out provision or not. It was the French philosopher 
Rene Descartes who asserted that something cannot be, and then not be at the same time; 
hence it either exists or it does not. Nonetheless, political divisions may arise between the 
weaker and stronger member states as a result.  
 
The Greek case further highlighted a supplementary problem that confirmed the existence of 
economic sophistication which had distorted the order of things. This propelled policymakers to 
rethink earlier strategies which were established on the basis of natural convergence between 
the European countries. This effort must however begin by first confronting the challenges 
posed as a result of enlargement, by progressively absorbing all the newcomers and at the 
same time preserve the credibility of the euro area as a whole by strictly respecting the 
conditions of entry; the Maastricht criteria.  
 
Drawing from this experience, there are five key issues which the chapter derives when 
assessing the regional risks. These should inform any consideration to surrender sovereignty in 
order to achieve further integration within the African continent. These are: a.) costs, b.) masked 
fiscal problems, c.) policy dilemma, d.) political posturing; and e.) the political and cultural 
vulnerability of integration. These issues create challenges in achieving fluid economic 
coordination within the RECs.  
 
Furthermore, within the African context, even though it has been recommended that the 
articulation by the REC Treaty of the status of REC legal instruments in Member States and the 
strengthening of REC regional enforcement institutions are ideal regional remedies that would 
aid the attainment of REC goals, they alone cannot guarantee the complete realization of these 
objectives. Member States must accord supreme status to regional law and procedures. This 
supremacy must be recognized in Member States from top to bottom by all organs and at all 
levels of government without which the RECs would be unable to achieve their long term goals.  
 
Concerning the adoption of EU financial regulatory and enforcement institutions in Africa, these 
are too advanced for the African system in the short and medium term. The chapter contends 
that in order to pursue African sovereignty, emphasis must be paid again to the concepts of 
supra-nationality, the supremacy of community law, the strength and effectiveness of the 
legislative and enforcement powers. The existing institutions must demonstrate consistently 
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over time the ability to be independent and free from political pressures. This will provide the 
organic development of the existing institutions. It is only following the strengthening and 
empowerment of the existing institution in the continent that further attempts can be made to 
adopt the more advanced EU institutions such as the ECJ, ECB and ESFS. 
 
All the same, this chapter discussed the benefits and consequences of surrendering national 
sovereignty within the regional context, the subsequent chapter however unveils that the idea of 
ceding national sovereignty does not only rest within a regional perspective. States have for 
many years also ceded parts of sovereignty at the global stage to global institutions in order to 
ensure inter alia global financial efficiency. The consequences of these efforts will now be 
observed.
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CHAPTER 4: CHANGING SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN GLOBAL 
MONETARY MANAGEMENT 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Mount Washington Hotel, one of the most deluxe hotels in the world situated in a self-sufficient 
mountain resort in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire was chosen by President F.D. Roosevelt to 
host the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. The representatives of the United 
Nations gathered there for the meeting in July 1944 with a shared vision to ‘save the world’ in 
the wake of the greatest economic collapse (Great Depression) and one of the most disastrous 
wars in history (World War II). They sought world peace, freedom and security. The starting 
point would be to deliberate on post-war recovery including infrastructural reconstruction and 
also stabilising the economic and financial systems. 
 
Today the international community continues to witness a proliferation of regulatory adjustments 
for banking and finance activities within national, regional and global levels. Following 
consideration of regional sovereignty in the preceding chapter and its relevance for the African 
continent, this chapter opens further lines of new thinking for the African continent by 
considering the importance of ceding national sovereignty to global institutions in order to 
encourage global integration as a solution to the residual global economic and financial 
problems. The chapter opines that as regional integration and eventual continental sovereignty 
is necessary to assist Africa in meeting its challenges within the continent, it is also imperative 
for Africa to increase and consolidate its influence on the global stage. This requires global 
integration which also necessitates the partial surrender of sovereignty to global institutions.   
 
The first part of this chapter revisits the objectives of the Bretton Woods System and 
investigates whether these objectives were ever fully achieved. The second part offers an 
examination of the events which resulted in the end of this system by pointing to the causes of 
its ultimate collapse and their significance for future regulation of global financial markets. The 
significance of this for Africa is summarised in part three which also concludes the chapter. 
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Part One 
 
4.2 The Bretton Woods System 
In times of globalisation, there is the need for adaptability because the economic environment 
changes speedily. Capital movements become larger and more sophisticated and yet remain 
less controllable. Therefore, the need for a stabilising economic and financial system becomes 
increasingly apparent. Going about this is absolutely fundamental in safeguarding a successful 
sustainable regime.  
 
Politically, it made sense to concentrate power in a small number of countries (in this case those 
who suffered most during the Great Depression and also the Allies of the War) and present a 
dominant power willing and able to assume a leadership role in global monetary affairs. Some 
consider this as an opportunity which the United States exploited to establish their hegemony 
over the rest of the world; after all once you have a big say on the running and control of global 
economic and financial systems, you basically control the world at large in terms of political and 
military power.1 
 
Economically and financially, restructuring international finance and currency relationships were 
imperative. The plans for the system were developed by two memorable economists of that 
generation, the Minister of State in the U.S. treasury, Harry Dexter White, and the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes. The latter outlined the complexities of creating a system 
acceptable by all states in the following statement, “ We, the delegates of this Conference, Mr 
President, have been trying to accomplish something very difficult to accomplish.[...] It has been 
our task to find a common measure, a common standard, a common rule acceptable to each 
and not irksome to any.”2  
 
In a bid to set up a system of rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate the international 
monetary system, the planners established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is the World Bank today. 
An International Trade Organisation (ITO) was also to be established, although subsequent 
                                               
1
 See Chomsky N: Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance; Metropolitan Books; New York, 
2003.  
2
 Moggeridge D (ed.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes(London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
vol. 26, p. 101 
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support from the US Congress was not available, and instead, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was implemented until a formal World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
could be set up in 19963.  
 
Importantly, a replacement dollar exchange standard was established with the US dollar 
becoming the new anchor currency. The United States defined the value of its dollar in terms of 
gold at $35 per ounce and an obligation arose for all other members to define the value of their 
money according to what was called the “par value system” in terms of U.S. dollars or gold.4 
 
It is worth noting that the Gold Standard had been suspended during World War I after a 
number of countries made attempts to restore a gold exchange standard following the War. In 
any case, the idea was subsequently abandoned with the beginning of the Great Depression 
between 1929 and 1933.  An agreement was reached in a conference in Genoa in 1922, on the 
rules to operate the international financial system between WWI and WWII. It provided the 
establishment of central banks of issue which would be independent from state government and 
countries would re-adopt the Gold Exchange Standard and maintain convertibility of national 
currencies either directly into gold or into a tied gold currency.5  However, many countries 
abandoned the Gold Exchange Standard in 1930 and 1931, and most of them adopted 
protectionist measures in the periods leading to the outbreak of WWII.  
 
4.2.1 Bretton Woods System: Objectives for Global Financial Integration 
Between the world wars, the most significant event was the World Monetary and Economic 
Conference, held under the support of the League of Nations in London 1933. It followed both 
the meetings in Genoa and the other in Rome in 1930 which established the Bank for 
International Settlements. The London conference sought to re-establish fixed uniformity for a 
wider range of currencies. This effort fell short as with the League of Nations, primarily because 
of a lack of support from the U.S. government. Three years later, the United States did sign an 
                                               
3
 Gallant P & Dosoo G; The Eurobond Market; Woodhead-Faulkner, Hemel Hempstead 1992, 4-5. 
4
 Dammasch S: The Sytem of Bretton Woods: A lesson from history; Available online at http://www.ww.uni-
magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/student/arbeiten/006.pdf (accessed 05 October 2014) 
5
 Eichengreen B; Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System; 2
nd
 Edition, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2008, p.60. Also, for a background on the Genoa Conference see Fink C: The Genoa Conference: 
European Diplomacy, 1921-1922; University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1984.  
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accord with France and the United Kingdom on a stabilization pact known as the Tripartite 
Agreement.6 
 
During the 1930s, states had experienced a series of problems such as shortage of gold, 
exchange rate instabilities, the movement of "hot" money in and out of their realms, and the lack 
of a mechanism to adjust balance of payments problems.7 
 
To resolve this, the IMF which was created to deal with these difficulties established an 
international monetary system that contained a stable exchange rates regime with some scope 
for revaluation ("pegged but adjustable"), provided for the convertibility of currency, provided a 
mechanism for overcoming short-term liquidity crises and an organizational actor for managing 
the system.8 On the other hand, the World Bank was designed to help the economic and 
industrial reconstruction of Europe and to help developing countries achieve industrialization.  
 
The purpose of the ITO was to propel states down the path of free trade, to stop them from 
defecting to protectionism as a way of responding to balance of payments problems for example 
by imposing import quotas as an alternative to devaluing their currency. This however proved to 
be too politically divisive, and so a decision on it was postponed until after the war. As a fallback 
option, a weaker agreement instead was established; the GATT.9 
                                               
6
 This agreement, however, was an impromptu effort to ward off a potentially competitive devaluation of the French 
franc. Though successful on its own terms, the agreement lacked an institutional structure and a sustainable 
enforcement mechanism. It thus did little to prevent similar conﬂicts from arising in the future. See Boughton J M; A 
New Bretton Woods?; Finance & Development; March 2009, Volume 46, No.1 
7
 Braithwaite J and Drahos P: Global Business Regulation, CUP, 2000, p. 97-101. 
8
 See Williamson J: The Failure of World Monetary Reform 1971-74, NYUP, New York, 1977, p. 2-28. 
9
 It is worth pointing out that the planners of Bretton Woods intended to create three multilateral institutions and not 
two as they also needed to realise the core objective of GATT which was to liberalise international trade in goods, 
services and investment through the gradual reduction of tariffs in terms of customs duties and charges. This 
arrangement was based on national treatment or non-discrimination between overseas territories and as such 
financial impediments on market access were prohibited outright while internal market regulation measures were 
subject to non-discrimination. 
     This provided the framework for the main global trading arrangements. This set the stage for the ensuing 
regional integration models which are replicated in many communities all over the world today. For example, 
membership of Selected Regional Trade Arrangements includes: Africa – CEAO (1973) Communauté Economique 
de L'Afrique de l'Ouest (West African Economic Community) (7 Members): Bénin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Mauritania. Niger and Sènégal; EAEC (1967) East African Economic Community (3 Members): Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda; ECOWAS (1975) Economic Community of West African States. (16 Members): Bénin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
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Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia. Mali, Mauritania. Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal, 
Sierra Leone and Togo; IOC (1982) Indian Ocean Commission (5 Members): Comoros, France, Madagascar, 
Mauritius and Seychelles; PTA (1981) Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. (19 Members): 
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; SACU (1910) Southern African Customs 
Union. Members (4): Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland; UDEAC (1964) Union Douaruère et 
Economique de 1'Afrique Centrale (Central African Customs and Economic Union). Members (6): Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea 
      Asia and the Pacific: ANZCERTA (1983) Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (Free trade area formed in 1965). Members (2): Australia and New Zealand; ASEAN (1967) Association 
of South East Asian Nations. Members (6): Brunei (1988), Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand 
      Europe: Benelux Union (1948) Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg Economic Union. Members (3): Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg; ECSC The European Coal and Steel Community. Members (12): Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, the Netherlands. EEC and Euratom (1957) The European Economic Community 
and European Atomic Energy Community. Members (12): Belgium, Denmark (1973), France, Germany, Greece 
(1981), Ireland (1973), Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. Portugal (1986), Spain (1986) and the UK (1973); EFTA 
(1960) European Free Trade Association. Members (7): Austria, Finland (1961), Iceland (1970), Liechtenstein (1991), 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland 
      Middle East: ACM (1964) The Arab Common Market. Members (7): Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, 
Syria and Yemen; ECO (1985) Economic Cooperation Organisation (formerly the Regional Cooperation for 
Development). Members (3): Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; recently several states of the former 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan have become members (1992); GCC (1981) Cooperation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf (also known as the Gulf Cooperation Council). Members (6): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates 
      Western Hemisphere: Andean Pact (1969), Andean Subregional Integration Agreement. Members (5): 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela (Chile withdrew in 1976); CACM (1960) Central American Common 
Market. Members (5): Costa Rica (1962), El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; CARICOM (1973), 
Caribbean Community. Members (13): Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas (1983), Barbados, Belize (1974), 
Dominica (1974), Grenada (1974), Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat (1974), St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia (1974), St 
Vincent and the Grenadines (1974), and Trinidad and Tobago; LAIA (1980) Latin American Integration Association 
(superseded Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA, signed in 196U). Members (11): Mexico and all South 
American Countries except Guyana, French Guiana, and Suriname. 
       USA-Canada: FTA (1988) United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (also known as Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement CUSTA). Members (2): The United States and Canada. US-Israel FTA (1975) United States-Israel 
Free Trade Agreement. Members (2): The United States and Israel. 
       As will be seen in Chapter four most especially with the European experience, the community borrowed some of 
the underlying ideas from and had been inspired to a significant extent by the operation of the GATT, however it went 
considerably further in terms of the nature or content and degree of market integration secured; this uncovers one of 
the main tension in terms of regional financial integration in Chapter four, which is that trade arrangements are 
voluntary and generally depend on the coincidence of mutual trading interests and supporting political good will.  
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The United States would emerge from the conference as the world’s most powerful economy 
and since all governments generally agreed that if exchange rates were not to float freely, states 
would also require assurance of an adequate supply of monetary reserves (where the US 
comes in). It has been acknowledged by many that the institutions that emerged from this 
largely reflected US preferences.10 In fact the headquarters of the two main institutions, IMF and 
World Bank are situated in Washington DC.  
 
4.2.2 Bretton Woods System: Outcome 
Many hold that, the singular success of Bretton Woods is attributed to the extraordinary 
circumstances in which it was held and to the care devoted to its preparation.11 This was further 
solidified by the remarkable optimism portrayed by the negotiators and planners of this system. 
The willingness of the U.S. government to host the meeting, to take the lead in the design of the 
IMF, to commit itself to be the principal creditor and to accommodate the needs of other 
countries was imperative to the success of Bretton Woods. The two-and-a-half-year 
collaboration between planners which preceded the end of the war produced many revisions to 
the original proposals, not just to accommodate each other but also to make the design more 
appealing to other countries thus overcoming well known differences between the parties 
especially the US and Britain. Boughton submits that the unanimous agreement on the Articles 
was achieved as a result of the combination of a number of factors. Firstly, the careful 
development of a realistic plan; secondly, strong leadership from the two predominant countries, 
and finally the effect of a major crisis in stimulating the political will to act.12  
 
Nevertheless, one of the most notable absentees in this grand plan for international institutions 
in the post war era was ‘tax’ and ‘an object of regulation’. Communication between the planners 
around the time of Bretton Woods did not appear to discuss the coordination of tax policy 
between states. By implication somewhat, tax policy would be retained by the nation-state.13 
                                               
10
 In fact it has been voiced that the Americans did not deliberately seek the responsibility of global monetary 
management and for a combination of reasons which include altruism and self-interest, they welcomed it 
wholeheartedly when they found themselves thrust with it; after all being the world’s money manager was fitting of its 
newfound leadership role in the Western Alliance. Cohen B; Organizing the World’s Money; Basic Books, New York, 
1977, Ch.14 
11
 Boughton (n.6) 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Braithwaite (n.7) 
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Hence after a short burst of activity during its first two years, IMF lending shrank to an extremely 
small scale. The burden was then shifted to the one actor at the time with the financial and 
economic muscle required to shoulder responsibility for global monetary stabilization - namely, 
the United States of America.14  
 
Free markets are a good thing, but if there is no appropriate regulation, they can spin out of 
control. In the case of Bretton Woods, what broke down were the rules of cooperation for the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold and the exchange rates regime. It became a problem to 
coordinate the balances between surpluses and deficits and many countries suffered this 
predicament including the US as they went from surplus to running trade deficits.15  
 
Furthermore, it was not until after WWII that the currency of the debt was separated from the 
country of issuance following the introduction and subsequent expansion of the Eurodollar 
market16.  The Euroloan and Eurobond markets began to expand during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, following the restoration of currency convertibility in 1958. This was supported by 
the large volumes of US dollars that flowed into Europe and London and the restrictions 
imposed on US foreign currency lending and foreign investment17.  By this time, New York had 
replaced London as the leading international financial centre although this was still only through 
the issuance of Dollar debt to domestic and foreign investors with the debt being traded in New 
York18.  
 
The creation of the Euro-dollar markets arose as a result of certain political events and financial 
opportunism as well as the general availability of dollar surpluses in Europe during the later 
                                               
14
Fortunately or unfortunately, as you would have it, the US was not only able but willing to take on that responsibility, 
in effect exercising its role as ‘money manager of the world’ (See Cohen (n.10)) 
15
 Braithwaite (n.7) 
16
  Gallant & Dosoo (n.3) Ch.1 
17
  Ibid; these were introduced under Regulations Q and D and interest equalisation tax.  
18
 New York and Zurich were the only markets not damaged by WWII. Europe had a US$25bn trade deficit with the 
US between 1946 and 1950. All of the major currencies apart from the US dollar and Swiss franc were devalued in 
1949 which created further concerns with regard to the availability of dollars and international liquidity. Aid was 
provided through the Anglo-American Financial Agreement and the Marshall Plan with foreign issues also being 
raised on the New York Stock Exchange. (See Gallant & Dosoo (n.3, p. 8-9)) 
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post-war period. Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries initially transferred US dollar balances from 
the US to European banks to avoid potential forfeiture and loss.19  
 
Again, a large number of US banks and investment houses (securities firms) had also set up 
branches in London which attracted US dollar deposits. These had been established to support 
US corporate investment in Europe in the post-War period. It is worth noting that this expansion 
of the market was also supported by the Bank of England20 and by other Western European 
governments such as West Germany and Italy.  
 
During this time, many problems arose including, enduring imbalances of payments between 
the Western industrialised countries which subsequently weakened the system of Bretton 
Woods. One substantial problem was that the US dollar had to be an international reserve 
currency at the same time as a national currency. This made the national monetary and fiscal 
policy of the United States free from external economic pressures, while heavily influencing 
those external economies.21 
 
Also, the rigidity of the fixed-exchange rate regime posed a significant set-back for the par value 
system. The strain reveals an “ambiguity of the key notion of fundamental disequilibrium”.22 The 
question is asked: “How could governments be expected to change their exchange rates if they 
could not even tell when a fundamental disequilibrium existed? And if they were inhibited from 
re-pegging rates, then how would international payments equilibrium be maintained?”23 In 
practice, governments attempted circumventing this set-back although, the ensuing complexity 
of the exchange rate system exacerbated underlying worries of likely global liquidity shortage, 
thereby creating temptations for speculative currency shifts. This negatively impacted global 
confidence as well.24 
 
 
 
                                               
19
 Ibid, p.10; also see Revell J; The British Financial System, Macmillan, London 1973; Ch.11.  
20
 Rt. Hon Earl of Cromer (Governor of the Bank of England), Bank of England Quarterly (1962) 11, 265 
21
 Dammasch (n. 4) p. 9-10 
22
 Jones R J B: Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy; Routledge, London 2001; p.99 
23
 Ibid 
24
 Ibid. 
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Part Two 
 
4.3 Bretton Woods System: “Nixon Shock”25 and Collapse 
Some hold that these aforementioned issues only provided a smoke-screen which masked a 
deeper political conflict as concerns grew about the mounting commercially competitive threat 
from Europe and Japan in conjunction with the intolerable cost of subordinating domestic 
interests to help strengthen foreign allies.26 Conversely, concern was growing in Europe and 
Japan about America's use of its privilege of liability financing (in fact France's Charles de 
Gaulle called it the ‘exorbitant privilege’).27 The Europeans and Japanese had just one major 
weapon they could use to curb America's policy autonomy: their right to demand conversion of 
accumulated dollar balances into gold.28 
 
More so, many countries wanted US dollars to meet their trade obligations and were happy to 
let the US run deficits since this provided liquidity in the international monetary system.29 This 
situation however led to a crisis first anticipated by the economist Triffin in 1960.30 As a result, 
US deficits continued to increase, partly because the US had to pay for its war in Vietnam. 
Subsequently, confidence in the dollar started to decline and countries began to seek the 
conversion of their dollars into gold.31It was becoming increasingly clear that the pegged rate 
system was incapable of coping with widening payment imbalances, and the confidence 
problem worsened as speculators became encouraged to bet on devaluation of the dollar or 
                                               
25
 This was coined following a series of economic measures adopted by President Nixon to push back the economic 
problems resulting from the gold standard system. This culminated in the unilateral cancellation of the direct 
convertibility of the US dollar to gold. [For a report on this, see article by Lowenstein R: The Nixon Shock; Bloomberg 
Business Week Magazine; (04 August 2011) 
26
 Cohen (n.10) 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 These days, China ironically wields this sort of power because the US policy autonomy will be severely jeopardised 
should the Chinese freeze their financial reserves. 
29
 Braithwaite (n.7) 
30
 Triffin R: Gold and the Dollar Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1960. He pointed out that if the US 
attempted to correct its balance of payments deficit it would cause a liquidity crisis. On the other hand, if it allowed its 
deficit to continue, other states would lose confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency and seek to convert their 
dollars back into gold. Triffin argues that the gold standard exchange regime is fundamentally flawed by its reliance 
on the pledge of convertibility by some national currency particularly the dollar into gold. 
31
 Braithwaite (n.7) 
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revaluations of the currencies of Europe or Japan. Therefore, President Richard Nixon was 
determined to force the Europeans and Japanese to accept a mutual adjustment of exchange 
rates as concerns grew about America's rapidly deteriorating payments situation, as well as 
rising protectionist attitudes in the US Congress. Besides the US may have lacked effective 
control over the dollar exchange rate under the prevailing rule of the game but it still had the 
power to unilaterally change the rules. For that reason, on 15 August 1971, the convertibility of 
the dollar into gold was suspended, allowing it to find its own level in the currency markets.32  
 
In February 1973, the Smithsonian Agreement was launched and the funds of all the industrial 
countries were set free to float independently. With these decisions, the two core elements, the 
par value system and the gold exchange standard, were effectively terminated and with this, the 
Bretton Woods system was relegated to history. 
 
Following this new era of flexible and floating exchange rates, the need for a new and 
appropriate international monetary system became imperative. The major industrial countries 
were divided on how to respond, and as noted, developing countries resisted being left out of 
the discussions. The Group of Ten (G-10) industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 
took the lead by agreeing to currency realignments. Although the G-10 could not devise a 
solution on its own, it did agree to the creation of the Committee of Twenty (C-20), a ministerial 
advisory body that at the time represented the 20 countries and constituencies of the IMF 
Executive Board.33  
 
Boughton points that even though the C-20 had the advantages of an already existent 
institutional framework and secretariat including the political support of both industrial and 
developing countries, it remained void of a realistic plan for restoring stability to the payments 
system. In fact, the goal of exchange rate stability was abandoned after two years and the IMF 
was subsequently mandated to exercise “firm surveillance” via bilateral and multilateral 
oversight. This mandate was eventually preserved in the Second Amendment of the IMF 
Articles of Agreement.”34 
                                               
32
Cohen (n.10) 
33
Boughton (n.6) 
34
 See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/ 
(accessed 10 October 2014) 
170 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, the highly regulated nature of European financial markets during the post-War 
period and maintenance of restrictions on capital mobility meant that London emerged as the 
natural centre for the new markets. The City of London’s open and liberal trading environment 
as well as stock of professional expertise and resources allowed it to become the natural focus 
for the new Euro-dollar based capital market. This new marketplace then arose partly as a result 
of the highly regulated nature of the US and European markets as well as the financial 
opportunities available in London.  
 
Once established, growth in the new markets was boosted by a combination of factors including 
the modification of international savings and investment, deregulation, technological 
advancement, increased domestic and international competition as well as a more general 
increase in the demand for financial innovation which supported the evolution and development 
of this market.35 These developments sum op the global benefits which could be gained from 
the development of global financial markets. They nevertheless come with their own demerits 
which will be investigated in Chapter Six.  
 
4.4 Bretton Woods System: the Aftermath 
Effectively, the Bretton Woods system could be summarised in practice as a ‘one-power’ 
monetary regime centred on the dollar despite being multilateral in its formal design. This was 
similar to the classical gold standard of the 19th century which centred on Britain's pound 
sterling.36  
 
Following WWII in this connection, American policy-makers as earlier mooted perceived a need 
to promote the economic recovery of important allies in Europe and Japan, and maintain a 
sizable and aggressive military establishment abroad at the same time; which of course was 
expensive.37  
                                               
35
 Bank for International Settlements (BIS); The International Inter-Bank Market: A descriptive study (July 1983). 
Available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/econ8.pdf (accessed 10 October 2014).  
36
 For a historical narrative on the classical gold standard, see Michael D. Bordo and Anna J Schwartz (eds): A 
Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821- 1931; University of Chicago Press, Chicago, The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 1984. 
37
 The benefit of ‘liability financing’ (financing deficits with its own currency) signified that America could effectively 
spend as freely as its leaders thought necessary to promote objectives believed to be in the national interest. Thus, 
the US could issue the world's principal reserve currency in amounts presumed to be consistent with its own priorities 
and not necessarily those of foreign dollar holders. (Cohen n.10) 
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It is fair to say that the significance of the Bretton Woods system lies primarily in the inspiration 
it provided to international regimes. It was tediously negotiated and concretely kept alive in a 
couple of multilateral organizations.”38 
 
Following the events of 1971, states looked to the likes of the G-7 and the G-5 to coordinate 
international monetary policy. The meetings of G-7 finance ministers became a centre of 
monetary cooperation and these meetings were more about information exchange and 
consultation, conditional policy understandings, than about rule-based guarantees. 
Industrialized countries kept lines of communication open with each other and used the IMF to 
bring monetary and fiscal discipline to developing debtor nations.39 
 
Some commentators also identify the speeding up of EC planning for monetary union as 
another consequence of the breakdown of Bretton Woods.40 The thesis draws from the strength 
of this assertion to solidify the arguments for regional integration and regional financial 
integration discussed in Chapters Two and Three.  
 
The beginning of the 21st century saw certain economists describe the emergence of a new 
international system involving an interdependency between states with generally high savings in 
Asia lending and exporting to Western states with generally high spending and consumption 
rates.41 The most striking example of this interdependency is the relationship between China 
and America. They began using the term “Bretton Woods II” to describe this de facto state of 
                                               
38
 It will be seen in Chapter 3 that the circumstances of the system's creation and collapse offered scholars invaluable 
material for assessing the relative importance of diverse variables in promoting or hampering economic cooperation 
between governments. This helped inspire eventual responses to the GFC. 
39
 At the Bonn G-7 summit of 1978 for example, the US, Germany and Japan agreed to restart the world's economy, 
but this cooperation dissipated in the face of inflationary fears (Braithwaite n.7).  
40
 Ibid- The European Monetary System (EMS) established in 1979 was intended to bring exchange rate stability to 
Europe by setting up an exchange rates regime in which the currencies of participating European states would adjust 
against one another within a fixed range rather than simply floating (this logic of European monetary union had been 
talked about since the early 1960s).  
41
 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber: ‘An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System’ NBER Working Paper 
9971(September 2003); available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9971.pdf (accessed 08 October 2014).  For 
a critique see Eichengreen B: Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods; NBER Working Papers 10497 
(May 2004); available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10497.pdf (accessed 08 October 2014) 
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affairs. Others have called it “New Bretton Woods” and it has also been used to call for the IMF 
and World Bank to be revamped in order to meet the demands of the current age.42  
 
Another pertinent issue of relevance which will be brought to fruition in Chapter Six is the nature 
of the relationship between the efforts to revise rules on global finance at the expense of efforts 
for other looming challenges of this century such as climate change, poverty reduction, peace 
and security. Some hold that programmes like the structural adjustment of the developing 
countries initiated by the World Bank and the IMF adversely increased poverty in those 
countries. Additionally, large-scale agrarian and industrial projects destabilised national 
economies and destroyed the environment and social patterns. This analysis finds that the inner 
structure of the Bretton Woods institutions ignore the interests of the people living in developing 
countries as their rights to speak are only limited and proportional to the amount of money that 
each country contributes.43 I must however hold that arriving at a consensus between these 
issues or elaborating further is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Part Three 
 
4.5 Global Advantage: Significance for Africa 
There are a number of issues which need to be considered in order to fully absorb the global 
advantage for the African continent brought about by global financial integration. Any efforts to 
plug Africa further into global financial markets should be on the back of a solid African 
sovereignty platform without which the lingering risks will persist. The six main points have been 
summarized as follows: differing economic and financial environment; global confidence; 
political affiliations; interdependency between states; uniform financial market rules; vulnerability 
to financial crisis. These are now outlined below: 
 
a.) Differing economic and financial environments 
It is true that when a country attains a developed financial system they become financially 
integrated with the rest of the world. The financial system in Africa is still developing in 
comparison with the financial systems of the more developed systems in Europe, North 
                                               
42
 Brenner R: “What is Good for Goldman Sachs is Good for America The Origins of the Current Crisis” Center for 
Social Theory and Comparative History, UCLA; April 2009; available online at:  
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0sg0782h (accessed 08 October 2014) 
43
 Dammasch (n.4) 
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America, South America, Australia and Asia. Capital movements are larger, faster and more 
sophisticated, yet remain less controllable. Global financial markets are familiar with the speed 
of capital mobility, modification of types of global savings and investments, technological 
advancement, increased global competition as well as a more general increase in the demand 
for financial innovation at the global stage.   
 
It is therefore essential for the African solution to ensure the continental financial architecture is 
stabilised in order to validate increased participation in crucial global financial matters. By 
adopting continental sovereignty, the process of modernising and advancing the continental 
financial system becomes less precarious. 
 
b.) Global confidence 
The demonstration of strong commitment to navigate the complexities in improving a financial 
system and the resulting progress that follows will provide a significant boost in confidence for 
the African continent. This renewed confidence at the global level will go a long way to prevent 
any negative perceptions ascribed to the continental financial architecture. Also, progress will 
illustrate the continental institutions’ ability to handle recurring risks. The methods of dealing 
with indigenous challenges would serve as important and relevant contributions at the global 
stage. This can in turn better inform global policy makers and global institutions on alternatives 
to be applied in different parts of the world. The African continent can stake a claim for a bigger 
role in these discussions only if key stake holders are confident in its ability to make significant 
contributions based on its experience. The progress in developing its continental financial 
system will give these key global players the requisite confidence to deal with Africa differently. 
 
c.) Political affiliations 
It is obvious that the Bretton Woods system concentrated economic and financial power in the 
hands of a few countries notably the United States. As they assume the leadership role in global 
monetary affairs, there is the tendency to exert amounts of influence for political expediency, 
convenience and benefits. This raises the issue of fairness and creates a limitation because the 
United States for example could cherry pick the nations in Africa it wants to deal with and 
present difficult and unfavourable conditions which underlie the relationship. Could this mean 
that countries can withhold trade partnerships and arrangements with others based on their 
dislike of the other’s domestic record on say human or gay rights or their dislike in the other’s 
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specific national economic policies? The answer to this question is out with the scope of this 
thesis and no attempt will be made to answer it. 
 
This sort of exploitation if permitted could be detrimental for the continent most especially the 
smaller and less performing countries. Conversely, some wealthier nations could move to take 
advantage of relationships with key global leaders for their own selfish national benefits.  
 
d.) Interdependency between States 
In connection to sub-heading (c) above, the emergence of a new international system involving 
interdependency between states has been recorded. This has been seen for example in the 
case of China and the United States where huge savings in the former are lent to the latter to 
fund its high spending and consumption rates. Global integration could pave the way for this 
type of interdependency. African policy makers need to determine whether this sort of 
relationship will assist in the continent and at what costs. 
 
Evidently, financial openness is often regarded as providing important potential advantages for 
both foreign investors and recipient countries. Access to world capital markets expands 
investors’ opportunities for portfolio diversification and provides a potential for achieving higher 
risk-adjusted rates of return. From the perspective of the recipient country, there are potentially 
many benefits as well. For example, access to world capital markets allows countries to borrow 
in order to pacify consumption in the face of adverse shocks, and to maximise potential growth 
and resulting welfare gains  
 
e.) Uniform financial market rules 
The need to have common measures, a common standards, a common rules governing the 
African financial market framework is crucial to enabling the continent adhere to uniform rules 
governing the global financial markets. Compliance with local rules provides the requisite 
conduct to demonstrate adherence to uniform rules at the global level. 
 
f.) Vulnerability to financial crisis 
Global financial integration could heighten a country’s vulnerability to financial crisis in particular 
with regards to contagion and reversals in capital flows. In fact, minimising the risks of 
integration requires the existence of well-functioning domestic and regional financial markets. 
This also is required at the continental level. African sovereignty would ensure the smooth 
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operation of national and regional financial systems with the application of sound economic and 
financial policies as well as strong institutions, thereby mitigating any risks and exposures at the 
global level. 
 
Reflections 
Considering both RFI and Global financial integration, the latter is more likely to encourage risk-
sharing than the former because business cycles tend to be more closely correlated among 
neighbouring countries than among distant ones. Again, the importance of local information and 
common time zones for financial markets could create a role for regional integration to improve 
welfare. Evidence suggests that gravity models work well for financial and trade deals, thus 
even in an age of efficient global communications, financial markets still find significant 
advantages in geographical proximity.44 These all work in favour of the African continent. 
Moreover, information asymmetries or differences in investment styles could cause investors in 
neighbouring countries to act differently from those in distant countries; hence RFI might help to 
diversify the global investor base.45 Nevertheless, financial integration be it regional or global is 
not without its disadvantages especially considering that financial markets are not perfect.46  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Over the course of history, attempts to revise the global financial architecture have come in 
response to a crisis; and if at all successful, it has only been partial. When problems were 
clearly identified and the major countries agreed on the type of solution required, deliberations 
within a group of those countries usually provided the necessary leadership for reform. In the 
most successful efforts, leadership came from a small inner group that was willing to include, 
listen to, and absorb ideas from a wider set of participants.   
 
                                               
44
Portes R and Rey H (2000); The determinants of cross-border equity flows: the geography of information; Centre for 
International and Development Economics Research Working Papers, no C00-111 
45
 Ibid 
46
 The process of regional financial integration does not necessarily preclude integrating globally through overall 
capital account liberalization; they are quite different. Low-income countries lacking in sound policy and strong 
institutions might be especially vulnerable to macroeconomic volatility from exposure to global financial markets. 
Regional rather than global liberalization of trade in financial services may be a more advisable preliminary step for 
these countries and put less of a strain on the regulatory authorities. Drawing from this, regional integration should 
not be understood as a substitute for global integration, they all bring their own potential benefits and costs. Thus 
they can have a complimentary relationship. (See Wakeman-Linn  and Wagh n.3 at p.92)  
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The Bretton Woods system no longer exists and its procedures and institutions needed to adjust 
to changing market forces beyond its control. However, for all intents and purposes, its aims 
and objectives are as valid today as they were in the past. I submit that Bretton Woods provided 
confidence and enabled the world’s biggest economies to get together and set up implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which the global 
financial architecture should function.47 More so, I agree strongly that inspiration towards many 
models of regional integration most notably the European case study found their source within 
the integration efforts made at Bretton Woods. This further develops the assertion and common 
theme of the thesis that cooperative solutions are the most appropriate means to the 
achievement of a sustained resolution to economic and financial challenges; and this 
necessitates the partial transfer of sovereignty in terms of economic and finance policies.  
 
The chapter illustrated that the Bretton Woods system unearthed a global advantage for 
financial markets integration by: modifying the nature of international savings and investment, 
deregulation, technological advancement, increased domestic and international competition and 
an increase in the demand for financial innovation. This global advantage if exploited in the 
wrong way will result in vulnerability to risk and exposure.  
 
It is in this spirit that the chapter offers thoughts for the African continent to determine its 
preparedness for a bigger role in global financial markets. The importance of attaining   
successful African sovereignty as a pre-condition to maximizing the global advantage cannot be 
overemphasized. Six main points have been identified and summarized to provide a better 
understanding of the exposure which could result from miscalculated global integration. They 
are: a.) differing economic and financial environment, b.) global confidence; c.) political 
affiliations; d.) interdependency between states; e.) uniform financial market rules; f.) 
vulnerability to financial crisis. The must be the existence of a solid economic and financial 
policy as well as strong institutions both at the national and regional levels to enable the robust 
and sustainable basis for the African sovereignty. Only then can a leap towards increased 
global participation be practicable. 
 
Having said this, the next chapter prompts a rethink of existing international financial laws and 
procedures in the wake of a GFC. This raises concern for the African continent to consider in 
the areas mentioned above as the continent strives to acquire more influence in international 
                                               
47
See Parker G, Barber T and Dombe D: “European Call for Bretton Woods II”; Financial Times; 16 October 2008 
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discussion forums concerned with global monetary management matters. It will consider the 
ravaging effect of the GFC which started in 2007 and analyse policy maker responses which 
tightened financial regulation and market control. It however nullifies any argument that these 
responses are an end-product. The thesis contends that they are merely a step towards the 
development of a more sustainable and reliable integrated global financial framework. 
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CHAPTER 5: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CRISIS 
RESPONSE: A TALE FOR AFRICA 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A search on Google for ‘the global financial crisis’, will return tens of millions of results in under 
a second. Staggering as these numbers may be, most of these results may be considered 
irrelevant depending on your expertise and interest area. Nevertheless, they relate to a global 
outpour of varied opinions by experts and novices’ alike, spanning differing walks of life, ranging 
from economists and financiers to lawyers, philosophers, and even climate change enthusiasts. 
In spite of this contrast, they all have something to argue for or against issues pertinent to the 
Global Financial Crisis which started in 2007 (GFC). Whatever the case, no matter how 
inconsistent these arguments and opinions are, one thing is for sure, there is a unanimous 
agreement of how serious and frankly cataclysmic the effects of the GFC were.  
 
Notwithstanding, I believe deeply in the inherent and intricate value of free markets, particularly, 
free financial markets. Even though their effectiveness has been challenged beyond measure 
recently, I nevertheless hold the view that now is the time to showcase and explain the benefits 
of financial markets, even if this is unpopular in some civic quarters. Generally, financial markets 
in themselves are vulnerable because of human intuition. Considering the stubborn human 
characteristic to make quick profits in the shortest possible time, these markets could be 
abused, exploited and easily spun out of control without a watchful eye.  
 
Having said this, the GFC has caused a rethink of the importance awarded to supervisory and 
regulatory institutions from a legal perspective and the increased influence of government in 
these matters. In addition, the more general fiscal and monetary issues and policy management 
of modern complex economies are defining of this age.  
 
In its attempts to remain plugged into the global financial framework and exert more influence in 
matters of policy, Africa must consider the effects of global financial market integration and its 
impact within the continent. While, the preceding chapter expounded the theory of a global 
advantage which can be gained from further integration at the global stage, this chapter seeks 
to uncover the risk and exposure that comes with this integration efforts. An analysis of these 
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global risks and how to manage them will provide informational insights for African policy 
makers and governments in their quest to insert the phenomenon of African sovereignty on a 
global platform. 
 
The first part of this chapter revisits the occurrence of the distinct events which constitute the 
GFC; a timeline so to speak. Part two delves into the triggers of the GFC and attempts to confer 
possible corrections. In this spirit, the third part will envisage these corrections in light of the 
crisis response at the global level, with the perspective of the global response geared towards 
an international regulatory agenda for the global financial markets; the US and UK responses 
remain central to this discussion. This Global response will be discussed with focus most 
especially on the G20 in relation to systemic risk and financial stability –and more broadly on 
growth and stability. In addition, a review of the efforts made during the Bretton Woods system 
will be done on a comparative basis in order to identify the lessons learnt today as a result of 
the `insufficient` approaches taken during the Bretton Woods system.  
 
Part four will investigate the impact of the GFC on the African continent and consider the need 
for African sovereignty as a buffer to provide more protection for the African financial system 
while enabling it to fit properly within the global financial framework. The chapter will close with 
recommendations in this section. 
 
There is indeed voluminous amount of information on this topic and the wide-ranging material 
available for analysis is unsurpassed. Only the relevant issues will be highlighted to avoid 
duplication. From these materials, it will be showed that there were multiple triggers that set the 
GFC rolling and no one factor should be addressed in isolation. This chapter contends that to 
hold the view that only bankers, complex financial instruments or the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
particularly in America caused the crisis, is flawed and myopic.   A toxic cocktail of factors 
accounted for the onslaught of this complex multi-faceted crisis and bankers singularly contrary 
to popular belief did not cause the crisis. In fact, it will be seen that in spite of the conditional 
technical issues, the lack of reliable lender of last resort mechanisms, including appropriate 
market support models did to a large extent exacerbate the crisis which would have been 
contained if these were in place. 
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Part One  
 
5.1.1 GFC: An Overview 
There are certain elements which intersect between this GFC and previous crises. As MacNeil 
and O’Brien point out- “common features would include the easy availability of credit as a result 
of loose monetary policy; the relaxation of lending standards associated with that process, 
speculative bubbles in property and financial assets driven both by excess liquidity and a 
herding mentality among investors; and the moral hazard problem associated with central banks 
acting as lender of last resort to banks deemed too big to fail. Features associated with this 
financial crisis much more so than those experienced in the past include the impact of financial 
innovation in creating difficult to value products, the globalisation of financial services; and the 
effect of regulatory arbitrage in creating a shadow banking system that was able to operate 
largely outside regulatory purview.”1 
 
They nevertheless go on to lament the fact that despite the admission of these background 
influences, it is much more problematic to identify direct causality to any of them. Of course this 
alone carries significant ramifications for the regulatory reform agenda. They go on to insinuate 
that the interconnectedness of the causes is illustrative of the difficulty that arises in attempting 
to establish specific causality. Thus, the answer will not rest exclusively in one particular 
solution given than the genesis in itself does not lie in any single causal factor. They advise that 
focus should dwell on the significance of the interaction between the multiple failures associated 
with crisis rather than on segregated attempts to ascertain causal linkages. They warn against 
for instance, the construction of simplistic narratives focusing on corporate greed or regulatory 
incompetence without pre-ascertaining how and why social norms were so eroded in the first 
place. As a factual matter, this could risk misdiagnosing the problem at hand and furthermore 
compromise the search for the solution altogether. More so, they maintain that causality itself is 
inevitably a contested issue, with resolution dependent upon the relative strength of individual 
corporate or professional actors.2 
 
They however caution that the failure of financial capitalism indicts a much wider range of 
market players, and as such crucifying only bankers will not solve the problem. MacNeil and 
                                               
1
Edited by MacNeil I & O’Brien J: The Future of Financial Regulation; Introduction; Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2010, p.4 
2
 ibid 
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O’Brien deftly explain this by highlighting the evidence of current debates over the accountability 
of central banks and regulators, and the turf wars that were being fought on both sides of the 
Atlantic over the survival, shape and remit of regulatory authorities. In addition, they emphasize 
that an ideational meta-failure of the terms of reference that underpinned the trajectory of 
corporate governance and financial regulation reform in the decades either side of the turn of 
the millennium encompasses these micro-failures.3  
 
Although it seemed to be a protracted GFC, four distinct phases can be identified which are all 
consistent with a pattern of plummeting confidence and a rising sense of uncertainty. 
 
The first phase of turmoil started from an initial credit or liquidity contraction in August 2007 and 
then to successive bank and financial institution failures and bail-outs in the summer of 2008. 
This then escalated to the second phase which saw a full stock-market crisis in the autumn of 
2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, leading to the third phase which was a Global 
Recession as attention had naturally shifted from crisis in the credit and financial markets unto 
the real economy. A fourth phase emerged in a sovereign-debt crisis within the Eurozone and 
notably the case of Greece.4 
 
There is no doubt that the second phase was forthrightly the most dramatic since the stock 
market crash and consequent Great Depression in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s. As George 
Walker stated in exactitude “if the five days between Monday 15 September and Friday 19 
September 2008 were not unsettling enough, the global financial system teetered on the edge 
of collapse three weeks later between Monday 6 and 10 October 2008.”5 He described this 
period as the brink of an ‘Armageddon’ with the likely return to a primitive financial era void of all 
the niceties of the global financial system which had been painfully built over the years.6 
                                               
3
A particular striking feature of corporate and regulatory responses to the GFC has been the paucity of institutional 
memory. MacNeil and Obrien draw from both Congressional hearings in Washington and testimony provided to the 
Treasury Select Committee in Westminster to make this assertion. In fact, they ask us to recall the use of similar 
defences during the conflicts of interest investigations that accompanied the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco 
in the accounting scandals at the turn of the century.- (MacNeil & Obrien, p.5) 
4
 See Para 3.6.2 at p.146 
5
 Walker G A; The Global Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform; Edited by MacNeil I & O’Brien J: The Future of 
Financial Regulation; 2010, p. 179 
6
Walker G A; Financial Crisis- Three days in September; University Lecture notes; University of Glasgow; 
September 2010 
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As will be seen later in the chapter, US markets remained unstable as the lengthy and 
somewhat muddled agreement of the $700bn Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) bail-
out plan did not seem to resolve matters. Concomitantly, European leaders fell short in agreeing 
on any combined response to salvage the situation. Things only took a turn for the better when 
the UK Government under the leadership of former Prime Minister Gordon Brown and former 
Chancellor of Exchequer Alistair Darling, were forced into engineering an inspired though 
abnormally hasty and dramatic lead in adopting the first informed and comprehensive package 
of response measures to the crisis on the morning of 8 October 2008. 
 
Discussions on these measures would then set a chain of discussions at the G7 Finance 
Ministers and central bankers’ meeting on the weekend of 11th and 12th October 2008 shifting 
to the G20 ‘Bretton Woods II’ meetings held in Washington and then in Paris, London and Italy. 
At this juncture, a re-examination of the causes of the GFC is crucial. 
 
5.2 GFC Timeline 
Chaos began with credit contraction in the inter-bank markets starting August 9th 2007. Inter-
bank liquidity tightened and ultimately froze following the suspension of payments by BNP 
Paribas on three investment funds. Prior to this, one of the initial indicators of a problem in the 
financial markets was the US sub-prime mortgage crisis which was characterized by sub-prime 
mortgage foreclosures and hence the consequent decline of the securities which backed these 
mortgages.  
 
Also, rumour was rife on Northern Rock’s discreet request for liquidity assistance from the Bank 
of England on the 14th September 2007. The withdrawal of funds from Northern Rock beginning 
the following day created a classic ‘bank run’. Their share prices plummeted, and they were 
eventually nationalised on February 17th 2008.7  
                                               
7
They were brought into public ownership despite the fact that there had been private sector bids on the table, 
notably one from a consortium led by Richard Branson’s Virgin Group, which were all rejected by Treasury. It was the 
first major casualty from the credit tightening in the UK. This was unquestionably within the rules as the bank was still 
solvent.  The open facility was fully collateralised and a decent though undisclosed interest rate was charged. 
    Northern Rock’s own business model which relied substantially on wholesale funding also meant 
that deposit withdrawals were not a major problem. These only represented 28% of its funding which 
could easily have been raised elsewhere before the crisis. The difficulty was that this model is dependent 
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On the other side of the Atlantic, the Federal Reserve remarkably aided the purchase of Bear 
Sterns by JP Morgan on the 17th March 2008 after they announced a special $30bn facility to 
enable the takeover. This was remarkably the first time in recent years that the Federal Reserve 
assisted in the bail out of a non-commercial bank. Some level of calm ensued after the 
managed acquisition of Bear Sterns as most people considered the most vivid phase at the time 
happened to be over. Nevertheless, not many saw the subsequent drama coming, six months 
later. 
 
By the end of summer 2008, the crisis and original pressure in the credit markets had spread to 
other financial sectors, many of which were non-commercial banks. The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (colloquially known as Fannie Mae) and The Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) were other colossal casualties. However, the US 
government announced they will take control of the struggling agencies and provide the 
required $200bn which will enable both institutions to stay solvent. Furthermore, the government 
continued to cover their debts by acquiring $5tn of mortgage-backed securities. This was done 
in a bid to stabilise the $12tn US mortgage market.8  
                                                                                                                                                       
on a continuous flow of funds through the inter-bank and wholesale markets. Northern Rock was then 
largely punished for its own efficient use of the markets although this does raise significant concerns with 
regard to liquidity cover and gearing ratios which will now be re-considered. (Walker n.5) 
     The former FSA was severely criticised for its supervision of Northern Rock and published a 
summary of the review conducted by its internal audit division into the supervision of Northern Rock.  The 
review confirmed four main failings in connection with Northern Rock. Firstly, there had been a lack of 
sufficient supervisory engagement with the firm with the supervisory team not following up rigorously 
enough with management on the business model vulnerability arising through changing market 
conditions. Secondly, there had been a lack of adequate oversight and review by FSA line management 
on the quality, intensity and rigour of the firm’s supervision. Thirdly, there had been inadequate specific 
resource directly supervising the firm and fourthly; a lack of intensity by the FSA ensuring that all 
available risk information was properly utilised to inform its supervisory actions. The FSA Board 
nevertheless confirmed its support for the philosophy of outcomes focused and principles based 
regulation with financial firms being primarily responsible for ensuring their own financial soundness. The 
Board accepted the regulatory failings identified although it noted that even if Northern Rock had been 
supervised to a higher standard, its funding difficulties and subsequent public acquisition would not have been 
necessarily avoided. (Walker n.5) 
8
 Cf. with the more modest $100bn of mortgage debt the UK Treasury acquired in the case of Northern Rock.  
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5.2.1 Collapse of Lehman Brothers 
Undoubtedly the largest and most complex liquidation in US history- Lehman Brothers filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on the 15th of September 2008 with over $600 billion in assets. The 
drama that unfolded in the seventy-two hours preceding its demise was a mere ‘aperitif’ 
compared to that which ensued thereafter.  
 
This by no means downplays the seriousness of events which occurred before Lehman’s 
collapse as they are befitting of a Hollywood blockbuster. Phone calls were made transatlantic, 
negotiations were fierce, and deals were contemplated. When a last ditch effort made to get 
Barclays to buy the 185 year old Wall Street Giant Institution hit a brick wall, there was a chilling 
realization that bankruptcy was the only card left to play.  
 
The actions of the authorities were deemed inconsistent given that days before, they had 
announced a support package for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This time around, they made it 
clear that they would not stop Lehman from collapsing and should any rescue package crop up, 
it will have to be from a private purchaser.  
 
It is worth noting that then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Board Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke had been bitterly criticised on both sides of the aisle on Capitol 
Hill for their actions taken to bail out Bear Sterns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.9 It could be 
said that these criticisms influenced their decision not to intervene in the Lehman debacle. 
 
The US authorities arranged a meeting at the Federal Reserve at 6pm on Friday the 12th 
September 2008 and invited the most senior executives of the largest US, UK and other 
                                               
9
Right wing Republicans objected to interference with the private markets while left wing Democrats criticised the 
support provided to the Wall Street elite. Kentucky Republican Senator Jim Bunning had argued that, ‘Simply put, it is 
socialism’ and ‘A calamity for a free market system’ and argued that Paulson and Bernanke should be resign. 
Paulson had acted ‘like the Minister of Finance in China’. Stern School of Business, New York University, Professor 
Nouriel Roubini, had stated that ‘Socialism is indeed alive and well in America’ but that this was ‘socialism for the rich, 
the well-connected the Wall Street’. Stewart J: ‘Eight Days – The battle to save the American financial system’ The 
New Yorker (21 September 2009) 59-81, 60 col.2. (Walker G A; Financial Crisis- Three days in September; 
September 2010) 
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European financial groups in New York.10 The SEC Chairman Christopher Cox was also 
present. Following an introductory address were Paulson confirmed that no public funds would 
be available and that Lehman may not open for business the following Monday morning, the 
bank representatives were divided into three working groups11 to attempt an impromptu rescue 
solution12 Discussions continued until 9.30pm on the Friday and reconvened at 8am the 
following morning. 
 
In light of these prevailing circumstances, the two main potential purchasers of Lehman were 
Bank of America under Kenneth Lewis and Barclays Capital under Bob Diamond. Nonetheless, 
concerns had also arisen with regard to the third largest securities firm on Wall Street, Merrill 
Lynch under John Thain. While a solution on Lehman was still being deliberated, Thain decided 
to approach Lewis once it had become clear that Lehman may be allowed to fail. He agreed to 
meet Thain in order to discuss a possible alliance. Lewis confirmed he was looking at a full 
acquisition, and subsequently a price of $29 a share was agreed. Merrill’s acquisition was 
approved by the board of Merrill Lynch and Bank of America by telephone with the deal being 
concluded at the offices of the Bank’s lawyers between 7.30pm and 1:00am the following 
Monday morning. 
 
With time running out before the markets opened on the Monday morning, only Barclays 
remained as a potential purchaser. The stumbling block of any possible deal was the fact that 
the UK authorities needed assurance from the US authorities that a guarantee of about $25- 
$30 billion (similar to that provided in the Bear Sterns situation) will be provided to facilitate the 
acquisition. The tripartite UK authorities had reservations – substantial reservations – about 
Barclays acting as the white knight for the Wall Street firm and would only agree to a deal on 
stringent terms. In particular, the Chancellor of Exchequer Alistair Darling wanted to know what 
Barclays was letting itself in for with Lehman – an institution nursing huge losses from the US 
sub-prime mortgage market – and whether Paulson was prepared to sweeten a takeover with 
US taxpayers' cash. The UK authorities needed a quid pro quo financial commitment from the 
                                               
10
Attendees included: Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman Sachs; John Thain, Merrill Lynch; John Mack, Morgan Stanley; 
Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan Chase; Vikram Pandit, Citigroup; and Brady Dougan, Credit Suisse, as well as other 
representatives from the Royal Bank of Scotland, Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas.  
11
The first group considered the valuation of Lehman’s distressed assets and possible shared contributions. Disposal 
and recapitalisation was considered by the second group with the third group considering bankruptcy. 
12
Paulson subsequently admitted that, “If there’s a chance to put in public money and avert a disaster, we’re open to 
it.” Stewart (n.9)  
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US to mitigate the risk of acquiring Lehman, (a commitment that Paulson was not prepared to 
make).  Darling was also fearful that Barclays had not conducted adequate due diligence on 
Lehman Brothers and that its distressed assets could infect the rest of the UK financial system. 
In addition, Barclays also knew it would need US taxpayer funds if it was to proceed with the 
takeover of an institution which had billions of pounds of outstanding trades that needed to be 
guaranteed before any takeover could be completed.13 Alas, Paulson could not give Darling the 
assurances he had been seeking-- and the rest is now history.14  
 
Timothy Geithner, then President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bernanke had 
maintained that there was no legal authority to support Lehman Brothers as a whole especially 
considering the fact that any bail out by Federal funds will have most certainly guaranteed a loss 
for the US tax payer15 
 
Up until Monday 15th September 2008, the norm of the year-long financial crisis was that 
governments would always offer a bailout to banks in trouble besides Darling had nationalized 
Northern Rock seven months earlier, while Paulson had orchestrated a takeover of Bear 
Stearns. 
 
                                               
13
Barclays was still interested in purchasing Lehman although this was subject to the distressed assets being 
transferred to a separate ‘Newco’ and funding being secured for the US$15-16bn shortfall for up to one month until 
the Barclays’ acquisition could be complete. In fact, Barclays had approached Warren Buffett although he was only 
prepared to provide support for up to US$5bn with no other single private source of funding appearing available. A 
Bank of America representative had separately suggested that the Federal Reserve provide up to US$60bn in 
support for Lehman’s distressed assets. (Stewart (n. 9); (see Walker- Three days in September). 
14
It is worth mentioning that Paulson claimed that somehow it was the British regulators who got in the way of a 
rescue deal for Lehman. In his memoir, which focuses on the time surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, Paulson 
recounts the desperate efforts to save the bank from failing. He personally called Mr. Darling to plead with him not to 
stand in the way of the rescue. However, Mr. Darling “…made it clear, without a hint of apology in his voice, that there 
was no way Barclays would buy Lehman. He offered no specifics, other than to say that we were asking the British 
government to take on too big a risk, and he was not willing to have us unload our problems on the British taxpayer.” -
--Paulson H: On The Brink-Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System; Business Plus-
Hachette Book Group Inc, New York 2010, p.211) 
15
 Speech by Bernanke on 15 October 2008 and statement by Paulson to the Market News International wire service. 
Paulson later added, ‘There’s no law that any of us could have used’ Stewart (n.9). Geithner later admitted that, ‘If we 
had had the authority to prevent a system threat, I would have been prepared to act despite the political costs.’  
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After 15th September, every financial institution from HBOS in the UK to Goldman Sachs in the 
US was perceived to be at risk. The financial markets were convulsed by a month of panic that 
saw bank shares drop precipitously, confidence sapped and governments forced to abandon 
their free-market principles to save the global financial system from collapse.16 
 
5.2.2 Post Lehman 
Given that the US authorities had estimated that the end of Lehman would not have any serious 
systemic consequences, it is fair to say their decision would have been different had they known 
then what they know now about the consequences of allowing Lehman to fail. 
 
As aforementioned, this event has been universally highlighted as that which transformed the 
credit crisis to a full blown stock market crash and ultimately a Global recession. 
 
Meanwhile, another huge US name was teetering on the brink of oblivion – little wonder this 
time around the US government acted. AIG, an insurer with $1 trillion in assets, 116,000 
employees and its name on Manchester United Football Club shirts, was faced with the 
imminent prospect of going bust and the Federal Reserve hurriedly stumped up $85bn in return 
for an 85% stake in the company. AIG's chief executive was summarily fired by the government 
in a rescue which Bernanke, later described to Congress as the event which infuriated him the 
most during the entire GFC: “If there is a single episode in this entire 18 months that has made 
me most angry, I can't think of one other than AIG.”17 
 
Also, significant market pressure was applied on Washington Mutual (WaMu), however it was 
allowed to close on the 25th September 2008 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). J P Morgan acquired its deposit and retail branch business and also its mortgage 
portfolio but without any unsecured debt or liabilities of the holding company. With assets of 
over $300billion and deposits of almost $200billion at the end of June 2008, needless to say, it 
was the largest single US bank bankruptcy.18 
                                               
16
Elliott L & Treanor J: Lehman’s fall to earth: the last hours of a Wall Street giant; The Guardian, 3
 
September 2009  
17
Clark A; How the Collapse of Lehman Brothers pushed Capitalism to the brink; The Guardian, 4 September 2009  
18
A number of institutions in the UK including Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and others had been able to raise 
substantial additional amounts of capital earlier in the year with an astonishing $430bn in total. Following Northern 
Rock, significant amounts of pressure continued to be heaped on institutions most dependent on wholesale funding 
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Also the money market funds were under pressure as they began to suffer immediate 
redemption requests on the morning of Lehman’s closure. These funds permitted individuals to 
participate in the US Treasury bill and bank certificate of deposit market19 and later company 
commercial paper.  
 
By the following day after Lehman, redemption requests rose to US$40bn in total and the New 
York Federal Reserve refused to provide any further assistance. No further funds could be 
provided through credit lines and the company ultimately ‘broke the buck’ for the first time in 
recent history and revalue itself at US$0.97 a share. These redemption requests increased 
again on Wednesday 17 September with credit contraction spreading further to the corporate 
commercial paper market as major blue chip companies were unable to raise funds. 
Redemption requests had then led to the closure of the commercial bill market with market 
money funds not being able to purchase short-term corporate paper. 
 
As a result, the Treasury was then forced to announce on the morning of Friday 19 September 
2008 that temporary guarantee facilities would be provided for all money market funds.20 
Ironically, the statement added that this was necessary to protect ‘the integrity and stability of 
the global financial system’.21 In my opinion, this was surprising, given that only days ago, this 
cataclysmic situation could have been averted with only a $25-$30 billion guarantee facility 
being provided to Barclays. Now the US authorities had to guarantee a market worth almost 
$4trillion. The Treasury was anxious to prevent any further collapse in confidence,22 as this 
followed attempts to develop a more comprehensive package that would allow the authorities to 
limit the danger and control the effects of the downturn. 
                                                                                                                                                       
such as Bradford & Bingley and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS). A combination of falling asset prices on their 
balance sheets and continued contraction within the inter-bank and money markets exacerbated the situation. 
19
 Investors could only purchase Treasury bonds in amounts of US$10,000 with market money funds allowing them to 
benefit the higher rates on government and bank paper. Funds also later purchased corporate commercial paper 
which allowed companies to cover their payroll and raise other short-term capital. The market was worth $3.5-4tn by 
summer 2008. Money market investment was considered to be very secure with no funds ever having lost net dollar 
value (referred to ‘breaking the buck’). (See Walker: Three days in September) 
20
 Stewart- Walker: Three days in September  
21
  ibid 
22
  Stewart notes that David Nason, an Assistant Treasury Secretary, had told the Investment Company Institute that, 
‘You’re getting this whether you want it or not … This is about confidence, investors feeling safe. Each time we’ve 
hoped for a break, we didn’t get it. We’re using overwhelming force.’ 
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As if all this was not bad enough, stock markets felt the wrath of the crisis as the value of shares 
in banks and other financial institutions plunged continuously during September and early 
October 2008. The panic continued nonstop and no one seemed to have a solution for it. 
Realising that they were all witnessing history unfold, World and industry leaders including those 
in the US, the EU, World Bank, IMF and so on, watched nail-bitingly as the global financial 
system as we knew it went into freefall. 
 
Calm only began to surface only when former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Chancellor 
Alistair Darling announced an informed three part solution (even though in a rushed manner) in 
order to prevent further falls. This comprehensive package was based on bank recapitalisation, 
additional inter-bank liquidity and a credit guarantee support scheme. This would then form the 
basis for other national and international responses to the crisis.23  
 
Looking back at all this, I am strongly of the opinion that the initial credit crisis could have been 
contained if properly managed and appropriate market support systems were activated by the 
Central Banks, and of course an escalation of this crisis only became possible when Lehman 
was allowed to close. It is true that issues of lender of last resort functions of Central Banks are 
raised here in line with Walter Bagehot’s persuasion of the Bank of England to acknowledge 
that it is its duty to support the market in times of panic.24 Also, rightfully, arguments of moral 
hazard can be put forward especially the worry that some institutions will make it now an 
objective to grow as large, as global and as interconnected and ultimately systemic as possible 
because they will be bailed out should the risky activities they carry out back-fire.25 
 
Unprecedented contagion resulted as a result of how systemically important Lehman was and 
controversy remains with regard to the extent of the then available legal authority to bail-out 
systemically-important-institutions. This inconsistency invalidates the reason given on legal 
grounds especially in light of bailing out AIG days later26 and some hold the view that the 
grounds can be explained in terms of perceived market impact rather than strict legal authority 
                                               
23
 See Para. 5.4 below 
24
  Bagehot W: Lombard Street, a Description of the Money Market. 1873, EP Dutton & Co., New York 1910 
25
  The issue of moral hazard was raised in Chapter 3 at Para. 3.6.2 and 3.6.2.1; p148 
26
 This would nevertheless be corrected in the legislation brought forward by the Obama Administration post-crisis. 
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or political intent.27 In fact, Barney Frank had once said that markets will never believe them 
until they let one of these companies die.28 There is no doubt that withholding the legal authority 
to save such companies is the fastest way to communicate this commitment.29  
 
Besides, it is absurd that the Central Banks of the biggest economies in the world did not know 
the scope of their legal authority in matters on this nature. That notwithstanding, there is little 
doubt that the decisions to support AIG and to proceed with the TARP are endorsed on 
systemic grounds although concerns remain with regard to the manner in which this was 
managed.  
 
Fair to say lessons have been learnt and what is considered systemic has to be put into context, 
defined and should not be a question that takes people by surprise. It should not be an issue of 
discretion at the hands of policy makers; especially elected government officials whose 
decisions are likely to be influenced by the electorate. For instance General Motors was bailed 
out on the pretext that idle suppliers and unemployed auto-workers in Detroit and elsewhere 
where considered systemic, after all their votes do count. In fact, some commentators have 
further qualified it, stating that systemic does not only apply to the ramifications in a technical 
sense that result but also importantly from the general expectation of a bail out prevalent in the 
financial markets.30 This makes sense considering that the rate at which panic spreads with the 
mere thought of a large financial institution not getting bailed out, then expect same treatment if 
you are a large financial institution as well.  
 
Underlying these consequences however were pre-existing conditions which triggered the GFC 
in the first place. In order to rebuild from the rubble, lessons ought to be learnt from the 
mistakes, and identifying these triggers is essential. Again, no single factor caused the crisis but 
rather a combination of factors, hence, one must refrain from cosmetically and simplistically 
providing isolated solutions. These triggers will now be discussed. 
 
                                               
27
   Walker n.5 
28
   Barney Frank is the Member of the US House of Representatives from Massachusetts and was the Chairman of 
the House Financial Services Committee from 2007-2011. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act  (Pub.L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223) was named after him and Senate Banking Committee 
Chairman Chris Dodd after they were credited in Congress for their work  
29
  Cochran J: Lessons from the Financial Crisis; Regulation, Vol. 32, No. 4; Winter 2009-2010. P. 34-37 
30
   ibid 
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Part Two 
 
5.3 Triggers and Corrections 
There is contention between financial market actors, policymakers and academics surrounding 
the origins of the GFC and how they can be corrected. However the vigour and depth of these 
debates have inspired five key pre-conditions of the GFC. They are: massive accumulation of 
credit and debt stock; product complexity and lack of transparency; asset valuation: credit rating 
errors and mispricing of risk; risk separation and risk mixing; and lack of effective market 
support.31 These will now be analysed in more detail: 
 
i.) Massive accumulation of credit and debt stock 
In the decade preceding 2001, national economies enjoyed significant growth and sustained 
credit, asset price, housing and oil bubbles subsequently developed. Then came September 11 
2001, and interests rates were kept down for the following five years although some economists 
argued that this was too long a period. This facilitated the availability of cheap credit and easy 
credit conditions, hence enabling mass accumulation of credit and eventual debt stock. Also, 
with the advancement of technology and financial innovation notably structured finance and 
securitization in particular, varied instruments and models were in place to precipitate this credit 
overabundance.    
 
Furthermore, excess liquidity mainly in the form of savings predominantly in the Asian 
economies encouraged this availability of funds. I am however inclined to rebuff this suggestion 
as a cause of the GFC because there is nothing wrong with people or businesses saving away 
their cash. In blaming them lies the failure to recognize the crux of the matter at hand which is-- 
there exists societies fuelled by an insatiable corporate and household appetite for debt and 
consumption. Most especially in the US where the more debt you have in your name, and your 
ability to repay debts determines your credit worthiness. That notwithstanding, in the case of 
sub-prime mortgages some NINJAs (No Income No Job Applicants) were deceived into entering 
contracts without their full understanding of what they were getting into. These teaser-rates 
proved very controversial and their application has been stormily debated ever since.  
 
                                               
31
 Walker G A: Credit Crisis, Bretton Woods II and a new global response: pt 2; BJIBFL, 2009 p.75-79 
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We cannot pin the stability of the financial system on the idea that nobody should ever lose 
money. Doing this will strangle the economy and crush financial innovation. Financial markets 
provide a platform upon which wealth is acquired, invested, protected, and ultimately 
transferred. About $194 trillion moved around the world prior the GFC- this reduced to round 
about $172trillion during the GFC and it has been rising ever since, returning to almost $200 
trillion once again.  
 
Granted, all this is subject to politics, but the availability of liquidity is beneficial for the 
functioning of each aspect of a country’s economy.  
 
In order to correct this, monetary authorities should monitor the effects of credit accumulation 
within the economy and if need be, adopt interest rate controls, regulatory restrictions or even 
fiscal charges through taxation where appropriate to limit disproportionate levels. Given that the 
authorities may not be able to manage price levels directly, nevertheless, with the above 
measures in place, they can control the volume and cost of money and credit in circulation 
within the economy. For example, although the availability of cheap credit is not a problem on its 
own, checks must be in place to ensure this does not facilitate the distortion of other asset price 
markets such as housing. It is worth noting that, corrective policies must be appropriate as any 
abrupt or drastic change in direction is unwarranted and could cause more harm than good.  
 
ii.) Product complexity and lack of transparency 
Since the early 1970’s, mortgage pools in the US have been securitised and ‘re-securitized’. 
They have been mixed with other income streams to form the structured finance market. A 
number of complex financial products such as Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs)32 and 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) emerged as a result of this innovation thus building 
upon earlier securitization and derivatives structures. The abovementioned products have been 
portrayed by an industry expert as belonging to the now “infamous club of complex financial 
instruments whose acronyms are said to form an alphabet soup.”33 
 
                                               
32
These SIVs and conduits were used by securities firms and banks as off -balance sheet holding vehicles for asset 
management purposes. It involved the creation of new entities to issue mainly commercial paper to fund the purchase 
of high-yielding structured finance products. 
33
 Tabe H: The Unravelling of Structured Investment Vehicles: How Liquidity Leaked Through SIVs (Lessons in Risk 
Management and Regulatory Oversight); Thoth Capital LLP, Great Britain, 2010, p.1 
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Credit derivatives surfaced with a momentum which transformed the derivates market for good. 
Some of these included Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), Total Return Swaps (TRSs) and Credit 
Spread Swaps as well as other combination instruments including credit linked notes which had 
entrenched credit derivative components.34 
 
Concurrently, the growth of non-bank institutions and credit companies restructured financial 
markets significantly.35 Also, there was also substantial competition from aggressive new 
players in the markets including internet banks and lenders, off shore financial institutions for 
instance from the Channel Islands as well as supermarkets and other store card operators and 
credit providers who fought vigorously for their own share of the market. 
 
The number of acronyms used thus far could indeed form a delicious alphabet soup given the 
assortment of letters. Having said that, this is simply all what they will appear to most people----
letters----as many struggle to understand what these instruments are. In fact, Tabe points out 
that in the case of SIVs and SIV-lites, little was known about this obscure corner of finance up 
until the late 1990’s and early 2000’s and it had to take the liquidity crisis of 2007 for them to 
become familiar albeit infamously. He wittily suggests that SIVs became known to a wider 
audience other than the handful of financiers and medical researchers working on the pathology 
of simian immunodeficiency viruses.36 
 
These substantially new levels of complexity in product design and unregulated investment and 
holding vehicles coupled with limited market knowledge if any, only concretized the argument 
that there was a lack of transparency surrounding these products. Small wonder, this has been 
dubbed ‘financial engineering gone wrong’.37 
 
It is important to note that amidst this financial engineering, one cannot overlook other 
innovative skills which played a vital role in sustaining this industry. A central ingredient in this 
                                               
34
 The CDS market grew to $64trn, with total over-the-counter derivatives reaching an astonishing nominal $683.7trn 
figure by end June 2008. (See Walker G A: Credit Crisis, Bretton Woods II and a new global response: pt 2; n.31) 
35
 This ‘shadow banking system’ covers any non-bank credit provider or asset manager including alternative 
investment management vehicles such as hedge funds, private equity funds 
36
 Tabe, n.33, p.21-23 
37
 McBarnet D: Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis; 
Edited by MacNeil I & O’Brien J: The Future of Financial Regulation; Introduction; Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2010 p.67.  
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financial modernization was legal creativity. Legal engineering was at the heart of fostering the 
practice of structuring creative transactions such that the driving characteristic is to deliberately 
and systematically thwart regulation and bypass regulatory control.38  
 
McBarnet reconceptualises financial innovation as legal innovation and she stipulates that 
“Finding arguably legal ways round legal and regulatory obstacles is a key function of the 
lawyer’s role for sophisticated clients such as banks, and sophisticated legal circumvention has 
been integral to the construction of innovative financial products in banking.”39 Also, she goes a 
step further to ridicule this phenomenon by saying that the crisis demonstrated that ‘clever 
manipulation of law and circumvention of regulation may not be quite so clever after all’40 given 
that its social costs can be grave.  
 
To this end, I agree with her call for new aspirations towards a greater respect for the rule of 
law, a greater respect for democracy in law and a new legal integrity as she pushes for ethical 
standards in compliance with not just the rule of law, but the spirit of the law. 
 
Regarding the more technical financial engineering, regulatory authorities must allow institutions 
to continue to innovate and expand and simultaneously maintain minimum levels of disclosure 
and transparency at all times in order not to undermine effective supervisory and market 
oversight. In the case of SIVs for instance, Tabe insists that far from popular belief, most SIVs 
were efficiently run bank-like entities and little in their structure, organisation and historical 
performance foreshadowed their demise.41 Refraining from laying blame on personnel, he 
laments that their ultimate demise came as a result of a combination of factors such as maturity 
transformation, leverage, secondary market funding and asset illiquidity and the absence of 
reliable lender of last resort provisions; emphasising the fact that these vehicles were largely run 
by intelligent, risk averse managers who designed them to engage in leveraged maturity 
transformation similar to banks and insurance companies. He points out that the vehicles 
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 Examples of research carried out include McBarnet D; Crime, Compliance and Control; Dartmouth/Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2004. A key issue to emerge from that research was the routine practice of ‘creative compliance’. Seen in 
Doreen McBarnet; n.37 above. 
39
  Ibid McBarnet, p.69 
40
  Ibid, p. 81 
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 Tabe, n.33, p.5 
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bought highly-rated assets issued by banks and securitization entities and operated at lower 
leverage levels than many banks and other financial institutions that survived the crisis.42 
 
There is little doubt that innovative financial products were enthusiastically believed to disperse 
risk, plus supported by mathematical models which senior executives often accepted prima 
facie neither questioning nor comprehending them. In fact, the financial structures set in place 
were so complex such that risk and even ownership became simply untraceable.  
 
In this light, product complexity going forward, must not be allowed to divert or obstruct proper 
regulatory or market accountability. More so, proper disclosure systems need to be set in place 
in order to restrict the use of off-balance sheet financing techniques for regulatory avoidance 
purposes. These should ensure that all stakeholders including regulators, shareholders, 
creditors and other market counterparties can form an accurate and informed view of both the 
on and off-balance sheet conditions of any financial institution at any time before entering into 
any transactions.  
 
iii.) Asset valuation: credit rating errors and mispricing of risk: 
Some have reached the ultimate conclusion that credit rating agencies are to blame for the 
GFC. The argument stems from the suggestion that but for the mispricing of assets and risk 
coupled with a catalogue of credit rating errors, investors would not have been tempted to enter 
transactions which seemed at the time to be highly rated whereas they were not.  
 
It is imperative that all debt instruments be properly and accurately graded and rated in every 
case. This shows that the issue was not strictly with banks purchasing structured debt (including 
US sub-prime assets) but the fact that these debts were not accurately assessed and rated by 
the credit rating agencies. Obviously with high ratings, banks and other investors not directly 
involved in the structured debt market where fully entitled to purchase high yielding and 
apparently low risk debt. 
 
iv.) Risk mixing and risk separation  
Novel methods of repackaging and restructuring debt also implied that the rating and trading of 
some financial instruments had been separated from certain underlying risks. Allocation and risk 
distribution across the market became increasingly blurred with the over-the-counter (OTC) 
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nature of the sector and the use of off-balance sheet holding vehicles such as SIVs and bank 
conduits).43 In short, risk distribution must be efficient and thoroughly managed.    
 
v.) Lack of effective market support  
One of the main problems brought to the fore was the inconsistency and delay in central banks 
carrying out their role as lender of last resort. The lack of government and central bank 
intervention most especially in the Lehman Brothers debacle underscored the crucial 
importance of such assistance. 
 
Having said that, central banks should continuously review the operation of domestic and also 
cross-border inter-bank markets to ensure that they work efficiently in all conditions and at all 
times with appropriate funding facilities being made available whenever necessary. Individual 
bank liquidity regimes need similar revision to enable market and institutional regimes operate in 
unison. The core difficulty that arose with the GFC was that banks had transferred reserves into 
higher return structured assets (away from more traditional but lower yielding government bills 
and gilts) and were then caught out when the original credit ratings were shown to have been 
incorrect.44 After all, banks have always looked to central banks for daily liquidity support with 
the relative level of underlying deposit cover simply being a matter of degree.  
 
Minimum capital levels must be maintained to protect institutions from insolvency where asset 
values fall although these are only ancillary to the liquidity measures referred to. Unnecessary 
and unreasonably high levels of capital adequacy should certainly not be imposed on banks and 
other financial institutions where this is only to compensate for inadequate central bank liquidity 
management systems or facilities.45  
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 Walker notes that while many more traditional securitisations have involved the retransfer (outsourcing) of the 
immediate risk management of the debt back to the originating bank, this process becomes considerably more 
complex with structured finance which involves more than one level of securitisation or with the securitisation of more 
than one of type of instrument or income stream. Underlying credit or default risk (and especially high risk debt) must 
be managed by an appropriate institution in all cases. (Walker, n.31) 
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Part Three 
 
5.4 Global Crisis Response 
Having reviewed the history of the GFC and understood its main causes and suggested 
corrections, it now makes sense to consider the global response to the crisis which ultimately 
curbed the damage. In parts, this response will be looked at in comparison with the period pre 
and post Bretton Woods drawing similarities and differences therein from previous crisis 
responses. After all there is little doubt that following the worst GFC since the Great Depression, 
there were great expectations for policy-makers to respond with equally ambitious and 
proportionate reforms. The G20 leaders' summits have encouraged these expectations; and like 
the Bretton Woods architects, the leaders appear to share a broad desire to assert greater 
public regulation over international financial markets. So far, however, their initiatives toward 
this goal have been more incremental than bold. Drawing from this, the adequacy of the efforts 
and recommendations made by the G20 will be evaluated. It will be seen that these various G20 
initiatives move beyond the original Bretton Woods regulatory agenda given that the Bretton 
Woods architects did not anticipate the kind of highly integrated global financial marketplace we 
have today, they devoted little attention to this kind of international prudential regulation. 
 
In another sense, however, contemporary reforms represent a less dramatic means by which to 
reassert public regulation over international financial markets. At Bretton Woods, negotiators 
reacted against laissez-faire approaches to international finance by endorsing national controls 
over cross-border financial movements. This made international financial regulation a sort of 
synonym for curtailing the international mobility of money. The rationale also went beyond a 
prudential one to include the protection of the policy autonomy of national governments from 
international market pressures. Little wonder national regulatory systems are unable to keep up 
with the evolving nature of cross-border finance. Regulatory systems remain locally bound, with 
laws and regulations designed to ensure national financial stability and to limit national costs 
from the failure of financial institutions operating the country. On the other hand however, cross-
border financial firms that organize their business activities on a global or regional basis have 
emerged faster than ever before. 
 
Initial Response: 
With the collapse of Lehman brothers and with significant impetus from these events, the U.S. 
Senate passed a revised bill on the $700billion “Troubled Assets Relief Plan” (TARP), with the 
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House following suit. By this time, however, the financial crisis had moved to the real economy 
and a TARP alone was actually insufficient to hide the problems or prevent the resulting 
damage.  
 
During the following week, domestic responses appeared rapidly, including most significantly a 
$600 billion rescue package from the United Kingdom by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
and the Chancellor of Exchequer Alistair Darling, focusing on three elements: capital, liquidity 
and funding.46 These elements would subsequently become central to the international 
response to the systemic crisis. Following the emergence of a comprehensive global response, 
it has been sufficient to resuscitate the U.S. and global financial systems nevertheless unable to 
prevent the significant economic damage especially relating to unemployment.  
 
This comprehensive approach included the following elements: Firstly, the use of “all available 
tools to support systemically important financial institutions and prevent their failure”; Secondly, 
ensuring that financial institutions “have broad access to liquidity and funding”; Thirdly 
establishing recapitalization schemes so banks can “raise capital from public as well as private 
sources”; Fourthly ensuring “robust and consistent” protection for depositors; And finally, taking 
action to “restart the secondary market for mortgages and securitised assets”47  
 
In addition, on 8 October, the world’s major central banks announced their first globally 
coordinated interest rate cut, with the U.S. Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of 
England, Bank of Sweden, Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Canada all cutting interest 
rates by 50bps and issuing a coordinated statement for the first time. Further, in the aftermath of 
the Group of Seven and IMF / World Bank / Financial Stability Forum meetings the following 
weekend, the Federal Reserve dramatically increased the provision of liquidity in dollar to the 
world’s major central banks. These efforts built on earlier efforts: In December of 2007, the 
Federal Reserve authorized temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the 
European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Canada, Bank of England and Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) for up to US$24 billion dollars in total.48 By late September of 2008, the Federal Reserve 
had made similar arrangements with the Bank of Japan, National Bank of Denmark, Bank of 
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 H.M. Treasury; Financial support to the banking industry, Press Notice 100/08, 8 Oct. 2008; available at 
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm (accessed 12 March 2014) 
47
 See Arner D W; The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences; (infra n.77) 
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Norway, Reserve Bank of Australia, and Bank of Sweden. The aggregate amount authorized 
over this period rose from US$24 billion to US$620 billion. By 13 October, the Federal Reserve 
had agreed to provide unlimited dollar liquidity to the ECB, Bank of England, Swiss National 
Bank and Bank of Japan. 
 
While not sufficient to prevent widespread economic consequences, this coordinated approach 
and subsequent actions at the domestic and international level have been sufficient both to 
prevent the collapse of the global financial system and return it to operation. 49 
 
5.4.1 Global Financial Framework after Bretton Woods and Global Financial 
Integration 
The Bretton Woods system was designed by the allied powers under the leadership of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. As discussed in Chapter Four, this design incidentally 
reinforced the economic positions of the US and UK; which is obvious to date. That design was 
overwhelmingly based on the grounds of trade liberalization, closed domestic financial systems, 
and fixed exchange rates. This focus on fixed exchange rates and closed domestic financial 
systems overshadowed efforts directed towards regulation, making this area subject to domestic 
law. Since that time, the world’s economy has reintegrated and become globalized in many 
ways. 
 
The first memorable change occurred in the 1970s with the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in 
Germany and Penn Central in the United States.50 The result was a series of discussions 
among the major jurisdictions involved, hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 
Basel Switzerland51, and later formalized as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
Committee on the Global Financial System, and the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems; all hosted today by the BIS.52 
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This highlighted that not only was international finance of increasing importance, but also that there was significant 
interlinking between domestic financial intermediaries and systems which raised real cross-border risks. 
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It was established in 1930 to act as a centre for central bank cooperation. However, the Bretton Woods Conference 
called for its liquidation. See Lastra R.M.; Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability; OUP 2006 p.346 
  
52
 See Weber R. & Arner D.; Toward a New Design For International Financial Regulation; University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 29, 2007, p392. 
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As international finance has developed and globalized, it has faced a number of crises, 
including: the developing country debt crisis of the 1980s; the global stock market collapse of 
1987; periodic collapses of international financial intermediaries such as, Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI), Barings, and Long Term Capital Management (LTCM); and 
financial crises with international implications in Europe, Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Turkey, and 
Argentina, among others. Each of these events resulted in international efforts to prevent similar 
situations through financial regulatory cooperation. Today, following development over the past 
decades, international financial regulation focuses not only on the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the BIS, but also on an ever-increasing number of international financial organizations such 
as the Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
as a result of varying levels of formality involved in the development, implementation, and 
monitoring of international financial standards. 
 
However, the Bretton Woods system as designed never actually functioned: the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) was ‘still-born’ (though ultimately reincarnated as the WTO in 1994 
after fifty years in the limbo as GATT).53 Likewise, the role of the World Bank was assumed in 
many ways, first by the bilateral efforts of the United States through the Marshall Plan and 
related reconstruction initiatives, and later by the European Community with its aid programs for 
Southern and Eastern European countries, leaving the World Bank to focus on developing 
(mainly post-colonial) countries; the role it continues to play today. Nonetheless, the design for 
monetary relations, with the IMF at the centre of a system of fixed exchange rates based on the 
U.S. dollar and its link to gold, did function until the early 1970s. 
 
Fifty years after the creation of the Bretton Woods system, the deficiencies of the existing 
international institutions and arrangements in dealing with the changed nature of global finance 
came dramatically to light through the Mexican, East Asian, and other financial crises that 
followed in the 80’s and 90’s. Since that time, the IMF, World Bank, and WTO have gradually 
been forced to adjust accordingly. 
 
Following the Mexican financial crisis, the Group of Seven Industrialized Countries (G-7) called 
on other countries to support the international monetary system to develop financing 
arrangements to help prevent and deal with the beginning of international financial crises in 
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emerging economies.54 The Deputies of the G-10 established a Working Party to consider the 
issues arising relating to the orderly resolution of sovereign liquidity crises, which was formally 
endorsed and released in May 1996.55 Overall, in the immediate aftermath of the Mexican crisis, 
the emphasis was very much on improving existing mechanisms, however with a new focus on 
the development of international standards. 
 
After the Asian financial crisis, the discussions on the IMF’s role in transparency and liquidity 
increased, with a new focus on whether there was a need to reform the existing international 
financial architecture. These discussions first looked to the changed nature of international 
finance and the implications of these changes. Two specific areas received the greatest 
attention: crisis prevention and crisis resolution. Both of these issues largely arose due to the 
changed nature of the international financial system due to globalization. As the decade 
progressed, a clear feature of international finance was the occurrence of a series of financial 
crises, often with international or global implications; exactly the sort of crises that the Bretton 
Woods system was designed to prevent.  
 
Following the US led international rescue after the Mexican financial crisis, leaders of the 
developed economies recognized the need to develop mechanisms to deal with the potentially 
systemic dangers of such crises. It became evident that a financial system that is robust is less 
susceptible to the risk of a crisis in the wake of real economic disturbances and is more resilient 
in the face of crises that do occur. In its report, the G-10 focused on three central elements 
necessary to the development of a robust financial system: Firstly, the creation of an institutional 
setting and financial infrastructure necessary for a sound credit culture and effective market 
functioning; Secondly, the promotion of functioning of markets so that owners, directors, 
investors, and other actual and potential stakeholders exercise adequate discipline over 
financial intermediaries; and thirdly, the creation of regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
that complement and support market discipline. In addition, the World Bank and regional 
development banks were given a leading role in providing technical assistance to countries 
seeking to build robust financial systems. The focus since the Mexican financial crisis has 
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http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1995halifax/communique/index.html (accessed 12 March 2014) (providing the 
general results and findings of the summit). 
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 See G10; The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to the Ministers And Governors prepared under 
the auspices of the Deputies (1996). Available online at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014) 
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therefore come to rest on the concept of “financial stability” as the primary target in preventing 
financial crises and reducing the severe risks of financial problems that do occur from time to 
time.  
 
Financial Stability: 
Financial stability was considered therefore both the absence of financial crisis and the normal 
operation of financial intermediaries and markets.56 The emerging international strategy for the 
development of financial stability was described as a system of international financial 
standards.57 
 
The G-7 at their Lyon Summit in 1996 directed the international financial institutions and 
international financial organizations— especially the IMF, World Bank and Basel Committee to 
develop standards for financial regulation to be implemented in developed, developing, 
emerging, and transition economies, as well as to develop solutions for domestic crises with 
international implications. As a result, a wide range of institutions and organizations have been 
producing standards in a number of areas. The only new institution to emerge from the auspices 
of these discussions was the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in February 1999 which 
subsequently became the Financial Stability Board (FSB).58 
 
The FSF was established to serve the role of the coordinator in the system of international 
standards and to promote these standards. In addition to the international financial institutions, 
other formal international organizations, such as the OECD are of importance. Finally, much 
standard-setting takes place through various international financial organizations of varying 
levels of formality.  
                                               
56
 Weber and Arner; Towards a New Design for International Financial Regulation; Quintyn M and Taylor M go a step 
further suggesting that “the achievement of financial stability... is now generally considered a public good.” See 
Quintyn M & Taylor M, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability 8 (IMF, Working Paper 
WP/02/46, Mar. 2002). 
57
 This standard has four levels, incorporating both existing and new international institutions and organizations. At 
the first level, there is a structure and process which has mainly been established through political processes. At the 
second level, the process focuses on international standard-setting, largely of a technocratic nature. At the third level, 
there is the process of implementation of standards, in principle a domestic process, but with technical assistance 
through a variety of international, regional, and bilateral sources. At the fourth level, there is a process of monitoring 
the implementation of standards 
58
It was the Financial Stability Forum; describing the creation, purpose, and work of the Financial Stability Forum, 
now available online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org (accessed 12 March 2014) 
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The FSF and the BIS served the primary role in coordination of the process of standard-setting 
and its purpose were primarily to promote international financial stability, secondly, to improve 
the functioning of markets, and thirdly to reduce systemic risk through enhanced information 
exchange and international cooperation in financial market supervision and surveillance. An 
important element of the standard-setting process involves monitoring the implementation of 
international standards around the world.  
 
Implementation is primarily a domestic process, but it is supported by a range of international 
assistance mechanisms. Monitoring mainly takes place at the international level through the 
international financial institutions, especially the IMF and the World Bank. Specifically, the IMF 
works through its annual Article IV consultations.59 The IMF and the World Bank collaborate 
through Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) and Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs (FSAP). The OECD and the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF) also engage in monitoring, with the FATF playing an influential role in the 
context of money laundering and terrorism financing. At the regional level, regional development 
banks encourage implementation through their respective projects and reviews.60  
 
In addition, regional economic associations should play a role; in cases such as the European 
Union, these associations may play a very important one. This is one of the loudest points 
advocated in the African chapter. At the bilateral level, some countries (especially the United 
States) are keen to support the implementation of certain standards, such as those of the FATF. 
Finally, at the market level, the rating agencies can play a role in monitoring standards. 
 
5.4.2 Problems with large complex global financial institutions  
Based on the information thus far, it can be said that international financial regulation is typically 
an accumulation of institutions, organizations, international standards, and domestic laws and 
                                               
59
 Available online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm (accessed 12 March 2014). The Fund’s 
regulatory powers comprise also Article VIII, section 2. Article VIII (which remains unaltered since its original 
formulations) imposes some ‘general obligations’ upon member countries with regard to the absence of restrictions in 
international transactions. Article VI (as amended in 1976, effective 1978) refers to the ‘obligations regarding 
exchange arrangements’ which forms the basis of the exercise of surveillance by the Fund. See. Lastra R.M.; Legal 
Foundations of International Monetary Stability; p.393  
60
It is worth noting that the African development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank are all exercising this role. 
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rules in many ways not designed to address the requirements of the continuing integration of 
domestic economies into an increasingly globalized financial system. While the original Bretton 
Woods design was for a coherent global economic governance structure, today’s milieu of 
actors lacks any consistent overarching economic, institutional, or legal framework. In fact some 
commentators assert that international financial regulation has developed in reaction to the 
globalization of finance. The challenges that the Bretton Woods institutions face in the 21st 
Century are remarkably different from the challenges these two institutions- IMF and World 
Bank-confronted when they started operations in Washington DC in May 1946.61 
 
In spite of all these, arguments have been made in favour of incorporating development issues 
explicitly in any framework- this suggestion fuels the discussion in Chapter Six which follows. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the system should be designed to address the realities of the 
global financial system and the increasing integration of domestic economies; in this context, 
the overall objective is to support financial stability and financial development. The Bretton 
Woods system was designed to support global trade but not global finance. As a result, it 
cannot simply argue in favour of returning to the old system but must look towards the 
requirements of today’s reality. 
 
Almost twenty years ago, the world experienced the first failure of a large complex global 
financial institution (LCGFI), the insolvency of BCCI.62 Although the BCCI fiasco was not a 
collapse of systemic significance, it did result in major domestic regulatory reforms respecting 
cross-border supervision as well as serious international efforts to both prevent the failure of 
LCGFIs (especially banks) and begin a regulatory and policy conversation that continue today 
respecting how to develop systems, mechanisms and procedures to address such failures. 
Serious complications regarding insolvency issues (liquidation, set-off and so on) were raised 
given that the lack of agreement on an insolvency regime brought about conflicts with regards to 
the treatment of deposits and assets at branches in different countries 
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 See Lastra R.M.; Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability; p347 
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 Because of its complex structure, BCCI operated largely on a non-transparent basis, with no single bank regulator 
or audit firm having a full view and control over the entire enterprise. Due to large scale fraud and corrupt and criminal 
practices at the core of the enterprise, the UK and US regulators, in conjunction with the Luxembourg and Cayman 
Island authorities, closed BCCI in 1991 and forced it into liquidation. For further discussion see Lord Justice Bingham, 
Inquiry into the supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (London: HMSO, Oct 1992); Kerry J &  
Brown H, “The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate (Dec 1992, 102d Congress 
2d Session Senate Print 102-140). 
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Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the current financial crisis, these efforts, while important, 
have not been sufficient to prevent the current global financial turmoil. Most importantly, they did 
not stop the collapse of Lehman brothers. As shall be seen later, the effective and timely 
resolution of insolvencies is probably one of the most important elements of a well-designed 
safety-net. The existence of weak financial intermediaries can undermine the entire financial 
system. Therefore, weak financial intermediaries should either be on a path that will restore their 
financial health or, if that is not deemed to feasible, closed in a timely fashion.63 
 
In November 2008, the G20 highlighted the necessity of addressing the regulation of complex 
financial institutions both domestically and globally. Specifically, on 15 November 2008, 
following two days of meetings in Washington DC, the heads of government and finance 
ministers of the G20 released their Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the 
World Economy.64 In this Declaration, the G20 discussed the causes of the crisis and committed 
to supporting an open global economy, defining a range of actions to be taken (under the 
supervision of G20 finance ministers and experts who were tasked to do so) in order to reform 
financial regulation to avoid future crises. The G20 heads of government established five main 
principles to guide reforms: Firstly, strengthening transparency and accountability; Secondly, 
enhancing sound regulation; Thirdly, promoting integrity in financial markets; Fourthly, 
reinforcing international cooperation and fifthly, reforming the financial architecture.65 
 
Historically, banking regulation developed as a response to crises resulting from the nature of 
banking business as a fractional reserve system based upon the management of credit and 
duration risks; a system works perfectly so long as depositors remain confident in the safety of 
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 Arner D.W.; Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law; Cambridge University Press, 2007 p140-
141 
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Available online at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014) Built 
upon the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors communiqué from the previous week: G20, 
Communiqué: Meeting of Ministers and Governors, Sao Paolo, Brazil 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/2008_communique_saopaulo_brazil.pdf  (accessed 12 March 2014) 
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 For each of these five principles, the leaders established a detailed action plan, incorporating immediate to be 
taken by 31
st
 March 2009) and medium term actions, pending a second G20 heads of government summit in London 
in April 2009. The Action Plans addressed three areas: First, regulatory regimes. Available online at 
http://www.g20.org/G20/webapp/publicEN/publication/communiques/doc/G20%20Summit%20Declaration.pdf 
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their money with individual banks. As a result, the risk is that the collapse of one bank could 
lead to transmittable loss of confidence, resulting in bank runs, potentially causing the collapse 
not only of individual banks, but also of the banking system as a whole (systemic risk) and the 
consequent collapse of economic activity in general.66 This risk today is considerably expanded 
and worsened as bank, capital and other financial markets and intermediaries have become 
increasingly interconnected to form a much broader financial system than had ever previously 
existed (which some may argue should have been anticipated by those behind the design of the 
Bretton Woods system). 
 
5.4.3 Lender of Last Resort 
In response to this existent problem, the theory of the need for a “lender of last resort” by Henry 
Thornton in 1802 (and later articulated by Walter Bagehot in 1873) was developed.67 The lender 
of last resort would provide liquidity support in order to allow solvent banks with good collateral 
to meet depositors’ demands and avoid closure. This will in turn support confidence and avoid 
potential systemic collapse. The next problem, of course, is the theory of ‘moral hazard’. 
Specifically, in this context, moral hazard has two components: first, potential incentives to 
management to take additional (perhaps excessive) risks due to the promise of a government 
bailout; And second, the consequent risk to public funds due to the potential expense.68The 
response to this problem has been the development of what may be termed the traditional 
process of bank regulation and supervision. Under this formulation, the goal of the traditional 
regulatory and supervisory process should simply do as it says on the tin: the prevention and 
resolution of financial intermediary crises. Unfortunately, while the goal is simple, its 
achievement is anything but simple; Although bank and nonbank financial institutions are 
increasingly interconnected, the regulatory approach and policies vary considerably.  
 
At the same time, international attention began to focus to a greater extent on these issues than 
ever before. In their April 2009 meetings, the G20 and FSF addressed these issues and the 
G20 communiqué stated that “major failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation 
                                               
 
66
See Arner D. & Norton J.J.; Building a framework to address failure of complex global financial institutions. Hong 
Kong Law Journal, Vol.39, 2009, p119. 
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 Ibid. 
 
68
 Ideally, the second should not exist, but more often than not, authorities shift from pure liquidity support (which 
should not entail public expenses) to more general solvency support (which can entail very high public expense). 
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and supervision were fundamental causes of the crisis”69, and committing “to extend regulation 
and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions, instruments and markets”.70  
 
It is worth mentioning that, there is a debate on the need for an international LLR as a 
consequence of the globalization and interdependence of financial markets across the world. 
The fear of domestic crisis to expand by contagion has led to the IMF as a de facto international 
LLR.71  
 
5.4.4 Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
In an annex to the April London communiqué, the FSF was renamed and reconstituted as the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). Its main objective inter alia, was to “set guidelines. for, and 
support the establishment, functioning of, and participation in, supervisory colleges, including 
through ongoing identification of the most systemically important cross-border firms” and to 
“support contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to 
systemically important firms”, including “to support continued efforts by the IMF, FSB, World 
Bank, and BCBS to develop an international framework for cross-border bank resolution 
arrangements”.  At the same time, reflecting that such efforts are in reality in most cases still at 
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G20, London Summit – Leaders’ Statement, London, 2 Apr 2009, available online at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_communique_020409.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014) 
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 Ibid. 
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 As was seen in Chapter three, the adequacy of this assertion has tested within Europe on how to deal with 
Greece’s budget crisis and discussions over a possible rescue plan. The UK and Sweden suggest that if Greece 
required help, IMF is best placed to assist. This breaks away from the positions held by others such as Germany and 
France. There are many dissimilar positions held by countries in the Eurozone but British officials suggest that the 
IMF might need to be brought in because the troubles of the Euro-zone’s weaker states risked spreading contagion to 
non-euro countries, (which in my opinion makes absolute sense). On the other hand, other governments fear IMF 
involvement would represent a strategic setback for Europe’s ambition to assert its global economic power with the 
help of a rock-solid currency and a shared sense of fiscal discipline. Greece’s socialist government would also be 
tempted to avoid accepting an IMF bail-out for political reasons because it would imply a partial surrender of 
sovereignty to a ‘US-based organization’.  It will be interesting to find out how this unfolds given that it will certainly 
have a knock-on effect on the credibility of the IMF with regards to its ability to be the unchallenged ‘international 
lender of last resort’. 
For discussion points see Sachs J; The International Lender of Last Resort: what are the alternatives? Available 
online at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf43/181p.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014) 
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an early stage, the G20 recognised “the importance of further work and international 
cooperation on the subject of exit strategies”.72  
 
In this respect, the working group concluded in its Recommendation 7 that “large complex 
financial institutions require particularly robust oversight given their systemic importance, which 
arises in part from their size and interconnectedness (or correlation) with other institutions, and 
from their influence on markets” with responsibility assigned to the FSB and prudential 
supervisors.73 
 
It must be noted that, the FSF released the most considerable attempt thus far to address 
issues of failure resolution: the FSF Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis 
Management.74 In this document, the FSF stated “the objective of financial crisis management is 
to seek to prevent serious domestic or international financial instability that would have an 
adverse impact on the real economy”. At the same time, it recognised that such financial crisis 
management “remains a domestic competence”, nonetheless requiring cross-border 
cooperation. In relation to preparation, authorities will “develop common support tools for 
managing a cross-border financial crisis, including: these principles; A key data list; A common 
language for assessing systemic implications (drawing on those developed by the European 
Union and by national authorities); A document that authorities can draw on when considering 
together the specific issues that may arise in handling severe stress at specific firms; And an 
experience library, which pools key lessons from different crises.” In addition, supervisors will 
meet at least annually through the college framework, share a range of information on LCGFIs, 
and ensure that firms have internal contingency plans in place.75 
 
While the recent pronouncements from the G20 and FSB are a very useful start, especially in 
relation to regulation, supervision and contingency planning for LCGFI failure, the statements, 
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reports and principles to date while recognising the problems raised by LCGFI failure, largely 
leave actual resolution to domestic authorities. In the final analysis, individual jurisdictions will 
have to carefully act proactively and consider their own arrangements respecting potential 
failure of any LCGFI operating within their jurisdiction and take appropriate precautionary 
actions ex ante as there is still insufficient consensus in respect of actual insolvency 
arrangements for any international framework to emerge at present.76 
 
5.4.5 Contagion and Systemic risk 
Systemic risk had not been properly evaluated and handled in the past. Systemic risk is defined 
as: “The risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant 
increases in uncertainty about a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious 
enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the economy. Systemic risk events 
can be sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence can build up through time 
in the absence of appropriate policy, responses. The adverse real economic effects from 
systemic problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to 
credit flows, and from the destruction of asset values.”77 
 
Following the demise of Bear Stearns in March 2008, market confidence continued to 
deteriorate, with financial institutions increasingly wary of dealing with one another, thus 
securities firms such as Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, mortgage lenders such as 
Washington Mutual and Hypo Real Estate, quasi-public mortgage market institutions such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, CDS providers such as AIG, and banking groups such as 
Citigroup, UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) were all vulnerable, with each case signalling 
the potential for systemic risk.  
 
While in each case there was potential systemic risk, it was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
on 15 September 2008 which finally triggered the global systemic financial crisis of autumn 
2008. As a result of the crisis, the governments of the United States, the European Union and 
Switzerland, among others, were forced to intervene dramatically in order to prevent the 
systemic financial crisis from becoming a systemic financial collapse. Their efforts included 
interest rate cuts, massive liquidity infusions (quantitative easing), capital injections, guarantees 
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and asset purchases.78 This systemic financial crisis highlighted the need for significant 
changes in both domestic and global financial regulation to prevent future systemic financial 
crises. 
 
As is often the case with financial crises, many of the underlying factors leading to the current 
global credit crisis arose from responses to previous crises. This crisis is no different and certain 
underlying factors date as far back as the design of the U.S. financial regulatory system in the 
Great Depression of the 1930. One of the underlying causes of the GFC was a divergence 
between domestic regulatory structures and the realities of global finance. This was most 
acutely the case in the US but also in the UK. In the context of the United States following the 
Great Depression, the economic response of the newly elected Roosevelt administration was 
the New Deal although ultimately it was the economic stimulus provided by World War II which 
finally brought the United States out of the Great Depression.79 
 
The financial response however differed dramatically from the response to the GFC: instead of 
government intervention at an early stage, the government focused on market-based solutions, 
closing banks, liquidating firms, and so on. It was in many ways the response to the financial 
shock which ensured that the economic consequences would be severe. In addition to its 
economic interventions, the Roosevelt administration also initiated the wholesale redesign of the 
U.S. financial system through legislation. These series of legislation was designed to address all 
aspects of the U.S. financial system which essentially established a financial system divided into 
banking, securities and insurance sectors, with the intention of reducing contagious risks and 
excesses that were seen to have characterized the 1920s.80  
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 The result was a major economic crisis across the world, although it was not to the extent of the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. 
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 Policy and financial matters would be coordinated in the government by the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve System was reinforced in its dual role focusing on the sometimes 
conflicting objectives of monetary stability and LLR. The banking sector was to be regulated at both the state and 
federal level and significantly, the Banking Act 1933(Glass-Steagall) banned banks from participating in nonbanking 
activities. The term “investment bank” resulted from the division of existing financial conglomerates into banks, 
securities firms (henceforward `investment banks`) and insurance companies. The securities sector was to be 
primarily regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the various securities laws. Insurance 
matters were left purely to state law and state regulators. With certain changes, this regulatory system continues to 
exist (some assert that the complexity of this system was bound to produce overlaps and gaps of which they were 
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In 1983, the global financial system experienced a major episode of systemic risk although it did 
not lead to a systemic collapse; this was the Developing Country Debt Crisis. This forced 
developed countries led by the US and UK to develop a new internationally agreed minimum 
capital standard. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), hosted by 
the BIS reached an agreement. The result of this meeting was the 1988 Basel Capital Accord 
and although only intended to apply to internationally active G10 banks, it became the 
international standard for bank capital regulation around the world and has been implemented 
through formal domestic legal arrangements in more than 100 countries.  
 
At its simplest, the 1988 Accord was intended to  reduce systemic risk through requiring banks 
to hold a minimum amount of capital against risks, and secondly, to limit regulatory competition 
and arbitrage, thereby providing a level playing field for internationally active banks. As a factual 
matter, the first goal was a response to the problems which resulted from the 1980s debt crisis, 
wherein large international banks made significant loans to developing countries, which 
subsequently defaulted. The subsequent default raised a very real risk of an international 
systemic banking crisis: Failure of the majority of the world’s ten largest banks was only averted 
through careful regulatory leniency and financial restructuring efforts (for both the international 
banks and their developing country borrowers) across the second half of the 1980s. 
 
In spite of this, by the end of the 1990s following the Asian crisis, the near failure (and bailout) of 
LTCM, these series of underlying events led to the view that a new model of universal banking 
had emerged.  
 
Following amendments and modifications in the 1990s, recognizing that the 1988 Accord 
suffered from numerous problems (especially relating to the way in which it dealt with risk 
classification), the Basel Committee began work on developing a new capital accord in 1999; 
Basel II. After approximately five years of discussion, consultation and market testing, in 2004, 
the Basel Committee released the final agreed framework.81 In 2005, the Committee released a 
slightly revised and updated version to address certain aspects of trading activities and, in 2006, 
                                                                                                                                                       
clearly brought to light in 2008). However, the financial and economic environment in which it operates has changed 
completely, not least as a result of globalization, technology and complexity.  
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Basel Committee, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised 
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released a comprehensive document incorporating unchanged elements of the 1988 Accord 
and subsequent amendments into a single framework.82  
 
Basel II is intended to provide an overall system of risk based supervision and risk management 
(internal and market) for banks.83 Following this framework, Basel II implements a number of 
changes through elements based upon three ‘pillars’: Pillar I addresses minimum capital 
requirements; Pillar II addresses supervisory review; And Pillar III addresses market discipline 
through disclosure requirements. The system is intended to be an evolutionary system.84  
 
5.4.6 Crisis and Response Reflections 
The plan outlined by the G20 and being implemented by the FSB and others provides a 
significant comprehensive outline of the major issues which are to be addressed in this respect. 
Conversely, it does not provide a significant amount of guidance in respect of the future of 
finance.  
 
As attempts are made to revamp the global financial architecture, some commentators stipulate 
that while international cooperation on regulatory reform is difficult to achieve on a piecemeal 
basis, it may be attainable in a grand bargain that rearranges the entire financial order. They 
argue that a new Bretton Woods conference, like the one that established the post-WWII 
international financial architecture, is needed to establish new international rules, including 
treatment of financial institutions that are too big to fail and the role of capital controls.85 There is 
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also scepticism over those institutions that survived as they now appear to hold stronger market 
positions than ever, and that they will resist a systematic overhaul.  
 
In addition, a new Bretton Woods would have to reform the currency system. The post-war 
order, which made the US more equal than others, produced dangerous imbalances. The dollar 
no longer enjoys the trust and confidence that it once did, yet no other currency can take its 
place.86 Also, the IMF will have to be reconstituted to reflect better the prevailing pecking order 
among states and to revise its methods of operation.   
 
Financial crises are inevitable. Regulation remains very important in reducing the frequency and 
severity of such failures and at the same time in providing appropriate incentives to 
stakeholders to maximise efficiency and minimise systemic risk. However, we need to bear in 
mind that over the past two decades, significant efforts have been made internationally and 
within major jurisdictions to upgrade prudential standards for financial institutions yet these were 
not sufficient to prevent the systemic crisis in autumn 2008. Key indicators should be devised in 
order to detect financial distress at an early stage and to assist its resolution in a timely manner 
so as to prevent a loss of confidence in the financial system.  
 
For the regulator to be proactive in respect of financial crises, early detection of a financial crisis 
is essential. Causes of a financial crisis are multiple and diverse, therefore various signals can 
indicate an impending financial crisis. A financial crisis surfaces from various routes, depending 
on the group of people affected or to whom information on financial distress is available. All 
these will assist regulators to intervene in a preventive and prompt manner when a financial 
institution or the financial system begins to show signs of fragility prior to actual insolvency. In 
addition, if such preventive intervention is not successful, the regulator then needs to be able to 
act promptly and orderly in closing and liquidating failed institution. 
 
The next part of this chapter places these preceding discussions within an African perspective. 
In this connection, a review is made on the extent to which the GFC affected the African 
continent, specifically Sub-Sahara Africa. Going forward, the argument for a new African 
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sovereignty to offer better protection and a more appropriate support system for the financial 
markets will be made. This will enhance the continent’s preparedness for any future crisis that 
may occur by mitigating the risk and exposure from global financial integration. However, I will 
revert to the point that any solution for Africa should go alongside global solutions for 
development problems. This matter is developed further in the subsequent chapter. 
 
Part 4 
 
5.5 Impact of the GFC on the African continent 
Many African countries enjoyed strong economic growth in the early 2000’s which positively 
changed their balance sheets. Better economic policies and a favourable external environment 
increased support in the form of debt relief and higher inflows.87  
 
The GFC that started in 2007 affected African countries quite differently from developed and 
emerging economies. While developed countries were hit first by the systemic banking crisis in 
the US and Europe, Emerging markets were affected mostly by cross-border financial linkages 
through capital flows, stock market investors, and exchange rates. Developing economies 
suffered in terms of lagging growth and trade figures.88  
 
Within Africa, emerging markets suffered first. South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya were 
first hit by virtue of their financial links with the developed regions in the world. This resulted in a 
fall in equity markets, reversal of capital flows and pressures on exchange rates. In fact Ghana 
and Kenya postponed planned borrowing89, and in South Africa and Nigeria external financing 
for corporations and banks became limited. 
 
For the majority of other countries, the prices of commodities were pushed down due to a 
reduced global economic activity. These had adverse effects on export earnings and the 
                                               
87
 See Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 2: “The Great Sub-Saharan African Growth Takeoff: 
Lessons and Prospects,” October 2008 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
88
 IMF Report: Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa: African Department, 2009; available 
online at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/books/2009/afrglobfin/ssaglobalfin.pdf (accessed 18 June 2015) 
89
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Impact of the Financial Crisis on Africa; 15 April 2009; available 
online at http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/04/14/impact-of-financial-crisis-on-africa-pub-22995 (accessed 20 June 
2015) 
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external current account, fiscal revenues, and household incomes. In fact commodity exporters 
faced major deterioration in terms of trade. IMF research shows that in the past a 1 percentage 
point slowdown in global growth has led to an estimated ½ percentage point slowdown in sub-
Saharan African countries.90 Alas this time, the tightening of global credit compounded the 
impact of the reduced economic activity, thereby worsening risks for trade finance and other 
capital flows. 
 
With regards to the more fragile states with more inherently vulnerable political and social 
situations concessional financing was affected. Countries like Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Liberia are dependent on very concessional financing.91 
 
It is worth mentioning that unlike in the developed markets where a systemic banking crisis 
persisted, in sub- Saharan Africa, the commercial banks and other financial institutions 
remained stable. This is so because there are not many cross-border banking system linkages 
and there is less exposure to complex financial products. Also, low financial integration partly 
explains why Africa escaped both the sub-prime and banking crises. In fact no African country 
announced a bank rescue plan at the scale seen in many developed countries. No difficulties 
have been reported on African sovereign wealth funds and the eventual impact on their returns. 
Generally, African banks have not engaged in complex derivative products and are not heavily 
dependent on external financing.92 
 
Furthermore the financial systems are fragmented and not well integrated with other global 
financial markets. However any further increase in integration with the global financial system 
will proportionately increase exposure to system risk. Nevertheless the IMF report suggests that 
prolonged crisis exposed the African financial system to growing risk.93 This is so because: 
 
 
 
                                               
90
 Ibid, p.3 
91
 Ibid 
92
 African Development Bank Working Paper Series: Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on Africa; 
Working Paper No.96, March 2009. Available online at: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/BAD%2096%20Anglais%20%20INTERNET%20
PDF.pdf (accessed 20 June 2015) 
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 IMF report (n.88, p.4-6) 
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(a) Credit risk: 
A prolonged economic crisis increases credit risk. For example, domestic financial systems are 
susceptible to reduced client incomes and capabilities to service debt especially where credit 
growth has been rapid in recent years. Also, banks could incur losses on other financial assets, 
such as deposits with troubled correspondent banks. 
 
(b) Concentrated bank portfolios 
Furthermore, concentrated bank portfolios have become a source of vulnerability in several 
African countries. As global demand for most commodities such as oil, timber and cotton 
reduces, this causes a significant decline in prices and as such these industries are hard hit. 
Commodity exports are one of the main drivers of economic growth therefore reduction in these 
have an adverse effect on the growth of the economy. As a result, fiscal balances are also likely 
to reduce because tax revenues, tied to commodity sales would decline.  Generally, rising 
demand for social spending compounds the stress on government budgets. With fewer 
resources at reduced prices, countries will struggle to reach their development goals in 
managing issues such as poverty.  Also, there is growing dependence on export receipts from 
other industries such as tourism and transportation services in sub-Saharan Africa particularly in 
the low-income countries.94Problems in all these sectors could quickly spill over into the banking 
sector.  
 
(c) Stock market investments 
In countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda where high equity returns led to borrowing for 
investment in the stock market the banking systems are at most risk because they remain 
exposed to market volatility.  
 
(d) Contagion from foreign parent banks 
Also, the risks of contagion from distressed foreign parent banks to local subsidiaries within 
Sub-Saharan Africa could lead to parent banks withdrawing capital from their local African 
subsidiaries; calling in early the loans to their African subsidiaries; stop investing local profits in 
local subsidiaries; or a combination of these.  This is particularly impactful in countries such as 
                                               
94
 Oil and metal exporters have been hardest hit: oil prices have fallen over 60 percent from their mid- 2008 peak. Oil 
exporters are going from fiscal and current account surpluses in 2007–08 to deficits in 2009, putting pressure on 
fiscal and external accounts. Oil importers benefit from falling oil prices but are affected by the decline in the prices of 
other commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, or cotton, and by lower global demand.  
217 
 
 
 
Mozambique, Swaziland and Madagascar where the share of foreign bank assets reaches 
100%. The headquarters of these foreign banks are located mainly in France, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom, where banking institutions suffered tremendous losses in stock capitalization 
and profit during the GFC. Nevertheless, the contagion effect on the subsidiary was weakened 
as compared to that of the parent bank following market capitalization because losses were not 
passed down to the African subsidiaries. In fact, some subsidiaries of foreign banks saw a 
considerable increase in their market capitalization. Examples include: Swaziland Nedbank, 
Bank of Africa Benin and Standard Bank of Ghana which saw their market capitalization 
increase between July 2007 and January 2009.95 
 
It is worth adding that even remittances to African countries fell following the GFC due to job 
cuts and the decline of activity in the mining sector. This is quite significant because of the 
remittances have become a major source of externalise financing in many African countries. To 
put this into context, the total volume of remittances to Africa stood at $38 billion in 2007.96 The 
slowdown in the amount of remittances has a direct adverse effect on the welfare of households 
which require these funds to sustain immediate pressing needs such as food, education, 
household bills and healthcare. 
 
5.5.1 Going Forward – Crisis Response and African Sovereignty 
Although Africa was isolated from a direct impact by the GFC, it was not completely insulated 
from risk and exposure. Even though it has underdeveloped and fragmented financial markets 
with partial links to the global financial system, there were other factors such as low commodity 
prices and reduced external demand that affected it. Nevertheless the African financial sector 
was hit relatively mildly as compared to the more developed and emerging regions.  
 
The major challenge presented in Africa was that of navigating the GFC to mobilize resources in 
order to finance growth, development, investment projects and poverty reduction programs. This 
required African countries to improve their performance in resource mobilization at the national 
and regional level. 
 
In terms of specific crisis response within the African continent, this remained pegged to the 
responses decided at the global stage as policy decisions at the global level which would filter 
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 ADB Working Paper (n.92, p.3) 
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down to the African financial system. With regards to the banking sector for example, changes 
to the integration of African banks into the global financial market and banking organization 
structures remained negligible. Most African countries still have little access to capital flows 
other than through foreign direct investment. 
 
To this end, improvement will require that African countries develop their performance in 
resource mobilization at the national and regional level. However, long-term strategies must be 
oriented toward building more resilience to the crisis and sustaining growth. Also, supporting 
domestic growth drivers is essential at both the national and regional levels. This will require 
close collaboration between key sector departments such as trade and finance, tourism, mining 
and other export oriented activities is also essential at the national and regional level.  
 
The financial sector, especially banks, must be monitored vigilantly in order to minimize 
vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. This is essential given that African financial systems are 
dominated by the banking sector.  
 
At this juncture, I advocate the need for strengthening existing regulatory and supervisory 
institutions in the continent most especially the Central Banks in a bid to award the financial 
system and economies more protection. These institutions are capable of managing financial 
activity and simply need the requisite authority to do so. Not one put on paper but rather one 
backed by strong political will and commitment. This recommendation is rooted in the concept of 
African sovereignty which has been elaborated over the course of the preceding chapters. 
African sovereignty will ensure the a robust financial system structure for the entire continent 
and provide a suitable ecosystem for the drivers of economic growth to flourish. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter identified five main causal factors of the GFC. They should be dealt with through 
appropriate action. I find Walker’s recommendations very useful in terms of addressing the 
corrections of these causes. He asserts that credit accumulation must be monitored and 
managed appropriately by the monetary authorities at all times. 
 
Also, appropriate standards of transparency and disclosure must be maintained especially in 
relation to the more complex innovative products and financing techniques which are common 
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place in this century. Existing and new instruments must be valued and rated properly with their 
effects on associated bank and other financial institution share prices properly assessed.  
 
Again, the quality and effectiveness of individual bank internal risk management systems must 
be confirmed in every case. Areas of underlying high risk activity (such as sub-prime lending) 
should insofar as possible be managed directly and immediately and not incorporated into larger 
more complex products with the destabilising effects that that may have on the repackaged debt 
and the subsequent solvency of the purchasing banks or other institutions concerned. 
Furthermore, with regards to liquidity and capital reserves requirements, there is need for 
central banks to continue developing new techniques for inter-bank management. 
 
Other technical causes of the GFC can be summarised into three key headings as: the 
inconsistent closure of Lehman brothers; the consequent cyclic systemic contagion in all 
markets; and loss of investment confidence. All these had drastic effects on the outlook of the 
GFC. 
 
As the narrative moved from crisis prevention and crisis resolution during the Bretton Woods era 
to growth and stability following the GFC, it now appears obvious that regulation of financial 
markets was not duly given as much deserved attention during the Bretton Woods discussions. 
This is the principal distinction with respect to global responses to the GFC. All in all, while 
much of the detail had been previously addressed by the FSB, the G20 Declarations have 
established the framework for the content of financial regulation going forward. I am thereby 
inclined to think that the move to the G20 is a step in the positive direction. It finally 
acknowledges and gives countries like China, India, Brazil and South Africa the opportunity to 
work together as the leading transition countries to shape an international financial architecture 
more responsive to developing economies. This simply did not happen during the Bretton 
Woods system as everything centred on the USA and UK (the allies, who of course won the war 
and bore the biggest burden, financially and otherwise). 
 
From an African viewpoint, the impact of the financial crisis has been transmitted to African 
economies not through the systemic banking risk and contagion that plagued the advanced and 
emerging economies, but rather through the global recession that followed.  
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It is worth noting that the GFC came at a time when some African countries had made 
significant progress in their development goals. However, the shortage of export revenues, 
foreign finance, and slower economic growth dented any further progress.  
Consequently, this could add more strain on the residual problems which the continent suffers 
and likely deepen poverty rates. Also, the economic deficiencies are likely to be spilled into the 
financial markets as a result of failing new businesses and an increase in credit defaults. 
 
It is therefore imperative that African economies remain stabilized in order to achieve 
development goals. Therefore, African countries need to improve resource mobilization at 
national and regional levels be developing closer cooperation and collaboration between key 
sectors and encouraging long-term strategies to ensure resilience to the crisis by sustaining 
economic growth.  
In the meantime, attention should be shifted towards protecting the poor in order to reduce the 
human impact of any crisis as the GFC. These residual development matters and global 
solutions are now considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: AFRICA, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND 
GLOBALISATION 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters Two and Three provided a review of what constitutes the legal and institutional 
requirements to ensure sustained financial integration. On the back of this, it is clear that 
financial markets and financial integration have been core drivers of regional and global 
integration generally. The efficient operation of financial markets is condicio sine qua non to 
economic growth whether within a domestic or regional context. In terms of fostering and 
sustaining this economic growth in Africa, it is imperative that a continental solution for Africa 
must consider development and globalization issues to provide a more comprehensive solution 
on how to negotiate and manage Africa’s residual difficulties. Certainly, these issues are 
normally country or region specific however a number of common factors can be identified. 
 
This chapter advocates the need for these solutions to be connected with broader global 
solutions within which the African continent can form an important part. In short African 
sovereignty should be superimposed on a larger framework of strategic and sustainable global 
programmes which are strategic and sustainable.  
 
The looming constraints which hold back the economic development and progress within Africa 
are frustrating even though reports of rapid economic growth rates continue to flow. The 
enjoyment of the continent’s rich natural resources, cultural diversity and intellect have been 
delayed by a vicious economic and legal environment which begs the question whether these 
are indeed a gift or a curse. Although many indigenous factors within its control account for this 
vicious environment, significant endogenous factors out of its control have played their own 
part.1  
                                               
1
 The economic and development conditions in Africa were mostly articulated by the UK Commission for Africa set up 
by the UK government under Prime Minister Tony Blair: ‘Our Common Interest; Report of the Commission for Africa; 
March 2005’; available online at http://www.commissionforafrica.info/wp-content/uploads/2005-report/11-03-
05_cr_report.pdf (accessed  01 May 2014). The report which includes a substantial record of the analysis and 
evidence considered delves into the specific problems within Africa and possible solutions as part of a larger 
development plan. The main assumption made was that Africa must drive its own development by taking ownership 
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This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses development and globalization 
issues and establishes the New Global Development Agenda to form the basis for a global 
strategic programme to resolve the world’s most pressing challenges including: poverty and 
debt reduction, governance and capacity building, energy use and climate control, peace and 
security. These problems overlap with the residual challenges Africa faces and as such the 
need for a continental solution to factor in the global solutions is essential. 
 
The second part provides the conclusion which also considers the significance for Africa. This 
will enable the continent to ascertain what lies ahead especially in terms of sustaining its 
competence and preparedness to remain part of the bigger global framework of global 
economic and financial markets.  
 
Part One 
 
6.2 Development amidst Globalization 
Contrary to popular conception, the world is not necessarily managed through domestic 
politicians despite their political, military and economic pretensions. As a matter of fact, the 
earlier 19th century Westphalia model of inter-state diplomacy seen in Chapter One has since 
been replaced by the new economically inter-dependent and market dominated global financial 
structure of the 1990s and beyond.2 Following an earlier period of initial cross-border bank 
expansion during the 1960’s and early 1970’s, a new single global market place in financial 
services has been created especially with the significant improvements available in 
telecommunication and computer software and hardware support as well as associated 
changes in capital mobility and market de-regulation.3 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
of its destiny. Its recommendations centered on governance and capacity building, peace and security, inclusion, 
growth and poverty reduction, trade, resources, implementation and delivery, impact and effect. In addition to 
chapters in each of the main areas in which recommendations are made, it includes an overview of the case for 
action, the legacy and causes of the lost decades and an African perspective on culture, change and development. 
The report stresses that the measures proposed constitute a coherent package for Africa and they must be delivered 
together. 
2
 For comment see: Walker G A: Emerging Markets Law- One World, One Market; (University Lecture notes, 
University of Glasgow, September2012) 
3
 Ibid 
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Walker stresses that the most powerful elements within the new global condition or framework 
created are the markets themselves and subsequently, domestic economies and domestic 
politicians and administrators must have regard to larger economic and market forces and the 
constraints that they impose in determining their local positions and postures.4 He goes on to 
note that even the largest countries are now subject to the heavy restraints imposed on their 
activities by the new global financial forces. In short, the objective of good national governance 
has become the creation of a robust local economy that can fit and operate within the new inter-
connected global financial system created.5 
 
Within the European context for example, following earlier failed attempts at political and military 
union after the first and second world wars, attention turned to economic functionalism as the 
new dominant integration tool. Countries could be brought together on the basis of closely 
defined areas of co-operation having regard to specific matters of common interest. This co-
operation could then be extended to other more general economic areas. The increased degree 
of common interest and dependence created would then generate levels of increased trust, 
familiarity and confidence.6 This attitude represents the quintessential philosophy of the central 
theme of this thesis which is-Continental Sovereignty within Africa. It is expected that this 
economic functionalism and associated core doctrine of mutual recognition will become one of 
the central doctrines for increased cross-border integration in Africa and many other parts of the 
world. 
 
In fact Walker underscores the fact that more recently, cross-border funds transfers and 
investment have become the main stimulants of global integration and following the creation of 
24 hour securities markets during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s,  a new single global financial 
market place was constructed. The associated social, cultural and political linkages that have 
emerged would have become impossible without the underlying improvements achieved in 
capital and financial mobility and cross-border payment and investment. In fact, the human and 
social or societal development cannot be achieved without some minimum level of economic or 
financial security.7 
                                               
4
 Ibid 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Ibid 
7
 Ibid; I agree with Walker who shrewdly endorses the role of financial markets and states that they typically generate 
funds that support and advance individual and social wellbeing; and also normally generate the surplus needed to 
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Accordingly, the construction of a stable and robust market is an essential requirement for all 
subsequent economic, political and social development. Thus, it is good to note that African 
financial markets have come a long way, from a period of barely any involvement in the 
international financial markets, to one of growing international relevance, even during financial 
instability. They still have a long way to go as many of the markets remain small, 
underdeveloped and marginalized from international financial transactions. Even though 
financial integration can considerably enable African financial markets attain their full potential, 
other development issues require strong commitments from African states as well as the rest of 
the world. 
 
The ensuing paragraphs will now conduct an appraisal of a number of recommendations which 
attempt to create the basis for a new development system and larger infrastructure within which 
common global concerns can be dealt with in a consistent and integrated manner. This global 
development agenda and priority programme is a set of recommendations which remains 
mindful of the complex issues and conflicting opinions and interests involved in its 
implementation. Realistically, the achievement of any perfect model solution will be impossible. 
Nevertheless a move towards beneficial compromise may reconcile many of the conflicting 
positions concerned. Whilst this may remain incomplete in terms of adoption and 
implementation at any particular time, the more important accomplishment would at least begin 
to move towards the underlying objectives and themes on which common agreement already 
exists.  
 
6.2.1 New Global Development Agenda  
The following five key ideas can spearhead the priority actions which should begin attempts of 
some immediate and longer-term direction to the processes concerned. They are: sustainable 
                                                                                                                                                       
ensure the less advantageous are able to share in the benefits- (this applies both within national systems and 
between countries at the international level). Markets and the new global financial markets specifically are not the 
core causes of all difficulties in the world as many critics point out; in truth they carry out essential functions without 
which even the most primitive societies could not survive. For instance, they stimulate and promote national, regional 
and international trade and integration and provide necessary resources for welfare development and support at both 
the domestic and global level. 
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development, global governance, individual and cultural protection, climate control and non-
exhaustive energy use, collective peace and security.8 
 
(a) Sustainable Development:  
This must be based on a clear and achievable set of restated policies and goals in connection 
with the promotion of meaningful development, fair trade and appropriate debt reduction. In 
terms of the restatement of development goals, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)9 
(though selective and somewhat narrowly drafted) remained a good starting point in pre-2000’s 
in identifying the necessary needs and objectives to be secured within a narrow timeframe to 
help curtail hardship across many communities the world over.10The idea of development must 
be extended beyond the simple growth or economic indicators to include more general social 
conditions and individual welfare issues.11 In addition to the development restatement, a new 
fair trade agenda must also take centre stage. This should correct the earlier shortcomings of 
the Uruguay Round which more or less penalized poorer countries.12 These have now be 
labeled Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s)13 which replace the MDGs as they tend to 
address wider global challenges on a broader scale. New trade negotiations began in Seattle, 
Washington USA in November 1999, and subsequent meetings held in Doha, Qatar in 
November 2001, Cancun in September 2003 and the proposed final meetings in Hong Kong, 
December 2005. Early difficulties arose surrounding the US farm subsidies which were doubled 
rather than reduced in 2002 under a new Farm Bill. Some progress was attained in Hong Kong 
even though this bore little connection to the original pro-development objectives of the Doha 
Round. A more equal level of benefit distribution is imperative within the larger global financial 
and trading system. A reform of the funding investment programmes run by the leading global 
                                               
8
 G A Walker: Global Development: A New Strategic Order And Priority Programme; (University Lecture notes, 
University of Glasgow , September 2012) 
9
 Available online at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (accessed 01 May 2014).  
10
The restated common principles could be set out in the form of an international treaty or convention whilst the other 
larger objectives relating to governance and operation within this new environment should also be considered within 
earlier preambles and additional protocols. Therefore, as the comprehensive development restatement is produced, a 
larger global order of principles to guide policy and political action must also be in place.  
11
 Reid D: Sustainable Development: An Introductory Guide; Earthscan, London, 2005. 
12
 While Sub-Saharan Africa lost $1.2billion in trade per year, 70% of profits were realised by developed countries 
($350billion). The latter enjoyed tariffs four times higher as capital flows and investments were liberalised rather than 
labour movement which paid very little attention to unskilled labour services. For comment see Stiglitz J: Making 
Globalisation Work; Allen Lane London 2006; pp.77-78. 
13
 Available online at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org (accessed 01 May 2014) 
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financial institutions as well as separate agreement on the final trade rules need to be agreed 
under the Doha Round. Concessions are necessary as the new funding and trading regimes 
should operate as fairly and as inclusively as possible.14 
 
Finally, debt reduction should also be core to the sustainable development agenda. During the 
1990s, third world debt doubled to $1.5 trillion, increasing further to $3 trillion by 1999. In fact 
between 1990 and 1997, developing countries paid out more in servicing debt than loan 
receipts. There is no doubt that developing countries must be assisted in servicing of external 
debt commitments including full cancellation where appropriate.15 
 
(b) Global Governance:  
After establishing a firm sustainable development agenda as outlined above, it becomes 
sensible to revise current arrangements on how the leading international financial institutions 
and development bodies function and operate. The underlying tasks and operational structures 
of each agency should be reconsidered following current global needs and altered financial 
circumstances. Granted, the relevance of the functions of many major development agencies 
remain important, the scope of their operations and assistance can be extended. For example, 
well funded and efficient organizations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) could assist other non-members and share the benefits of its technical 
                                               
14
 The new revised trade agenda should encourage developed countries to allow non-reciprocal open market access 
thereby giving specific attention to the needs of developing countries. For instance, the imposition of non-tariff 
barriers should be strictly controlled while decision making and transparency more wholly should be improved. It is 
possible to construct a fairer and more pro-development trade regime although all relevant obstacles need to be 
eliminated to ensure this works properly. See Stiglitz J: Globalisation and Its Discontents; Penguin Books, London 
2002; Stiglitz J: The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World’s most Prosperous Decade; Penguin Books, 
London 2003. 
15
 For comments on the Third World debt crisis, see Susan George who outlines how just a few select countries 
continue to accrue wealth, while a vast majority sink deeper into the abyss of poverty and insecurity; George S: A 
Fate Worse than Debt: The World Financial Crisis and the Poor; Penguin Books, London 1988.  
     Another connected criticism points out that the original loan terms were tied to strict structural adjustment 
programmes most of which were based on economic deleveraging including privatizations and withdrawal of 
government from many public functions. Ever since, various initiatives have attempted to deal with debt servicing 
problems, most notable is the IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPCI) which was criticized 
for its strict conditions and limited availability. A more substantial deal was agreed at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, 
Scotland in July 2005 which allowed a more substantial debt write-off.  
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expertise.16 Also, the IMF could have an important role to play in the design of a new global 
financial order. All this is to ensure coherence and above all, global financial stability.  
 
(c) Individual and Cultural Protection:  
Some issues arise with regard to the extent to which legal protections should be adopted 
relating to the rights of persons individually and collectively within local communities. Under 
human rights laws, these basic protections already exist however debates have also considered 
the extent to which countries have legally recognized economic rights including the right to 
development. These were earlier considered under the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment 
of New International Economic Order (NIEO) and subsequently in the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). The NIEO particularly recognized the sovereign equality 
of all states and the self-determination of all peoples and the full and permanent sovereignty of 
every state over its natural resources and economic activities. Also, it referred to the preferential 
and non-reciprocal treatment of developing countries, the extension of development assistance 
free of political or military conditions, promotion of the transfer of technology and strengthening 
                                               
16
 Speaking of reform, the main organisation needing substantial revamping is the IMF. Its original objectives need 
reconsideration especially following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. It must start considering its role in the 
21
st
 Century and beyond of managing international financial reserves and crisis especially given the considerable 
pressures on its sources of funding. It was to revisit this issue of its funding sources, including its economic policies 
and its voting structure to reflect more democratic balanced inclusion; after all emerging economies like Brazil, India, 
and South Africa are growing economically from strength to strength. Correspondingly, problems arise with regards to 
the World Bank too. Its role and functions must be revised accordingly including its funding and voting structures, 
representation, and efficiency. The main funding problem centres on the fact that each of the organisations within its 
larger group receives adequate resources consistently. For instance, difficulties arose in 2007 with refunding the 
International Development Association (IDA) as per the earlier promises on debt reduction in Gleneagles in 2005(For 
comments see Guha K; Embattled Wolfowitz seeks more cash; Financial Times 05 March 2007). All major, financial 
institutions, agencies and development banks need to carry out meaningful roles within the broader integrated 
support network. Walker also points out separate problems which arose with regards to Paul Wolfowitz’s leadership 
of the World Bank which may also have far-reaching and long-lasting consequences on the institution’s overall 
performance. This is mainly due to the criticism lodged at him following his support of the Iraq War while he was in 
the US Defence Department among other shortfalls. (Walker ,n.2) 
        These issues of funding spill over into problems with conditionality as a number of countries have expressly 
stated that they will not voluntarily borrow funds from the IMF mainly as a result of the severity of conditionality 
obligations imposed previously on them. They have resorted to other sources of support such as in Asia following the 
May 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative under which the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed with 
China, Japan and South Korea that they would set up a new regional arrangement based on exchange of currency 
reserves after their initial idea to create an Asian Monetary Fund was rejected (despite Japan’s pledge of $100billlion 
initial investment).  
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of mutual economic, trade, financial, and technical cooperation between developed and 
developing countries on a preferential basis (Article 4). 
 
In the same wavelength, CERDS referred to the individual and collective rights of states to 
eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination and neo-colonialism as a prerequisite for 
development and the obligation of developed countries to grant generalized, preferential, non 
reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to developing nations to support their trade and 
development needs (Articles 16 and 18).17 
 
Although both sets of provisions were never formally implemented, they are commonly referred 
to in international discussions and negotiations. A series of further initiatives must be 
spearheaded to ensure the protection of human rights, individual and collective development 
within the larger global architecture.18 
                                               
17
 It is worth noting that the CERDS was adopted by the UN although the US, UK, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg voted against it with 10 further abstentions. They opposed based on the content and structure of the 
rights to be conferred as well as the effective creation of corresponding Treaty obligations under public international 
law.  
18
 In terms of human rights, all countries including the developed and developing must sing along using the same 
hymn book. The USA for example cannot call on other nations to observe human rights if it cannot observe the 
obligations itself especially in relation to the maintenance of detention camps in Guantanamo and the use of torture in 
US-managed camps. The rhetoric may shift from left to right depending on the political leadership but the underlying 
flaw exists. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights originally signed in 1948; The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights came into effect in 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in 1976. A Vienna Declaration and programme of action was adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
1993 to provide uniform interpretation. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was drafted in 1951 and 
came into effect in 1953. This was implemented in the UK under the Human Rights Act 1998.  
     Regarding the right to individual (human or personal) development, it has proven difficult to define and 
embody this right in international treaty language. In 1977, the UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 referred to the 
link between human rights and development and the need to promote the full dignity of the human person and the 
development and well being of society. The preamble to the UN Charter went on to recognise the legal basis for a 
Right of Development and under Articles 55 and 56; also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1979. This 
right was reaffirmed under Resolution 34/46 and in subsequent statements. The right to development was expressed 
as an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realised (Article 1). The Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) was 
subsequently adopted on 4 December 1986 although the US, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Sweden voted against while the UK abstained. Regardless of the adoption of UNDRD, attempting to give legal effect 
to this fundamental right is problematic. Problems remain with defining the right precisely, avoiding the dilution of 
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d.) Climate Control and Non-Exhaustive energy Use:  
Although many do not consider environmental issues as directly relevant to development 
discussions, climatic effects do have an increasingly noticeable impact on the socio-economic 
and cultural conditions within all countries with disproportionate damage suffered mainly in 
developing nations. Global warming and climate degradation have increased concerns with 
scientific agreement identifying atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases including methane as the main cause.19Carbon trading has been a useful 
initiative as the reduction of carbon emissions is a bold step n the right direction. The 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was agreed in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and The 
Kyoto Climate Convention was subsequently agreed in Japan in 1997 although the US did not 
support.20A general commitment was however agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
5.2% by 2012. Specific national targets range from 8% reductions for the EU, 7% for the US, 
and 6% for Japan. Following Russia’s commitment, the protocol came into effect on 16 
February 2005. Many countries consider carbon trading an effective response as this will allow 
                                                                                                                                                       
more core human rights, confusing individual and collective benefit and the extent to which this can properly be 
formulated as a legally binding obligation under international law. It seems more sensible to secure the legal 
protection of this individual right under human rights rather than development law. 
      In relation to collective development, the former President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn promoted 
the need to include individual protections within any development framework by proposing a Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF) which would allow the main international financial institutions to secure relevant 
macro-economic objectives as well as structural, social and human development objectives. The human components 
included education and knowledge (CDF5), health and population matters (CDF6), water and sewage issues (CDF7), 
energy (CDF8) and sustainable development and environmental and cultural issues (CDF10). These proposals, in 
spite of how legitimate they appeared brought about numerous debates. Many commentators criticised the over-
extension of the mandate and resources of the international financial institutions that full achievement of the CDF 
program required. Nonetheless, the idea was retained by the World Bank and taken forward in certain follow-up 
papers (World Bank- Supporting Development Programmes Effectively (November 2004); Enabling Country Capacity 
to Achieve Results (2005); The construction of a more complete development framework remains a necessary goal 
although it needs to be evaluated whether this can be achieved by one or more specific organisations especially the 
World Bank- within their existing modus operandi and resource allowances. 
19
 Naomi Oreskes confirmed in 2004 that from a study of the abstracts of 928 scientific articles, between 1993 and 
2003, 75% attributed the cause to human activity; Oreskes N; The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change; Science 
(December 2004). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change also agreed that human actions were very likely 
the dominant cause (90% probability) in 2007. 
20
 China and India and other developing countries were not required to reduce carbon emissions although they can 
participate in voluntary reduction initiatives. 
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countries and governments to buy and sell relevant concessions. Developing countries on the 
other hand criticize this as being flawed as the markets themselves drive the increased energy 
consumption and noxious emissions. 
 
Also, the need to invest in alternative energy sources including solar energy, wind power, water 
power, bio-fuel, geothermal and nuclear energy have been widely promoted in several quarters 
although problems persist in relation to availability, proximity, reliability, efficiency, sustainability 
and corresponding environmental impact and degradation. In terms of nuclear energy for 
instance, there is no denial of the political and security debates which are uncovered especially 
regarding Iran, Israel and the US.  
 
Another very difficult political challenge will be to include the most rapidly developing nations 
such as China and India in any global solutions. China’s reliance on coal-fired energy 
production and high levels of domestic coal use could possibly undermine all progress made 
elsewhere. A carefully constructed set of compromises and concessions may have to be agreed 
to ensure that all parties including the US, China and India participate and contribute to arriving 
at some satisfactory conclusion. To put this into perspective, China is currently the second 
largest producer of carbon dioxide after the US although it is expected to be first by 2030. This 
issue of development country contribution is absolutely critical to the achievement of any 
international protocols set out to reduce green house gas emissions. 
 
(e) Collective Peace and Security:  
It is known that long term economic and financial stability would be impossible without 
underlying political stability. Hence, more serious than any other is the need for a stable 
international political order. Central to this requirement are energy security and International 
relations and the US Foreign Policy.21 
                                               
21
 The predominant threat that exists with respect to energy security is in relation to disputes that arise over energy 
supply and use. Agreeing on and protecting these energy supply contracts for the major economies remains central 
in this issue.       
     International relations have changed significantly over recent decades especially with the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall, the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union. The US has emerged as the sole superpower in 
a new world order characterised by globalisation, increased trade and cultural linkages. (Dubbed Pax Americana by 
Robert Cooper- The Breaking of Nations; Atlantic Books, London 2003; Cooper investigates the nature of the current 
order and chaos of the 21
st
 century, examining periods of disorder including during the 14
th
 century, the Hundred 
Years War, the Thirty Years war and the First and Second World Wars. Along with the Pax Americana 
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abovementioned, he considers the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica and looks forward to a Pax Globalis under which 
peace and security will become the responsibility of all countries and all continents working together). Whilst this 
American hegemony comes with great responsibility, its foreign policy has been intensely criticised especially with the 
war in Iraq. (For an analysis of America’s perceived imperialism which connects information repression within the US 
ad aggressive empire-building abroad, See Noam Chomsky- Deterring Democracy; Vintage Books, London 1992. 
Also See Chomsky N: 9-11, Seven Storeys Press, New York 2002 which questions the US reaction to the bombings 
on 9/11 and the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
        Little wonder global political instability can be understood in terms of resentment against emergent US 
dominance and hegemony worsened by President G W Bush’s aggressive foreign policy and significant policy 
mistakes. This political enmity stands on underlying religious but more importantly cultural divisions and the main 
clashes have been summarised by Samuel Huntington in terms of the forceful promotion of continuing Western 
Universalism (based on the assumption that Western ideals reflect the only set of true and correct values) as against 
rising Muslim militancy and Asian and Chinese economic development. (See Huntington S P: “The clash of 
civilizations”; Foreign Affairs 1993; he goes on to explain that the only way to secure world peace is through the 
construction of an international order based on respect for cultural diversity and civilization balance. See Huntington 
S P: The Clash of Civilizations –and the Remaking of World Order; Simon and Shuster, London 1996.). In the same 
vein, I also agree wholly with Robert Cooper when he questions the effectiveness of direct social engineering and the 
imposition of Western democratic models in overseas territories. He asserts that conflicts in the Middle East and 
Africa can only be dealt with through local involvement and while America is powerful, it is not large enough to be 
responsible for the whole world. More countries must co-operate in promoting world peace under a new Pax Globalis 
(Cooper182-186). 
     In constructing a new global political order, there must be the acceptance of the US military and technical 
dominance alongside the recognition of other powerful economic sectors emerging in other parts of the world such as 
China and India. A new sense of common collective policy should be promoted based on a series of accepted 
principles reflecting the structure and needs of the new world order. These would typically include but not limited to: 
sovereign respect, multi-polar relations, political tolerance, economic cooperation, technological exchange and the 
absence of military intervention (except in extreme cases where the protection of indigenous peoples not already 
under the protection of  any legitimate local government and only where intervention is agreed at the appropriate 
international level). Instead of agreeing a new treaty framework, these could be incorporated into a new international 
economic agreement. It will be sensible to promote an economic and market based solution. 
       Another issue of utmost importance is the global governance structure which needs to be set-up to police 
this new global political order. It is necessary to begin to construct a new global governance framework. Many 
difficulties arise with regard to existing institutional structure governing international relations especially operating 
under the United Nations system. There is now the increasing need for more general democratic inclusion of people 
in their immediate governance structures as well as for a larger participative role in global relations and share in the 
benefits of globalisation. Some immediate level of democratic inclusion can be provided through reform of the voting 
and membership rules within the main international financial institutions (including principally the World Bank and 
IMF) and other international organisations (including the UN Security Council).  
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Part Two 
 
6.3 Significance for Africa 
African financial markets have come a long way from hardly any involvement in the international 
markets and presence in international discussions decades ago, to a period of growing global 
relevance. However, there still remains a long way to go in terms of translating this growing 
relevance into meaningful impact implemented on the ground within their countries especially 
when faced with domestic and global challenges. This will no doubt require strong political will 
and commitment from the countries’ leaders as well as robust enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Also, the need for African States’ involvement in realizing the new global development agenda 
especially in relation to sustainable development and global governance cannot be 
overemphasized. It remains crucial that they have a seat on the table with regards to 
negotiations and dictating policy reforms in these areas. This has been witnessed for example 
with the inclusion of South Africa (December 2010) into the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) in reference to this grouping of emerging national economies with significant 
influence in global affairs.22 
 
Generally there is the recurrence of similarities in problems faced by different countries in Africa 
such as poverty, xenophobia, infringement of women rights, infringement of gay rights, conflict 
over natural resources, terrorism and so on. Whilst the origins of these problems may be rooted 
in differing historical, religious and cultural backgrounds, addressing them must be central in 
any development agenda for economic advancement in Africa.  
 
In a global context, appropriate adjustments can be made within the global market system to 
ensure that African countries compete fairly. It is possible to design or streamline existing trade, 
monetary and development rules to create conditions of fair involvement and proportionate 
                                               
22
 This acronym was coined by Jim O’Neill a former Goldman Sachs economist in his game-changing paper: Building 
Better Global Economic BRICS; Global Economies Paper No:66  available on http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf (accessed on 03 May 2014). He has also recently coined another 
acronym of block nations suggested to be the next economic giants- MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey); 
from an African perspective, the mentioning of Nigeria is a sign of growing responsibility in global affairs discussions. 
(See BBC article: The MINT countries: Next economic giants? Available online at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060 (accessed 03 May 2014) 
233 
 
 
 
participation for the African continent. Instead of assuming that all countries can always be 
treated identically, the developed nations have a responsibility to deal with emerging or 
transitional economies on a proper sequenced and fair basis. Achieving this feat can be done 
through the construction of appropriately funded and supported, sequenced and sustainable 
development programmes that cover all relevant economic and social systems. Additionally, 
appropriate adjustments having regard to local social, economic and political structures can be 
built-in. These adjustment mechanisms must reflect the capabilities and capacity of all 
participating territories (developed and developing) otherwise ineffective markets will be 
established. More so, suitable corrective devices and components to limit or prevent abuse by 
individuals or groups of individuals are imperative as markets themselves are not abusive, but 
are vulnerable to unruly abusers if the appropriate rules and regulations are absent. African 
sovereignty will guarantee strong enforcement institutions and fitting corrective measures to 
validate this requirement. 
 
There are four key issues which could be extracted from this programme which should be of 
consideration for the African continent in their approach to adopting any global plan going 
forward. These are: economic functionalism, maximizing the role of financial markets, suitable 
arrangements for servicing debt and minimizing overdependence and servitude towards 
developed nations. 
 
(a) Economic and financial functionalism: 
The progress of continental sovereignty in Africa will no doubt demonstrate its familiarity in 
achieving close cooperation in matters of common interest. In this case, economic and financial 
functionalism can serve as a vital tool to increase integration between Member States in Africa 
with those in the rest of the world. This will thereby solidify their influence on the global stage 
because of the renewed trust and confidence other countries will have in the continent. The 
ability to advance common interest initiatives in economic and financial matters within the 
continent will stand in good stead in determining the continent’s ability to find common ground 
with the rest of the world to resolve common residual problems. 
 
(b.) Maximizing the role of financial markets: 
As mentioned earlier, the efficiency of financial markets is an integral condition for economic 
growth. The African continent should pay more attention to the role of financial markets and 
develop them further in order to continuously maximize the benefits derived. These financial 
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markets generate the liquidity to support and advance the wellness of citizens. Although this is 
not usually pursued, there is scope for developing these financial markets in order to generate 
the necessary funds to resolve the more immediate indigenous problems within the states with 
the benefit of the citizens at the fore.  
 
(c.) Suitable arrangements for servicing external debt: 
For many years African countries suffered the misfortune of exploitative external debt 
arrangements which resulted in payments for servicing these debts outweighing the debt 
repayments themselves. This had punishing ramifications for the countries as they suffered 
tremendous strain on their budgets and public finances. Over time, some of these debts (which 
had accrued over decades) were cancelled but after severe consequences. Going forward, 
there is need for Africa to assert itself by negotiating appropriate credit facilities in order to 
sustain any development agenda in the continent. 
 
(d.) Minimizing overdependence and servitude towards developed nations: 
There is the likelihood of unfair relationships developing between African states with the 
developed nations given proximity at the global stage. This could be in the form of unfair trade 
deals or natural resource concession arrangements which prove exploitative for the African 
state. This is more likely with the smaller weaker nations who feel helpless in these 
negotiations. This is a very important determinant in the quality of influence Africa can attain at 
the global stage. 
 
From the above, it is logical to imply that even if Africa achieves greater influence in the global 
market space, it will only remain one voice among many and will still need to work its way 
through the international system. Nevertheless this platform provides a step in the right 
direction. Africa may not be the loudest and most vocal voice, however it will certainly be a voice 
amongst many, even if the chorus is not harmonious because different voices will say different 
things. An influential voice for Africa will be a huge achievement considering all the pitfalls that 
have come its way; the continent would have arrived by design and not delay. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
World leaders have continued to deliberate albeit in an exasperating and repetitive manner on 
the development of strategic programmes to help confront problems dogging the world as a 
whole such as poverty and debt reduction, governance and capacity building, energy use and 
climate control, peace and security. Suitable solutions must not only target problems such as 
bad governance, disease, geographical and infrastructural hindrances singly but rather be 
based on combining targeted initiatives centered on a common structure with suitably tailored 
individual programmes for specific countries. This combination touted as a global development 
agenda and priority programme was expounded in this chapter. 
  
Having considered these, it was Scottish Economist Adam Smith who voiced his criticism of the 
use of force in emerging colonial territories to allow European powers “to commit with impunity 
every sort of injustice” although the discovery of America and the opening of the trade routes to 
Asia were considered by him to be the “two greatest and most important events recorded in the 
history of mankind”. Smith also looked to a time when nations would be able to respect the 
rights of one another with equality of courage and force arising through extensive commerce 
and trade.23 It is hoped that Africa’s relationship with the rest of the world from the Americas, 
Europe, Asia and everywhere in between can be reformed and rebuilt based on a new trade 
and service related economic respect and interdependence.  
                                               
23
 Walker, n.2 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis brings out a new continental sovereignty for Africa as it tosses up issues of law with 
reference to financial integration and how these are being approached in the African continent. 
At its centre, financial integration encompasses legal interactions between national, regional 
and global financial systems. The theory developed suggests that effective financial integration 
and in particular monetary consensus is the result of correctly structured and managed layers of 
cooperation between national, regional and global community arrangements, within robust legal 
frameworks and institutions. In other words, the new African sovereignty involves a community 
with well-defined and managed relations most especially legal interactions between African 
nations and their regional arrangements within a broader continental and global community. 
 
Considering the development of this theory and its application to the African story, the thesis 
concludes that Africa’s financial integration efforts have been largely imperfect as the 
interactions between nation states, and their regional communities have been plagued by weak 
institutions and legal systems implying that these attempts were not thoroughly thought through. 
Unless these imperfections are rectified, this thesis argues that any African integration project 
will be flawed and destabilized. Nevertheless Africa‘s financial integration project is progressing 
through differing stages of integration, from free trade areas to complete monetary unions 
although particular emphasis must be paid in revamping the legal structures and empowering 
enforcement mechanisms of these arrangements as well as staying connected within wider 
regional and global solutions where Africa must remain plugged and form an integral part. 
 
7.2 Thesis Threads- An Overview 
In summary, the thesis has disclosed five important themes. These are: Sovereignty; African 
Sovereignty; Regional Integration; Globalization; and Global Development. These are 
considered as extractions from the various chapters in the thesis. 
 
7.2.1 Sovereignty 
As discussed in Chapter One, the new African solution called continental sovereignty surfaces 
from the changing nature of sovereignty whereby countries surrender parts of their sovereignty 
in order to work together to solve mutual challenges. As such, the chapter defined the nation 
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state and national identity through the lenses of the historical renaissance (pre-1550), 
reformation (1550-1650), enlightenment (1650-1775), and revolution (1775-1850). This 
established the modern state and public international law which set in place the idea of 
independence from which nation states carry out their modes of operation all over the world. In 
essence this prompted countries to desire running themselves as the principles they established 
rejected monarch and church control. 
 
This independence includes the freedom to determine and conduct money matters within the 
confines of the state. Therefore any surrender of this freedom is bound to bring about 
apprehension. In this respect however, the chapter reveals the African problem to be that of 
multiple national sovereignty and overlapping sovereignty whereby African countries are still 
unable to solve unique problems plaguing the continent such as war, poverty and disease. In 
most cases any resolution to these problems is sourced from outside the border which usually 
includes interactions between different legal systems. This lends credence to the truth that as 
the world gets smaller, challenges overlap between nations and mutual solutions are imperative. 
It is no different with the integrating nature of financial markets which have made a single state’s 
solo-competence to resolve monetary and financial matters impracticable. It is based on this 
reality that the argument of African Sovereignty develops because increasingly, national 
constraints have been met by regional and global consensus. This foundation sustains the 
central narrative of this thesis. Thus the chapter considered the aspect of African challenge in 
tandem with the changing nature of sovereignty and how deeper monetary consensus and 
cooperation can provide the solutions for these challenges. 
 
Here, continental sovereignty was introduced as my recommendation for Africa in a bid to 
resolve many of its underlying challenges. This recommendation can be summarized under nine 
headings: supra-nationality and supremacy of regional law; strengthen the regional financial 
integration communities; revamping payment systems; indigenous needs should dictate regional 
standards; national supervisory co-ordination; strong regulatory and supervisory regimes within 
member states; sound regulatory strategy; strong legal and judicial regimes; and economic 
growth enhancement.  
 
The chapter also provided a description of the relational issues of law as the relationship which 
exists between community law, community institutions and those of its member states. It argued 
that the need for a smooth relationship between the platforms for interaction between the RECs 
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and their member states and amongst the member states themselves will assist in minimizing 
jurisdictional conflicts. The allocation of authority to the community and its institutions over those 
of member states is vital to this platform.  Nevertheless, the thesis focused mainly on the legal 
and institutional structures and the interactions between different legal and judicial systems in 
reference to regional arrangements vis-a-vis domestic systems.  
 
7.2.2 African Sovereignty or Continental Sovereignty 
Chapter Two sought to provide a new model of cooperative integration for Africa based on 
mutual alliance and reliance drawing from regional perspectives. It brought out the complication 
of overlapping and duplicated sovereignty in Africa labeled the ‘spaghetti bowl’ as the starting 
point of the African problem by outlining the different RECs in Africa and expanding on the eight 
specific RECs which have been recognized by the AU. These are: ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, 
COMESA, ECCAS, AMU, CEN-SAD, and IGAD. It provided a description of the RECS and 
specified the institutional structure and governing features of these RECs. This revealed that the 
RECs are in differing grades of development and are progressing through the different stages of 
integration at varying speeds. Any solution for Africa will require the RECs to be divided into 
groups depending on the similarity in development. This will help to untangle the spaghetti bowl 
and simplify the overall continent-wide-integration project. 
 
Following on from the description of this complexity, this chapter proposed effective financial 
integration by virtue of correctly structured and managed legal frameworks incorporating the 
fluid relationships between states, communities, legal systems and institutions. The emphasis 
was based on further and deeper integration (constraints on national sovereignty) to resolve 
problems faced by investors who must negotiate existing RECs to operate. In this regard, the 
chapter sought to showcase examples of successes to indicate the manner in which the 
complexity is being negotiated and managed in some RECs and Member States. This success 
cases illustrate the re-conceptualization of sovereignty within Africa. To further enhance the 
redefinition of sovereignty which can inspire a project towards continental sovereignty, 
examples are drawn from cases such as the establishment of the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite FTA whose primary objective is to strengthen and deepen economic integration of the 
Southern and Eastern Africa region. 
 
Furthermore, there is acceleration in Africa’s growth trends and the continent is gaining greater 
access to international capital as total foreign capital flows are on the rise. The chapter 
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highlights the McKinsey report which illustrates how the rate of return on foreign investment in 
Africa is higher than in any other developing region. In this connection, the development of the 
capital markets is discussed notably with the increase in stock exchanges in the Africa over the 
last two decades. Also, some changes in the banking sector are mentioned and the Ecobank 
example is used to demonstrate how a banking institution adopted a business model based on 
economic development and financial integration to become a colossal Pan-African Banking and 
Financial Institution. 
 
The discussion was focused entirely on the banking and finance sector with emphasis on 
monetary consensus. The chapter argued that the best way forward for Africa’s integration 
agenda and as seen with the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA example is a combination of 
robust regional communities with strong laws, enforcement mechanisms and institutions while 
retaining some parts of national sovereignty in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and 
policies domestically. It is these RECs that form the building blocks for the new continental 
sovereignty. 
 
With regards to strengthening the legal system, the chapter went on to recommended that the 
African regional integration agenda will benefit greatly from more efficient drafting of treaties and 
secondly the bolstering of regional enforcement mechanisms. All these must be matched with 
decisive action and implementation. In essence, it was revealed that many of the REC Treaties 
are ambiguous and have been poorly drafted resulting in the sluggish progress of the integration 
agenda.  
 
Nevertheless, the chapter asserts that the growing story in Africa is that of investment and 
economic growth as opposed to aid and recession, despite the fact that lingering political, 
social, economical, cultural and religious issues still influence this changing story. Generally, it is 
accepted that political will is essential in encouraging the integration agenda and sustaining 
investment and economic growth.  
 
7.2.3 Regional Integration 
Developing the above successes further, Chapter Three showcases a regional advantage with 
the example of the EU given that it is the most sophisticated regional arrangement in the world. 
It strives to determine whether this EU model is appropriate for replication within the African 
continent. The model will examine the extent to which countries are willing to surrender 
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sovereignty and remain integrated to enjoy mutual benefits and also to manage mutual 
problems.  
 
Tracing the trajectory through the development of Treaty Law, the uniqueness of the EU model 
can be simplified as follows: the prevalence of supremacy of European Law, under Costa v 
Enel; the creation of legal rights through the principle of direct effect established in van Gen 
Loos; the concept of mutual recognition; state liability and the prominence of a new legal order. 
Putting these together, the banking and financial services sector in the EU provides a glaring 
example of the successful workings of regional integration. Here there is a robust single market 
programme in place which brings to the fore the importance of the concept of mutual recognition 
supplemented by the doctrines of minimum harmonization and home country control. These 
help a great deal in resolving the regional access and domestic control conflict emanating from 
global access and local control conflict seen above with globalization. Again this conflict arises 
as a result of the need to surrender parts of sovereignty in these matters. Even though this 
single market programme metamorphosed into legal obligations through Treaty Laws, its 
completion is still far away. The chapter suggests that the concept of mutual recognition could 
be replaced by mutual assistance and mutual reliance which includes the development of 
common operational and administrative systems to ensure closer cooperation and coordination 
of all relevant activities especially with reference to monetary issues.  
 
Nevertheless, the chapter concedes that the benefits of regional integration are still dented by 
regional risks and exposures as witnessed in the EMU with the sovereign debt crisis and the 
region’s handling of the GFC. Hence the over-all regional advantages discussed are at best only 
partial from an EU-wide perspective. 
 
From a legal perspective, the interrelationships between markets were tested deeply as 
contagion spread following the financial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis with Greece bearing 
the greatest brunt and needing an imminent arrangement of a bailout package. Although the 
bailout is supported in this chapter, the deliberations over the legality of this bailout posed 
serious concerns for lawyers. This centered on navigating the interpretations of the two 
contradictory articles in the TFEU: while Article 122 allows for the provision of financial 
assistance by member states to each other in case of an emergency beyond that country‘s 
control, Article 125 explicitly prohibits member states from taking on the financial 'commitments' 
of another national government. 
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All in all, policymakers were forced to rethink earlier strategies which established the motive for 
the natural integration between the European countries. This however leaves the criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty as the strongest point of reference to fall back on as the model for other 
regional arrangements such as those attempted in Africa to emulate especially in terms of 
tackling the regional risks posed as a result of enlargement. This in no way dents the overall 
success of the EU integration agenda which has provided the platform for other communities to 
replicate. 
 
Having said this, in no other continent has the European example been more imitated than in 
the African continent. It is on this basis that the narrative central to this thesis, that of the African 
challenge was considered further in this chapter.  Here, a succinct compilation of the legal and 
institutional differences between the experience of the RECs in Africa and the regional 
integration project in Europe. There is no doubt that there is an over-abundance of lessons 
Africa can learn from the European example so far.  
 
Drawing from the Greece case study, there are five key issues which were identified to assess 
regional risks and exposures. These issues were highlighted in order to provide informative 
insights to African policy makers as they consider surrendering more sovereignty to achieve 
deeper and further integration within the African continent. These are: costs, masked fiscal 
problems, policy dilemma, political posturing; and the political and cultural vulnerability of 
integration. These issues can inhibit the fluidity of economic coordination within the RECs.  
 
Furthermore, concerning the African efforts for continental sovereignty, the chapter 
recommends an organic development of existing regulatory and supervisory institutions in Africa 
in the short and medium term instead of unrealistically striving to achieve an EU-type financial 
regulatory framework. It is my contention that the EU model is too advanced for the African 
system in the short and medium term. The chapter therefore advocates for existing institutions 
to consistently demonstrate their ability over time to be independent and free from political 
manipulations. It is only on the back of stronger and independent existing regulatory and 
supervisory institutions in the continent can there be any further attempts made to co-opt the 
more advanced EU institutions such as the ECJ, ECB and ESFS. 
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7.2.4 Globalization 
The notion of surrendering sovereignty to acquire closer cooperation between states does not 
rest only in a regional framework. Chapter Four confirms that for many decades, efforts have 
been made towards global integration and global financial integration in particular. States have 
ceded national sovereignty in the areas of economic, fiscal and monetary policies for the sake of 
global financial market efficiency. This chapter advocates the need for Africa to also to increase 
and consolidate its position on the global stage by ceding more sovereignty to global institutions 
for integration purposes. These constraints on national sovereignty can prove advantageous in 
the medium and long term as there are benefits to be gained in order to meet Africa’s recurring 
challenges. 
 
Nonetheless, the chapter accepts that being part of the global financial design exposes the 
challenges of modern sovereignty and modern monetary sovereignty which could have 
devastating consequences if unprepared.  
 
The chapter discusses the events that followed the Great Depression and the Second World 
War, and underlined the efforts which were made to revamp the global financial framework. 
Though partial success was recorded, the chapter demonstrates how countries came together 
to resolve mutual challenges. In this case infrastructural, economic and financial recovery was 
vital to the establishment of robust laws and institutions to enable the smooth operation of global 
financial markets. Relinquishing parts of national sovereignty in these matters was the basis for 
constructing the new global monetary management system that emerged. 
 
This new system of global monetary management hatched in Bretton Woods, USA was the 
flagship arrangement whereby global leaders came together to reform procedures and 
institutions notably in monetary matters in order to adjust changing financial market dynamics. 
The chapter underscores the benefits which came with this system for global financial markets. 
Some of these were: the nature of international savings and investment was modified, 
deregulation was extensive, technological innovation was commonplace, better domestic and 
international competition ensued, and there was an overall increase in the demand for financial 
modernization.  
 
The chapter points out that the various models of regional integration such as the EU drew 
inspiration from the Bretton Woods system because it initiated a cooperative solution to attain 
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higher objectives for economic and financial programmes. On another hand, the chapter 
reminds that the notion of sovereignty withers when economic and financial challenges co-
mingle between different nations and different communities which have different motives which 
stem from differing political, socio-economic, cultural factors inter alia. Evidently, as seen with 
the Bretton Woods system, the lines of jurisdictional divide become blurred in these sorts of 
arrangements and the moment a cooperative agenda of global advantages is exploited in the 
wrong way, things spiral out of control and lead to eventual crisis.  
 
It is in this light that the chapter deduces the significance of this global design for the African 
continent especially considering the need for broader participation at the global stage to assist 
in building solutions for its indigenous problems on the ground. The chapter offers thoughts for 
the African policymakers to determine the continent’s readiness and predisposition for a bigger 
role in global financial markets. It stresses however that the need for successful African 
sovereignty as a prerequisite to maximize the global advantage and position the continent in a 
more influential role within the global financial market architecture. There are six main points 
which were identified to provide a better understanding of the exposure which could result from 
ill-judged global integration. They are: differing economic and financial environment, global 
confidence; political affiliations; interdependency between states; uniform financial market rules; 
vulnerability to financial crisis.  
 
To this end, Chapter Five exploits the elements of global risk and exposure within the context of 
the GFC which started in 2007. The five main causes of the crisis were underlined to include: 
accumulation of massive credit and debt; complex products and limited transparency; erroneous 
asset valuation and; co-mingling of risks; and lackluster market support.  
 
The devastating consequences of these causes were exposed in combination with other 
important triggers such as the inconsistent closure of Lehman brothers; cyclic systemic 
contagion in all financial markets; and the loss of investment confidence. The global responses 
which were examined can be summarized as increased financial regulation and increased 
market control.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter shows that the global responses which followed the GFC were 
considered as another glaring example of collective cooperative solutions provided by global 
leaders in response to a crisis which affected the entire global financial market. An attempt is 
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made to contrast the manner of this response with that of the Bretton Woods era. The latter is 
seen to have focused more on crisis prevention and crisis resolution whilst the response 
following the GFC focused on growth and stability particularly because the elements of systemic 
risk and contagion continued to create panic during the crisis. In a nutshell, the responses post-
GFC articulated more regulation of financial markets as opposed to deregulation during the 
Bretton Woods system.  
 
From an African viewpoint, the chapter also considered the impact the GFC had on the African 
continent It pointed out that although Africa did not suffer directly from contagion and systemic 
risk in the banking system as was the case in the developed markets, African economies 
suffered rather through the global recession and reduced economic activity because of a 
shortage of export revenues, foreign and trade finance. The adverse effects on its development 
goals were also underscored as countries struggled to mobilize funds to achieve development 
goals such as poverty reduction and investment. 
 
To this end, the chapter proposed African sovereignty as an appropriate solution to offer better 
protection to the African financial system and enable it to fit comfortably within the global 
financial system. This will be done by strengthening existing regulatory and supervisory 
institutions especially the Central Banks. The chapter held however that any solution should 
factor in development issues in order to mitigate the impact on the welfare of citizens. 
 
All the same, it is held that the challenges of risk and exposure which can arise following global 
integration should not undermine its overall benefits of collective harmonization of laws and 
institutions notably in banking and financial matters. It is established that despite the constraints 
on national sovereignty, global integration brings about mutual advantages and limitations. It is 
in this connection that the chapter argues for a framework of responses involving the inclusion 
of important countries like China, India, and Brazil and other emerging African countries like 
South Africa and Nigeria in working together to shape an international financial architecture to 
correspond with the nature of integrated challenges faced this day. These countries all have 
important roles in global financial markets and as these markets continue to integrate deeper 
over time, it is sensible to have all hands on deck in order to develop sustainable solutions for 
mutual global challenges. 
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This is the sort of response framework which requires the African continent to have a strong 
presence in international discussion fora in order to exert more influence on these global 
economic and finance matters. It is unlikely that African representation from emerging nations 
such as South Africa and Nigeria at the global stage will be sufficient and have a significant 
impact for the continent as a whole. These countries are more likely than not to seek solutions 
beneficial for their own economies. Therefore, the adoption of continental sovereignty will 
provide the platform from which the entire African continent can speak through one voice and 
ensure the attainment of solutions which are mutually beneficial for the continent as a whole. 
 
7.2.5 Global Development 
In light of globalization above, Chapter Six goes further to discuss the need for African 
sovereignty to be superimposed on a larger platform of global programme solutions in order to 
circumvent the continent’s residual difficulties. It highlights the necessity to incorporate 
development initiatives within broader global economic objectives to promote growth benefits 
within the continent. As stated however, this requires strong political will. The chapter asserts 
that African States’ involvement must be fundamental in achieving the new global development 
agenda especially in relation to sustainable development and global governance. As typified by 
the BRICS, it is of utmost importance that African countries have a say in negotiating and 
dictating global policy reforms most especially in the banking and finance sector.  
 
In the same light, the need for apposite adjustments to be structured within the global market 
system to guarantee fair competition between countries is also mentioned. This includes 
streamlining existing trade, monetary and development policies to create conducive conditions 
of involvement and proportionate participation. The chapter outlines the construction of an 
adequately funded and managed sustainable development programme which encompasses all 
the necessary socio-economic structures (which reflect the potential and capacity of all 
participating nations) as the basis for this favourable global market environment. This 
programme can be outlined as follows: a.) sustainable development; b.) global governance; c.) 
individual and cultural protection; d.) climate control; e.) collective peace and security.  
 
There is the perception however that this programme is bedeviled with policies that encourage 
some sort of economic slavery or servitude; with the development of a theory of dependence by 
weaker nations on the stronger and more influential developed nations. Besides, 
implementation has been very sluggish and exasperating despite the fact that there have been 
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too many conferences, communiqués, and statements by global policymakers and leaders with 
very limited action. The arguments in the chapter therefore urge the developed nations to 
continue to bear the responsibility of ensuring the fair and sequenced participation of emerging 
economies in the global playing-field. Above all, a suitable legal structure with strong global 
rules and regulations including effective corrective measures is necessary to deter and 
discourage unruly abuse by individuals or financial institutions. As evidenced with the GFC 
markets themselves remain vulnerable. The need for Africa to maintain one voice has never 
been more pivotal for continental sovereignty because a cooperative and coherent endeavour to 
resolve mutual challenges is better achieved unanimously through the international system. 
 
7.3 Summing Up and Thesis Close 
There is little doubt that the prevalence of legal issues abound in financial integration. These 
issues are rampant mainly when dealing with the interactions between national, regional and 
global laws and institutions in relation to how and where they overlap. Generally however, the 
magnitude of attention given to these legal issues normally depends on the grade or stage of 
integration attained. Although financial integration has been acknowledged to come with many 
advantages as many nation states and economic arrangements around the world enjoy a 
plethora of benefits, there are still risks and disadvantages which dent its effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, vibrant financial integration models center on those with strong legal principles 
and enforcement mechanisms to confront the resulting risks and exposures as those brought 
about by the thumping GFC at the global level and the Greek sovereign debt crisis at the 
regional level. From this, it is evident that global markets are vulnerable to huge global crisis 
and similarly regional markets are susceptible to regional crisis. 
 
From a regional perspective, the regional communities in Africa have made efforts to 
incorporate these legal principles and mechanisms into their agendas by attempting to copy the 
EU example. Nevertheless, the application and implementation is lackadaisical. With regards to 
those that are being adopted and implemented, the full beneficial impact on the financial 
integration agenda in the continent remains to be seen. In fact, the question still lingers as to 
whether this one-stop-shop example is conducive for Africa and whether the continent has the 
social, cultural and political readiness for the effective adoption of these legal principles and 
mechanisms. My answer to this is the need for the existing community laws and institutions in 
Africa to be developed organically. They must be strengthened and empowered to provide the 
requisite competence. When progress of this organic development and evidence of significant 
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success rates is evident, then the necessary confidence will be achieved to make further 
attempts at copying the European example. There have been instances which record some 
success and these need to be built upon. This provides the fabric for a redefined notion of 
sovereignty for the African continent- African sovereignty. 
 
The potential to foster financial integration and the overall benefits that come with it based on 
this new African sovereignty has been apparent in regional communities such as COMESA, 
SADC and the EAC. It is recognized that the future success of Africa’s Integration project 
depends on how other regional arrangements within the continent apply these legal principles 
and mechanisms in proportion to their stage of integration by drawing inspiration from other 
successful application examples within Africa. 
 
Going forward, it is worth recollecting that this thesis began by appreciating the priorities of a 
nation state through the doctrine of sovereignty, and how apprehensive countries become when 
required to surrender some of this sovereignty for the mutual resolution of challenges faced. 
Defining the changing nature of sovereignty which involves the ever growing need to relinquish 
some parts of national sovereignty has exposed a number of legal issues that currently 
surround global and regional financial integration processes in general and monetary 
corporation in particular. Nevertheless this thesis is unable to exhaustively address all pertinent 
issues simultaneously. In my opinion, the most important and immediate issues worth 
prioritizing for the African continent to sustain continental sovereignty are firstly, validating the 
relationship between the various regional communities; secondly, strengthening the community 
laws and institutions and empowering national enforcement structures; thirdly, overcome the 
notorious duplicity of memberships of the communities; and finally and most importantly, laying 
a robust legal basis for the African Integration Agenda to evolve.  
 
Furthermore, another priority would be for member states to endorse laws to implement 
respective regional treaties preceded by thorough research on any likely conflicts between 
existing regional and domestic laws. Steadfast political will and compromises must subsist in 
order to set aside differences. This is to ensure the efficient implementation of the regional 
treaties and laws at the national level. In this regard, the training of legal practitioners such as 
judges, lawyers, and other auxiliaries of the law like law enforcement officials must be prioritized 
as well. Broadly, this will require the inclusion of regional law into local education curricula and 
other educational campaigns geared towards creating awareness about the overall African 
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Integration project. As the regional arrangements continue to move up the various degrees of 
integration, the legal issues especially those involving monetary matters will become more 
significant. Therefore, it only makes sense for all stakeholders in the communities, including the 
member state governments and policy makers, businesses and scholars to put all hands on 
deck and pay more attention to this viable solution for Africa. 
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